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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

-v-

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, *et al.*,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In this interdistrict school desegregation case, the District Court found that Missouri's intentionally discriminatory school and housing policies before 1954 segregated black children into the Kansas City School District and white children into the 11 surrounding school districts; that the State's and the Kansas City District's unconstitutional actions after 1954 preserved and expanded interdistrict segregation; that the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and its predecessors complied in the State's housing violations before 1954 and funded its housing violations thereafter; and that all these actions continue to segregate black and white children into separate Kansas City school districts today.

The District Court and the evenly

divided en banc court below nonetheless denied interdistrict school desegregation relief. They ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit intentional racial segregation among school districts caused by governmental actors other than the school districts themselves. Under these circumstances, this petition presents the following questions:

1. Whether, having found that Missouri intentionally segregated black children into one of the school districts in the City of Kansas City and white children into the surrounding districts, the courts below erroneously denied interdistrict relief on the ground that the State and not the surrounding school districts caused that segregation?

2. Whether, having found that Missouri and the other defendants intentionally segregated black and white

children into separate school districts before 1954 and took no steps thereafter to remedy that interdistrict segregation, the courts below erred by denying interdistrict relief without considering the continuing areawide effects of the defendants' post-1954 segregative conduct?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

The parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals were as follows:

Appellants/cross-appellees (now petitioners):

Kalima Jenkins, by her next friend, Kamau Agyei

Carolyn Dawson, by her next friend, Richard Dawson

Tufanza A. Byrd, by her next friend, Teresa Byrd

Derek A. Dydell, by his next friend, Maurice Dydell

Terrance Cason, by his next friend, Antoria Cason

Jonathan Wiggins, by his next friend, Rosemary Jacobs Love

Kirk Allan Ward, by his next friend, Mary Ward

Robert M. Hall, by his next friend, Denise Hall

Dwayne A. Turrentine, by his next friend, Sheila Turrentine

Gregory A. Pugh, by his next friend, Barbara Pugh

Cynthia Winters, by her next friend, David Winters, on behalf of themselves and the class of black and white present and future students in the Kansas City, Missouri School District.

Appellant/cross-appellees (now petitioners) the Kansas City, Missouri School District and Dr. Claude Perkins, then-Superintendent.

Appellant/cross-appellee Kansas City, Missouri Federation of Teachers, Local 691

Appellees/cross-appellants:

The State of Missouri

Honorable John Ashcroft, Governor of the State of Missouri

Arthur L. Mallory, Commissioner of Education of the State of Missouri

Wendell Bailey, Treasurer of the State of Missouri

The Missouri State Board of Education:

Roseann Bentley
Dan Blackwell
Terry A. Bond, President
Delmar A. Cobble
Grover Gamm
Jimmy Robertson
Robert L. Welling
Donald E. West

Appellees:

Park Hill School District R-5 and Dr. Merlin A. Ludwig, Superintendent

North Kansas City, Missouri School District and Dr. Raymond Waier, Superintendent

School District of the City of Independence and Dr. Robert Henley, Superintendent

Raytown, Missouri Consolidated School District C-2 and Dr. Robert Atkin, Superintendent

Center School District and Donald Richmond, Superintendent

Hickman Mills Consolidated School District C-1 and Blaine E. Steck, Superintendent

Grandview Consolidated School District C-4 and Dr. Tony L. Stansberry, Superintendent

Fort Osage School District R-1 and Victor Gragg, Superintendent

Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R-7 and Dr. Bernard C. Campbell, Superintendent

Blue Springs Reorganized School District R-4 and Dr. Gale T. Bartow, Superintendent

Liberty School District and Dr. Ronald L. Anderson, Superintendent

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Secretary Samuel Pierce

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No. 86-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, et al.,

Petitioners,

-v-

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners, KALIMA JENKINS, et al., respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming by an equally divided en banc vote the denial of interdistrict school desegregation relief.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, reported at 807 F.2d 657, is set out in the Appendix, 2a. The unpublished June 5, 1984 order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri is at 274a. The September 17, 1984 decision of the District Court, reported at 593 F. Supp. 1485, is at 518a.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The Court of Appeals entered judgment on December 5, 1986, and denied rehearing on February 5, 1987.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides in relevant part:

> [N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides in relevant part:

> [N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Preliminary Statement.

This is an interdistrict school desegregation case. Petitioners, Kalima Jenkins et al., are the plaintiff class of public school children in the Kansas City, Missouri School District ("the Kansas City District," or "KCMSD").

The Kansas City District is one of 13 school districts located wholly or partly within the City of Kansas City. Encompas-

sing only a fourth of the City's territory but all of its predominantly black neighborhoods, the Kansas City District is 68 percent black. Its professional staff is 53 percent black. Exhibits (X) 9, 36, 53G, 3757. Surrounding the Kansas City District on three sides and encompassing most of the remaining three-fourths of the City of Kansas City are the respondent school districts. Those 11 districts have a combined student population less than five percent black and a professional staff less than one percent black. Together, the Kansas City District and the 11 surrounding districts have a student body less than 25 percent black.[1]

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[1]X 9, 36, 53G, 721G. Also referred to here as the "surrounding school districts" and the "SSDs," the 11 respondent districts are the Blue Springs, Center, Fort Osage, Grandview, Hickman

City of Kansas City and Twelve Area School Districts

Missouri School District boundaries in blue
City of Kansas City, Missouri in yellow
Location of census tracts where percentage of black residents exceeds 60% in brown.



Rendered from Plaintiffs' Exhibits 9 and 36

The District Court found that, for a century before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the State of Missouri (i) discriminatorily confined its de jure segregated schools for blacks to the Kansas City District while locating schools for whites throughout the Kansas City area, and (ii) enforced racially restrictive covenants in the parts of the City now served by the surrounding districts but not in the older neighborhoods served by the Kansas City District. The District Court determined that these and other intentionally discriminatory acts influenced the patterns of residential development of the metropoli-

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Mills, Independence, Lee's Summit, Liberty, North Kansas City, Park Hill, and Raytown School Districts. The State of Missouri and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are also respondents. The Kansas City District is a petitioner.

tan area, had an important impact on the composition of inner city neighborhoods, and "continue[] to have a significant effect in the Kansas City area" today. September 1984 Decision, 530a-37a, 568a-69a, 601a-02a.

The District Court also found that the Missouri Legislature in 1957, the same year it repealed its mandatory school segregation laws, adopted legislation exempting Kansas City from the city/district coterminousness rule applied to other Missouri cities. But for this legislation, the 74 percent minority District of Kansas City instead would today have the same boundaries as the 73 percent white City of Kansas City and would encompass all or parts of nine of the predominantly white surrounding school districts.[2]

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[2] June 1984 Order, 334a-39a (discussing Act of July 6, 1957, 1957 Mo. Laws 454; Act of July 6, 1965, 1965 Mo. Laws 275, 276-77 (1965),

The District Court denied interdistrict relief and dismissed the surrounding school districts. It ruled that Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), prohibited those districts' inclusion in a remedy for Missouri's intentional segregation of white children into those districts and black children into the Kansas City District because the State and not the surrounding districts caused the segregation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed by an evenly divided vote: Four judges (Judge Gibson, joined by Judges

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codified, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 162.563, 162.571). But for this legislation, the Kansas City District automatically would have quadrupled in size and become coterminous with the City of Kansas City in 1970. All the respondent school districts except Blue Springs and Fort Osage lie wholly or partly within the City of Kansas City. Three of the City's 13 school districts are not part of this suit. See map, supra.

Ross, Fagg, and Wollman) voted to affirm. Based on their reading of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit precedents, those judges interpreted Milliken v. Bradley to immunize governmentally sponsored racial discrimination from constitutional cure so long as the resulting segregation affects school districts not themselves responsible for causing it. P. 30, infra. Four judges (Chief Judge Lay, joined by Judges Heaney and McMillian, and Judge Arnold) voted to reverse. Applying the rule of the Third and Seventh Circuits, those judges concluded that, if the State of Missouri intentionally segregated black children out of the surrounding districts and into the Kansas City District, then Brown and Milliken obligate the State to cure that segregation whether or not the surrounding districts helped create it.

Pp. 31-33, infra.

The inconclusive en banc judgment below leaves the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class in legal limbo and 36,000 plaintiff children in racially segregated schools. It also leaves the six judicial circuits that have addressed the question in conflict and metropolitan areas throughout the Nation in confusion as to the dispositive legal standards under Milliken. This petition presents issues of sufficient public importance to warrant the Court's plenary consideration.

II. The District Court's Interdistrict Violation and Effect Findings

Trial of this case began in October 1983. In the middle of trial, the Court granted the surrounding school districts' motions to be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 41(b) and denied interdistrict relief. After trial, the District Court dismissed HUD but ruled that the State of Missouri and the Kansas City District were guilty of intentional racial segregation with effects in both the Kansas City District and the school districts surrounding it. The Court nonetheless denied interdistrict relief.

Consistent with its interpretation of Milliken v. Bradley, the District Court separated its interdistrict violation/effects findings into two sets. The first set, announced during trial in the District Court's unpublished June 1984 Order, considers the intentional violations of only the 11 respondent school districts and the effects of those violations on only the Kansas City District. 274a. The second set of findings,

announced after trial in the District Court's published September 1984 Decision, considers the constitutional violations committed by the State of Missouri, the Kansas City District, and HUD and the effects of those violations on both the Kansas City District and the surrounding districts. 518a.

Explaining why it dismissed the surrounding school districts before reaching a conclusion about the effects of the violations committed by Missouri and the other defendants, the District Court stated that "[t]he linchpin of an interdistrict case, as declared by the Supreme Court, is whether there has been a racially discriminatory act by each district that substantially caused segregation in another district." June 1984 Order, 285a (citing Milliken, supra). The District Court accordingly held as a

matter of law that "[w]hether plaintiffs' evidence [is] sufficient to sustain a finding of liability against other actors . . . is irrelevant to the instant motions to dismiss filed by each SSD defendant." The absence of complicity by the surrounding districts in "the actions of those responsible for shaping [segregated] patterns," the District Court concluded, "forbids a finding of liability against the SSDs to remedy any racial imbalance [within those districts] that may be attributed to [the other] actors."[3]

A. The State's Violations and Their Effects

De Jure School Segregation. Below, "[t]he State admitted and the [District] Court judicially noticed that Missouri

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[3]June 1984 Order, 508a-09a. Accord, e.g., Trial Transcript (T) 24,561-62 (court's statement the last day of trial explaining its previous dismissal of the surrounding districts: "But I

mandated segregated schools for black and white children before 1954." 530a. (Citations in this section are to the District Court's September 1984 Decision, unless noted.)

During the 90 years when Missouri law mandated school segregation, the State's black population was widely dispersed throughout tens of thousands of one-room school districts. X 184, 208-12, 2322. Instead of heeding those districts' periodic requests to be allowed to educate their black and white children together in the limited facilities available, Missouri enacted a series of statutes requiring districts with small numbers of black

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was bound by law, as I read it at the time, that you cannot require an entity to be part of the [interdistrict] remedy unless you found a constitutional violation on the part of that entity").

children to transfer them at State expense to neighboring districts that had collected enough blacks to justify constructing a separate school. KCMSD Petition, 3-7 & nn. 8-18 (collecting statutes and record citations). The District Court found that "[e]ach school district in Missouri participated in this dual school system before it was declared unconstitutional in Brown I. Districts with an insufficient number of blacks to maintain the state-required separate school made interdistrict arrangements to educate those children." 531a-32a.

In 1900, 22 percent of the 7,000 black public school students in the Kansas City area lived outside the Kansas City District and within 55 predecessors of 10 of the 11 "Reorganized" or "Consolidated" respondent districts. Six of those

districts (Blue Springs, Center, Fort Osage, Grandview, Hickman Mills, and Raytown) never operated schools of any sort for black children prior to Brown; a seventh (Lee's Summit) closed its only black school in 1910; an eighth and ninth (North Kansas City and Park Hill) never operated high schools for black children; and all 11 lacked a high school for black children at the time of Brown. By contrast, the State required the Kansas City District to operate a full complement of segregated schools for black children throughout the pre-Brown period, and those schools received black children -- sometimes by the busload -- from at least seven respondent school districts. June 1984 Order, 372a-476a; Opn. of Lay, C.J., 211a-14a & n.9; X 37-39, 49, 49B, 53E, 1830-40.

The District Court attributed two effects to the state-mandated and state-

financed "interdistrict system of locating dual schools." Opn. of Gibson, J., 49a. First, the District Court found that black families "[u]ndeniably" moved from the respondent districts "to districts, including the KCMSD, that provided black schools."[4]

More importantly, the District Court found that the interdistrict dual school system diverted into the Kansas City District and away from the surrounding school districts "the great[] influx of blacks" migrating to the Kansas City area from southern and border states during the two World Wars. 533a. Noting the importance of "[e]conomic and job opportunities . . . in black migration," the court found that "[o]ften jobs would pull migrants to

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[4]531a-32a. See Opn. of Lay, C.J., 247a-50a & n.18. In 1900, the SSDs had 22% of the area's 7,000 black children; in 1954, they had 2.5%. In 1900, the proportion of black students in the

the city and then availability of schools would influence, more specifically, what housing choices would be made within the city."[5]

The District Court concluded that "Missouri's legacy" of dual schools "'influence[d] the patterns of residential development of [the] metropolitan area and ha[d] important impact on composition of inner city neighborhoods,'" and "that segregated schools, a constitutional violation, has led to white flight from the KCMSD to [the SSDs] . . . and that it has caused a system-wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of KCMSD."

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surrounding districts was nearly identical to that in the KCMSD (7% vs. 9%); by 1954, the SSDs' proportion of blacks had dropped to 1%, while KCMSD's had doubled. While losing 75% of their black student population between 1900 and 1954, the SSDs' white student population grew by nearly 300%. X 53E.

[5]534a. The District Court found that: "[T]here is an inextricable connection between schools and housing. 'People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to

536a-37a (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971)); August 25, 1986 Order, at 1-2. See September 1984 Decision, 555a.

De Jure Housing Discrimination. The District Court listed a number of other actions the State undertook before Brown "which were discriminatory against blacks," had "the effect of placing the State's imprimatur on racial discrimination," and "ha[d] and continue[] to have a

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the needs of the people.'" 537a (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971)). "Before 1954, access to schools was one of many reasons [in-migrating] blacks chose to move into the KCMSD" rather than the surrounding districts. 533a. "Regardless of their motivation for coming, once here, blacks settled in the inner city or, the 'principle black contiguous areas'" where the region's only "segregated facilites with segregated staffs" were located. 535a, 542a. "This immigration coupled with a high birth rate resulted in the Kansas City black population doubling from 41,574 in 1940 to 83,740 in 1960." 533a.

significant effect on the dual housing market in the Kansas City area." Id., 601a-02a (emphasis added). The Court found, for example, that: 1. Until 1953, the State's "mass enforcement" of racially restrictive covenants prevented blacks from moving into neighborhoods in all but one of the 11 surrounding districts and caused the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) until 1959 to withhold financing from housing developments in those districts with "incompatible" "racial" and "social" groups. 2. Between 1953 and 1973, the State's Land Clearance for Redevelopment Agency, with HUD funding, "practiced discrimination in relocating [13,000 households] displaced by urban renewal, steering blacks to southeastern Kansas City [served by the Kansas City District] and relocating whites throughout

the [13 school districts in the] city." 3. The State's Housing Authority of Kansas City, also with HUD funding, "explicitly segregated its housing units until 1958, . . . may have continued segregative practices until 1964," and was found by HUD in 1976 to have violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the preceding eight years by not placing white families in the projects it previously had reserved "for Negro families" and black families in the projects it previously had reserved "for whites."[6]

The Court determined that the State-sponsored "dual housing market, which still exists to a large degree today, impacted blacks in the KCMSD and consequently caused the public schools to swell in black enrollment." 536a-37a.

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[6]536a (citing T 12,974-75), 567-72a, 577a; Opn. of Arnold, J., 158a-65a; X 22, 3531. See X 27F (20,000 units of public and subsidized housing in Kansas City area). Finding that the State's

"The intensity of segregation is demonstrated by the fact that the average black family [in the KCMSD] lives in a census

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enforcement of racial covenants affected economic "realities," the District Court concluded that "FHA did not act arbitrarily []or capriciously in giving [those] covenants consideration" in administering its housing subsidy and accordingly that the agency is not constitutionally liable for its explicitly racial policies of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. 566a, 569a. Four of the eight judges below voted to reverse the District Court on this point. Opn. of Lay, C.J., 216a-19a; Opn. of Arnold, J., 163a n.10. The District Court and Judge Gibson also excused HUD for knowingly funding the State's discriminatory relocation and public housing policies in the 1940s-1960s because (i) HUD-funded housing is located throughout the Kansas City area and (ii) HUD took steps in the mid-1970s to end those discriminatory policies. 573a-78a. Judge Arnold comments: "Both of these points involve a misapprehension of the plaintiffs' claims: As to the first, the claim is not that unbalanced housing site selection . . . caused interdistrict segregation, but instead that once the projects were built, HAKC explicitly segregated them, or later, steered whites to some projects and blacks to others. As to the second, the plaintiffs' complaint is not primarily about HAKC and LCRA activities in the 1970s; LCRA practiced discrimination from 1953 to 1973, and the plaintiffs contend that HAKC segregated its housing units from its inception in 1939 . . . ." Opn. of Arnold, J., 173a-74a. Accord, Lay, C.J., 216a-19a.

tract that is 85% black while the average white family [in the SSDs] lives in a census tract that is 99% white." 535a (citing T 14,739, 14,745).

Affirmative Duty Violations. Measuring the State's post-1954 conduct by its "'effectiveness, not [its] purpose'" in "'decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system,'" the District Court found that "the State as a collective entity . . . fail[ed] to affirmatively act to eliminate the structure and effects of its past dual system." 605a, 611a (quoting Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)). In particular, the District Court cited the General Assembly's failure to enact legislation to "abolish or create school districts" or, if "necessary . . . change them" in a desegregative manner. 607a-

08a. Prominent among the State's post-1954 defaults in this regard was its enactment in 1957 of H.B. 171, discussed at p. 6, supra. See also June 1984 Order, 316a-52a (other post-1954 segregative actions).

B. Findings As To The 11 Surrounding Districts

In keeping with its interpretation of Milliken, the District Court in its June 1984 findings held the surrounding districts responsible only for those aspects of Missouri's interdistrict dual system for which the districts, and not the State, had primary responsibility. Sifting the evidence, the Court held the surrounding districts responsible only for the modestly "blackening" effect on the Kansas City District of blacks moving from the surrounding districts and not for the

nearly complete "whitening" effect on the surrounding districts themse'ves (see note 4, supra), or for the dual system's diversion of thousands of in-migrating blacks exclusively into the Kansas City District. The Court concluded that the effects it did attribute to the surrounding districts were "de minim[i]s."[7]

The District Court next found the surrounding districts innocent of any housing violations and refused as a matter of law "to find the SSDs liable for racial imbalance" in their districts "that may be attributed to policies or practices of [state] housing actors." 370a-71a. The Court likewise refused to consider the effects in those districts of the State's

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[7] "[P]laintiffs had to prove first that the segregated schools existing before 1954 were the direct and substantial cause of blacks leaving each defendant district; second, assuming that occurred, that it had a significant segregative effect in the KCMSD. Plaintiffs' proof was weak, speculative and in any event de minim[i]s." 301a (emphasis added; citations omitted). Accord,

post-1954 affirmative-duty violations.[8]

Having ruled irrelevant to the surrounding districts and to plaintiffs' interdistrict claims (i) the major segregative consequences of the State's pre-1954 interdistrict dual school system, (ii) all the multidistrict effects of the State's and other parties' area-wide housing violations, and (iii) the City-wide effects of the State's post-1954

Opn. of Gibson, J., 49a. Applying a different interpretation of Milliken, Chief Judge Lay took a wider view of the surrounding districts' role in the interdistrict system: "[U]nder the pre-1954 dual school system the SSDs exercised their discretion, granted them by the state, either to provide schools for black students which offered at best a substandard education or to decline to provide any schools at all. Instead, the SSDs transferred black students to the KCMSD. . . . Not only did the SSDs thus create segregated conditions in their individual districts by emptying their districts of all black school children, but they set historical precedent for interdistrict transfer of students on the basis of race in the Kansas City metropolitan area." 225a-26a.

[8]September 1984 Decision, 605a-08a. The District Court found that, by 1960, each SSD had "dismantl[ed] [its] dual system" by "sending its

freezing of the Kansas City District's boundaries, the District Court held that

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students to school without regard to race." 503a. (As of 1954, the 11 surrounding school districts had about 200 black children left, to be integrated with 20,000 white children. X 53.) Based on this "unitariness" finding, the District Court exonerated the SSDs of any liability for the various actions it found those districts took after 1954 without segregative intent but with massive segregative effects. 316a-52a. In particular, while successfully supporting passage of H.B. 171 and other legislation making it virtually impossible for the Kansas City District to annex the predominantly white areas surrounding it, the SSDs actively and successfully opposed four legislative proposals for desegregative school-district reorganization; at least seven plans for integrative student exchanges, including two by the United States Civil Rights Commission (in 1977 and 1981) and two by the Kansas City District (in 1969 and 1975); and three proposals to increase minority and government-subsidized housing opportunites in their jurisdictions. 316a-52a, 371a-72a, 377a, 381a, 389a, 398a-99a, 409a, 461a, 489a-90a. Likewise, in 1974, the SSDs in the City of Kansas City would not accept proceeds from a citywide 1/2-cent sales tax for education until the City Assessor assured one of them in writing that, by taking the money, they were not committed to participating in desegregative interdistrict transfers between themselves (at the time 1% black) and the Kansas City District (at the time 58% black). 318a-20a. See X 53G, 1763, 1766. Four judges dissented from the District Court's handling of these issues. Opn. of Lay, C.J., 256a-58a; Opn. of Arnold, J., 165a-66a.

the current effects of the few violations it did consider were "legally insufficient to justify the relief sought against the suburban school district defendants." 499a. So, too, having concluded that SSD innocence precluded interdistrict relief, the District Court expressly refused to consider the "cumulative" interdistrict effects of the other parties' violations. 498-99a. See Opn. of Arnold, J., 146 n.1, 157a-58a, 164a.

III. Post-Trial Proceedings

The District Court refused to include the surrounding districts in a remedy for the explicitly interdistrict violation and effects it found because, in its view, the State's violations gave the Court "no power to restructure the operation of [the dismissed surrounding districts] absent a

constitutional violation by those entities." September 1984 Decision, 608a.

Having barred interdistrict desegregation relief, the District Court also ruled out mandatory intradistrict desegregation measures, fearing that reassignment of students within the Kansas City District would cause its few remaining white students to flee. Instead, the District Court ordered the State in June 1985 to pay all the tuition and transportation costs of any KCMSD black child who wished to transfer to a school in any of the surrounding school districts that voluntarily agreed to accept black transfers from the KCMSD. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 35-39 (W.D. Mo. 1985).

In the 22 months since the District Court issued its June 1985 voluntary-interdistrict-transfer proposal, nearly

ten thousand black parents in the Kansas City District have expressed interest in having their children transfer to schools in the respondent school districts, and plaintiffs and the Kansas City District have announced their willingness to drop the litigation if those districts would agree to accept some of those black children. Nonetheless, each of the 11 respondent districts on four separate occasions during that 22-month period has formally refused to accept black KCMSD children into any of its underutilized schools.[9]

On December 5, 1986, the United

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[9] E.g., 639 F. Supp. at 51. The District Court also ordered the State and the Kansas City District to undertake a number of compensatory education programs within the Kansas City District designed to alleviate the harmful educational effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 26-35.

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which heard the appeal en banc, affirmed the District Court's denial of interdistrict relief by an equally divided court. Relying on decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, Judge Gibson "'decline[d],'" to accept "'the argument that a school board otherwise innocent of segregative intent is liable [to participate in remedying] the discriminatory . . . practices of other governmental agencies.'"[10] Affirming the District Court's interpretation of Milliken, Judge Gibson cited only the District Court's June 1984 findings on the SSDs' conduct and not the September 1984 findings on the effects in those districts of the State's violations.

Judge Arnold dissented in part.

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[10]Opn. of Gibson, J., 67a (quoting Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982)). See, e.g., id. 26a (interdistrict relief is a "'wholly impermissible remedy'" for "'out-

"[T]ak[ing] as established" the contrary rule of the Third and Seventh Circuits "that a school district can be made to participate in an interdistrict remedy even if it is not 'personally' guilty of violating the Constitution, that such relief is appropriate where a State's constitutional violations have contributed to interdistrict segregation, . . . and that there is nothing unique or peculiar about [State] housing agencies that would take them out of this rule," Judge Arnold

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lying districts not shown to have committed any constitutional violations'"); 100-04. "Limit[ing] to its facts" contrary en banc precedent of the Eighth Circuit, Judge Gibson concluded that, while "imposition of an interdistrict remedy on the innocent SSDs" may be appropriate when the State was guilty of "racial gerrymandering" of the sort that leaves black and white families where they are and draws boundary lines between them, interdistrict relief is not appropriate if the State, but not the SSDs, left existing boundary lines where they were and caused black and white families to relocate on opposite sides of the lines. 69a-72a n.19 (distinguishing Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc)). But see Opn. of Lay, C.J., 203a-04a; Opn. of Arnold, J., 153a-55a & n.5.

concluded that "the case should be remanded to the District Court to determine precisely what current interdistrict segregative effects may be attributed to housing discrimination by the State" and to devise "a remedy including each affected SSD:"

> [I]n accord with the equitable principles that govern such remedies, Milliken, 418 U.S. at 737-38, the role that may be assigned to each SSD may be limited by the fact that the SSD is not itself a constitutional violator. . . . On the other hand, it seems clear that affected SSDs could be required to participate in an interdistrict transfer program designed to make the racial composition of the districts' schools what it would have been absent official . . . discrimination.

151a, 176a-78a.

Chief Judge Lay for himself and Judges Heaney and McMillian agreed with Judge Arnold "that school districts which were not themselves found to be con-

stitutional violators nevertheless [may] be included in interdistrict relief where the effects of the unconstitutional actions of . . . the state were felt in those school districts." 198a. Voting to remand, Chief Judge Lay concluded that "the district court's own factual findings with regard to the constitutional violations of the state and KCMSD, especially with regard to the significant link between housing patterns and school availability in the Kansas City metropolitan area, strongly suggest that the plaintiffs are entitled to an interdistrict remedy." 269a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS THAT HAVE ARISEN OVER WHETHER MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY PERMITS STATE OFFICIALS DELIBERATELY TO SEGREGATE A SINGLE CITY'S CHILDREN INTO SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICTS SO LONG AS THE STATE AND NOT THE SURROUNDING WHITE DISTRICTS IS TO BLAME FOR THAT SEGREGATION

A. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve the Conflict Between the Judgment Below and its Decision in Milliken v. Bradley

In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court declared that "no state law is above the Constitution. School district lines and the present laws with respect to local control are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies." Id. at 744. Based on this principle and the rule that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation, the Court established the following guidelines for interdistrict relief:

> Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside . . . by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown

> that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.

Id. at 744-45 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that plaintiff school children may satisfy this standard by "showing that either the State or any of the . . . outlying districts engaged in activity that had a cross-district effect." Id. at 748 (emphasis added). The Milliken majority thereupon denied relief because the record before the Court contained "evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools" "and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must by limited to that system." Id. at 745, 746 (emphasis added).

Joining the five-person majority, Justice Stewart wrote separately "to state briefly [his] understanding of what . . . the Court decides today." Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring). Agreeing that interdistrict relief in the Detroit area was inappropriate because the violations "occurred . . . within a single school district whose lines were coterminous with those of the city of Detroit," id., Justice Stewart nonethless declared that an interdistrict remedy "would . . . be proper, or even necessary," if it were "shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines; by transfer of school units between districts; or by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state

housing or zoning laws . . . ."[11]

The judgments of both courts below warrant certiorari because they so directly conflict with this Court's own teachings in Milliken: Whereas Milliken authorizes interdistrict remedies whenever "discriminatory acts of the state **or** local school districts . . . cause . . . interdistrict segregation," id. at 745 (majority opinion) (emphasis added), the District Court and Judge Gibson below "rejected plaintiffs' . . . argument which would have held the SSDs liable and incorporated them in an interdistrict

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[11] Id. at 755 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In 1975, this Court summarily affirmed the decision of a 3-judge court ordering interdistrict relief premised explicitly on (i) housing as well as school, and (ii) people-moving as well as line-drawing, violations by the State of Delaware and (iii) including in the remedy districts that the district court explicitly had determined were both innocent and "unitary." Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 432, 433-38 (D. Del.) (3-judge court) (emphasis added), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).

remedy on the basis" of "wrongs committed by . . . the state" and held that interdistrict relief is available only if there has been "a racially discriminatory act by each defendant" district. June 1984 Order, 497a, 285a (emphasis added). See Opn. of Gibson, J., 63a-64a, 67a.

Whereas Justice Stewart, casting the deciding vote in Milliken, concluded that an interdistrict remedy would "be proper, or even necessary, . . . [w]ere it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by . . . racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws," id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring), the District Court and four members of the court below flatly refused to "find the SSDs liable for [inclusion in a remedy for] racial imbalance that may be attributed to policies or practices of inde-

pendent housing actors." June 1984 Order, 371a. Accord, e.g., id., 508a-09a; Opn. of Gibson, J., 67a.

Certiorari is appropriate "[w]hen . . . a federal court of appeals . . . has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court." S. Ct. R. 17.1(c). This is such a case.

B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve the Conflict Among the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits Over the Proper Interpretation of Milliken

Applying the standards set out in Milliken, two circuit courts of appeals and a district court in another circuit have concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes interdistrict remedies when the State intentionally causes multidistrict segregation, notwithstanding the lack of complicity in the violation by school districts included in the remedy. The Third Circuit twice has held that

interdistrict relief is required "[w]here the State has contributed to the separation of races" and that "exclusion of the suburban districts [from the remedy] cannot be predicated on their own purported innocence."[12] The Third Circuit has expressly applied this rule to predicate interdistrict relief (i) on housing as well as school segregation violations, (ii) on violations of a people-moving, as well as a line-drawing, sort, and (iii) as a basis for consolidating out of existence surrounding districts that the district court not only found "innocent" of the interdistrict violation but also had pre-

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[12] Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 340 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). Accord, Hoots v. Commonwealth, 672 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.13 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[t]he district court also properly held that the State and County Boards violated the constitution . . . and so all surrounding districts can be implicated in a remedy, despite their alleged lack of involvement in the process").

viously adjudicated "unitary."[13]

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit twice has upheld interdistrict remedies based on the rule that:

> The suburban school officials may not maintain that their districts should be excluded from any interdistrict remedy if they are found innocent of committing any constitutional violations because they should not be held responsible for the acts of the state legislators or other state subdivisions such as a local housing authority or a zoning board. . . . Thus, if state discriminatory housing practices have a substantial interdistrict effect, it is appropriate to require school authorities to remedy the effects even though they did not

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[13] Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 762-63 n.11 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (affirming interdistrict relief based upon "eight separate interdistrict violations," four of which involved housing actions and seven of which involved governmental actions that left existing school district boundary lines intact and caused blacks and whites to relocate on opposite sides of those lines (emphasis in original)); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 339 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (surrounding districts may be included in an interdistrict

> themselves cause this aspect of school segregation.[14]

The views of the four judges who concurred in the judgment below and the District Court opinion they affirmed directly conflict with these holdings of the Third and Seventh Circuits. That conflict, in turn, divides those judges from their numerically equal dissenting collegues, who voted to apply the law of the Third and Seventh Circuits and to reverse.

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remedy even though "each" is "at present operating a unitary system," if "the State . . . acted in a [discriminatory] fashion which is a substantial and proximate cause of the existing disparity in racial enrollments in [those] districts"). Accord, United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 490 (1972) ("desegregation is not achieved by . . . two . . . systems, each operating unitary schools within its border, where one of the two systems is, in fact, 'white' and the other is, in fact, 'Negro'").

[14] United States v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir. 1978). Accord, United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101,

Also in conflict with the Third and Seventh Circuit holdings are the views ascribed to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit by the lead opinion below. For example, Judge Gibson quoted the Sixth Circuit's statement that:

> "We do not find any case addressing the argument that a school board otherwise innocent of segregative intent is liable for the discriminatory housing practices of other governmental agencies. We decline to accept this argument."[15]

Judge Gibson also relied on decisions

1109-11, 1115 (7th Cir. 1980) ("the power to order students from [the suburban] districts to transfer to [Indianapolis] schools . . . depends not on the culpability, or lack thereof, of the suburban districts involved but rather on the finding that discriminatory actions by the state had a significant segregative impact across district lines" (emphasis added)). A district court in the Sixth Circuit recently adopted the Third and Seventh Circuit views with regard to school violations. Bronson v. Board of Education, 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1098-99 (S.D. Ohio 1984). The Sixth Circuit's approach to housing-violation cases is discussed infra.

[15] Opn. of Gibson, J., 67a (quoting Bell v.

of the Fourth Circuit. 62a, 101a. That

Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982)). Accord, Bronson v. Board of Education, 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1104-05 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("absent a showing of a nexus between the conduct of any of the named [suburban school district] Defendants and the acts of housing authorities or other government . . . agencies responsible for shaping the residential patterns in their districts . . ., these named Defendants herein cannot be held liable for, or be responsible for remedying, any racial imbalance that may be attributed to the practices and policies of these independent actors and agencies" (emphasis in original)).

In conflict with Bell and Bronson are the following Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuit decisions premising intradistrict school desegregation relief on housing violations: Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 640 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1980) (racially restrictive covenants); Hart v. Community School Board, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (aff'g 383 F. Supp. 699, 747-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)) (public housing, urban renewal, relocation, and subsidized housing)); Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974) (zoning and building permit policies); United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1289-376, 1531-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (appeal pending) (public housing, subsidized housing, urban planning). See Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 23 (reserving question "whether a showing that school segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree"). See generally

Circuit's Richmond decision, in denying interdistrict school desegregation relief premised on housing discrimination, states: "That there has been [official] housing discrimination in all three [school district] units is deplorable, but a school case, like a vehicle, can carry only a limited amount of baggage." Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972) (en banc), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). More recently, the Fourth Circuit denied interdistrict relief premised on both school and housing allegations, because "[a]n independent school district which has not caused segregation in a neighboring independent district has no duty to rectify a racial

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Note, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School Desegregation Relief, 93 Yale L.J. 340 (1983).

imbalance in the other district."[16]

Certiorari is appropriate "[w]hen a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another federal court of appeals on the same matter . . . ." S. Ct. R. 17.1(a). The judgment below rests on a dispositive interpretation of Milliken that directly conflicts with the clear rule of the Third and Seventh Circuits. The controlling legal issue in this case also has sundered

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[16] Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, 745 F.2d 324, 328, 332 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984). Judge Gibson also relied on Fifth Circuit decisions 100a. The rule of that Circuit is unclear. Compare Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 648 F.2d 959, 969 5th Cir. 1981) (dicta) ("should interdistrict effect alone transform otherwise intradistrict unconstitutional action into an interdistrict violation, then the Milliken insistence that 'without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy,' . . . contains a redundancy"), with United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (1971), cited approvingly in

the law of the Third and Seventh Circuits from that of the Fourth and (in housing-violation cases) the Sixth Circuits, divided panels of the Fifth Circuit, and left the rule of the Eighth Circuit and the rights of the plaintiff school children hanging in the balance of an evenly divided en banc court. That the proper interpretation of this Court's decision in Milliken has been the source of so much "controversy . . . ever since" reveals that the time has come for the Court to settle the question once and for all. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1976).

Milliken, supra, 418 U.S. at 744 (ordering inter-district relief encompassing districts not guilty of any violation because "the State of Texas . . . created, and . . . participated in the continued support" of those districts as racially identifiable "administrative units").

II. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve the Conflict Between the Judgment Below and the Third and Other Circuits Over Whether the Affirmative Constitutional Duty to Dismantle the Effects of Prior De Jure Segregation Applies in Interdistrict Cases

In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II) and predecessor intradistrict decisions, this Court held that the intentional segregation of schools in 1954 places the offending parties "under a continuing duty" thereafter "to eradicate the effects of that system," and that the systemwide nature of the violation furnishes prima facie proof that current segregation was caused at least in part by prior intentionally segregative official acts. Id. at 537 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973); Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 26). Part of the affirmative duty imposed by the Court's decisions "is the obligation not to take any action

that would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects." Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added) (citing Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)).

Under Dayton II, the measure of a prior segregator's post-1954 compliance with this duty "is the effectiveness, not the purpose of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system." 443 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added). Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty "continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," and the effects of each such "continuing" violation count as much in determining the scope of the necessary remedy as the effects of the earlier intentionally discriminatory violation. Columbus Board of Education

v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979).[17]

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[17]The outcome in Dayton II turned precisely on this last-mentioned "rule of addition" -- i.e., on the need to sum the continuing segregative consequences of both the intent-measured original violation and the effects-measured "compounding" violations in order to determine the proper scope of the remedy. Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 538-41. The district court in Dayton II had denied systemwide relief because the plaintiffs had not shown that the Dayton Board's intentional violations had continuing systemwide "incremental segregative effects." See id. at 540-42 (discussing Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), and Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Ohio 1977)). Without disturbing the district court's conclusion, the Dayton II majority upheld the Sixth Circuit's grant of systemwide relief because the Board's post-Brown actions, though not intentionally segregative, violated the Board's affirmative duty and undeniably had systemwide effects: "The Court of Appeals was . . . quite justified in utilizing the Board's total failure to fulfill its affirmative duty -- and indeed its conduct resulting in increased segregation -- to trace the current, systemwide segregation back to the purposefully dual system of the 1950's . . . ." Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 541-42 (citing Columbus, supra, 443 U.S. at 464-65; Keyes, supra, 413 U.S. at 211; Swann, supra, 443 U.S. at 21, 26-27). In concluding that the Board's conduct required systemwide relief, the Court summed the indeterminate effects of one intentional violation (a pre-1954 dual system) with the "systemwide" effects of five nonintentional violations (the post-1954 failure to dismantle prior segregative effects; student assignment practices; optional attendance zones; school construction and site selection; and grade struc-

In determining the scope of the State's responsibility for funding the single-district educational-enhancement remedy within the Kansas City District, the District Court applied the above principles of law and made the following findings: 1. Missouri administered a de jure "pre-Brown interdistrict system of locating dual schools" (Opn. of Gibson, J., 49a) and engaged in a series of "actions . . . discriminatory against blacks" that "continues to have a significant effect on the dual housing market in the Kansas City area." September 1984 Decision, 531a-32a, 601a-02a. 2. The area's segregation into one black district surrounded by eleven white districts has persisted ever since. See p. 4, supra.

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ture and organization). Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 537-41 (quoting 583 F.2d at 258 and discussing Brinkman v. Gilligan, supra)). Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented on just this point. Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 493, 502-04.

3. "State [officials] . . . had and continue to have the constitutional obligation to affirmatively dismantle any system of de jure segregation, root and branch. . . . This case is before this court simply because [State officials] have defaulted in their obligation . . . ." September 1984 Decision, 611a.

Chief among the State's post-1954 defaults was its enactment in 1957 of H.B. 171, which exempted Kansas City from the city-district coterminousness rule applied elsewhere in the State and allowed the City of Kansas City to quadruple in size and remain 73 percent **white** while the School District of Kansas City remained virtually static in size and became 74 percent **minority**.[18] Although concluding

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[18]See p. 6, supra. Although the discussion here focuses on H.B. 171, it applies as well to the other post-1954 segregative actions of the State, SSDs, KCMSD, and HUD. See pp. 22, 24-26 & nn.7, 8, supra; September 1984 Decision, 542a-56a.

that H.B. 171 and the State's other segregative line-drawing activities after Brown were not undertaken "with the intent to concentrate black students within the KCMSD," June 1984 Order, 334a-45a, the District Court relied on them nonetheless in requiring the State to fund a single-district remedy because, under Dayton II:

> "the measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual school system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system."

September 1984 Decision, 605a (quoting Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at 538).

The District Court and Judge Gibson thus relied upon H.B. 171 and other defaults to require Missouri to fund single-district relief for the blacks the State unconstitutionally segregated into the Kansas City District. But both courts refused to rely upon those same undeniably

interdistrict defaults to require multi-district relief for those same black children and for the white children the State segregated into the rest of the City. Adopting the Fifth Circuit's view, both courts below concluded that "'Milliken, unlike Swann and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), does not sanction . . . an inference that the continued existence of one-race schools in a system that formerly practiced de jure segregation is a vestige of such segregation'" and accordingly does not impose an affirmative duty to dismantle the effects of de jure interdistrict segregation.[19]

Both opinions hold, therefore, that H.B. 171's undeniably continuing and city-wide effects are irrelevant absent a fresh

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[19]Opn. of Gibson, J. 22a, 55a (quoting Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F. 2d 1243, 1254 (5th Cir. 1981)); June 1984 Order, 285a, 339a, 510a. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit view

intent to discriminate; and both opinions deny relief on the otherwise inapplicable grounds (i) that the continuing effects considered are "insufficient" and (ii) that this is a people-moving, not a line-drawing, case. See pp. 27, 30-31 n.10, supra.

The above conclusion and the Fifth Circuit language on which it relies conflict with this Court's holdings in the Swann - Keyes - Dayton II line of intra-district decisions discussed above. They also conflict with this Court's and the Third Circuit's affirmances of inter-district relief in the Wilmington case.

In Wilmington, the pre-1954 de jure

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quoted above, Milliken does not reject the proposition that (1) an interdistrict violation in the past, coupled with (2) continuing interdistrict segregation thereafter, triggers an ongoing affirmative duty to dismantle that interdistrict segregation. Milliken simply holds that when the first of the two triggering conditions is absent -- because no interdistrict violation is present -- no interdistrict affirmative duty arises. Milliken, supra, 418 U.S. at 744-45. See id. at 741 n.19.

violation had the same two components as Missouri's pre-Brown violations in the present case: (1) a pre-1954 inter-district system of locating schools pursuant to which "the only high school in the County that accepted black students was . . . in Wilmington;" and (2) the State's invidious "assistance, encouragement, and authorization" of housing discrimination via enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, FHA practices, and public housing policies.[20]

The third major component of the Wilmington violation is also familiar to the present case -- i.e., the State's exclusion of the central city district

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[20]Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 433-35 (D. Del.) (3-judge court), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). See also Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F.2d 328, 341, 343 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). The identical violations in the present case are discussed at p. 12-22, supra.

from post-Brown legislation that otherwise could have led to the consolidation of that predominantly black district with the predominantly white districts surrounding it. Although the Wilmington trial court explicitly found that this post-Brown legislation was "not . . . purposefully . . . discriminatory," that Court -- in decisions affirmed summarily by this Court and twice by the Third Circuit en banc -- relied heavily on the legislation's post-Brown boundary- and segregation- preserving effects as a basis for interdistrict relief. The Wilmington courts did so because "[a]t the time the [legislation] was enacted, the State Board had not yet satisfied its obligation to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation in the Wilmington schools" and the legislation accordingly violated the State's affirmative "obligation to consider the racial consequences of [its] major educational

policy decisions."[21]

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the conflict between the judgment below and the decisions of those Circuits that have applied the Swann-Keyes-Dayton II affirmative duty principles in interdistrict cases.

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[21]Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 439, 441-42 (D. Del.) (3-judge court) (emphasis added) (citing Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 16), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975)); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 340 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). Accord, Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 765 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (quoting Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 26 and citing Keyes, supra, 413 U.S. at 208, 211 & n.17). Other Court of Appeals decisions relying on the violation of a prior segregator's affirmative duty as a basis for interdistrict relief are: Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1121 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Keyes, supra, 413 U.S. at 208-10); Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education, 510 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)). The position of the Seventh Circuit is unclear. Compare United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of the City of Indianapolis, 637 F.2d 1101, 1113 (7th Cir. 1980) (relying on Dayton II), with id. at 1113 n.24 (reserving question).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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No. 86-

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

-v-

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, *et al.*,
Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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APPENDIX

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1765
No. 85-1949
No. 85-1974
No. 85-2077

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western
District of Missouri

Kalima Jenkins, by her next friend, Kamau Agyei, *

Carolyn Dawson, by her next friend, Richard Dawson, *

Tufanza A. Byrd, by her next friend, Teresa Byrd, *

Derek A. Dydell, by his next friend, Maurice Dydell, *

Terrance Cason, by his next friend, Antoria Cason, *

Jonathan Wiggins, by his next friend, Rosemary Jacobs Love, *

Kirk Allan Ward, by his next friend, Mary Ward, *

Robert M. Hall, by his next friend, Denise Hall, *

Dwayne A Turrentine, by his next friend, Shelia Turrentine,

Gregory A. Pugh, by his next friend, Barbara Pugh,

Cynthia Winters, by her next friend, David Winters, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Appellants/Appellees,

and

American Federation of Teachers, Local 691,

Appellant/Appellee,

v.

The State of Missouri

Honorable John Ashcroft, Governor of the State of Missouri,

Wendell Bailey, Treasurer of the State of Missouri,

Missouri State Board of Education,
Roseann Bentley,
Dan Blackwell,
Terry A. Bond, President,
Delmar A. Cobble,
Grover Gamm,
Jimmy Robertson,
Robert L. Welling,
Donald B. West,
members of the Missouri State

Board of Education,

Arthur L. Mallory,
Commissioner of Education of
the State of Missouri,

School District of Kansas City,
Missouri and Claude C. Perkins,
Superintendent thereof,

Appellants/Appellees,

ParkHill School District R-5 and
Dr. Merlin A. Ludwig,
Superintendent thereof,

North Kansas City, Missouri School
District and Dr. Raymond Waier,
Superintendent thereof,

School District of the City of
Independence and Dr. Robert Henley,
Superintendent thereof,

Raytown, Missouri Consolidated School
District C-2 and Dr. Robert Atkin,
Superintendent thereof,

Center School District and Donald
Richmond, Superintendent thereof,

Hickman Mills Consolidated School
District C-1 and Blaine E. Steck,
Superintendent thereof,

Grandview Consolidated School District
C-4 and Dr. Tony L. Stansberry,
Superintendent thereof,

Fort Osage School District R-1 and Victor Gragg, Superintendent thereof, *

Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R-7 and Dr. Bernard C. Campbell, Superintendent thereof, *

Blue Springs Reorganized School District R-4 and Dr. Gale T. Bartow, Superintendent thereof, *

Liberty School District and Dr. Ronald L. Anderson, Superintendent thereof, *

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Samuel Pierce, Secretary thereof, *

Appellees. *

Submitted: November 13, 1985

Filed: December 5, 1986

Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, ROSS, McMILLIAN, ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, En Banc*

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*Judge Bowman did not participate in consideration of this case and Judge Magill was not a member of the court when it was argued and submitted.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from claims of unconstitutional racial segregation of school children in the Kansas City metropolitan area. After trial, the district court[1] imposed an intradistrict remedy against the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) and the State of Missouri with the State bearing approximately three-fourths of the cost. The district court found that the KCMSD and the State had not eradicated vestiges of the racially segregated dual school system once required under state law in violation of the Constitution. The claim for interdistrict relief in the form of consolidation or realignment of the suburban

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[1]The Honorable Russell G. Clark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

school districts (SSDs) was rejected as the SSDs were found to have eliminated all vestiges of their segregated school systems and there was no finding of interdistrict violation or interdistrict effect. The SSDs were dismissed from the action. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also was held not liable. In this appeal, both the KCMSD and Kalima Jenkins, the named plaintiff in a certified class of present and future KCMSD students (Jenkins class),[2] challenge the denial of interdistrict relief. The Jenkins class also appeals the judgment in favor of HUD. In addition, both the KCMSD and the State challenge the scope and the allocation of

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[2]The named student plaintiffs were replaced at various times during the litigation. In February 1985, the court certified the class of present and future KCMSD students.

costs of the intradistrict remedy ordered against each.

The district court's findings and conclusion that the suburban school districts are not liable for interdistrict violation and may not be ordered to participate in interdistrict relief, on those issues not related to housing, are affirmed by the vote of five judges (Judges Ross, Fagg and Wollman join in this opinion; Judge Arnold concurs in the result; Chief Judge Lay, joined by Judges Heaney and McMillian, dissents).

The interdistrict findings and conclusion on the housing issues are affirmed by an equally divided court (Judges Ross, Fagg and Wollman join in this opinion; Judge Arnold files a concurring and

dissenting opinion in which he concludes that the case should be remanded to the district court to consider whether there are interdistrict housing violations which would require relief; Chief Judge Lay, joined by Judges Heaney and McMillian, dissents).

The dismissal of the SSDs and HUD at the close of the plaintiff's evidence is therefore affirmed.

The intradistrict remedy ordered against the State of Missouri and KCMSD is modified in some respects with five judges concurring (Judges Ross, Fagg and Wollman join in the opinion and Judge Arnold concurs in the result; Chief Judge Lay, joined by Judges Heaney and McMillian, dissents).

This suit was filed in 1977 by the KCMSD, the School Board, and four children

of two School Board members. The complaint alleged that the State, surrounding school districts in Missouri and Kansas, and several federal agencies including HUD[3] had helped cause or had been part of a system of racial segregation among Kansas City metropolitan area school districts. In October 1978, the district court dismissed the Kansas defendants for want of jurisdiction. It also concluded that the KCMSD lacked standing to bring an action against the State as party plaintiff and realigned the KCMSD as a defendant. School District of Kansas City Missouri v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421

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[3]The named defendants included the State of Missouri, the Missouri State Board of Education and various Missouri officials, the State of Kansas, the Kansas State Board of Education and various Kansas officials, several Kansas school districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area, twelve Missouri school districts in the area, the United States Departments of

(W.D. Mo. 1978).[4]

In May 1979, an amended complaint was filed against KCMSD, and the federal and Missouri defendants named in the original complaint. The amended complaint made two distinct allegations: first, of an interdistrict violation, committed by the SSDs, and the State and federal defendants; and second, of an intradistrict violation within the KCMSD, committed by the KCMSD and the State defendants. KCMSD pursued its claim by filing, in July 1979, a cross-claim against the State, reiterating the allegation of interdistrict violation made by the Jenkins class, and seeking

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Transportation (DOT), Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

[4]These rulings were certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for interlocutory review. 460 F. Supp. at 445. An appeal, taken by the KCMSD and the North Kansas City School

indemnification against any intradistrict liability.

Trial to the court commenced October 31, 1983.[5] Over the course of 64 trial days, plaintiff called over 140 witnesses, offered 2,100 exhibits, and designated approximately 10,000 pages of depositions. Before hearing evidence in response, the district court, based on standards set out by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), dismissed the eleven SSDs from the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).[6] The court found that

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District, was denied by this court. KCMSD thereafter filed an appeal under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 which was dismissed. See School District of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 592 F.2d 493 8th Cir. 1979).

[5]Before trial, the DOT and one of the SSDs, the Raymore-Peculiar School District, were dismissed voluntarily. See Order of June 5, 1984 at 2.

[6]The eleven districts dismissed were the Blue Springs, Center, Fort Osage,

school districts in Missouri are autonomous and that none of the districts had committed any acts with intent to discriminate on the basis of race, to contain blacks in the KCMSD, or bar blacks from the SSDs. The court further found that within four years after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), and in most cases within a shorter time, all the SSDs had eradicated the vestiges of their dual school systems and were operating unitary systems. The court further found that none of the alleged

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Grandview, Hickman Mills, Independence, Lee's Summit, Liberty, North Kansas City, Park Hill, and Raytown School Districts. HEW subsequently was dismissed for plaintiffs' failure to prove that the agency acted with racial animus or abused its discretion in the enforcement of Title VI. See Order of July 16, 1984.

discriminatory actions committed by the State or the federal defendants had caused any significant current interdistrict segregation. The district court therefore denied inter-district relief. See generally Order of June 5, 1984.

The district court then heard additional evidence and, on September 17, 1984, issued its order holding the State and the KCMSD liable for racial segregation of students within the KCMSD. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984) The court observed that before 1954, the State and the KCMSD had maintained a racially segregrated dual school system. The court found, in the existance of twenty-four KCMSD schools with a black enrollment in excess of 90%, and in other areas, vestages of the now unlawfull dual

school system. It therefore held that the state and the KCMSD, under principles announced by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 301 (1955) (Brown II), had failed in their affirmative duty to dismantle the unconstitutional pre-1954 system. The court also held that HUD was not liable, finding that HUD had followed a balanced approach to sponsoring subsidized housing projects in both innercity and suburban areas.

On June 14, 1985, after a two-week hearing on the scope of appropriate relief, the court issued a remedial order requiring the State and the KCMSD to fund compensatory and remedial educational programs and necessary capital improvements in KCMSD schools. The plan is projected to cost $87,000,000 over the next

three years, with the State bearing approximately $67,000,000 and the KCMSD approximately $20,000,000. See Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at 41-42.

In this appeal the Jenkins class challenges the district court's dismissal of HUD, and joined by KCMSD, its dismissal of the SSDs, and its denial of inter-district relief. The KCMSD also challenges the district court's realignment of the KCMSD as a party defendant. The State challenges the scope of the district court's remedy and the allocation of costs.

INTERDISTRICT LIABITITY FINDINGS

In Milliken, 418 U.S. 717, the Supreme Court held that an interdistrict remedy may not be imposed absent a finding of a

constitutional violation within one district producing a significant segregative effect in another school district. Id. at 744-45. Without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong requiring an interdistrict remedy. Id. Plaintiffs advanced to the district court three theories to support their claim of interdistrict violation and effect, requiring the imposition of an interdistrict remedy in the form of consolidation of the KCMSD and SSDs:

> [F]irst, that the SSDs, as agents of the state, were guilty of operating a regional system of segregated schools that centered on and impacted Kansas City with blacks and made the suburbs whiter before 1954; second, that the SSDs failed in their affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of the dual school system; and third, that the SSDs are liable for the effects of actions by the KCMSD and other

> defendants and can therefore be included in an interdistrict remedy.

Order of June 5, 1984 at 5. The district court found, based on the Milliken holding, that there was lack of proof of discriminatory intent in the establishment or change of any school district boundary and thus distinguished the interdistrict cases upon which the plaintiffs relied. It rejected the arguments that the SSDs were not separate and autonomous but were instead agents of the State. It further rejected the argument that, as agents and subdivisions of the State, the SSDs must be included in an interdistrict remedy absent any finding that they had committed specific violations by their own initiative.

The court examined the plaintiffs' argument that the pre-1954 dual school systems had caused racial segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The court acknowledged the substantial increase in the KCMSD black population from 1910 to 1960, but found that the increase resulted principally from the unusual economic and employment ramifications of the World Wars and intervening Depression. Order of June 5, 1984 at 17. The absence of black schools in the SSDs, it found, had not discouraged black families outside or within Missouri from moving to and living in those districts. The district court also rejected the argument that within the SSDs any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remained. The acts thirty

years past, the court found, had negligible current effects. While some of the SSDs had dual school systems in the pre-1954 era and some did not,[7] after Brown I each had disestablished its pre-1954 school system with deliberate speed and all vestiges of those systems have long since disappeared. The district court entered separate findings with respect to each SSD. It found that all were unitary, most by 1955, in immediate compliance with the mandate of Brown I, two more by the 1957-58 school year, and the last, Park Hill, was fully integrated by the 1959-60 school year. Id. at 43-95.

The court then considered the plain-

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[7]The court specifically found that Independence, Lee's Summit, Liberty, North Kansas City, and Park Hill had earlier maintained dual school systems, but the other districts had not. Id. at 43-95.

tiffs' second theory, that the SSDs had failed in their duty, pursuant to the mandate of Brown II, to eliminate vestiges. The district court found that the establishment of an association of regional school districts did not negate the autonomy of the individual SSDs, and that the sharing of sales tax revenues by certain of the SSDs whose area may have been partly within the Kansas City, Missouri, city limits did not amount to a constitutional violation. Id. at 19-21. Further, a juvenile home, local special and vocational education programs, and particularly the creation of certain vocational education districts were examined and found not to have been constitutional violations on the part of the SSDs. Id. at 21-26. The district court also exa-

mined a statute enacted by the Missouri General Assembly in 1957 enlarging the size of a city that should constitute a single school district.[8] The court found that the enactment was not driven by an intent to concentrate black students within KCMSD, and therefore, was not an intentional interdistrict violation. Id. at 28-29. The court also examined the SSDs' response to recommendations of the Spainhower School District Commission of 1979, regarding realignment of boundaries so as to create some twenty school districts in the state, and with respect to financing and local control, and found no evidence that any of the SSDs rejected or declined to consider these proposals

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[8]H.B. 171 increased from 500,000 to 700,000 the size of a city that should constitute a single school district. In the 1960 census, the population of Kansas City did not exceed 500,000. The court

for reasons at all related to race. It further rejected arguments based upon employment practices in the SSDs.

The district court finally analyzed in detail plaintiffs' third theory, that the SSDs may be included in an interdistrict remedy because the effects of others' discriminatory acts were felt within the SSDs. It found no evidence that white families had been lured to or black families discouraged from living in the SSDs. Nor did any of the factual evidence concerning housing implicate any of the SSD defendants. Id. at 34-35. The steady increase in black enrollment in the SSDs

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found that significant annexations in eastern and southern Jackson and Clay Counties occurred after the bill was enacted and that KCMSD had annexed several all-white schools from 1955 to 1973.

since 1968, particularly in Raytown, Hickman Mills, Center, and Grandview districts,[9] and the fact that in 1980, 23,434 blacks resided outside the principal contiguous area was found to refute the testimony of plaintiffs' experts. The court rejected white-flight theory as a constitutional violation by the SSDs. Id. at 36-39.

The district court also addressed plaintiffs' claims regarding housing violations. While the court found that before 1948, in several areas within the SSDs restrictive covenants were enforced, the court further found that such enforcement did not have a current significant

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[9]In 1982 the Center district had an enrollment of 10.6% black, Grandview 9.8%, Hickman Mills 16.7%, and Raytown 7.6%. Id. at 41-42.

segregative effect.[10] With respect to public housing, it found that such housing is available in significant amounts within every SSD and that the HUD section 8 program is available in all parts of the metropolitan area. No testimony linked any SSD to the transition of neighborhoods within the KCMSD from white to black and the accompanying white flight which had taken place in Kansas City since 1940. Id. at 41.

The court therefore concluded that these was no interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect. Thus, as required by Milliken, interdistrict relief was denied. Id. at 95. The court stressed that awarding relief "'would impose on the

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[10]See Note 22, infra.

outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court.'" Id. at 96 (quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746). It rejected a cumulative effect and found plaintiffs' evidence de minimis at most and legally insufficient to justify the relief sought against the SSDs. Id. at 97-98. The court thus dismissed the case against the SSDs.

INTRADISTRICT LIABILITY FINDINGS

The district court then tried the intradistrict issues and found that the inferior education indigenous to the State-compelled dual school system has lingering effects in the KCMSD. Jenkins

v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1492. The district court recognized the stipulation that before 1977 KCMSD was not unitary and did not comply with federal regulations. Id. at 1489. KCMSD was majority white in enrollment until 1970 and could have achieved mathematical racial balance in its schools. Id. at 1492. Instead, it chose to operate some completely segregated schools and other integrated ones. In 1974, twenty years after Brown I, 39 schools were more than 90% black; another 38 had 10% to 90% black enrollment. Eighty percent of all blacks in the district attended schools that were 90% black. Only 19% of the blacks attended a school that was 10% to 90% black. Id. at 1492-93. As of 1977, 25 one-race schools under the pre-1954 system remained 90% or

more of the same race. Id. In addition, four schools that were black under the dual system were predominantly black when closed in 1968. Id. at 1492. In the 1983-84 school year no KCMSD school had less than 30% black enrollment, but 24 schools were racially isolated at more than 90% black. Id. at 1493.

The court found that the KCMSD still has not entirely dismantled the dual school system. The court then made particular findings on the liberal transfer policy, the neighborhood school policy, and attendance zones, and found that these, rather than facilitating integration, fostered the maintenance of segregated attendance patterns. Intact busing was found to have been segregative in intent and effect, but, as it was stopped

in the 1960's, no continuing violation existed. The court found that plans had not been adopted for district-wide desegregation until 1977-78. Id. at 1493-94.

Similarly, the court imposed liability on the State based on its intentional creation of the dual school system and the obligation that existed to disestablish such a system.[11] As vestiges of the State's dual school system lingered in KCMSD, the obligations of KCMSD and the State had not been met. The court rejected the State's argument that constraints imposed by the state constitution or statutes prevented its affirmative disestablishment of the dual school

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[11]While the court conceded that the State may have through its actions created an atmosphere in which private white individuals and members of the real estate, banking, and insurance communities could

system. It held the issues in favor of the Jenkins class and against KCMSD and the State and held the issues in favor of KCMSD and against the State on the cross-claim. Id. at 1505.

LIABILITY OF HUD

With respect to the claim against HUD, the court examined Federal Housing Administration appraisal practices before 1949, cooperative agreements with the City of Kansas City under the auspices of the Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC) and the Land Clearance for Redevelopment

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justify bias against blacks, it found no evidence that the State significantly encouraged such practices. 593 F. Supp. at 1501-03. The court also found that freeway placement did not amount to a constitutional violation.

Authority (LCRA), and section 8 certificates. It found that HUD followed a balanced housing policy and attempted to insure that assisted housing was located in both innercity and suburban areas. There was no evidence that HUD's site selection and approval practices for federally subsidized multi-family housing substantially affected the racial composition of schools within KCMSD. Id. at 1499. The court pointed to HUD's affirmative marketing efforts to apprise participating section 8 certificate-holders that affordable housing was available throughout the entire community. Id. at 1500. There was no evidence that HUD routinely denied blacks FHA mortgages, that it discriminatorily foreclosed on mortgages held by blacks, or that it

avoided selling the homes on which its insured mortgages had been foreclosed to blacks. Further, there was no evidence that neglect of HUD-held homes was racially discriminatory in intent or purpose. The issues were held in favor of HUD.

I.

We have had earlier occasion to deal with the legal standards governing interdistrict school desegregation cases. See, e.g., Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984).[12] We

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[12] In Little Rock this court rejected the consolidation remedy but ordered adjustment of the boundaries between the districts, a voluntary intradistrict or interdistrict transfer system, the

draw our basic guidance from the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974):

> Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines

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exploration of magnet or special school or programs, and consideration of cooperative programs. 778 F.2d at 435-36. In Liddell we approved a settlement providing for intradistrict relief, a voluntary transfer program between cities and suburban schools and a magnet school program.

> have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.

418 U.S. 744-45 (citations omitted).

Two courts of appeals have read this language to require clear proof of cause and effect of a constitutional violation, and a careful delineation of the extent of the effect, before an interdistrict remedy may be invoked. Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, 745 F.2d 324, 332 (4th Cir. 1984); Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, 1256 (5th Cir. 1981). As the Fifth Circuit stated in

Lee:

> We believe the Court's deliberate choice of phrases such as "substantial" or "direct cause" and "significant segregative effect" also expresses an insistence that in cases where an interdistrict remedy is requested, there must be clear proof of cause and effect and a careful delineation of the extent of the effect. In the absence of such a showing, school district lines are to be carefully observed and desegregation remedies confined to orders affecting the school district in which the condition of segregation is manifest.

Id. at 1256.

In addition to "clear proof" of the interdistrict violation and its interdistrict effect and "a careful delineation" of the extent of the interdistrict effects, it must be shown that the interdistrict segregative effects

are current. Lee, 639 F.2d at 1260. Federal courts may not invoke their equitable power to fashion a remedy to correct a condition unless it currently offends the Constitution. As the Court stated in Milliken: "A federal remedial power may be exercised 'only on the basis of a constitutional violation' and, '[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.'" Id. at 738 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)); see also General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982) (a remedial decree should "extend no farther than required by the nature and the extent of that violation").

II.

We must also recognize at the outset the importance of the district court's factual findings in school desegregation cases. As we stated in Little Rock:

> We will not reverse the district court's factual findings with respect to liability unless we conclude that they are clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90 (1982); Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534 n.8; Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 468-71 (concurring opinions of Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1978). Nor will we reverse such findings when they are based on inferences from other facts unless the rigorous standards of the same rule are met. Anderson, 105 S. Ct. at 1511. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the clearly erroneous rule in civil rights cases, see, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 287-90, and, more particularly, in school desegregation cases:

> The elimination of the more conspicuous forms of governmentally ordained racial segregation * * * counsels undiminished deference to the factual adjudications of the federal trial judges in cases such as these, uniquely situated as those judges are to appraise the societal forces at work in the communities where they sit.
>
> Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 449, 471 (1979) (Stewart. J., concurring, with whom Burger, C.J., joins, concurring).

Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 410-11. See Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); see also Riddick v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir. 1986) (factual findings by a district

court in school desegregation cases are entitled to great deference on review "especially where the presiding judicial officer has lived with a case for many years").

The Supreme Court in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985), has explained that the trial judge's role is to determine fact, and duplication of these efforts in the courts of appeals "would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination." Id. at 1512. The Court stated:

> The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52 if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. "In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues

> de novo." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969). If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of apeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

Id.at 1511-12.

Chief Judge Lay's dissent,[13] in violation of Anderson, duplicates the role of the district court and is an exercise in appellate factfinding. A reading of the dissent is sufficient to demonstrate the rejection of the district court's carefully weighed findings of fact and substitution of those more desirable, fre-

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[13]Chief Judge Lay's dissent, in contrasting facts to rhetoric "doth protest too much." W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, sc. ii, line 242. The language,

quently based on evidence considered and rejected by the district court.[14] While on some occasions placing the mantle of the clearly erroneous rule about the discussion, it is evident that Chief Judge Lay was engaging in an original evaluation of the voluminous and ofttimes contradictory record seeking an ultimate conclusion more satisfactory than that reached by the district court. This is directly contrary to the mandate of Anderson.

III.

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on its first page particularly, is exaggerated, without support in the record. The "extravagant language" (see Milliken, Steward, J., concurring, 418 U.S. 753), requires this rejoinder.

[14]We need point to only a few examples. "The record is replete with evidence of constitutional violations by many of the SSDs and of the effect those violations had on all of the SSDs and on the KCMSD."

The Jenkins class does not challenge the findings of the district court.

Chief Judge Lay's dissent at 94. In discussing the rejection of the evidence of Dr. James D. Anderson, plaintiff's expert historian which the district court discussed in detail in the June 5, 1985 Order, id. at 15-16, 18, Chief Judge Lay states: "This evidence was highly probative and it was wholly arbitrary for the court to reject it and inject its own inferences. Moreover, I believe it is especially crucial in a case of this nature to give great consideration to the testimony of historial experts where the theory to be proved occurred long ago and few witnesses are alive to testify." Chief Judge Lay's dissent at 103, n.17. The increase in black enrollment in the SSDs since Brown "is conclusive evidence that the lack of schools for blacks in the SSDs prior to 1954 was a deterrent to blacks settling there. * * * It is clear that the SSDs as well as the state and KCMSD, have all failed to fulfill their affirmative duty under Brown v. Board of Ed. to eliminate the vestiges of their prior segregative policies and that significant interdistrict effects of these policies are still evident in the Kansas City metropolitan area." Id. at 106. "Here the racial imbalance is clear evidence of continuing segregation following a pre-1954 de jure policy." Id. at 109.

Rather, it argues that the findings establish continuing interlocking, interdistrict violations whose cross-district nature and metropolitan-wide scope require relief encompassing the SSDs. It argues particularly that there is an interdistrict violation or effect under Milliken and Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), and points to several independent bases for interdistrict relief. These are: the pre-1954 interdistrict system of locating dual schools; the State's and the SSDs continuing interdistrict violations; KCMSD's officially sanctioned suburban flight violation; the State's market-wide dual housing systems; and LCRA and HAKC's racial steering and siting violations.

The Jenkins class further argues that

the district court denied interdistrict relief based on a "concatenation of legal error" as to interdistrict liability. It argues that in six respects the district court abandoned controlling legal principles in concluding that: the existence of dual schools before 1954 does not now amount to a constitutional violation; the SSDs were autonomous and independent; the SSDs were absolved of liability for their pre-1954 violations and erroneously ignoring the post-1954 segregative acts and omissions; without a finding of fault, the SSDs may not be required to take part in eliminating the effects on children in their districts of the State's metropolitan-wide dual school and housing violations; the SSDs did not invidiously entice white families to move into their

district, and that unconstitutional actions within one district making it blacker which reciprocally affects adjacent districts by making them whiter may not provide an independent basis for interdistrict relief; and absent intentional segregative acts by each school board sought to be included, a finding of liability against actors in the housing market is irrelevant to the SSDs. The housing argument will be discussed separately in IV and V.

Finally, the Jenkins class argues that the district court applied an improper burden and standard of proof of significant effects in an improperly piecemeal fashion. It further argues that the district court improperly fragmented the evidence of unconstitutional acts rather

than evaluating the evidence as a whole. It argues that the district court's finding of six distinct metropolitan-wide constitutional violations satisfies Milliken's significant segregative effect standard. It urges under Swann that proof of a system with a history of segregation warrants a presumption against schools that remain disproportionate in their racial composition. It argues that the proof acknowledged by the court, of prior de jure segregation on an area-wide basis, coupled with a patently continuing racial imbalance among the SSDs' student and faculty compositions, established the liability of the SSDs. It further argues that the district court improperly rejected much of the evidence, and improperly barred the presentation of quan-

titative evidence, as irrelevant.

The broad scope of these arguments is considerably narrowed when viewed in light of significant factual findings of the district court. These findings are not challenged as clearly erroneous. The district court found that the SSDs were autonomous and locally controlled,[15] and that the State was powerless to require a merger or consolidation.

The district court recognized the stipulation that before 1954 the State mandated dual school systems and mandated SSDs' compliance in maintaining dual systems. It found that all SSDs met their constitutional obligation to operate a unitary school system within a maximum of

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[15]The district court pointed to evidence that the SSDs are governed by local boards elected by the voters, hire the superintendents and teachers, by vote establish their own tax levy, have plenary power to

four years after Brown I, most of them doing so within one year. The dismantling of the dual system was accomplished with all deliberate speed. Order of June 5, 1984 at 99. It specifically found that the evidence established that there was no barrier to movement of blacks into the SSDs. Id. at 39. It found the pre-Brown acts thirty years past to have negligible present effects. It further found that the faculty and staff composition of the

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establish school attendance zones, and determine whether to provide transportation for their students. Reorganization is a decision to be made by the local school districts, and the state constitution prohibits legislative enactment of special laws to change the boundaries of any school district. The district court further found that there was no discriminatory intent in the establishment or maintenance of the boundary lines between the school districts. Order of June 5, 1984 at 10-11.

SSDs do not affect the racial composition of the student bodies. The court found the faculty were hired and promoted on a racially neutral basis. The court could not conclude that there was an interdistrict violation from any possible intradistrict factors.

The factual argument based on the pre-Brown interdistrict system of locating dual schools flies in the face of the district court's finding that the pre-Brown acts have negligible present effects. Chief Judge Lay's dissent suffers from a similar infirmity as the district court made numerous findings interspersed through its order concerning the negligible and de minimis nature of any such effects. These findings are not clearly erroneous.[16] These findings make

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[16]The district court in its June 5, 1984

Order made the following findings: The evidence that segregated schools existing before 1954 were the direct and substantial cause of blacks leaving each SSD, and that such had a significant segregative effect in the KCMSD "was weak, speculative and in any event de minimis." See Order of June 5, 1984 at 12. Plaintiff's argument that the state through its agents, the SSDs, maintained a regional black interdistrict school system causing blacks to leave the SSDs and migrate to Kansas City in search of an education is not supported by the law or the evidence. Id. at 15. Assuming the entire population decrease in the three county area was caused by people leaving and going to Kansas City because of the dual school system, it found "the impact of that movement on the KCMSD enumeration insignificant." Id. at 16. The motivation for blacks leaving the three county area and moving to Kansas City "resulting from segregated schools was de minimis and insignificant" when compared with other primary motivating factors transferring blacks to the KCMSD under the segregated school system "is not a cause of the present racial distribution of the population in the three county area." Id. at 18. The Jenkins class did not persuade the court "that any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remain" in any of the SSDs. Id. at 18. "At most plaintiff's evidence is only de minimis and is therefore legally insufficient to justify the relief sought against the suburban school district defendants." Id. at 98. The district

unnecessary a detailed recitation of the

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court summarized:

> Another factor negating the importance of plaintiffs' voluminous pre-1954 evidence is simply its age. Our society is dynamic; myriad factors produce a multitude of simultaneous decisions and consequent effects. If it were a stagnant entity, the pernicious effects of de jure segregation would be obvious. Due to its fluid nature, however, acts now 30 years past have negligible present effects. Such is the fate of the discriminatory practices plaintiffs took months to develop. Too many events have intervened, reshaping earlier actions. Lee v. Lee County, supra, 639 F.2d at 1259.

Id. at 98-99. In concluding, the district court stated "even if the court were to view plaintiff's evidence liberally, which under Rule 41(b), it is not required to do, the violations proved are at most, de minimis and far removed in time." Id.at 105.

Chief Judge Lay's dissent does not establish what the Jenkins class and KCMSD did not argue, that these findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

pre-1954 evidence.

The argument that the State and SSDs participated in continuing interdistrict violations is contrary to the district court's finding that the SSDs had met their constitutional obligation to operate unitary school systems within four years after Brown I, most of them doing so within a year. Similarly, the argument that KCMSD officially sanctioned suburban flight looks first to KCMSD's violation which the district court clearly found to be only intradistrict in nature. The argument based on flight into neighboring SSDs making the southeast area schools blacker and recipient SSD schools whiter, thereby causing racial segregation in adjacent districts, is contrary to the district court's finding that there was no

barrier of movement to blacks to the SSDs. The district court specifically found that there was considerable increase in the black enrollment of the SSDs, particularly Center, Grandview, Hickman Mills, and Raytown.

Similarly, in the enumeration of six legal errors, three are based upon pre-1954 actions of the SSDs. The district court's findings that these acts have negligible present effect fundamentally undermines the validity of these arguments. As we have seen, the argument based on the actions of KCMSD and white flight run contrary to the factual findings mentioned above.

So also, the argument that the SSDs, though not at fault, would still be liable to take part in eliminating the effects on

children in their districts of the State's metropolitan-wide dual school violations, suffers from two fatal deficiencies. It ignores the lack of finding of any such effects, and is contrary to the district court's findings that within at most four years after Brown I, any vestiges of the dual school systems that may have existed in the SSDs had been eliminated.

The Jenkins class further argues that Swann raises a pre-sumption against schools that are disproportionate in their racial composition. The district court did not err in rejecting the Swann presumption. Milliken was careful to point out that disparity in the racial composition of pupils within a single district merely signals an inquiry into the causes for pronounced racial iden-

tifiability of schools within one school system. The Milliken limitation of this presumption is the subject of comment by the Fifth Circuit in Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, where the court stated:

> It seems important to note also that Milliken, unlike Swann and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), did not sanction the use of any presumptions on the question of the cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus, while Swann, as noted above, permits an inference that the continued existence of one-race schools in a system that formerly practiced de jure segregation is a vestige of such segregation, and Keyes permits one to infer the existence of systemwide de jure segregation from proof that school authorities have pursued an intentional policy of segregation in a substantial portion of a school district, Milliken refused to sanction a presumption that significant disparities in the racial composition of autonomous school districts resulted from impermissible action by those districts and

> thus justified imposing upon them the burden of remedying conditions of segregation existing in other districts. The Milliken Court noted that both Keyes and Swann merely involved "the use of a significant racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal which operates to shift the burden of proof [which] is a very different matter from equating racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy." 418 U.S. at 741 n.19 * * *.

639 F.2d at 1254.

Contrary to the argument of the Jenkins class, cases of this court do not adopt the Swann presumption in inter-district cases. See Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d at 230; see also United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 451 (1975); Haney v. County Board of Education, 410 F.2d 920

(8th Cir. 1969). They simply recognize that racial gerrymandering, which the district court specifically found is absent here, will make school authorities responsible for the foreseeable effects. So also, the argument concerning the presumption runs directly contrary to the teachings of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), that there must be a showing in a school desegregation case of "a current condition of segregation" resulting from intentional state action. The district court's finding that the SSDs were autonomous prevents a conclusion that there is a single system to which such a presumption applies.

The arguments of the Jenkins class run contrary to the facts found by the district court.[17] In essence, in the

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[17]Chief Judge Lay's dissent also argues

detailed recitation of evidence, it seeks to have this court substitute its judgment for that of the district court. This is contrary to the general rule of Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, supra, and to the specific dictate of this court that we give "undiminished deference to the factual adjudications of federal trial judges in cases such as these, uniquely situated as those judges are to appraise the societal forces at work in the communities

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that a recent order of the district court made some nine months after the argument of this case illustrates that the refusal to grant interdistrict relief was clearly erroneous and contradictory to its own findings. We cannot read the general statement in the recent order to have the effect of setting aside carefully detailed findings of facts and conclusions in its 105 page June 5 Order, its 21 page order on intradistrict liability, or its 45 page order on remedy.

where they sit." Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 410-11.

IV.

We next consider arguments advanced by the Jenkins class that racially discriminatory acts by the State in housing-related areas justified interdistrict relief involving the SSDs. Before considering the district court's findings on this matter, we must address the class' argument that the district court misread Milliken in deciding whether the SSDs could be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy. In doing so, we must read all of Milliken and all of the district court's order. According to the class, the district court read Milliken as

holding that each SSD could not be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy absent a finding that that SSD had engaged in racially discriminatory conduct.

The passage from Milliken set forth above in Part I, supra, made plain that, before a federal court may impose an interdistrict remedy, "it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." 418 U.S. at 744-45. Specifically, the court must find that racially discriminatory acts "have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."' Id. at 745. Absent this showing, "there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." Id.

On the facts before it, the Court was forced to conclude in Milliken that:

> With no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect, the court went beyond the original theory of the case as framed by the pleadings and mandated a metropolitan area remedy. To approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court.

Id.

The Court's decision in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, two years later, forcefully emphasized this central holding of Milliken. Justice Stewart wrote for the Court:

> Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor "the scope of the remedy" to fit "the nature

> and extent of the constitutional violation." * * * In Milliken, there was no finding of unconstitutional action on the part of the suburban school officials and no demonstration that the violations committed in the operation of the Detroit school system had had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs. * * * The desegregation order in Milliken requiring the consolidation of local school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area thus constituted direct federal judicial interference with local governmental entities without the necessary predicate of a constitutional violation by those entities or of the identification within them of any significant segregative effects resulting from the Detroit school officials' unconstitutional conduct. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the interdistrict decree was impermissible because it was not commensurate with the constitutional violation to be repaired.

Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Goldsboro City Board of

Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, 745 F.2d at 328 ("An independent school district which has not caused segregation in a neighboring independent district has no duty to rectify a racial imbalance in the other districts.").

Milliken and Hills make clear that we may grant interdistrict relief only to remedy a constitutional violation committed by the SSD, or to remedy an interdistrict effect in the SSD caused by a constitutional violation in KCMSD. The district court first carefully considered whether the SSDs had violated the Constitution. It found they had not. Indeed, the district court concluded that to award relief in this case would, as the Court concluded in Milliken, "impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have

committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy." 418 U.S. at 745. Order of June 5, 1984 at 96. It further found that the Jenkins class had not established any acts or omissions by the SSDs "which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district."[18] The district court was compelled to make this inquiry by Milliken and Hills, stressing as they do the significance of the commission of a constitutional violation. The court's consideration of the appropriateness of interdistrict relief would have been incomplete without this inquiry. Milliken makes plain that the issue of whether the parties are constitutional violators must be

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[18]See Note 16, supra.

considered as well as the issue of whether there is a constitutional violation in one district causing a significant segregative effect in a neighboring district.

Moreover, contrary to the argument of the class that the court looked only to the culpability of the SSDs, the scope of the order is far broader. The court's order admittedly emphasizes the absence of culpability of the suburban districts. However, the court explicitly recognized that under Milliken "there must be evidence of a constitutional violation in one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." Order of June 5, 1984 at 14, 95. The district court compared the theories before it with those in Milliken. It noted that only the schools in one

district were affected and that the remedy must be limited to that system. In examining the cause and effect issue, the court noted that "not only is plaintiff's evidence here blurred as to cause and effect, 'there is no 'careful delineation of the extent of the effect.'" Id. at 96 (quoting Lee, 639 F.2d at 1256). The district court thus dealt not only with the issue of whether the SSDs were constitutional violators but also whether there were significant interdistrict segregative effects. See V, infra. When it did so, it made specific findings that negate current significant interdistrict effects, and concluded that the requirements of Milliken had not been met.

In Bell v. Board of Education 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982), the Sixth

Circuit suggested a number of practical problems in attempting to order school districts to remedy housing violations:

> We do not find any case addressing the argument that a school board otherwise innocent of segregative intent is liable for the discriminatory housing practices of other governmental agencies. We decline to accept this argument. Under this argument the discriminatory conduct of the FHA in making housing loans and local housing authorities in the construction and rental of public housing is attributable to school boards. Such a proposal places too heavy a burden on the schools to remedy wrongs for which they are no more or less responsible than the plaintiffs, the courts, the churches, the Congress or other institutions. Plaintiffs do not suggest how the schools, after a finding of liability, would go about remedying this problem or what kind of order a federal court could enter that might as a practical matter have a chance of changing the fact that black and white families live in separate neighborhoods in most towns and cities.

Id. at 968 (footnote omitted).

The Supreme Court has given consistent admonition in Hills and Milliken that federal courts may not "restructur[e] the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation." 425 U.S. at 279. The district court's findings amply establish that the SSDs were not "implicated" in the State's housing violations. See Part V.

We have considered that culpability is an important factor in interdistrict analysis. In Little Rock, 778 F.2d 404, we ordered that the boundaries of the North Little Rock School District remain intact "in partial recognition of the fact that the nature and extent of its interdistrict violations are less severe than those of

the other defendants." Id. at 435. Judge Arnold's separate concurring and dissenting opinion recognizes that the remedy to be imposed against the SSDs must be "limited by the fact that the SSD is not itself a constitutional violator." Post at 75.

We recognize that Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, states that school districts may be required to participate in a remedy when "there was no evidence implicating them in a direct way with the establishment" of the segregated district. Id. at 228. Morrilton is a gerrymandering case. Its broad language must be limited to its facts, an interdistrict violation in the consolidation of school districts, with the effects felt in each.[19] An attempt

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[19]Milliken makes clear that "an inter-

district remedy might be in order * * * where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." 606 F.2d at 228 (quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745). Unlike the present case, Morrilton contains findings that clearly fall within the Milliken language. We dealt in Morrilton with the consolidation of school districts in Conway County, Arkansas that created an all-black East Side District and a disproportionately white Morrilton District. The court stated:

> The violation here is clearly interdistrict in nature. East Side is almost entirely black and includes territory that would properly have been absorbed by the surrounding districts were it not for racial considerations. The boundaries of the East Side District, and consequently, the boundaries of the other school districts in Conway County, were not neutrally drawn. Thus, the prohibition in other cases * * * is not applicable here. Interdistrict relief is appropriate and necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.

Id. (citations omitted). The court continued:

> Here, the nature of the violation was the consolidation of school districts on the basis of race. * * * [T]he effects of that consolidation were manifested primarily in the boundaries and racial composition of

to imbue Morrilton with broader force disregards not only its salient facts, but also the Seventh Circuit precedent it quotes: "If the state has contributed to the separation of the races, it has the obligation to remedy the constitutional violations. That remedy may include school districts which are its instrumentalities and which were the product of the

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the Morrilton, Plumerville and East Side Districts. East Side is almost all black, and Morrilton is disproportionately white.

Id. at 229.

Morrilton holds that the unconstitutional consolidation of school districts so as to create an all-black district leaving others disproportionately white may properly be remedied through interdistrict relief. To argue that Morrilton compels imposition of an interdistrict remedy on the innocent SSDs in this case ignores that it deals with racial gerrymandering.

violation." Morrilton, 606 F.2d at 229 (quoting United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bowen v. United States, 439 U.S. 824 (1978)). Here the district court clearly found that the SSDs were autonomous, not mere instrumentalities of the State, and their boundaries not the product of any constitutional violation by the State. Despite plaintiffs' urging, the language of Morrilton is limited to its facts, and does not reach the issues we face today.

V.

The Jenkins class argues that a dual housing violation, fueled by State enforcement of racially restricted covenants and felt in virtually every other

housing program in the three-county area touching lending, appraisal, and sales practices, effectively channelled black and white low-income families to separate communities. Such violation and effects, it argues, were interdistrict, and therefore require the interdistrict remedy of consolidation. The Jenkins class further argues that as part and parcel of the State's dual housing market violations, there were constitutional violations by the LCRA and HAKC, which diverted blacks exclusively to the black areas within the KCMSD.

The district court made a general finding that not only is the evidence "blurred as to the cause and effect, there was no 'careful delineation of the extent of the effect.'" Order of June 5, 1984 at

96. It made specific findings that negate the existence of significant interdistrict current effects in the SSDs.[20] As Milliken requires an interdistrict violation causing a significant segregative effect in another district, these findings pose an insuperable barrier to granting interdistrict relief.

The district court found that school district boundaries had not constrained black movement in any way, id. at 39, and no acts of the SSDs contained blacks in KCMSD or kept them out of the SSDs. Id. at 3. The absence of black schools in the defendant districts before Brown did not discourage black families from outside or within Missouri from moving to and

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[20]The court also specifically found the converse. The district court found that no SSD had committed any constitutional violation that had interdistrict segregative effect in the KCMSD or any other

living in those districts. Id. at 18. The district court found that there was steady increase in black enrollments in the SSDs since 1968, and in 1980, 23,434 blacks resided outside the principal contiguous area. Id. at 36-37. We have observed the increase in black enrollment in Hickman Mills, Center, Grandview, and Raytown. See note 9, supra.

The court found that the substantial increases in the KCMSD black population were in large part due to the unusual economic and employment ramifications of the World Wars and intervening Depression. Id. at 17. None of the SSDs were shown by the expert Dr. Tobin to have played any

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district. Order of June 5, 1984 at 18-19, 45, 48, 51, 54, 59, 67, 74, 78, 83, 91, and 95.

significant role in housing matters or to have exerted any control whatsoever over the private decisions people made about where to live. Id. at 37-38. The district court made numerous findings concerning housing choices, economics, and job opportunities. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1490. In rejecting the expert testimony of Dr. Kane, the court pointed to the importance of job location, ethnic clustering, and personal preference. Id. at 1491. These findings demonstrate the importance of personal choice,[21] referred to by at least two courts as "voting with feet." See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537; Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 721 F.2d 1425, 1435

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[21]The court observed that people move for a variety of reasons, including a desire to be with persons of the same race or religion. It specifically found that many blacks who moved to the suburbs did

(5th Cir. 1983).

Regarding the existence of racially restrictive covenants, stressed by the Jenkins class and by Judge Arnold in his concurring and dissenting opinion, the district court made it plain that the restrictive covenants have no current effect in the SSDs. The district court found no evidence that the covenants were enforced by state courts following Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). It recognized the tremendous housing growth in many suburban areas after 1948, when the

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so to enjoy a middle class environment rather than an integrated environment. Order of June 5, 1984 at 35. A substantial number of black families moved to the SSDs during and after the 1960s, many from inside the KCMSD. Id. at 41-42. There was testimony that crime and city riots were factors in housing choices.

covenants were a nullity. That blacks presently live in locations previously covered by restrictive covenants further undermines their significance. Order of June 5, 1984 at 39.[22]

These findings of the district court that we have outlined above deal with conditions or effects that would have been expected had there been an interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from housing violations committed by the State or other actors in KCMSD.

Judge Arnold's concurring and dissenting opinion argues, as does the Jenkins class, that Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D.C. Del.), aff'd 423 U.S. 963 (1975), and United States v. Board of

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[22]With respect to the various districts, the court found that Fort Osage had had no covenants, Order of June 5, 1984 at 51, that Grandview, Lee's Summit, and North Kansas City had very few covenants, id. at

School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980), both approved interdistrict remedies based in part upon housing discrimination practiced by state actors. Post at 65.[23] In Evans, the district court found that

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53, 73, and 83, and that Independence and Liberty also had few such covenants. Id. at 66, 77. The district court found that the restrictive covenants had no effect in Blue Springs, id. at 44-45, and Park Hill, id. at 90. There was no evidence that covenants prevented blacks from moving into Independence, id. at 66, Lee's Summit, id. at 73, or Liberty, id. at 78, and there was no present effect of past practices in preventing movement into Center, id. at 48, Hickman Mills, id. at 59, and Raytown, id at 94. There was no credible evidence of housing discrimination in North Kansas City that had substantial interdistrict effect and much of the development there occurred after the effects of the few covenants were mooted by Shelley, id. at 83, and similar development after Shelley eliminated the effect of such covenants in Grandview. Id. at 53.

[23]Both cases dealt not only with the housing issue, but also contained strong findings based upon boundary violations. See Part VI, infra.

governmental authorities had provided public housing almost exclusively within the confines of Wilmington and restricted the availability of private and public housing to blacks in suburban New Castle County. 393 F. Supp. at 435. In Board of School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a finding that all public housing in the county had been located within the boundaries of the Indianapolis public school district and this was the segregative intent of state agencies.[24] 637 F.2d at 1110-11.

In this case the district court findings are far different. There was no lack of balance between federally assisted housing within the KCMSD and the suburban

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[24]On similar facts in United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), decided after submission of this case, a New York district court imposed an interdistrict remedy

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based on housing violations. The detailed findings of the district court established a lengthy chain of actions which were designed to and succeeded in concentrating the black population in southwest Yonkers and in maintaining east and northwest Yonkers as overwhelmingly white communities. In contrast to the facts presented in this case, not one of Yonkers' subsidized housing projects for families was located in the overwhelmingly white neighborhoods of the city's east and northwest sections. Sites for such projects in white communities were repeatedly considered and rejected. Such action contributed significantly to extreme segregation in Yonkers. Id. at 1364-65. More than 30 years of subsidized housing activity with a sizeable and changing group of city officials sharing responsibility was involved. Id. at 1369. Over that period, there was constant strong community opposition following proposals of sites, a political structure likely to make community opposition effective, and extreme consistency in sites in east Yonkers and other heavily white areas being rejected. Whatever the personnel, there was a common theme that racially influenced opposition to subsidized housing in certain areas of the city and acquiescence in that opposition by city officials. Id. at 1369-70. The court found that the extreme concentration of subsidized housing in southwest Yonkers was the result of a pattern and practice of racial discrimination by city officials. Id. at 1373.

areas, as demonstrated by the 6,832 HUD-insured or subsidized multi-family units within KCMSD and 9,872 such units in the eleven SSDs. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1499. HUD efforts were designed to insure that participating section 8 certificate-holders were aware that affordable housing was available throughout the entire community and that they were informed of their rights under the fair housing laws. Id. at 1500. The court pointed to the affirmative marketing efforts in the Parvin Estates area, located in predominantly white North Kansas City, which were never able to attract more than 12% minority residents. Id. The district court further found no evidence that the practices of HUD in site selection and approval for federally sub-

sidized multi-family housing had a substantial effect upon the racial make-up of schools in KCMSD. Id. at 1499. The findings contained in the analysis of HUD's liability also relate to LCRA and HAKC.

The facts relied on to support the housing violations in Evans and Board of School Commissioners are directly contrary to those found in this case. These cases simply give no assistance to the argument that there have been constitutional violations by housing actors having a significant segregative effect in the SSDs.

Other findings on housing practices are significant. The district court specifically found that FHA appraisal practices before 1950 had at most a de minimis effect on present racial housing patterns.

It examined LCRA practices and its role in administering urban renewal programs under the Housing Act of 1949. It found that HUD had investigated LCRA and issued a report in April 1972 finding discrimination in LCRA's referral practices and in requiring that such practices be ceased and reports filed. Failure to correct this led in June 1973 to refusal to fund the program and a cooperative agreement between HUD, LCRA, and the City of Kansas City by which the city assumed responsibility for relocation under the Act. The relocation report showed that during the period from 1971 to 1976, only 174 black families were relocated. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1497-98. Again, the finding of the district court concerns and is limited to intradistrict claims.

This finding is not sufficient to justify remand to the district court for consideration, as Judge Arnold suggests, of what interdistrict effect may have resulted from such actions.

The district court found that while the HAKC constructed seven family projects between 1952 and 1963 within the model cities or urban renewal areas, the location was in accordance with congressional acts and the assignment practices were approved by HUD. Id. at 1498-99. The court reviewed HUD policies and found expenditures to be balanced between KCMSD and the suburban areas. Id. at 1499. It further found no evidence that the practices of HUD in site selection and approval for federally subsidized multi-family housing substantially affected the racial

make-up of schools within the KCMSD. Id.

These findings clearly were made with reference to the claims against HUD. They do not apply to the housing practices in KCMSD. They belie the possibility of interdistrict effect occurring in the SSDs.

Another weakness immediately is apparent in analyzing the Jenkins class' arguments in the context of the district court's findings. The activities of LCRA and HAKC to which attention is primarily pointed, the investigation and the change in practices, both occurred in the 1970's after KCMSD had experienced the substantial increase in black school population. The exhibit relied upon by the district court in its findings demonstrates that the KCMSD black population

was 18.9% in 1955-56, that it had grown to 30.7% in 1961-62, and had reached 50.2% in the 1970-71 school year. The substantial increase which resulted in the district becoming majority black thus had occurred before the particular events to which the Jenkins class points. To argue that alleged LCRA and HAKC violations created these interdistrict effects simply ignores logic.

The court specifically found that KCMSD assignments of children to particular schools had an intradistrict effect and were not influenced by any SSD. Further, these actions did not have a significant effect on the enrollment in any SSD. Order of June 5, 1984 at 38.[25]

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[25]Chief Judge Lay's dissent devotes considerable discussion to the findings of the district court in the intradistrict hearing concerning the acts of KCMSD. It refers to the movement of the black popu-

The court considered many non-governmental housing factors and rejected the theory that liability may be imposed upon the SSDs for being the recipients of people moving for whatever reason. The court found that red-lining, steering, and block-busting practices by private real estate agents, which may have affected the racial composition of KCMSD, were not the actions of KCMSD or of any SSD and are beyond the control of any school district.

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lation from the central city in a south-east direction. See 593 F. Supp. at 1494. The dissent embarks upon factfindings of its own, however, when it argues that such movement "directly result[ed] in displacing whites into the SSDs." Chief Judge Lay's dissent at 98-99. This is directly contrary to the finding of the district court in its consideration of interdistrict liability, and the dissent makes no effort to consider these statements in a proper Rule 52(a) analysis.

The transition of neighborhoods from white to black and accompanying white flight existed in Kansas City since the 1940's, but no testimony linked the SSDs to the process. Id. at 41. Absent a nexus between the conduct of the SSDs and the policies or practices of independent housing actors, the court would not hold the SSDs liable for racial imbalance. Id. at 42.

Judge Arnold stresses the district court's findings that there is a dual housing market impacting blacks in the KCMSD and causing the public schools to swell in black enrollment, 593 F. Supp. at 1491, and that the State had encouraged racial discrimination by private individuals. Id. at 1503. The court went no further but commented that the question of

State liability would be close if it hinged solely on this encouragement of private discrimination. It then proceeded to base its finding against the State on the intentional creation of the dual school system in KCMSD and the failure to eradicate its vestiges. The Jenkins class makes much of these statements by the district court. Nevertheless, they fall short of making a specific finding of a constitutional violation, and certainly make no finding of any interdistrict effect. That the findings are in the district court's separate opinion concerning intradistrict liability prevents extension of such findings to arguments regarding interdistrict effect in the SSDs.

Thus, even accepting the Jenkins

class' arguments that the district court misread Milliken by improperly limiting its inquiry solely to whether the SSDs were guilty of committing constitutional violations, we conclude that the factual findings of the district court effectively foreclose findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD.[26] It is, of course, evident from the findings that there were no constitutional violations in the SSDs. Under Milliken this answers the arguments made by the Jenkins class, as well as the further articulation in the arguments of KCMSD, and forecloses efforts to require the SSDs to be subject to the

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[26]A recent article, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Inter-District School Desegregation Remedies, 93 Yale L.J. 340 (1983), flatly argues for the extension of housing as a basis for

claim for interdistrict relief, be it con-

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metropolitan school desegregation remedies and as a means of overcoming the Milliken barriers. It outlines in some detail the use of this theory in various desegregation cases, including this one. See id. at nn. 20 & 21. Its description of the limitations of this theory are of interest:

> By contrast, the housing approach is limited in two ways. It does not justify expansion of the remedy beyond the geographical area of operation of the housing authority or other governmental entity found guilty of constitutional violations. Further, the scope of the remedy is limited to the extent to which official housing discrimination demonstrably caused school segregation. Consequently, the housing approach is consistent with the agency principle that seeks to prevent local agents of the state from escaping participating in remedies for their own wrongdoing.

Id. at 347 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). There simply is no evidence in the record in this case that official housing discrimination caused school segregation and the findings of the district court as we have outlined above so demonstrate.

solidation or some step less drastic.

To consider isolated bits of evidence, de minimis in nature, and to mix this with speculation is insufficient to support the conclusion that there are additional factual issues not passed upon by the district court. The findings made were adequate to dispel the conclusion required by Milliken that there be significant segregative effects in the SSDs caused by actions of a constitutional violator in KCMSD.

The housing discussion is not complete without another word of caution. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Gary Orfield, testified that the Kansas City metropolitan area, located in both Missouri and Kansas, comprised a single housing market. Dr. Kane testified that 7,239 black stu-

dents now in Missouri schools would be in Kansas schools had there not been housing discrimination. Record at 7669-70, Pl's Exhibit 1265-R. A number of witnesses called by plaintiff testified their children were moved from the KCMSD to Johnson County, Kansas. Record at 6722-23, 6809, 6863-64, 6953. The district court dismissed the Kansas districts from this action in its order of October 6, 1978. School District of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. at 431. Accordingly, it made no findings on these issues. This evidence, however, points to the serious complications present in a claim based on housing violations where the housing market extends into another state and there is movement from an impacted district into the other

state.

VI.

The Jenkins class relies particularly on decisions from Wilmington, Louisville, Indianapolis, and Allegheny County, in which interdistrict remedies had been ordered. These cases involved gerrymandering; the present case does not. The district court specifically found that the establishment and maintenance of school district boundaries was a local matter in Missouri, determined through local initiative, and uninfluenced by racial animus. The district court thus held the gerrymandering cases inapposite. We agree.

Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, considered the effect of Delaware legislation explicitly prohibiting the state

board from altering the boundaries of the Wilmington school district, fixed as coterminous with the Wilmington city limits. The district court found no racially discriminatory purpose in the Act's freezing of the Wilmington district's boundaries. Id. at 439. It held, however, that the Act helped to maintain the racial identifiability of the Wilmington and the suburban New Castle County school districts and thus contributed to the segregation of the races. Id. at 445-46. The district court also found that the Wilmington district and the suburban districts were not meaningfully separate and autonomous. Id. at 428.

Similarly, in Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.

931 (1975), the court observed that while the county was established by statute as the basic educational unit, "school district lines in Kentucky ha[d] been ignored in the past for the purpose of aiding and implementing continued segregation," and that "[s]uch disregard continue[d] to have an effect on the racial imbalance in the county's schools * * *." Id. at 1360. In addition, the court specifically recognized that both the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts had failed to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Id. at 1359. Accordingly, it is clear that unlike the present case, the Louisville boundary lines were purposefully manipulated to maintain segregated school districts.

United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101, involved the exclusion of certain school districts from the Uni-Gov legislation which perpetuated the segregated white schools in suburban Marion County. Id. at 1105. The issue involved was whether the school boundaries should coincide with the expansion of the boundaries of the City of Indianapolis. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the findings that the decisions were made with discriminatory purpose. Id. at 1108.

In Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982), the court pointed to findings that in 1971 the state and county boards intentionally created a district which was 63% black, and four nearby districts that were from 87% to over 99% white. Id. at 1111.

This process involved the redrawing of school boundaries, and as such was a constitutional violation. Id. at 1120. The violation was interdistrict in nature and required interdistrict relief.

These cases all involve governmental action fixing or ignoring boundaries with discriminatory intent. The findings in the case before us are to the contrary. These cases are therefore distinguishable as are the boundary cases such as Morrilton, considered by this court. See Part IV, supra. These decisions upon which the Jenkins class so heavily relies, when viewed in light of the findings made by the district court, plainly have no applicability to the present case. The district court therefore correctly rejected arguments based upon them.

VII.

To the contrary, other decisions relied upon by the district court carry great force. Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, distinguishing Newburg and Evans, refused to impose an interdistrict remedy on truly autonomous local school districts. Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 648 F.2d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1981), also found autonomous school districts and an intra-district violation as opposed to inter-district violations. A showing of segregative effect alone was considered to be insufficient under Milliken without demonstration of interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect.

Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, 745 F.2d

324, presents many similarities to the case before us. The argument was made, similar to that advanced by the Jenkins class, that the district court erred in its legal ruling that the county board owed no duty to the city board to decrease the proportion of blacks in the city schools. Both the city and county school districts were unitary. The court in Goldsboro stated:

> An independent school district which has not caused segregation in a neighboring independent district has no duty to rectify a racial imbalance in the other district. * * * Both the City and County were found to have unitary school systems. * * * Swann implies that once a school system is unitary it has no duty to go to extraordinary measures to compensate for demographic changes it did not cause or encourage.

Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted)(footnote ommitted). Goldsboro rejected the argu-

ment that it violated the Constitution by maintaining separate county and city school districts which, while racially neutral when created, had in the face of demographic changes made the population of the city schools more black.[27]

The Atlanta case also involves facts similar to those before us. The decision of a three-judge court in Armour v. Nix, 16-708 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 930 (1980), denied an interdistrict remedy. Armour discussed particularly past conditions and practices and stressed the need for a current interdistrict effect. The holding in Armour was best summarized in Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, as follows:

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[27]Goldsboro commented about the myriad reasons for increase in black population in metropolitan areas, referring to Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, Va., 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th

Armour involved the City of Atlanta school district and a number of suburban county districts in the metropolitan Atlanta area. The demographic pattern was a familiar one. The City of Atlanta, and its schools system, has become smaller and predominantly black, as the surrounding suburban communities have expanded rapidly and become predominantly white. Given these residential patterns, no intra-district desegregation plan promised any degree of meaningful racial integration of the public schools within the city district. In Armour, the court concluded that interdistrict relief would, nevertheless, be inappropriate because the current pattern of pervasive residential segregation, which the court found to be the proximate cause of the racial disparities in the population of the various districts, was not the direct result of any official action on the part of the school authorities or any other governmental agent.

Cir. 1972), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). Goldsboro, 745 F.2d at 330 n.9.

Id. at 1259 (footnote omitted).

It is interesting to observe that the central thrust of the jurisdictional statement filed with the Supreme Court by appellant in Armour is based on acts of state actors causing housing segregation in the greater Atlanta area, which, it was argued should require an interdistrict remedy. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Armour, therefore, provides precedential guidance for us. Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68 (1976); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).

VIII.

Yet another reason gives strong support to the district court's denial of interdistrict relief. The district court,

as we have observed on several occasions, made strong findings that the SSDs had become unitary and had eliminated all vestiges of the dual school system at least by the early 1960's.[28] This makes appropriate, as the district court correctly recognized, the Court's discussion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1:

> At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in Green and Alexander.
>
> It does not follow that the communities served by such systems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial

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[28]Chief Judge Lay in his dissent argues that the SSDs did not satisfy the requirements of Brown by simply adopting a

> composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.

Id. at 31-32.

The district court found that in the 1954-55 school year 18.9% of KCMSD's students were black and that the district was

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racially neutral position. The argument that the SSDs must do more to counteract the interdistrict effects flowing from the pre-1954 interdistrict violations completely and totally ignores the district court's findings that any pre-1954 acts had negligible and de minimis current effects.

majority white in enrollment until 1970. Jenkins v. Missouri., 593 F. Supp. at 1492. The exhibit upon which these findings were based further demonstrates that the district became 30% black in the 1961-62 school year, 40% black in the 1965-66 school year, and 60% black in the 1975-76 school year. The significance of these findings is that the increase in black population in KCMSD accelerated after the SSDs eliminated the vestiges of tie system and began operating unitary school systems. The situation is similar to that in Goldsboro, 745 F.2d at 328-29.

In Riddick, 784 F.2d 521, the court stated:

> But once the goal of a unitary school system is achieved, the district court's role ends.
>
> * * *
>
> We have only recently examined both Pasadena and Swann

> and concluded that a district court's power to effect additional remedial orders is limited. "Once a school system has achieved unitary status, a court may not order further relief to counter-act resegregation that does not result from the school system's intentionally discriminatory acts." Vaughns, supra, at 988. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. Davis, supra, 721 F.2d at 1435 ("Changes in neighborhood ethnicity taking place after school officials have transformed their system into a unitary one need not be remedied, of course, for school officials are under no duty to adjust for the purely private acts of those who chose to vote with their feet."); Ross v. Houston Independent School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 5th Cir. 1983)

Id. at 535-37.

Thus, the findings of the district court that the SSDs had become unitary, and that only later did the KCMSD's black population grow, together with the expla-

nation in Swann, compel the conclusion that there be no further intervention by federal courts with the SSDs.[29]

IX.

The district court dismissed the claims that HUD, in administering housing policies and programs, had violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 U.S.C. § 2000(d), et seq., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., and various housing laws and regulations.

We have discussed briefly, in the housing context, the Jenkins class' claims against HUD. It claims that HUD violated its Title VII and Title VIII obligation by

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[29]The Supreme Court, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), pointed to the continued vitality of this principle.

continuing to fund LCRA and HAKC after it knew that that agencies employed racially discriminatory housing practices, and by continuing to administer its section 8 housing program in a manner which is segregative in fact. Section 8 is a housing assistance payment program in which HUD issues certificates to low income renters who then present these certificates to landlords for rental payments. The Jenkins class maintains that HUD failed to direct the certificate recipients to integrative locations and, as a result, three-fourths of certificate holders rent in predominantly black housing units within the KCMSD. It further contends that HUD administered its section 235 single-family mortgage assistance program in a manner which fun-

neled blacks into transitional areas of KCMSD and whites into the SSDs. Ultimately, the Jenkins class asserts, HUD allowed foreclosed section 235 housing in these transitional areas to deteriorate, thus contributing to white flight into the suburbs. They finally charge that although HUD abandoned its 1960s "social homogeneity" policy, it took no steps to encourage families benefiting from its housing programs to make integrative choices.

The district court addressed these contentions in denying the claims against HUD. The Jenkins class simply reasserts these claims on appeal. They do not assert that the district court's underlying factual findings are clearly erroneous. With respect to HUD's rela-

tionship with HAKC and LCRA, the court found, as we discussed above, that HUD investigated the violations and entered a cooperative agreement with those agencies and the City of Kansas City to correct the violations. The court found that HUD acted in a reasonable and responsive manner, that its conduct was not arbitrary and capricious, and concluded that there was no violation of plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1498-99. Regarding section 8 certificate-holders, the court found no evidence that HUD attempted to direct these individuals into particular housing areas. With respect to the other siting issues, the district court found that HUD followed a balanced housing policy and, by assisting housing projects

in the suburban area, attempted to ensure that housing located in inner-city areas was balanced. Id. at 1499. Further, it is again relevant that the section 235 program, authorized by the National Housing Act in 1968, began essentially after the massive shift in the racial population of southeast Kansas City had occurred. Record at 12048-49. Most of these schools had by then become predominantly black. The rapid racial turnover was attributed by plaintiffs' witnesses to a variety of non-HUD related factors and was considered by one of plaintiffs' expert witnesses to be inevitable. Record at 12034, 12061. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Gary Orfield, testified that by 1954 the KCMSD schools, like those of most central cities in the country, were on course to

become predominantly black, regardless of the desegregation actions taken at that point. Record at 14891-93.

We conclude that plaintiffs' arguments do not show that the district court erred as a matter of law in its judgment for HUD. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims against HUD.

X.

Finally, the KCMSD challenges the district court's ruling that for lack of standing KCMSD must be dismissed as a party plaintiff and realigned as a defendant. KCMSD argued that it sustained economic injury through the action of the other defendants and therefore had standing to seek recovery against them. The district court carefully considered

this and other arguments urged by KCMSD to proceed as a party plaintiff. The court recognized a potential conflict between the interests of students seeking to demonstrate the existence of segregative conditions in the area, and those of the KCMSD, which would resist the introduction of incriminating evidence concerning its own past or present actions. School District of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. at 441. The findings of KCMSD liability in the Order of September 17, 1984, Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1492-95, 1504, 1506, and the Order of June 14, 1985, confirm the concerns of the district court in October 1978 that a conflict of interest existed. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing KCMSD as a party plaintif

and realigning it as a defendant.

XI.

We now consider the intradistrict remedy ordered by the district court. No one challenges the substantial portion in which the costs are divided evenly between the State and the KCMSD. These include a program to achieve the AAA rating which would include library improvement and teaching load and curriculum improvements and addition of counselors. The implementation of a summer school program and full-day kindergarten, before- and after-school tutoring, and an early childhood development program are the other remedial steps ordered by the district court. These programs impose a cost over a three-year period on both the State and KCMSD of $10,140,472 each.

The State, however, challenges an improved student achievement program which essentially involves grants to each of the schools in KCMSD for a three-year period, the voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, and the reduction of class size proposal, all of which involve costs to be imposed upon the State alone. We will consider each of these items in turn, as well as the capital improvements program which imposed a cost on the school district of $10,000,000 over a three-year period, and $27,000,000 on the State over the same period.

We have approved remedial and compensatory programs in school desegregation cases. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294. There we stated, in a portion of the opinion joined by eight judges of this court:

> [T]o remedy the effects of a dual system which operated for decades with the sanction of law, remedial efforts must also concentrate on systemic educational improvements.
>
> A secondary remedial objective of the quality education improvements is to enhance the appeal of the city school system, thereby promoting the chances of a stable and successful voluntary desegregation plan. The exodus of white parents and students out of fear of integration, or "white flight," is no excuse for school officials to avoid desegregating.

Id. at 1313 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The district court properly recognized this principle when it stated in its Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985:

> Measures requiring educational improvements have been incorporated into many desegregation remedies. * * * The use of ancillary programs to improve the educational quality of a school district in a desegregation remedy is based upon the federal district's "duty to render a

> decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past. . . " * * * No party to this case has suggested that this plan should not contain components designed to improve educational achievement. In fact, it is "appropriate to include a number of properly targeted educational programs in a desegregation plan" (State Plan at 5). This is true because "individuals in our society who do not possess the levels of skill, literacy, and training essential to this new era will be effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that accompany competent performance, but also from the chance to participate fully in our national life." A Nation at Risk at p 7.

Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at 3-4 (citations omitted).

Recognizing these principles, a number of the programs designed to improve student achievement are not the subject of attack in this appeal before us.

A.

The State argues that the voluntary interdistrict transfer plan imposes an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict violation. The State concedes that this argument was rejected in Liddell, 731 F.2d 1294. This court there held, relying on its earlier decisions in the Liddell litigation, that a voluntary interdistrict program was a "valid part of the attempt to fashion a workable remedy within the city" and would be entirely enforceable against the State. Id. at 1303.[30]

Our holding in Liddell was the basis for the following findings of the district court:

> To accomplish desegregation within the boundary lines of a school district whose enrollment remains 68.3% black is a difficult task. As this Court stated in its January 25, 1985

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[30]A voluntary interdistrict program is one that has great potential for improving the racial balance in the Kansas City

> order, "because of restrictions on this Court's remedial powers in restructuring the operations of local and state government entities," any mandatory plan which would go beyond the boundary lines of KCMSD goes far beyond the nature and extent of the constitutional violation this Court found existed. * * * In addition, voluntary interdistrict transfers may serve to provide additional opportunities for desegregated schools as well as desegregative educational experiences for KCMSD students.

Order of June 14, 1985 at 31 (citations omitted).

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area. The experience in St. Louis with such a plan seems to have been favorable. The district court is correct in its holding that such a program cannot be mandatorily imposed upon the record before the court. Whether a refusal of a district to participate in such a voluntary program may evidence discriminatory intent and thus be an independent basis for further relief and mandatory participation is an issue that we should not anticipate.

The district court specifically found that the State had created the dual school system in Kansas City, that vestiges still lingered, and the obligations of KCMSD and the State to eliminate them have not been met. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1503-04. This finding of a constitutional violation, even though intradistrict in nature, is sufficient under the principles of Liddell to place upon the State the obligation to fund the voluntary inter-district transfer program, under procedures enunciated in Liddell.

We believe, however, that the State properly raises a valid concern with respect to the requirement that the State pay KCMSD the full student foundation allotment for each student who transfers from KCMSD to a SSD. KCMSD, after all,

has also been found to have violated the Constitution. We believe that the situation is not unlike that in St. Louis where both the State and the school district were constitutional violators in an intradistrict violation. There we approved payment by the State on one of two formulas, either one-half of the State aid the district would have received had the student not transferred, or, if a district sends more students than it receives, State aid based on the district's enrollment for the second prior year. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1302. We also have concern that the court has given to the State alone full authority to monitor the voluntary interdistrict program. We believe that the use of a citizens committee in the St. Louis area with

authority to monitor the program and assist in recruitment has been most effective. We direct that the district court modify its order on the voluntary inter-district program so that it is consistent with that approved in Liddell.

B.

The State argues that the district court improperly ordered it to fund an increase in the number of teachers above and beyond that necessary to meet AAA standards.[31] The district court found that "achieving reduced class size is an essential part of any plan to remedy the vestiges of segregation in the KCMSD." Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at

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[31]That portion of the court's order relating to achieving AAA status divided costs evenly between the State and KCMSD. None of the parties object to this portion of the ordered remedy which provides for an increase in librarians and teachers

13.[32] The district court analyzed the school system in detail ordering an increased number of teachers so as to reach the achieved class size goals. It placed the entire burden of this cost on the State and required that any responsibility beyond the minimal goals would be borne by KCMSD. The order contains no findings specifically directed to the issue of the liability of the State for this cost as opposed to that of KCMSD. We believe this portion of the order is infirm in two respects. First, it goes beyond the scope of our order in Liddell, which approved the requirements that would bring the schools within the AAA standing,

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primarily for the purpose of providing additional planning time.

[32]This program carried a total cost of $12,000,000 with payments of $2,000,000, $4,000,000, and $6,000,000 for each of three years.

but only as applied to the non-integrated schools. It also runs counter to the Liddell provision for funding equally divided between the State and the school district. 731 F.2d at 1318. As we have observed, both KCMSD and the State are constitutional violators. We see no reason for this cost being placed solely on the State. We direct the district court to modify that portion of its order dealing with reducing elementary and secondary school class size so as to divide the cost equally between the KCMSD and the State.

C.

The State also objects to that part of the court's order providing for an effective school program, with the goal of improving student achievement, to be

funded entirely by the State. This program provides specific grants for each school, in an amount higher for those with 90% or more black enrollment. Over three years, it totals $17,000,000.

The district court made detailed findings with respect to the first year's expenditures and the components to be considered that year, and ruled that later years would be determined by a school advisory committee at each school making recommendations to the School Board. Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at 22. The goals of the program were to be directed toward improvement of elementary reading and improving the pass rate on the BEST on the secondary level. We have no difficulty concluding that the findings of the district court support the creation of

this fund as its purpose is to provide programs that would enhance education. Nevertheless, we see no findings in the district court order that in any way substantiates placing the entire burden of this program on the State. We believe that the cost should be shared equally between the State and KCMSD and direct that the district court modify its order in this respect.

- D.

The State argues that it should not be required to furnish $27,000,000 toward a $37,000,000 capital improvement program.

The district court found that the average age of the sixty-eight school buildings utilized by KCMSD is fifty-eight years and that improvement of school faci-

lities is an important factor in the overall success of the desegregation plan. The district court said:

> Specifically, a school facility which presents safety and health hazards to its students and faculty serves both as an obstacle to education as well as to maintaining and attracting non-minority enrollment. Further, conditions which impede the creation of a good learning climate, such as heating deficiencies and leaking roofs, reduce the effectiveness of the quality education components contained in this plan.

Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at 34.

These findings of the district court are sufficient to support its conclusion that capital improvements are necessary for successful desegregation. The State raises a troublesome argument based upon the finding of the district court that the buildings in the school district were in

need of repair because of deferred maintenance and the failure to maintain the buildings. It argues that this was not the result of an unlawful action by the State. Nevertheless, we believe that the district court findings establish the propriety of this portion of the remedy and because the State is a constitutional violator, it has the obligation to support its proportionate share of this aspect of the remedy. Once again, however, we believe that the equal division between the State and KCMSD, both constitutional violators, is more equitable, and is consistent with our earlier opinion. See Liddell 731 F.2d at 1318-19.

Further findings support our view. The district court found that the deferred maintenance was a result of KCMSD's lack

of financial resources as evidenced by its inability to pass a capital improvements bond issue, although several attempts had been made since 1965. Memorandum Opinion of June 14, 1985 at 33. This is not unlike the situation in St. Louis where only one bond issue was passed in the last twenty-four years and thirteen were rejected. We are troubled with the district court's reasoning in which it takes into consideration the expenditure by KCMSD of $15,000,000 to $18,000,000 for implementation of an earlier desegregation plan for which it was not reimbursed and for its budgeting in the 1986 fiscal year of approximately $17,000,000 for desegregation programs not covered in the plan. The State argues that to apply such payments to justify additional contribu-

tion by the State is similar to the equitable restitution for payments unlawfully withheld in the past, which were condemned as contrary to the Eleventh Amendment by the Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In view of our conclusion that these costs should be shared equally by the State and KCMSD prospectively, we need not give further consideration to this troublesome issue.

E.

The State makes a final argument that the total cost of the funding placed approximately 80% on the State and only 20% on KCMSD. Our discussion of the specific items above and our conclusion that these costs should be shared equally by KCMSD and the State obviate our further consideration of these arguments. We have

already pointed to the role of both as constitutional violators and we need not catalog further the acts of the State or of KCMSD that causes liability to be placed upon each entity. Equal division of costs between the local school authorities and the State was approved in Milliken, 433 U.S. at 277; Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, 519 F. Supp. 923, 942 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 663 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); and Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 404, 424-26 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).

We observe also that the record before the district court demonstrates that KCMSD has a higher property valuation than those in the SSDs[33] and that KCMSD has imposed

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[33]The valuation per pupil in KCMSD is

upon itself a below average rate of tax levy. KCMSD had a levy of $3.43 per $100 while the other districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area had an average levy of $4.28. This real estate tax falls upon a property base, a great portion of which is highly developed commercial real estate, as opposed to single family homes occupied by students in KCMSD.

We are aware of the complexities of the State's funding of Missouri schools. While the district court made no findings on this subject, a memorandum filed by the State discusses the procedure established in Chapter 163, R.S.Mo, in great detail. The wealth of the school district plays a

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$60,371 as opposed to averages of $40,000 in the SSDs. State Ex. 4.

considerable role in determining the working of the State formula. As the formula deals entirely with distribution of funds, we believe that, should the district court determine it to be desirable, further consideration could be given to the working of this formula, particularly in reference to desegregation plans in the case now before us, and that in St. Louis, which we treated in Liddell, to determine whether there is any discriminatory motive or action in application of the formula and distribution of funds to school districts.

While our decision places greater financial obligation on KCMSD, it is our intention that the remedy ordered by the court be fully funded. We discussed in detail methods available to the district

court to achieve this goal in Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1319-1323.

CONCLUSION

One further comment is in order. The record demonstrates in a number of areas that insofar as "white flight" may have been a factor in the Kansas City area, it cannot be considered without reference to the schools in the neighboring State of Kansas. This aspect of the case was not developed in detail nor did the court find it necessary to make findings on this issue. Nevertheless, it is a fact that might at some appropriate time in the future need to be given consideration in evaluating the segregation that may exist in the greater Kansas City area. Certainly, it would be appropriate and desirable, although we admit complex, to give careful consideration to inclusion of

the Kansas schools in any voluntary inter-district plan.

We affirm the judgment of the district court in favor of the SSDs and affirm the judgment of the district court and its intradistrict remedy imposed upon the State and the KCMSD with the exceptions we have discussed above that equalize the cost between the State and KCMSD.

ROSS, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in Judge Gibson's opinion but write separately to emphasize to the parties in this case the importance of the admonition in footnote 30.

At the time of argument it was my understanding that a voluntary inter-district program, patterned along the lines of the St. Louis program was a real possibility. It would now appear that some of the districts are not moving forward with this plan.

In my opinion the failure to organize and implement this program would be a very significant factor in determining discriminatory intent in the future litigation which is certain to result from the further processing of this case. The St.

Louis program would be a useful model for the actions to be taken by all the Missouri districts which are parties to this action.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I concur in much of what the Court has said today, I must respectfully dissent from those portions of the lead opinion concerning suburban school district (SSD) participation in a remedy for the interdistrict effects of the State of Missouri's housing violations. In all other respects, I concur in the judgment.

I would hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the SSDs cannot be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy for interdistrict school segregation caused by the State's constitutional violations in the area of housing. The case should be remanded to the District Court for determination of

the current interdistrict effects, if any, of the State's housing violations. Any SSDs implicated by this analysis should be obliged to partipate in an appropriately tailored interdistrict remedy.

I.

The District Court was of the view that no SSD could be made to take part in an interdistrict remedy unless there had been "a racially discriminatory act by [the SSD] that substantially caused segregation in another district." Opinion of June 5 at 6, citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). The District Court concluded that because the housing discrimination at issue here was perpetrated by the State and other governmen-

tal entities, rather than by the SSDs, the SSDs cannot be allotted a mandatory role in an interdistrict remedy for any resulting school segregation. Opinion of June 5 at 42.

This position involves a misconstruction of Milliken. In a passage which expresses the core of Milliken, Chief Justice Burger wrote:

> The controlling principle consistently expounded in our holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education], 402 U.S. [1], at 16 (1971). Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one distirct that produces a significant segregative effecting another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory

> acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.

418 U.S. at 744-45 (emphasis added). Numerous other portions of Milliken further evidence the Court's view that an interdistrict remedy involving a school district may be based on discriminatory acts of the state or other school districts with interdistrict segregative effects on the school district in question. See, e.g., id.at 745 ("With no showing of significant violation by the . . . outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect" (emphasis added), an interdistrict remedy was improper); id. at 748 (interdistrict relief unjustified because ". . .

there has been no showing that either the State or any of the . . . outlying districts engaged in activity that had a cross-district effect." (emphasis added)); id. at 750-751 (discussing state activities as possible bases for interdistrict relief).

As support for the District Court's decision regarding housing, the lead opinion cites the discussion of Milliken in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).[1] Yet, Hills states that the Court in Milliken rejected an interdistrict remedy because, while the trial court had found that "constitutional violations committed by the Detroit School Board and State officials had contributed to racial segre-

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[1]The lead opinion does not make clear its precise view of the District Court holding that because the SSDs are not themselves constitutional wrongdoers, they may not be made part of an interdistrict

gation in the Detroit schools, . . . there

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remedy for State housing violations. See ante at 25-31. At points, the opinion appears to agree that Milliken precludes inclusion of non-culpable SSDs in an interdistrict remedy for State violations. See ante at 28-31. At other points, however the opinion suggests that the District Court viewed the lack of SSD culpability simply as an important factor in determining that interdistrict relief was inappropriate, a factor considered along with factual findings as to the lack of interdistrict effects of state-fostered housing discrimination. See ante at 26, 28, 29. This is a mischaracterization of the District Court's position which understates the significance the District Court attached to SSD innocence. The District Court repeatedly made clear its view that the fact that the SSDs were not constitutional violators, taken by itself, barred requiring SSD participation in an interdistrict remedy. See Opinion of June 5 at 6, 34-42, 45, 47-48, 51, 53-54, 58-59, 66-67, 73-74, 78, 82-83, 89-91, 94-95, 97, 100-103. Further, the District Court did not determine whether or what interdistrict segregation is attributable to State housing violations, and never claims to have made such a determination; instead, having concluded that SSD innocence precluded interdistrict relief, the District Court found it unnecessary to devote substantial consideration to the question of interdistrict effects. See infra, Part II.

had been neither proof of unconstitutional actions on the part of neighboring school districts nor a demonstration that the Detroit violations had produced significant segregative effects in those districts." Id. at 792 (emphasis added). Further, in the portion of Hills quoted by the Court, ante at 27, the Supreme Court states: "In Milliken, there was no finding of unconstitutional action on the part of the suburban school officials and no demonstration that the violations committed in the operation of the Detroit school system had had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs." 425 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added).[2]

Thus, it is not necessary that each

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[2]The lead opinion's citation of Hills is particularly ironic because the author of Hills, Mr. Justice Stewart, expressly stated in his Milliken concurrence that

school district subjected to an interdistrict remedy have itself committed a constitutional violation.[3] Instead, Milliken establishes that an interdistrict remedy is justified wherever discriminatory actions of either the state, or local school districts, or both, have had significant interdistrict segregative effects. The SSDs

> may not maintain that their districts should be excluded from any interdistrict remedy if they are found innocent of committing any constitutional violations because they should not be held responsible for the acts of the state legislators or other state subdivisions such as local housing authority or a zoning board. The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed

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state officials' housing violations, if they had an interdistrict effect, would justify an interdistrict remedy. See infra at 64, quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).

[3]Indeed, the principal opinion concedes that a constitutional violation in the operation of the KCMSD with interdistrict

> at the state and cannot be avoided by a fragmentation of responsibility among various agents. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1958).

United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (emphasis added).[4]

Perhaps the paradigm case in which a state's constitutional violation merits interdistrict relief even absent participation by the local school district in

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segregative effects felt in the SSDs would merit an interdistrict remedy involving the SSDs. See, e.g., ante at 28. Yet it offers no explanation of how or why violations by the State or the KCMSD in operating KCMSD are to be distinguished from State housing violations. In either case the SSDs would themselves be innocent of wrongdoing, but would feel the effects of other actors' violations.

[4]Of course, since formulation of an appropriate interdistrict remedy is guided by equitable principles, the fact that a school district has not itself violated the Constitution may affect the particular

the violation is where the state draws boundary lines on the basis of race. See, e.g., Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 228 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1119-1121 (3d Cir. 1982). But a state's actions also merit an interdistrict remedy where it or its subdivisions cause interdistrict school segregation by employing discriminatory housing laws, policies, or practices. "[W]here the state has contributed to the separation of the races . . . by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws," it may be

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role it is assigned in remedying the state's violation. See infra at 75-76.

appropriate to enter "a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district lines." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Thus, I take it as established that a school district can be made to participate in an interdistrict remedy even if it is not "personally" guilty of violating the Constitution, that such relief is appropriate where a State's constitutional violations have contributed to interdistrict segregation, that "State" for this purpose includes any state or local agency, and that there is nothing unique or peculiar about housing agencies that would take them out of this rule. These conclusions are established, not only by Milliken itself and the other authorities

just discussed, but also by our own unanimous en banc opinion in Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, supra. There, the Morrilton and Plumerville school districts argued that "since the government made no showing that either Morrilton or Plumerville participated in the development of the East Side District as a segregated district, the District Court's imposition of interdistrict relief was unwarranted." 606 F.2d at 225. We squarely rejected that argument:

> Morrilton and Plumerville argue that since there was no evidence implicating them in a direct way with the establishment of the East Side District, the court has no authority to order them to remedy the state's wrong. This argument is clearly without merit since the effects of the unconstitutional state action are felt in both districts.

606 F.2d at 228 (footnote omitted). We then quoted the very passage, explicitly

mentioning housing, from Board of School Commissioners, 573 F.2d at 410, a portion of which I have already quoted. In light of this en banc opinion, which of course authoritatively states the law of this Circuit until and unless overruled, I do not know how the District Court's position - that the SSDs, because individually guiltless, cannot be made part of an interdistrict remedy - can stand.[5]

The Supreme Court has recognized on a number of occasions that there is a close reciprocal relationship between residential patterns and the racial composition of schools. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973); Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21. The District

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[5]The lead opinion maintains that Morrilton is a gerrymandering case that "must be limited to its facts." Ante at 30-31. Yet, the lead opinion provides no explanation of why the principles we

Court here found that "there is an inextricable connection between schools and housing." 593 F. Supp. at 1491. Other federal courts have ordered school districts to participate in interdistrict remedies based in part upon housing discrimination practiced by other branches of state government. See Evans v. Buchanan 393 F. Supp. 428, 434-438 (D. Del.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); Board of School Commissioners, 456 F. Supp. 183, 188-192 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd in part and

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approved in Morrilton are to be so limited in their application. It does not explain how or why State discrimination in drawing school district boundaries is to be distinguished from State discrimination in housing. Housing violations may be harder to prove or create special problems of remedy, but that does not mean that no remedy should be afforded.

vacated in part on other grounds, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109-1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). This Court should demonstrate no less concern for the segregative effects of state housing violations upon schools. When a state segregates children on a multi-district basis, whether it does so by drawing boundary lines or by steering or restricting the races to homes on different sides of pre-existing lines, the courts can provide interdistrict relief that includes all affected districts. See generally, Note, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School Desegregation Remedies, 93 Yale L.J. 340 (1983).[6]

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[6]In a case relied upon by the District Court and by the principal opinion, Bell v. Board of Education, Akron Public Schools, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982), the Sixth Circuit refused to accept that an

II.

Having concluded that an SSD may be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy for any interdistrict effects of housing discrimination upon the SSD, I turn to the question whether the State or its subdivisions have committed any housing violations that have current interdistrict segregative effects. In its September 17, 1984 opinion, 593 F. Supp. 1485, the District Court found or referred to a number of instances of housing

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otherwise innocent school district could be made to participate in a remedy for the discriminatory housing practices of other governmental agencies. Id. at 968. I find this portion of Bell irreconcilable with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Milliken, as well as with this Court's Morrilton opinion.

discrimination by the State and its subdivisions that could have had such segregative effects. However, examination of that opinion and of the District Court's June 5, 1984 opinion, in which it granted the SSDs' Rule 41(b) motions, persuades me that the District Court never finally determined whether or what current interdistrict segregation is attributable to these housing violations. Having concluded that the SSDs could not be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy, assessing the interdistrict effects of housing discrimination by the State was a task the District Court no longer found necessary. Although the principal opinion asserts that the District Court made findings that foreclose the possibility of interdistrict effects, the findings that

it cites are largely not on point and do not resolve the question. The lead opinion's arguments on this point are in essence an exercise in appellate fact-finding, an exercise that is unjustified since the record here is hardly so one-sided as to make any alternate findings clearly erroneous. This determination has not yet been made by the District Court, and must be before the book can be closed on the SSDs' liability to interdistrict relief.

Perhaps the clearest, most direct example of the State of Missouri's discrimination in the area of housing is the enforcement by its courts of racially restrictive covenants. See 593 F. Supp. at 1497. Even after state enforcement of such covenants was held unconstitutional

in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), Missouri's courts continued to entertain damage actions for breach between parties to the covenant, see Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1949), a practice the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Barrow v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Further, the District Court found that the State had in the past taken numerous other actions that were discriminatory against blacks, such as mandating separate schools for blacks and whites, Mo. Const. Art. IX, §1(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976), §§ 163.130, 165.117 R.S. Mo. (repealed 1957); providing that school boards could establish separate libraries, parks, and playgrounds for whites and blacks, §165.327 R.S. Mo. (1959); and making it a crime for a person of one-eighth Negro blood to marry a white

person, §563.240 R.S. Mo. (1959). 593 F. Supp. at 1503. "These actions," the District Court found, "had the effect of placing the state's imprimatur on racial discrimination." Id. Thus, the state "created an atmosphere in which the private white individuals could justify their bias and prejudice against blacks," and "encouraged racial discrimination by private individuals in the real estate, banking, and insurance industries." Id. The District Court concluded that "[t]his has and continues to have a significant effect on the dual housing market in the Kansas City area." Id.[7]

A predicate for interdistrict relief may also be found in discriminatory

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[7]The District Court did not base its award of intradistrict relief against the State on these housing violations, since it found a "more salient reason," 593 F. Supp. at 1503, for State intradistrict

housing practices of the LCRA and the HAKC, which are both instrumentalities of state government for whose discrimination the State of Missouri is accountable.[8] Since it had determined that the SSDs could not be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy, and since it had found other bases for state intradistrict liability, the District Court considered these two entities only in connection with claims against HUD. Nonetheless, it appears from the Court's findings, as well as from evidence not addressed by the

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liability in the State's failure to dismantle the dual school system it had created within the KCMSD. Id, at 1503-1504. The issue here, however, is whether interdistrict relief is warranted, an issue the District Court did not speak to in its evaluation of state housing discrimination.

[8]Missouri's state legislature established the LCRA in 1953 and gave it, subject to the approval of Kansas City's government, citywide jurisdiction to admi-

Court because it was not directly relevant to HUD's liability, that these agencies have committed housing violations that may have interdistrict segregative effects. Between 1953 and 1973, LCRA practiced discrimination in relocating persons displaced by urban renewal, steering blacks to southeastern Kansas City and relocating whites throughout the city. 593 F. Supp. at 1497-1498. It appears that HAKC explicitly segregated its housing units until 1958, and that, despite the nominal adoption of a "freedom of choice" tenant-selection policy, HAKC

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nister urban-renewal programs. §§ 99.320 (1), 99.330 R.S. Mo. The HAKC was created by the state legislature in 1939 and, subject to Kansas City's approval, given authority to administer low-income housing programs throughout the City. §99.040 R.S. Mo.

may have continued segregative practices until 1964. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Kalima Jenkins, et al., at 24; Brief of Defendant-Appellee Department of Housing and Urban Development at 11.[9] Like Missouri's enforcement of racially restrictive covenants and encouragement of private discrimination, the discriminatory practices of LCRA and HAKS could have significantly affected the dual housing market in the Kansas City area; if these practices have current interdistrict segregative effects, they merit interdistrict relief.[10]

The District Court did find that the State's own discrimination had contributed

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[9]I would require the District Court to make findings on these points on remand.

[10]I note at this juncture several concerns I have over the District Court's analysis of the claims against FHA and HUD.

From the mid-1930s through 1947, the FHA's appraisal manuals stressed the desirability of racial covenants, limited availability of mortgage insurance for developments not subject to racial covenants, and down-graded appraisals in neighborhoods undergoing integration. After 1947, the FHA removed explicit racial references from its manuals, but continued to emphasize in them the importance of "social homogeneity" and "compatibility among the neighborhood occupants." 593 F. Supp. at 1497; P. Ex. 1305. Although a number of other courts have noted the invidious character of these and other aspects of FHA's appraisal policies, see, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 729 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 368 F. Supp. 143, 182-183 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), the District Court exonerated the FHA, reasoning that the FHA was merely gauging the economic realities associated with racial discrimination. 593 F. Supp. at 1497. I believe that in so holding the District Court overlooked the fact that FHA was not merely an uninvolved observer, but was rather an active participant in the housing market whose policies and practices had a significant impact on the market. FHA practices set a standard followed by other lenders and complied with by real estate developers who wished their developments to be eligible for FHA-insured financing, even if some units were not ultimately financed through the FHA. The FHA not only gave private discrimination consideration in

its own conduct, but also encouraged others to engage in discrimination; this government cannot lawfully do.

The District Court's finding that FHA's policies and practices have no significant current effect may be similarly vulnerable. The Court based its conclusion on the fact that prior to 1950 FHA insured 15,000 homes in the KCMSD, and between 1950 and 1980 there were over 2,000,000 housing turnovers in the area. 593 F. Supp. at 1497. But the FHA's practices may have affected far more homes than were actually financed through the FHA.

With regard to HUD, the District Court found that the agency had acted "reasonably" because it had taken action in the 1970s to end discriminatory practices by HAKC, whose programs HUD funded. 593 F. Supp. 1498-1499. Yet there was extensive evidence, not addressed by the District Court, that HUD knew of shortcomings in HAKC's tenant-assignment practices for years without taking action to end them.

In view of the fact that, under the prevailing view in this Court, there will be no remand for further fact-finding on the effects of housing discrimination, I do not pursue further this line of argument. Under my view (shared in part by three other judges), there would be such a remand, and in that event it would be open to the District Court to reconsider its findings as to HUD and FHA and, if

significantly to the dual housing market in "the Kansas City area," 593 F. Supp. at 1503, and that "the dual housing market . . . , which still exists to a large degree today . . . , impacted blacks in the KCMSD and consequently caused the public schools to swell in black enrollment." 593 F. Supp. at 1491. But the Court provided no more precise findings on the question of to what extent black students were concentrated in the portion of Kansas City covered by the KCMSD rather than more evenly dispersed through the portions of the Kansas City area served by the SSDs. Nor did the District Court assess the interdistrict segregative effects of housing discrimination by the LCRA or HAKC. Again, because the District Court concluded that the SSDs could not be made

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appropriate, bring them back in as participants in an interdistrict remedy.

to help remedy the violations of independent housing actors, it had no need to determine whether the State's housing violations have current interdistrict segregative effects.

The plurality does not contend, by and large, that the District Court addressed this issue directly, but instead contends only that a number of findings that the Court made in other contexts somehow negate the possibility of significant interdistrict effects. First, it is argued at various points that the fact that the SSDs have operated unitary school systems since a few years after Brown precludes the possiblity that housing violations have caused interdistrict segregation. E.g., ante at 21-23, 44-46. However, it is difficult to fathom how the

fact that a school district is internally unitary indicates that school children have not been segregated on an interdistrict basis; that an SSD's schools are integrated with respect to children who live in the SSD has little bearing on whether, due to State housing discrimination, more whites and/or fewer blacks live in the SSD, and, concomitantly, fewer whites and/or blacks live in KCMSD, than would otherwise be the case. If the SSDs had not been unitary, their own discrimination might have added to any State-fostered interdistrict segregation that exists; that they are unitary indicates only that they have not augmented interdistrict segregation caused by state housing violations. Unitary SSDs are no longer under an obligation to undo intra-

district segregation, Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32, but they still may be required to participate in a remedy for the current segregative effects of interdistrict segregation.

Next, the plurality argues that the District Court "was plain" that the State's pre-1948 enforcement of restrictive covenants has no current significant segregative effect. Ante at 33 & n.22. While I agree that the District Court made findings that dispose of the issue as to several of the SSDs, as to most of the SSDs the District Court did not make findings that are adequate to resolve the question whether present residential patterns would be significantly less segregated had restrictive covenants not been enforced. I agree with the lead opinion

that there are no current segregative effects attributable to racially restrictive covenants in the Fort Osage School District, since there was no evidence of any such covenants located in that district, see Opinion of June 5 at 51; a similar conclusion is probably justified as to the Park Hill School District, see id. at 90. As to the nine remaining SSDs, however, I cannot agree that the District Court made findings sufficient to support a conclusion that the State's enforcement of restrictive covenants has caused no current interdistrict segregation. First, in each portion of the District Court's opinion discussing the restrictive covenants in a particular SSD, the District Court emphasizes the lack of SSD complicity in the placement or enforce-

ment of the covenants within its boundaries. See, e.g., Opinion of June 5 at 48 (Center School District); id. at 73 (Lee's Summit School District). Thus, the District Court's misconstruction of Milliken may have tainted its consideration of the restrictive-covenant problem.

Even were this difficulty absent, the District Court's remaining findings are still not adequate to support a finding of no current effect. As to the Center, Hickman Mills, and Raytown School Districts, the District Court noted that there was no evidence of any black family that failed to move into the districts because of the covenants, and that there is no present barrier to black movement into the districts. Id. at 48, 58-59, 94.

With regard to the Lee's Summit, Independence, and Liberty School Districts, the Court found that there were relatively few restrictive covenants in the districts, and that there was no evidence of any black family that failed to move into the district due to restrictive covenants. Id. at 66, 73, 77-78. Finally, the District Court observed that there were few racially restrictive covenants in the Grandview and North Kansas City School Districts, and that the effect of such covenants in these districts and the Blue Springs School District is limited or mooted by extensive post-Shelley residential development in those districts.

None of these findings resolves the question whether fewer blacks or more whites reside in the SSDs due to

pre-Shelley and pre-Barrow enforcement of restrictive covenants. That there is no present barrier to black movement into an SSD hardly demonstrates that there was no barrier to such movement in the past that has current effects. That extensive post-Shelley residential development has occurred does not mean that earlier enforcement of racial covenants has not helped make a district identifiably white and inhospitable to blacks, or that it has no other current effect on residential patterns. Finally, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to give evidence of particular black families that did not move into a district due to restrictive covenants in order to demonstrate the segregative effect of such covenants; to hold that they had no segregative effect on

this basis simply blinks reality.

Further, the District Court did not determine the current effects of the State's continued efforts to give legal force to these covenants from 1948 to 1953, and, more importantly, the imprimatur that the State placed upon private housing discrimination by ordaining various forms of racial discrimination, see supra at 67-68.[11]

Finally, the plurality contends for two reasons that there can be no current interdistrict effects of housing violations by LCRA and HAKC. First, it cites the District Court's finding that HUD followed a balanced housing policy, locating federally funded housing in both

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[11]However, I note with regard to the latter basis of State liability that the District Court stated, "To the extent, if any, that the racial composition of the KCMSD is the result of steering and block-

KCMSD and in the SSDs, and that HUD's site- selection-and-approval practices had not affected the racial make-up of KCMSD schools. Ante at 36, citing 593 F. Supp. at 1499. Second, the lead opinion contends that the LCRA and HAKC practices of which the plaintiffs complain occurred in the 1970s, after KCMSD had experienced a substantial increase in black population. Ante at 37. Both of these points involve a misapprehension of the plaintiffs' claims: As to the first, the claim is not

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busting practices by private real estate agents . . . the Court finds that these actions of private individual real estate agents are not actions of the KCMSD or any SSD." Opinion of June 5 at 41. This reinforces my conclusion that the District Court has left open the question whether State-fostered private discrimination in the housing area has current interdistrict segregative effects.

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that unbalanced housing site selection and approval caused interdistrict segregation, but instead, that once the projects were built, HAKC explicitly segregated them, or later, steered whites to some projects and blacks to others. As to the second, the plaintiffs' complaint is not primarily about HAKC and LCRA activities in the 1970s; rather, the District Court found that LCRA practiced discrimination from 1953 to 1973, and the plaintiffs contend that HAKC segregated its housing units from its inception in 1939 until as late as the mid-1960s. See supra at 68-69.

I agree with Judge Gibson that there are many factors other than housing discrimination that may have contributed substantially to the present concentration of blacks in the KCMSD. See ante at

32-33. Insofar as economic and demographic factors unrelated to official discrimination caused interdistrict residential segregation, the State and the SSDs may not be required to remedy the concomitant interdistrict school segregation. See Pasadena City Board of Education v, Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-437 (1976). I also agree that there are geographic limitations on the effects of housing discrimination, and that some of the effects of the State's constitutional violations may have been felt in Kansas, rather than in the Missouri SSDs. See ante at 40. But the District Court has not yet made any findings on these points, as well as many other issues bearing on the question of interdistrict segregative effects, and as the lead opinion itself

observes, the District Court is "'uniquely situated'" to assess such matters. Ante at 25, quoting Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 410-411; see Morrilton, 606 F.2d at 230.

Therefore, the case should be remanded to the District Court to determine precisely what current interdistrict segregative effects may be attributed to housing discrimination by the State, LCRA, and HAKC. Upon remand, the District Court should first consider this question from the perspective of the SSDs' Rule 41(b) motions. Any SSD that does not prevail on its motion should be permitted to present evidence to rebut a finding that it is implicated in the current interdistrict segregative effects of the housing violations. While the SSDs were given the opportunity to continue to participate in

the proceedings after the District Court granted their Rule 41(b) motions, this was not "a meaningful opportunity for [the SSDs] to present evidence . . . on the propriety of a multidistrict remedy." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 721-722. After the District Court had held that the SSDs could not be made part of a remedy for the constitutional violations of other governmental entities, the SSDs no longer had any reason to take part in the suit. Therefore, were this Court to reverse the District Court on this issue, the SSDs would be entitled to present evidence.

If, at the end of these proceedings, the District Court found current segregative effects of the housing discrimination, it should then formulate an appropriately tailored interdistrict

remedy, a remedy including each affected SSD. I caution, however, that, in accord with the equitable principles that govern such remedies, Milliken, 418 U.S. at 737-738, the role that may be assigned to each SSD may be limited by the fact that the SSD is not itself a constitutional violator. Thus, it would likely be inappropriate to burden the SSDs, rather than the State, with the financial costs of the remedy. On the other hand, it seems clear that affected SSDs could be required to participate in an inter-district transfer program designed to make the racial composition of the districts' schools what it would have been absent official housing discrimination.

III.

I conclude that an SSD, even if its

own actions are without blemish, may be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy for the housing discrimination of the State of Missouri or its subdivisions, so long as that discrimination has current interdistrict segregative effects involving the SSD. The case should, in my view, be remanded to the District Court to determine whether the established constitutional violations of the State and the LCRA, as well as the possible violations of the HAKC, have had any such effects. If the District Court finds that this discrimination has produced interdistrict segregation, it should fashion a remedy which accords with the principles discussed in this opinion.

Insofar as Judge Gibson's opinion departs from this view, I dissent; in all

other respects I concur. It is appropriate to add that, although the plurality opinion in this case of course announces the judgment, it does not make law for this Circuit except in those respects that command a majority vote of the judges sitting in this case. Four judges seem to agree that school districts not individually guilty of constitutional violations may not be compelled to participate in an interdistrict remedy. Four do not. That question is therefore open for determination in future cases in this Circuit.

LAY, Chief Judge, with whom HEANEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.

A world of rhetoric cannot hide the world of fact.[1] No one can deny that the school systems within the Kansas City metropolitan area were racially segregated before 1954, continued to be segregated after 1954, and that virtually all remain segregated today. The clearly erroneous rule, used by the lead opinion to give blanket approval to the district court's conclusions, was never intended to be a rule of blind deference. This is particularly true when, as here, the record does not support the district court's conclusions. This court's affirmance of the district court, if allowed to stand,

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[1]Cf. T.H. Huxley, Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews (1891) ("A world of fact lies outside and beyond the world of words").

destines the Kansas City metropolitan area to racially segregated schools and a segregated community for decades to come. The lead opinion ignores Supreme Court precedent and brushes aside thirty years of this circuit's rulings mandating school integration.[2] The lead opinion also fails to acknowledge the district court's misunderstanding of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), and the resulting erroneous legal premises on which the district court's conclusions are based. The effect of this pervasive error makes the lead opinion's analysis largely irrelevant to the record before us.

It now remains for the people of metropolitan Kansas City to choose whether

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[2]For the history of this circuit's school desegregation rulings, see Heaney, Busing, Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of Equal Opportunity, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 735 (1985).

their community and school systems shall continue to foster an environment of racial separation. Although many might respond that freedom of choice is essential to democratic government, this proposition should be accepted only so long as equality of opportunity is not denied to those who do not have the majority will on their side. Here, the tragedy of the legalized discrimination of the past century is that it has resulted in continued denial of acceptable equal opportunities to both the black and white children in the Kansas City area. The lead opinion closes its eyes both to Missouri's long history of legally-mandated segregation of and discrimination against blacks and to the uncontroverted evidence at trial that showed that for decades only the Kansas

City metropolitan school district (KCMSD) provided blacks in the Kansas City metropolitan area with any educational opportunity at all. Moreover, for much of the period during which the suburban population dramatically increased, blacks were precluded by law or otherwise discouraged from residing anywhere other than the southeast corridor of the KCMSD.

Although a district court's findings of fact may not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), an appellate court nevertheless has the power to correct errors of law, including factual findings that are predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) (quoted in In Re Martin, 761 F.2d

472, 475 (8th Cir. 1985)). Where, as here, the district court's factfinding process was tainted with legal error from the start of trial by the court's erroneous application of controlling legal principles, the district court's findings are entitled to less than usual deference and should be reversed as clearly erroneous.[3]

The district court's own conclusions and the clear weight of the uncontradicted evidence establish that constitutional violations, committed by the suburban school districts (SSDs) and HUD as well as the State of Missouri and the KCMSD, have caused significant continuing segregative effects in the SSDs. I would reverse the

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[3]The lead opinion's reliance on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), provides the basis of its criticism that this dissent "engag[es] in an original evaluation of the volumi-

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nous and ofttimes contradictory record seeking an ultimate conclusion more satisfactory than that reached by the district court." Ante at 18-19. It suggests that this dissent "embarks upon fact finding of [its] own" and makes "no effort to consider [the district court's finding] in a proper Rule 52(a) analysis." Ante at 37 n.25. It also urges that the dissent "completely and totally ignores the district court's findings that any pre-1954 acts had negligible and de minimis current effects." Ante at 44-45 n.28.

I start with the legal premise, never refuted by the lead opinion, that the district court's opinion is fundamentally unsound because it is based on an erroneous legal premise in its interpretation of Milliken and because it totally ignores the historical and factual record. Not only is the record contradictory, as the lead opinion admits, but in its own opinions the district court contradicts itself. This dissent does not substitute the views of appellate judges for that of the trial court. What this dissent focuses on is that the district court's application of the law to its findings is erroneous, a conclusion to which the clearly erroneous standard does not even apply. It is not a duplication of the district court's role when on review an appellate court identifies errors in the district court's reasoning. In Anderson, the Supreme Court made it clear that to uphold a district court's findings as not clearly erroneous, the district court's account of the evidence in making those

district court's dismissal of the SSDs and HUD, holding that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case for interdistrict relief; I would remand for further evidentiary hearings with the SSDs and HUD reinstated as parties, with directions that new findings be made in light of this

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findings must be plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74. Anderson does not hold that a trial court's fact-finding power is limitless, nor that appellate review is nothing more than a rubber stamp of the district court's actions.

Moreover, the lead opinion states that the Jenkins class and the KCMSD did not argue that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. This assertion too conveniently seeks to avoid the legal arguments made by the appellants that the district court formulated conclusions which were incorrectly based upon erroneous legal premises. See Reply and Response Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee Kansas City, Missouri School District at 14-24.

opinion and any further evidence produced. Thereafter, if the overall evidence so indicates, the district court should fashion an appropriate interdistrict remedy which incorporates the SSDs and takes into consideration the liability of HUD. The result of our divided vote is to endorse the district court's fragmentation of the plaintiffs' evidence and its refusal to draw obvious inferences from that evidence and to thereby uphold the district court's denial of any form of interdistrict relief, the remedy most likely to eradicate the effects of years of legalized segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area.

Several fundamental errors compel reversal of the district court's dismissal of the SSDs and HUD. I join Judge Arnold

in his conclusion that the district court erroneously interpreted Milliken v. Bradley to require that each SSD have separately committed a constitutional violation with interdistrict effects before it could be included in an interdistrict remedy. Unlike Judge Arnold, I would hold that this error encompasses more than the housing violations claim but instead infects all of the district court's findings. Rather, I would hold that the district court erred in failing to find that the SSDs committed constitutional violations with continuing significant interdistrict effects. I would hold too that the district court erred in drawing the conclusion that the constitutional violations by the state and the KCMSD have no, or at most de minimis,

continuing segregative effects on the SSDs, a finding that was falsely premised on the district court's misapplication of Milliken and on the district court's failure to adhere to the record as developed at trial.

The District Court's Misconstruction of Milliken v. Bradley

First, as discussed in Judge Arnold's opinion, the district court misconstrued Milliken when it concluded that Milliken precludes interdistrict relief in a racially segregated metropolitan area unless each school district is found to be a constitutional violator and by that violation to have caused a significant segregative effect in another district. As Judge Arnold notes, in its memorandum

opinion and order dismissing the SSDs the district court prefaced discussion of the plaintiffs' legal theories regarding SSD liability with the incorrect statement that "[t]he linchpin of an interdistrict case, as declared by the Supreme Court, is whether there has been a racially discriminatory act by each defendant that substantially caused segregation in another district."[4] Jenkins v. State of Mo.,No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 5-6 (W.D. Mo. June 5, 1984) (emphasis added), citing Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. The Supreme Court's precise language in Milliken differs significantly from this gloss by the district court and actually reads:

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[4]The district court's fundamental misconstruction of Milliken is illustrated by the following transcript excerpts of statements made by the district judge at trial:

> As I read Milliken and its progeny, the constitutional violation must have occurred in one of the suburban districts . . . . Now, that's Milliken, as I read it. And 80 percent of [the plaintiffs'] proof in this case so far would not comport with Milliken. Now, if I'm reading Milliken wrong, then I'm reading it wrong. Tr. 7342-43.
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> But I was bound by law, as I read it [when dismissing the SSDs], that you cannot require an entity to be part of the [interdistrict] remedy unless you found a constitutional violation on the part of that entity * * *. Tr. 24,561-62.

In its June 5, 1984 opinion, the district court further stated:

> Because each defendant district is independent and autonomous from the state of Missouri, and from all other school districts, none has an affirmative duty to merge with other districts. None can be held vicariously liable for the acts of the state, federal government or other entities. And, absent a finding of an interdistrict constitutional violation, none can be made a part of an interdistrict remedy.
> * * *
> Instead, plaintiffs had to prove

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first that the segregated schools existing before 1954 were the direct and substantial cause of blacks leaving *each* defendant district; second, assuming that occurred, that it had a significant segregative effect in the KCMSD. *See*, 418 U.S. at 744-45; *Lee*, 639 F.2d at 1256 ("there must be clear proof of cause and effect and a careful delineation of the extent of the effect"). Plaintiffs' proof was weak, speculative and in any event *de minimus* [sic].

Jenkins v. State of Mo., No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 12 (W.D. Mo. June 5, 1984).

Even accepting Dr. Kain's conclusion that the present racial segregation is due to discrimination, Dr. Kain offered no evidence or opinions tending to show that any actions or inactions of any SSD contributed in any significant way to causing the racial residential separation he described. The Court finds that none of the SSDs did or failed to do anything which had any significant effect on residential patterns in the Kansas City SMSA. His testimony, therefore, does not support plaintiffs' claims for relief against the SSDs.

Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 36.

Again, in an order issued in January, 1985, the distrct court stated:

> It would be very beneficial in the event the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals were to reverse this Court's dismissal of the suburban districts. It would be useful in any effort undertaken to seek voluntary consolidation between any or all of the school districts. However, because of restrictions on this Court's remedial powers in restructuring the operations of local and state government entities, that portion of the KCMSD plan which would require the consolidation of eleven suburban school districts with KCMSD goes far beyond the nature and extent of the constitutional violation this Court found existed. See, Order filed September 17, 1984. This Court found that there was no unconstitutional action on the part of any of the eleven suburban school districts nor was there evidence of constitutional violations by those school districts which had any significant segregative effect within their own districts or on the KCMSD. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.8. 717, 745-48 (1974) (where respondents, alleging the Detroit school system was racially segre-

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gated, sought the creation of a unified school district as a remedy without a finding of constitutional violations by the suburban districts and without finding significant segregative effects). "The Supreme Court in Hills v. Gautreaux, [425 U.S. 284 (1976)] has interpreted Milliken I to mean that district courts may not restructure or coerce local governments or their subdivisions." Liddell v. State of Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1308 (8th Cir. 1984). Clearly a plan which would require the consolidation of suburban school districts, ones in which no constitutional violation or significant segregative effect has been found, results in a restructuring and coercion of local government which is prohibited under Milliken I.

Jenkins v. State of Mo., No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. January 25, 1985).

> [I]t must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.

Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45 (emphasis added). The district court thus erected an improper proof burden for the plaintiffs to overcome. Ironically, that the district court's interpretation of Milliken has never been the legal standard by which grants of interdistrict relief have been measured was recognized even by the defendant State of Missouri, which correctly restated the Milliken standard in its brief on appeal to this court.[5]

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[5]In its brief on appeal, the state notes:

In affirming the district court's incorrect interpretation of Milliken, the lead opinion ignores the established precedent of this circuit. In Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 228 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc),

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> Thus, in any case in which a state school system exhibits a large measure of local control, Milliken I requires that parties seeking an interdistict remedy prove either (a) that the school district boundaries were manipulated for racial reasons or (b) that some intentionally discriminatory action by the governmental defendants -- the State or the local school districts -- was a "substantial cause" of "significant" current interdistrict segregation. Id.; see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 & n.11 (1976) [Hills] (Milliken I requires demonstration of "significant" interdistrict segregative effects caused by unlawful governmental act); Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, 1254-56 (5th Cir. 1981).

Brief of State Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 10.

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980), this court unanimously rejected a district court's similarly limited interpretation of Milliken. Although the lead opinion states that Morrilton was intended to be limited to cases involving gerrymandered school district lines, so narrow a view of the acts that may constitute constitutional violations and trigger interdistrict relief is unsupportable. In Morrilton, this court found that school districts which were not themselves found to be constitutional violators nevertheless could be included in interdistrict relief where the effects of the unconstitutional actions of another (in Morrilton, the state) were felt in those school districts. Morrilton, 606 F.2d at 228. Similarly, the holding in United States

v. Board of School Comm'rs., 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (cited in Morrilton, 606 F.2d at 228-29) affirms the appropriateness of granting interdistrict relief even absent separate constitutional violations by each school district, but nowhere limits relief only to cases where the school district is found to be dependent on the state and its boundaries established for segregative purposes. The lead opinion distorts what our earlier opinions have held in this regard.[6]

Again, in Liddell v. State of Mo., 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (Liddell VII), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984), we noted that in Liddell v. Board of

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[6]Judge Heaney, who authored the Morrilton opinion, now joins in this opinion's specific conclusion that Morrilton was never intended to be limited to gerrymandered boundaries. Moreover, this

court's reliance in Morrilton on Board of School Comm'rs. clearly refutes the lead opinion's position. In Morrilton, we adopted wholly the language of the Seventh Circuit, which states:

> [S]chool officials may not maintain that their districts should be excluded from any interdistrict remedy if they are found innocent of committing any constitutional violations because they should not be held responsible for the acts of the state legislators or other state subdivisions such as a local housing authority or a zoning board. The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the state and cannot be avoided by a fragmentation of responsibility among various agents. * * * If the state has contributed to the separation of the races, it has the obligation to remedy the constitutional violations. That remedy may include school districts which are its instrumentalities and which were the product of the violation.

Board of School Comm'rs., 573 F.2d at 410 (quoted in Morrilton, 606 F.2d at 228-29) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The lead opinion attempts to distinguish this language from Board of School Comm'rs. by asserting that the school districts in that case were "mere instrumentalities of the state." Ante at 31. As grounds for its conclusion that the SSDs are "independent and their boundaries must be

respected," the district court stated that "to find the SSDs vicariously liable for acts of the state, the Court must make the threshhold determination that the SSDs are mere agents or arms of the state and not independent, locally autonomous entities." Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 101-02. See also id. at 8-14. Not only does the lead opinion's statement reflect the district court's misconstruction of Milliken, but it overlooks the fact than an SSD may have some attributes of autonomy and yet remain an instrumentality of the state.

In its June 5 opinion, the district court found that the SSDs had more attributes of autonomy than those Michigan school districts examined in Milliken. Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 8. While it is true that the SSDs may have some authority to act independently, that authority is delegated to them by the state and the state retains ultimate authority over the SSDs' actions. The SSDs exist pursuant to provisions of the Missouri constitution, are maintained at the pleasure of the Missouri legislature, and are subject to the authority of state statutes and the rules and regulations of the Missouri State Board of Education. See, e.g., Mo. Const. arts. III, § 40(20); IX. Evidence introduced at trial acknowledged the authority of the Missouri General Assembly to reorganize Missouri's schools for the purpose of achieving racial balance. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1010. The Missouri Supreme Court has found that school districts "form an integral part of

Educ., 667 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1981) (Liddell III)

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the state, and constitute that arm or instrumentality thereof discharging the constitutionally [e]ntrusted governmental function of imparting knowledge and intelligence to the youth of the state," School Dist. v. School Dist., 102 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Mo. 1937), and that the school districts are statutory trustees for the discharge of the governmental function to apportion funds in the best interests of education which by the constitution is entrusted to the state, School Dist. No. 59 v. Maple Grove School Dist. No. 56, 359 S.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Mo. 1962) (citing School Dist. v. School Dist.). Moreover, the district court explicitly concluded in its September opinion that "none of the provisions of the Constitution nor statutes of the State of Missouri would have prevented the State of Missouri from fulfilling its affirmative duty of disestablishing a dual school system subsequent to 1954." Jenkins v. State of Mo., 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1504 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The court further concluded that "[i]t is clear that school districts in the State exist pursuant to the State Constitution," id., and that "[t]he State executive and its agencies as well as the State's General Assembly had and continue to have the constitutional obligation to affirmatively dismantle any system of de jure discrimination, root and branch," id. at 1505.

> we rejected the State's argument that the district court was without authority to formulate an interdistrict plan without finding an interdistrict violation. We also noted that voluntary interdistrict pupil exchanges "must be viewed as a valid part of the attempt to fashion a workable remedy within the City." (Liddell III, 667 F.2d] at 651. In an order appended to that opinion, we noted that the State had been "judicially determined to be a primary constitutional violator," and we held that an interdistrict transfer plan would be salutary and would be entirely enforceable against the State. Id. at 659.

Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1303. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2926 (1986). Though gerrymandering is certainly one type of constitutional violation, nothing in the lead opinion explains why it is the exclusive means by

which a school district may suffer significant segregative effects for which interdistrict relief may be granted.[7] See Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 340 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (Milliken's "specification of the deliberate drawing of lines to achieve segregation was by way of example, not limitation").

The lead opinion's heavy reliance on Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1981), and Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984), is also misplaced. Goldsboro is distinguishable on several grounds. The Goldsboro city school district had been declared unitary

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[7]This court's line of cases interpreting and applying the Milliken standard to encompass a wide range of constitutional violations is consistent with Justice Stewart's restatement of the

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Supreme Court's holding in his concurring opinion in Milliken, in which he stated:

> Since the mere fact of different racial composition in contiguous districts does not itself imply or constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of a showing that such disparity was imposed, fostered, or encouraged by the State or its political subdivisions, it follows that no inter-district violation was shown in this case.

Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Stewart further emphasized that

> [t]he Constitution simply does not allow federal courts to attempt to change that situation unless and until it is shown that the State, or its political subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist. No record has been made in this case showing that the racial composition of the Detroit school population or that residential patterns within Detroit and in the surrounding areas were in any significant measure caused by governmental activity, and it follows that the situation over which my dissenting Brothers express concern cannot serve as the predicate for the remedy adopted by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals.

by a federal district court in 1973. See id. at 325-26. Moreover, in Goldsboro, there was no showing of any housing violations or interdistrict transfers for segregated purposes, and on appeal the Fourth Circuit specifically found that the district court did not erroneously apply the law to that case's facts. See id. at 328. Although Lee exhibits some similarities to the present case, as we noted in Little Rock the Lee case did not involve segregative interdistrict transfers, segregative boundary changes, or state-imposed residential segregation, and the city district had been previously

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Id. at 756 n.2 (emphasis added). Nowhere does Justice Stewart limit the definition of unconstitutional governmental activity solely to instances of gerrymandering.

declared unitary. See Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 429.

Missouri's History of De Jure Segregation

Significantly, the lead opinion omits any discussion of the State of Missouri's long history of de jure segregation in which the KCMSD and most, if not all, of the SSDs participated. Much of this history, which was recounted in Liddell v. Board of Educ., 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (Liddell VII), is detailed in the district court's opinion granting intra-district relief. See Jenkins v. State of Mo., 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1490-95 (W.D. Mo. 1984). This history bears repeating here, however, because the nature and gravity of the constitutional violations for which plaintiffs seek redress can properly be

evaluated only in light of their historical context.

The State of Missouri's implementation and enforcement of school segregation can be traced to well before the Civil War, when Missouri enacted laws prohibiting the creation of schools to teach blacks to read or write. Act of February 16, 1847, § 1, 1847 Mo. Laws 103. Beginning in 1865, the Missouri constitution expressly required separate schools for blacks and whites. Mo. Const. 1865, art. IX, § 2. This provision was retained in three successive constitutions. Mo. Const. 1875, art. XI, § 3, retained Mo. Const. 1919, art. XI, § 3, revised and retained, Mo. Const. 1945, art. IX, §§ 1(a) and 3(c). See also Act of February 17, 1865, § 13, 1865 Mo. Laws 170. In 1889, the Missouri

legislature made it a criminal offense for a black child to attend a white school. Act of June 11, 1889, § 7051(a), 1889 Mo. Laws 226. Although a 1954 Attorney General opinion declared the school segregation laws unenforceable, the statutes implementing the constitutionally mandated segregation were not repealed until 1957, see Act of July 6, 1957, § 1, 1957 Mo. Laws 452, and the constitutional provision was not rescinded until 1976. See Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).

Prior to 1954, school districts in Missouri were not even in compliance with the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). From 1866 to 1929, state law exempted school districts from providing schools

for black children if there were fewer than fifteen black children in the district and required them to discontinue black schools whenever average daily attendance fell below eight students. See 1865 Mo. Laws 177; 1869 Mo. Laws 86-87; 1870 Mo. Laws 149; 1887 Mo. Laws 264; 1893 Mo. Laws 247; 1909 Mo. Laws 790-91. In 1929, the Missouri legislature gave school districts the option to forgo schools for blacks altogether, no matter how many black school children resided in the district. 1929 Mo. Laws 382. Although school districts refusing to provide schools for blacks within their district were required to make interdistrict arrangements for and pay the tuition of black elementary school children beginning in 1929 and for black high school students

beginning in 1931, the school districts were not required to fully reimburse transferred black students for transportation costs until 1945. See 1945 Mo. Laws 1700.

Rather than providing schools for blacks within their districts, school districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area, including the predecessor districts of the SSDs,[8] took full advantage of state law provisions allowing them to arrange for the transfer of black school children out of their districts. Blue Springs, Fort Osage, Center, Raytown, Grandview, and Hickman Mills provided no

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[8]Under Missouri law, the SSDs are legally responsible for the constitutional violations of their predecessor districts. See Lewis County C-I School Dist. v. Normile, 431 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Mo. 1968) (en banc); McClure v. Princeton Reorganized School Dist., 307 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Lynch v. Webb City School Dist. No. 92, 373 S.W.2d 193,

schools for blacks.[9] Lee's Summit did not operate any black schools after 1910. North Kansas City intermittently operated a black elementary school until 1944. Independence, Liberty, and Park Hill each operated a black elementary school. Independence operated a black high school from approximately 1934 to 1945, and Liberty offered high school through the eleventh grade after 1938. However, the evidence is overwhelming that the quality of education available in these black

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200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). See also Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961) (school board at time of litigation held liable for the discriminatory acts of predecessor boards. Any reference to the conduct of an SSD therefore includes liability for any acts of its predecessors.

[9]The district court found that four of the SSDs -- Center, Raytown, Grandview, and Hickman Mills -- did not operate dual school systems because they had no black residents prior to 1954. However, this

schools was quite poor, especially in comparison to that available in the white schools in the SSDs and the black schools in KCMSD. Moreover, despite state laws requiring districts not operating black schools to reimburse black students for tuition and at least part of their

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finding is highly questionable, especially as to Raytown, Grandview, and Hickman Mills, in light of the school records and other evidence before the district court which showed the presence of at least some black children in their predecessor districts. In any event, that no black children may have lived in these districts prior to 1954 does not exculpate these districts. The great weight of evidence at trial indicated that the fact that there were no schools for black children to attend in these SSDs deterred blacks from moving to those districts in the first place. See, e.g., Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490; testimony of Dr. James D. Anderson, an expert in the field of the history of American education, summarized in Brief of Amicus Curiae The Kansas City Branch of The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at 3-8.

transportation costs, none of the SSDs did so until Lee's Summit began reimbursement in 1931, followed by Independence in 1945, Park Hill and North Kansas City in the late 1940s, and Liberty in 1953. As the district court itself found, in 1954 KCMSD was the only school district in the Kansas City metropolitan area providing any real educational opportunities for blacks, operating fourteen black elementary schools, one black junior high vocational school and one black high school-junior college. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492.

Legalized segregation of and discrimination against blacks in Missouri was not limited to education. State law permitted local authorities to establish separate libraries, parks, and playgrounds for

whites and blacks, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 165.377 (1959); made it a crime for a black to marry a white, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.240 (1959); and required segregation in colonies for the "feebleminded." See, e.g., Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1503. Of foremost importance to this case is the pervasive system of housing segregation in which all levels of government participated. Racially restrictive covenants, FHA appraisal practices, relocation policies of state and local housing agencies, and private discrimination operated to restrict blacks to certain geographic sections of the Kansas City metropolitan area.

Housing Violations and HUD Liability

Judge Arnold's opinion recounts the

long history of Missouri's involvement with housing discrimination in the Kansas City area, which in some instances continued through the 1970s. I join Judge Arnold in concluding that remand is required for further findings, for the purposes of fashioning interdistrict relief, on the extent of constitutional violations by the state and its various agencies in implementing segregative housing policies. For similar reasons, I would also reverse and remand for further consideration the district court's dismissal of HUD. Though the lead opinion affirms the district court's finding that HUD did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and that HUD's acts were without discriminatory intent or effect, the record makes clear that HUD committed

numerous constitutional violations. As Judge Arnold points out:

> With regard to HUD, the District Court found that the agency had acted "reasonably" because it had taken action in the 1970s to end discriminatory practices by HAKC, whose programs HUD funded. 593 F. Supp. 1498-1499. Yet there was extensive evidence, not addressed by the District Court, that HUD knew of shortcomings in HAKC's tenant-assignment practices for years without taking action to end them.

Ante at 70 n.10. Use of the arbitrary and capricious standard is inappropriate in the context of HUD's alleged constitutional violations through the participation in and support of racially segregated housing practices. Where a government entity's discriminatory practices causes housing and population shifts with metropolitan-wide effects, an inter-

district remedy has been found an appropriate form of relief. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs., 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). Moreover, considering whether the participation of each SSD in the dual school system had any significant interdistrict effect, the district court concluded that for each SSD the proof of any current effects was "weak, speculative and in any event de minimus [sic]." Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 12. Because the district court erroneously assumed that each SSD must be found to have committed a constitutional violation with current segregative effects before it could be included in interdistrict relief, the district court did not properly take into account the current segregative

effects on the SSDs of the state's or KCMSD's actions to maintain a dual school system in the Kansas City metropolitan area.

Milliken makes clear that an interdistrict remedy is justified if the constitutional violations of even "a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. The Supreme Court denied interdistrict relief in Milliken simply because the plaintiffs had only shown that the constitutional violations of the Detroit public school system had intradistrict, not interdistrict, effects. Id. at 747 (explaining that dissent's position was that the existence of a dual school system in Detroit justified an interdistrict

remedy); id. at 749 ("Where the schools of only one district have been affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial composition of that district's schools with those of surrounding districts."); id. at 751 ("Thus, there was no evidence suggesting that the State's activities * * * within Detroit affected the racial composition of the school population outside Detroit or, conversely, that the State's * * * activities within the outlying districts affected the racial composition of the schools within Detroit."). In contrast, the plaintiffs here presented evidence showing that KCMSD's decision to operate some completely black schools and some completely white schools long after 1954 led to the

rapid turnover of neighborhoods from black to white and caused many whites to move out of KCMSD to the SSDs. The district court repeatedly recognized that evidence at trial demonstrated the link between KCMSD's delay in implementing effective integration policies during the 1960s and 1970s and the exodus of whites from KCMSD during this period in discussing KCMSD's liability for segregation within KCMSD. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492-95. The district court did not consider KCMSD's conduct as a basis for ordering inter-district relief, however, because it misconstrued Milliken to require culpability with continuing segregative effects on the part of each SSD before that SSD could be included in an interdistrict remedy. Because under Milliken the con-

duct of even a single school district may be the basis for interdistrict relief if the continuing effects of that conduct are interdistrict, I would require the district court to consider on remand the extent to which KCMSD's delay in implementing an effective integration policy has current interdistrict effects.

Ironically, though Judge Arnold concludes that the district court misapplied Milliken in assessing interdistrict effects from housing violations, he apparently upholds as not clearly erroneous the district court's findings of no constitutional violations by the SSDs and its findings of only de minimis continuing segregative effects on the SSDs from the state's and the KCMSD's operation of a dual school system. To this extent,

I part company with Judge Arnold.[10] These findings are inseparable from the district court's misunderstanding of the Milliken standard.

Constitutional Violations by the SSDs

The district court failed to analyze the housing violations by the state agencies because it believed they were irrelevant to the SSDs' participation in any interdistrict relief. Similarly, the district court failed to analyze the effect of the state's and the KCMSD's discriminatory practices because it decided their conduct was irrelevant to any remedial relief. The record is replete with evidence of constitutional

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[10]This attempt to separate constitutional violations related to housing and the segregative policies of the various school districts ignores the district court's undisputed finding of the

violations by many of the SSDs and of the effect those violations had on all of the SSDs and on the KCMSD. As has already been stated here, these violations cannot be ignored by simply expressing deference to the district court's findings under the clearly erroneous rule. Whether there exists a constitutional violation is more a question of law than of fact and is clearly subject to de novo appellate review. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501 n.17 ("A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles through which it was deduced.").

"inextricable connection between schools and housing." Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1491. The constitutional violations here are so intertwined that it is impossible to separate the effects of one from another.

Even under the district court's erroneous interpretation of Milliken, the lead opinion errs in affirming the district court's dismissal of the SSDs because it failed to find that the SSDs committed constitutional violations with cross-district effects. The uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that under the pre-1954 dual school system the SSDs exercised their discretion, granted them by the state, either to provide schools for black students which offered at best a substandard education or to decline to provide any schools at all. Instead, the SSDs transferred black students to the KCMSD. Understandably and undisputedly, KCMSD became the only school district in the Kansas City metropolitan area in which black school children could receive a

complete education. Not only did the SSDs thus create segregated conditions in their individual districts by emptying their districts of all black school children, but they set historical precedent for interdistrict transfer of students on the basis of race in the Kansas City metropolitan area.

The district court's conclusion that the SSDs were local automonous units[11] and therefore exempt from liability for any segregative acts done by the state is the major premise on which the lead opinion relies in affirming the district court's finding that the SSDs committed no

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[11]But see this dissent's footnote 6, supra, criticizing the lead opinion's conclusion that the SSDs are not instrumentalities of the State of Missouri.

acts with discriminatory intent that had significant segregative effects. However, to the extent the SSDs exhibited autonomy in deciding to provide inferior or no schools for blacks, under Milliken proof of autonomy here leads only to the conclusion that the SSDs did commit constitutional violations. Moreover, the lead opinion ignores the uncontradicted fact that after the SSDs participated in pre-1954 segregation on an interdistrict level, they took no affirmative steps on a similar interdistrict level to reverse the effects of those autonomously chosen educational practices. Even if Milliken required proof of constitutional violations by each individual SSD, which it does not, the district court erred in failing to draw the obvious inferences

from the uncontroverted evidence to find such violations in the "autonomous" acts of the SSDs. The result today, as the evidence at trial showed, is that KCMSD's student body is sixty-eight percent black whereas the student population of the SSDs is only five percent black.[12]

Continuing Significant Interdistrict Effects

My most fundamental objection to the majority's position, however, is its wholesale affirmance of the district court's finding that to the extent any constitutional violations were committed by any of the defendants, the continuing segregative effects on the SSDs were de minimis and that inclusion of the SSDs in an inter-

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12 Because Missouri mandated separate schools for blacks and whites until 1954, the current disparity between the percentage of blacks attending school in the

district remedy was therefore precluded.

In concluding that the pre-1954 dual school system in which the SSDs participated has no continuing interdistrict effects, the district court found that despite the fact that only KCMSD provided

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SSDs and KCMSD should raise a rebuttable presumption that the de facto segregation that currently exists is the result of the prior constitutional violations. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). The lead opinion argues that the Swann presumption that proof of prior de jure segregation coupled with a continuing racial imbalance establishes liability unless rebutted is inapplicable in interdistrict cases. To support this conclusion, the lead opinion notes that the Supreme Court did not apply the Swann presumption in Milliken. Ante at 24. Unlike this case, however, there was no allegation nor proof in Milliken that prior de jure segregation had interdistrict effects. In any event, even if the Swann presumption does not apply to interdistrict cases, the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that the constitutional violation of the SSDs have current interdistrict effects.

blacks in the Kansas City metropolitan area with any real educational opportunities prior to 1954 as a direct result of the constitutional violations of the state, the KCMSD and the SSDs, those violations had but a de minimis effect on the housing choices of blacks prior to 1954. Such a finding is contrary to legal precedent, many of the district court's own factual findings, and the plaintiffs' unrebutted expert and lay witness testimony and is clearly erroneous.

In affirming as not clearly erroneous the district court's findings of de minimis continuing segregative effects on the SSDs from the KCMSD's actions, the lead opinion follows the district court in overlooking the weight of uncontradicted evidence in the record and the district

court's own findings that the KCMSD's perpetuation of segregated schools within the KCMSD caused a mass concentration of blacks in an area where a substantial number of whites lived. This in turn resulted in displacement of whites, who moved to or transferred into the SSDs.

The evidence produced at trial demonstrated that by a variety of affirmative official acts, the KCMSD sought to preserve the all-white character of some of its schools at the expense of the schools in the southeast corridor of Kansas City. There, KCMSD followed a policy of "integration and stabilization." As part of this piecemeal desegregation policy, KCMSD implemented attendance zones, intact busing, liberal transfers, neighborhood school policies, and faculty

transfers which had segregative instead of integrative effects. One of the most significant of these was the creation of shifting and optional attendance zones. Evidence at trial indicated that the attendance zone choices were based on Troost, a north/south street that traditionally had divided white neighborhoods west of Troost from the neighborhoods to the east which also contained many whites but in which most of the blacks in Kansas City lived. Testimony at trial indicated that despite overcrowding in schools east of Troost and underuse of schools west of Troost, attendance zones did not traverse Troost until 1976. Moreover, testimony at trial established and the district court itself found that as the population of Kansas City changed in the years following

Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), KCMSD "made frequent shifts in the attendance areas of its schools" with the result of removing white sections from the western-most portions of the racially transitional areas and attaching them to all-white zones further west, shifts which, coupled with a liberal transfer policy, "allowed attendance patterns to continue on a segregated basis." Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1494. The district court also found that "as the black population expanded from the central city in a southeast direction, neighborhoods and schools experienced a racial transition. As blacks moved, or were bused to the schools in the [southeast] area, whites moved out." Id.[13](citations omitted).

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[13]Other examples of KCMSD's segregative policies include the transfer of its best and most experienced black teachers to

As a result of these policies, blacks were bused to or moved to the southeast area of Kansas City and whites moved to the neighboring SSDs. As the black population of Kansas City expanded to the southeast, KCMSD chose to operate some completely segregated schools and some integrated ones. The result of KCMSD's official school policies was to make the KCMSD "blacker" and the SSDs "whiter," actions which have been found by courts before to be constitutional violations for which interdistrict relief is appropriate.

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white schools, leaving less capable teachers in black and changing schools and accelerating those schools' transition to all-black schools. Too, as the district court found, the liberal transfer policy allowed "whites living in racially transitional neighborhoods in Kansas City to transfer * * * to whiter schools." Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1493.

Cf. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982) (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)) ("Actions and omissions by public officials which tend to make black schools blacker necessarily have the reciprocal effect of making white schools whiter.") (citation omitted). See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 436 and n.15 (D. Del. 1975) (presence of proportionately more black children in a city school than in the neighborhood served by the school likely encouraged white families to move to nearby suburbs, where "black students were barely present" in the school systems).

It is evident that the segregative

policies perpetuated by KCMSD caused a greater concentration of blacks and black schools in the southeast corridor, directly resulting in displacing whites into the SSDs.[14] In this regard, the district court's own findings are at least contradictory and at most support the grant of interdistrict relief based on continuing effects in the SSDs from the KCMSD's policies. The district court recognized that the KCMSD had chosen to operate some completely segregated schools and some integrated ones in the district

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[14]The lead opinion asserts that this statement is an example of "appellate factfinding." To the contrary, this statement is based on the district court's own observations as to what actually occurred in the Kansas City metropolitan area due to institutional segregation. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1493-94.

and that as of 1977, twenty-five one-race schools under the pre-1954 dual system remained ninety percent or more of the same race. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492. Moreover, in a supplemental order, of which we take judicial notice, that enjoined for one year the property tax rollback provided under a Missouri statute, the district court summarized its findings in this case to date by stating:

> The Court has found that segregated schools, a constitutional violation, has led to white flight from the KCMSD to suburban districts, large number of students leaving the schools of Kansas City and attending private schools and that it has caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of KCMSD. It has also found that by improving the quality of education in KCMSD, it will enhance the appeal of the school system, thus giving it a chance to retain its present white enrollment and also encourage whites in private and suburban schools to enroll in its

> schools. As set forth in its order of June 14, 1985, the basic remedial principle in school desegregation cases, is that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Jenkins v. State of Mo., No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip. op. at 1-2 (W.D. Mo. August 25, 1986). Not only does this language further support the view that the district court did recognize that the effects on the SSDs from the segregative policies of the KCMSD were more than de minimis, but it illustrates that the district court's refusal to grant interdistrict relief was clearly erroneous and contradictory to its own findings from the record.[15]

That the availability of schools

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[15]It is conceivable that the district court found nothing inconsistent in so holding, because it labored throughout these proceedings under the miscomprehen-

influences housing choices is a common sense proposition. After a fifty-year period during which the SSDs provided no schools or inadequate schools for blacks, it is hardly surprising that black families living in the SSDs and those moving to the Kansas City area from other states chose to move to the KCMSD, where adequate educational facilities were available. As the district court notes in its opinion on

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sion that Milliken requires each individual SSD to be a constitutional violator. The lead opinion now urges that the August 25, 1986 opinion was merely a general order which does not contradict the district court's earlier, more lengthy orders. Ante at 25 n.17. This statement is at odds not only with the August order's plain language, but also with the objections to that August order made to this court by the SSDs on the grounds that the order was entered after the SSDs were no longer parties to the case and that its language was prejudicial to them.

intradistrict liability, the nexus between availability of schools and housing patterns has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1491 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21). This nexus has also been recognized by this court in the context of interdistrict cases. See, e.g., Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 412 n.5. The Little Rock case is particularly instructive in that, under facts very similar to this case, we upheld a district court finding that black families from other school districts were drawn to the Little Rock school district precisely because it was the only district that provided blacks in the area with substantial educational opportunities. Id. at 412. The district court's finding in Little Rock that school availability influences

housing on an interdistrict as well as an intradistrict basis, which we upheld, seriously undermines the credibility of the district court's finding in this case "that the absence of black schools in any of the [SSDs] did not discourage black families outside (or from within) Missouri from moving to and living in those districts." Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 18 (citations omitted).

The district court's finding is further undermined by several statements in its September, 1984 opinion regarding intradistrict liability of the state and KCMSD. In rejecting the state's argument that job availability rather than school availability was responsible for the segregated housing and school patterns within the KCMSD, the district court

stated that "[o]ften jobs would pull migrants to the city and then availability of schools would influence, more specifically, what housing choice would be made within the city." Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490. In finding that the current dual housing market affected blacks in the KCMSD, the court again referred to the "inextricable connection" between schools and housing. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1491. It is difficult to see how school availability would be an important factor in making housing choices within a single school district, but would not influence housing decisions within the metropolitan area in general.

In support of their argument that the constitutional violations here produced significant interdistrict effects, plain-

tiffs produced statistics showing that although the school population in the three-county area, excluding KCMSD, was between 7.19% and 8.7% black in 1881, the black school-aged population in the same area had steadily declined to between .39% and 1.5% by 1954. At the same time, the black population in KCMSD had risen from 8.8% in 1900 to 14.0% in 1954. Plaintiffs produced several expert witnesses on education and housing patterns who testified that the inability of blacks to provide their children with an education in the SSDs caused many black families to move to KCMSD, the only district providing any real educational opportunities for blacks in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The absence of schools for blacks in the SSDs, the experts testified, also influenced the

housing choices of blacks moving into the Kansas City metropolitan area from other states, both because there would be less chain migration to the SSDs as the existing black population in the SSDs declined and because accessible education is an important factor for blacks, as for all people, in making housing choices. Plaintiffs also produced the testimony of many blacks who had lived in the SSDs prior to 1954 but had had to travel long distances or move to KCMSD itself to receive an education. Other evidence included pre-1954 school board reports and other documents stating that the absence of educational opportunitites for blacks in rural areas caused by the dual school system was causing many black families to leave rural areas for large cities.[16]

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[16]See infra note 18.

Notwithstanding plaintiffs' extensive evidence, the district court concluded that the absence of educational opportunity for blacks in the SSDs prior to 1954 had a de minimis effect on current housing patterns and school segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The lead opinion merely reasserts the district courts findings and concludes that they are not clearly erroneous. Close examination of the district court's opinion, however, reveals that its reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs' evidence as de minimis ring hollow. For example, the district court found that the increase in the black population in KCMSD prior to 1954 was attributable to jobs and employment opportunities available in the KCMSD area, rather than to the availablility of

schools. Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 15-16 and 18. No one disputes that economic opportunity was a major factor in drawing blacks, especially from the South, to the Kansas City metropolitan area. The plaintiffs' argument, however, was not that school availability to the exclusion of economic opportunity drew blacks to KCMSD. Rather, plaintiffs argued that once blacks were drawn to the Kansas City area for whatever factors, including economics, school availability caused many blacks to settle in KCMSD rather than in the SSDs. This argument remains unrefuted, and in fact is substantiated by the district court's own findings regarding the nexus between school availability and housing patterns.[17] See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at

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[17]The court also erred in rejecting much of the plaintiffs otherwise uncontroverted expert testimony regarding the effect of

1491.

The district court also failed to assess the importance of the relative depopulation of blacks from the SSDs prior to 1954 with respect to the present racial composition of the Kansas City area. In rejecting the plaintiffs' evidence of depopulation, the district court noted that although the black population in the

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defendants' constitutional violations on the residential choices of blacks in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Much of this testimony, given by Dr. James D. Anderson, a leading scholar and historian, was uncontradicted and based on interpretation of public records. See supra note 9. This evidence was highly probative, and it was wholly arbitrary for the court to reject it and inject its own inferences. Moreover, it is especially crucial in a case of this nature to give great consideration to the testimony of historical experts where the theory to be proved occurred long ago and few witneses are alive to testify.

three-county area, excluding KCMSD, decreased by only approximately 837 from 1910 to 1960, the black population in KCMSD increased by more than 45,000 during this same period. Thus, the district court concluded, the impact of that movement on the black enumeration in KCMSD was insignificant. Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 15-16. The effect of the decline of the black population living in the SSDs prior to 1954, however, is not limited to those black families that left the SSDs for KCMSD because of the lack of schools. Instead, as the plaintiffs' evidence demonstrated, the resulting lack of blacks in the SSDs in turn caused blacks moving to the Kansas City area from the South to live in the KCMSD, where there was a growing black population, rather than in

the overwhelmingly white and hostile SSDs.

Not only did the district court improperly discredit the plaintiffs' evidence, it also omitted any reference to the evidence that most strongly supported plaintiffs' claims. For example, the plaintiffs submitted several reports prepared by the superintendent of public schools in Missouri during the 1920s and 1930s stating that the absence of black schools in rural areas was causing black families to migrate to the large cities.[18] Contemporaneous documents such as these, prepared by school officials at the time black depopulation of rural areas was occurring in Missouri, are highly probative of the link between school availa-

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[18] See, e.g., 1929 Report of Missouri State Superintendent of Public Schools at 122-23 ("high school opportunity for [N]egro children is very limited" other than in St. Louis and Kansas City; "84

bility and housing patterns on an interdistrict basis. Although the district court recognized this link, see Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490 ("[u]ndeniably, some blacks moved to districts, including the KCMSD, that provided black schools"), it largely discounted the plain inferences to be drawn from it.

The district court rejected the plaintiffs' statistical evidence regarding the

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percent of all the high school education in the state" for blacks is provided in these cities although "less than half the [N]egro population in the state" lives there; in light of poor education for blacks in areas outside the cities, "the pronounced drift of the [N]egro population away from the farm to the city is quite understandable"); 1924 Report at 197 ("[m]any [blacks in rural areas] leave to seek better educational facilities for their children").

number of black students in the SSDs who transfered to KCMSD prior to 1954 as "de minimis." It is true that the number of transfers actually shown to have occurred during this period, anywhere from 251 to 600, appears small. These examples, however, were presented only as representative of the effects of the dual school system on school attendance and housing patterns in the Kansas City area, not as an exhaustive enumeration. The plaintiffs' inability to produce more accurate statistical evidence of interdistrict transfers is not surprising in light of the incentives to underreport black students and the conceded unavailability of interdistrict transfer records, for which the SSDs are at least partially responsible. The SSDs had an incentive to

underreport the number of black school children in their districts because state law excused them from their duty to provide a school for blacks if the number of black school children in the district fell below a certain number. Black students from the SSDs had an incentive to be counted as residents of the KCMSD rather than as residents of the SSDs because they could thereby avoid paying tuition to attend KCMSD before the SSDs began to reimburse them for tuition in the 1930s and 1940s. It is difficult to imagine what level of statistical proof would satisfy the district court and the lead opinion. Evidently, they would be satisfied only if the plaintiffs had paraded before the district court every black student who had transfered from the

SSDs to KCMSD or who had moved from the SSDs to KCMSD prior to 1954. Such a stringent level of proof has never been required. See, e.g., Board of School Comm'rs., 637 F.2d at 1113-14.

Even assuming the numbers relied upon by the district court are accurate and controlling, it requires little additional evidence to buttress the common sense proposition that blacks would be deterred from migrating to an overwhelmingly white school district where no black schools existed, where arbitrary policies or school transfers placed the primary burden of educational expenses on many black families, and where racial covenants prevented home purchases. To fail to acknowledge that blacks were deterred from living in the SSDs is to ignore the

obvious. Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977) (in reversing denial of Title VII relief, the Supreme Court stated that to fail to account for non-applicants being deterred from even applying for employment would mean that "[v]ictims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful"). Perhaps most disturbing, however, is the district court's repeated reliance on the increasing black enrollment in the SSDs after 1954 as an indication that the prior constitutional violations of the SSDs have no current interdistrict segregative effects. The district court noted, for example, that black enrollment in Hickman Mills

increased from twenty-nine black students in 1967 to 1,571 in 1983, and that black enrollment in Park Hill has increased by 110 students since 1976. Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 56, 88. That black enrollment in the SSDs has increased since the 1960s may indicate that barriers to black movement into the SSDs are declining over time. Far from indicating that there are no current significant segregative effects of the SSDs' past conduct, however, this increase in black enrollment in the SSDs since Brown v. Board of Educ. is conclusive evidence that the lack of schools for blacks in the SSDs prior to 1954 was a deterrent to blacks settling there. In light of the compelling evidence presented by the plaintiffs that the absence of schools for blacks in the SSDs prior to

1954 had a significant effect on housing choices made by blacks during this time, the district court's conclusion that the effects were de minimis is clearly not supported by the record.

Affirmative Duty of State of Missouri, KCMSD, and the SSDs

It is clear that the SSDs, as well as the State of Missouri and KCMSD, have all failed to fulfill their affirmative duty under Brown v. Board of Educ. to eliminate the vestiges of their prior segregative policies and that significant inter-district effects of these policies are still evident in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The district court, now affirmed by this court, held that because all of the SSDs had opened the doors of

their all-white schools to blacks in 1960, the SSDs had discharged their duty under Brown. Courts have long recognized, however, that racially neutral policies are generally ineffective to counteract the continuing effects of past segregative practices, especially where such segregation has influenced housing patterns. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21; Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 190 (8th Cir. 1968). The district court itself recognized the ineffectiveness of racially neutral policies after a long period of intentionally segregative policies in its opinion on intradistrict liability. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490-95. The reason such racially-neutral plans are ineffective is plain. A racially neutral policy, such as a neighborhood school

policy, will simply not correct the effects of many years during which black schools were located in only certain parts of a school district, causing black families to settle in those areas. Similarly, to merely open to blacks the doors of schools in virtually all-white districts simply fails to eradicate the effects of many years when those districts provided blacks with no schools or at best inadequate schools, causing black families already living in those districts to leave and discouraging black families newly moving into the area from settling in those districts. It is precisely because of this continuing affirmative duty under Brown that pre-1954 evidence is relevant.

Conclusion

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The effects of the SSDs' pre-1954 constitutional violations and their continuing failure to fulfill their duty under Brown are still evident in the Kansas City metropolitan area today. Eighty-seven percent of the black students in the Kansas City metropolitan area are educated in KCMSD; eighty-nine percent of the white students attend school in one of the SSDs. Yet the district court concluded that the pre-1954 conduct of segregated schools and housing practiced by the SSDs did not significantly contribute to the current racial imbalance in the Kansas City metropolitan area. To support this conclusion, the district court noted that KCMSD was only 18.9 percent black in 1954-55. The fact that the major increase in the black population in

KCMSD occurred after 1954, said the district court, is strong evidence that the current racial composition of the Kansas City area was caused by factors other than the pre-1954 dual school system. See, e.g., Jenkins, June 5 opinion at 41-42. Undeniably, many factors have contributed to the enormously disparate racial composition of the student bodies of KCMSD and the SSDs. Housing policies of federal, state, and local agencies have contributed to the dual housing market that exists in the Kansas City metropolitan area, which in turn has contributed to the de facto dual school system that exists today. Ineffective integration policies of KCMSD during the 1960s and 1970s caused an exodus of whites from

KCMSD to the SSDs.[19] The evidence at trial showed that the continuing influx of blacks to the Kansas City metropolitan area from the South and the higher birthrate among blacks have also contributed to the higher percentage of blacks in KCMSD. To the extent that these factors have magnified the effects on the SSDs of the pre-1954 conduct of state, the KCMSD, and the SSDs and those effects have not been affirmatively addressed, all the defendants are at least partially to blame. Had the SSDs not contributed to the depopulation of blacks from those areas by failing to provide schools for blacks, the higher birthrate among blacks would have presumably also increased the percentage

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[19] The lead opinion's implication that interdistrict relief here would trigger white flight to Kansas, ante at 57, is irrelevant in determining whether interdistrict relief is appropriate. See, e.g.,

of blacks living in the SSDs. Similarly, had the SSDs' policies not contributed to the depopulation of blacks from those areas, more blacks moving into the Kansas City metropolitan area from the South would have settled in the SSDs rather than in KCMSD.

The lead opinion agrees with the state and the SSDs, who emphasize that the plaintiffs' case rests entirely on racial disparities, that proof of disparate impact on the SSDs is not enough to hold the SSDs liable and and provide the basis of interdistrict relief. See Columbus Bd.

United States v. Board of School Comm'rs., 503 F.2d 68, 80 (7th Cir. 1974) (Seventh Circuit reversed district court order for interdistrict relief, but found prediction of "white flight" an unacceptable reason for failing to desegregate schools).

of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). I have no quarrel with that premise. But as Penick recognizes, in Swann intra-district relief was premised on a presumption of continuing racial imbalance within a unitary district. See Penick, 443 U.S. at 400. Here the racial imbalance is clear evidence of continuing segregation following a pre-1954 de jure policy. It is not necessary to switch the burden of proof where there is overwhelming evidence of violations and effects throughout the system.

Moreover, the lead opinion is also incorrect in affirming the district court's reliance on the mere passage of time as exculpating the SSDs. The lapse of decades, without any showing of affirmative steps taken to reverse the invi-

dious effects of de jure segregation, reinforces the broad scope of the effects of the defendants' constitutional violations here. Nor is the lead opinion correct in affirming the district court's rejection of the overall thrust of plaintiff's proof of interdistrict effects on the grounds that a series of de minimis violations cannot be aggregated to produce a finding of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977). Here, neither the violations found proved by the district court nor the effects of those violations are insignificant. See, e.g., Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1503 (finding that presence of dual schools had important segregative effects throughout the Kansas City metropolitan area). The pre-

mises on which the majority bases its affirmance of the district court's conclusion of de minimis continuing segregative effects on the SSDs have no basis in law nor in the facts as otherwise found by the district court and as developed at trial.

Although the lead opinion suggests to the contrary, this case differs notably from Milliken and this circuit's Little Rock case in that it does not present on appeal an issue of whether the only appropriate remedy is consolidation of the entire metropolitan area's school districts.[20] The plaintiffs and the KCMSD seek alternative forms of inter-district relief as well as consolidation

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[20] As we observed in Little Rock, in Milliken it was proposed that the remedy include consolidation of one city district with fifty-three suburban districts in three counties where there was no evidence

as a means to achieve an integrated school system. And even if the requested relief includes consolidation, relief can be tailored by the district court itself or as directed by this court to fit the constitutional violations. As was true in the Little Rock case, the automony of the city and suburban school districts can be preserved concurrent with mandated inter-district relief. As we stated in Liddell VII:

> [R]elating the remedy to the violation pursuant to Milliken II [443 U.S. 267 (1977)] does not require a finding that each educational program at issue has in the past been "infected with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school system." * * * It is sufficient to determine that the

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in the record indicating that the fifty-four districts were closely interrelated geographically, economically, politically or culturally as are the districts in this case. Little Rock, 778 F.2d at 429.

> remedial program is directed to cure the general condition offending the Constitution.

Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1315-16 n.18 (citation omitted). The relief sought here is narrowly tailored to the particular situation and responsive to the Supreme Court's concern in Milliken that the "nature of the violation determine[s] the scope of the remedy." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738 (citation omitted).

The quarrel I have with the intradistrict relief mandated by the district court, as modified by the lead opinion, is that the intradistrict programs will do little to integrate the metropolitan school system. The lead opinion calls for improved facilities and quality education programs, requires the state to pay its

share of the cost of those programs, and authorizes the district court to order a tax increase if that alternative is necessary to enable the school district to bear its share of the cost of the mandated programs. This remedy is fine as far as it goes; however, it falls far short of the relief that should be required under the facts of this case.[21] It is hoped that at the very least the magnet school component and the voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, if implemented, will be of some help in integrating the district. In my view, however, these interdistrict

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[21]Although for the reasons stated herein we stand in dissent, we nonetheless agree with Judge Ross' statement as to the likely effects of refusal by the Kansas City metropolitan school districts to participate now or in the future in any cross-district programs.

programs should have been mandated already.

To summarize, I would hold that the district court erred in interpreting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), to preclude interdistrict relief. Under Milliken, properly interpreted, the district court's own factual findings with regard to the constitutional violations of the state and KCMSD, especially with regard to the significant link between housing patterns and school availability in the Kansas City metropolitan area, strongly suggest that the plaintiffs are entitled to an interdistrict remedy. Because the district court clearly erred in finding that the SSDs committed no constitutional violations with continuing significant interdistrict effects, the

district court's dismissal of the SSDs should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. If on remand, after each of the SSDs have had an opportunity to present evidence, it remains unrebutted that the acts of the state, the KCMSD, or any of the SSDs have a continuing inter-district effect, those SSDs which the district court determines to be within the violations' effects should be ordered to participate in an interdistrict remedy, such as a mandatory interdistrict transfer program, narrowly tailored to remedy the constitutional violations proved here.

The case should be reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Milliken v. Bradley, and the SSDs and HUD should be joined to determine the extent of their liability.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1765
No. 85-1949
No. 85-1974
No. 85-2077

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri

Kalima Jenkins, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

State of Missouri, et al,

Appellees.

Filed: February 5, 1987

ORDER

The motions for rehearing of the Jenkins Class and the Kansas City,

Missouri School District are denied. Both motions raise the issue of the suburban school districts' refusal to participate in voluntary interdistrict plan and argue that the refusals evidence discriminatory intent. These are issues to be raised in the district court in the first instance. Our denial of the motions for rehearing does not foreclose the assertion of such claims in the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

KALIMA JENKINS, et al.,	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No.77-0420-CV-W-4
	)	Filed
	)	June 5, 1984
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,	)	
	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

GENERAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Background

This school desegregation case was filed in 1977 by the Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD), its school board and superintendent, and students of the KCMSD. Plaintiffs sought a metropolitan desegregation plan in the greater Kansas City area encompassing two states and

seven counties. Named as defendants were the states of Missouri and Kansas, their state boards of education, nineteen school districts and three federal agencies. Plaintiffs alleged the numerous defendants failed to carry out their affirmative duties to eradicate segregation in the metropolitan area and have actually contributed to segregation by individual and concerted actions.

On October 6, 1978 the Court dismissed the Kansas defendants for lack of jurisdiction and realigned the KCMSD as a defendant. See, 460 F.Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978). Plaintiff school children filed an amended complaint on May 18, 1979 naming as defendants Missouri, its Board of Education, thirteen Missouri school districts including the KCMSD, and three federal agencies seeking metropoli-

tan desegregation and relief from the segregated conditions in the KCMSD. On July 3, 1979 the KCMSD filed a cross-claim against the state of Missouri alleging it failed to carry out its affirmative duty to eradicate the vestiges of its pre-1954 dual school system.

Before the trial to the Court commenced on October 31, 1983, the Raymore-Peculiar School District and the United States Department of Transportation were dismissed by stipulation.

On the 64th day of trial, March 6, 1984, after offering over 2,100 exhibits, calling over 140 witnesses and designating over 10,000 pages of depositions, plaintiffs rested. (See Tr. pp. 101-16,372). At the close of plaintiffs' case and before the KCMSD presented evidence on its cross-claim against the state, all defen-

dants except the KCMSD moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This memorandum embodies findings applicable to all suburban school districts, an overview of plaintiffs' theories, and the Court's conclusions of law. Findings of fact notable to each district are in separate sections. References to the defendants in this order, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the suburban school district defendants.

The Court has reviewed the entire record, and has reached its judgment after consideration of the live testimony, the demeanor, believability and credibility of the witnesses, all of the exhibits, the designated depositions and interrogatory answers filed by plaintiffs. In addition, the Court took judicial notice from time to time of various matters and has con-

sidered all such matters in reaching its judgment. The Court has also reviewed plaintiffs' offers made both on the record and in writing and concludes there is no credible evidence that would alter the judgment rendered herein.

Even considering all the exhibits which were not admitted but merely received for the record, the Court still concludes there is no credible or substantial evidence of a constitutional violation by these SSDs.

A study of plaintiffs' witnesses testimony both at trial and by deposition reveals that none identified any acts of the SSDs done with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, to contain blacks in the KCMSD, or to keep blacks out of the SSDs. Witness after witness, including witnesses who had been actively

involved in the promotion of civil rights, testified that they knew of no acts by the SSDs that were done with a discriminatory intent. (See, e.g., Lucille Bluford (Editor of the Kansas City Call, Kansas City's leading black newspaper) (Tr. 3125, 3127, 3129); Dr. Edward Fields (longtime black KCMSD administrator (Tr. 2076-77); James McCreary (longtime KCMSD black administrator) (Tr. 13,743); Joyce Stark (KCMSD School Board President) (Depo. at 111-12, 124-125, 150, 181); and Robert Wheeler (KCMSD black superintendent) (Depo. at 21-22, 24, 29-30, 41, 49).

Procedural Posture

The Court deferred ruling the Rule 41(b) motions of the State of Missouri and HUD. Because of this ruling, Missouri commenced its defense on April 2 and con-

tinued until April 18, 1984. When the case resumed on May 7, HUD began its defense.

In regard to HEW,* the motion was deferred on April 2 to give the Court an opportunity to more fully assess plaintiffs' evidence against it. After due consideration, and before any defense by the federal government, the Court on April 18 granted HEW's Rule 41(b) motion. Those findings of fact and conclusions of law will be set forth in a separate order.

For the purposes of the Rule 41(b) motions, "[t]he Court is not to make any

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*The Court realizes HEW was dismantled by Congress in 1979 and was succeeded by Health and Human Services and the Department of Education. See, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1979). However, because HEW, not the Dept. of Education, is the subject of plaintiffs' allegations, the Court will continue to refer to the agency as HEW.

special inferences in the plaintiff's favor nor concern itself with whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Instead it is to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the preponderance lies." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2371 at 224-25 (1971). The Court has made detailed findings of fact in support of its judgment, see Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ P., and has applied the standards set forth in Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) The Court in Shull declared, "The district court may find the facts itself and may render judgment against the plaintiff if the Court considers that plaintiff has not made out a case, and if the district court sustains the Rule 41(b)

motion, its findings will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Id. See also, Lang v. Cone, 542 F.2d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 1976). Based on these standards, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not proven a case against any of the suburban school district defendants. Because the Court must make specific findings as directed in Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P., and to aid in appellate review, Lora v. Board of Education, 623 F.2d 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1980), it has made page citations to the 65-volume transcript and 130 depositions.

All defendants except the KCMSD filed Rule 41(b) motions at the close of plaintiffs' case, and the Court's decision regarding the SSDs was entered before any defense was initiated. The Court did proceed, before a recess, with the KCMSD's

cross-claim against the State of Missouri, but with the understanding that "once plaintiffs rested, they rested." (See, e.g., Tr. 13,859). Despite the Court's clear pronouncement that none of the evidence adduced during the cross-claim would be considered in ruling the 41(b) motions, plaintiffs repeatedly rose during the presentation of evidence to "join in the offer" for support of its case in chief. Even if the Court were to consider the evidence presented by the KCMSD in its cross-claim, there was nothing in that evidence that would aid plaintiffs' case against the SSDs. That evidence by the KCMSD was not persuasive to the Court insofar as it was arguably relevant to the suburban school districts.

Theories

Plaintiffs' theories involving the

SSDs are three-fold: first, that the SSDs, as agents of the state, were guilty of operating a regional system of segregated schools that centered on and impacted Kansas City with blacks and made the suburbs whiter before 1954; second, that the SSDs failed in their affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of the dual school system; and third, that the SSDs are liable for the effects of actions by the KCMSD and other defendants and can therefore be included in an interdistrict remedy. Essentially, plaintiffs seek the realignment or consolidation of the existing KCMSD and surrounding SSDs, which would purportedly produce an integrated educational environment for each child attending school in the KCMSD and surrounding school districts. These theories, when considered in light of the

evidence and the prevailing legal standards, must be rejected.

Because this is an interdistrict case, all the evidence comprising this voluminous record must be weighed by that standard. Intradistrict cases are inapplicable. The linchpin of an interdistrict case, as declared by the Supreme Court, is whether there has been a racially discriminatory act by each defendant that substantially caused segregation in another district. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Milliken I).

Boundaries

Plaintiffs seek to racially balance the public school population in the metropolitan area. As Milliken explained, however, plaintiffs' only right is to attend school in a unitary school system

in the district in which they reside, not to attend school in a racially balanced metropolitan area. 418 U.S. at 746-47. There is a tremendous distinction between looking at racial imbalance as evidence of a segregated school system in an intra-district case and equating racial imbalance on an interdistrict basis to a constitutional violation: "[T]he use of significant racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal [in intradistrict cases] which operates to shift the burden of proof is a very different matter from equating racial imbalance [between two school systems in an interdistrict case] with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741 n.19 (emphasis added). See also, Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, 1254-55

(5th Cir. 1981). This being an inter-district case necessarily requires rejection of intradistrict presumptions.

In order for plaintiffs to prevail, they had to prove that the school district boundaries as originally established or later maintained, evidenced a racially discriminatory motivation; inferences from discriminatory impact would not suffice. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Lack of proof of discriminatory intent in the establishment or changing of any school district boundary lines requires the Court to reject plaintiffs' arguments and effectively distinguishes the inter-district cases granting relief upon which plaintiffs rely. Cf. Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 225-27 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v.

Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975) (the Kinloch litigation); and Haney v. County Board of Education, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969) (pre-Milliken). All of these Eighth Circuit cases evidenced racial gerrymandering, an action specifically recognized in Milliken as justification for an inter-district remedy. 418 U.S. at 745. It is axiomatic, however, that absent a constitutional violation in one district producing a significant segregative effect in another district, the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts must be respected. Id. at 745-46.

The hub, therefore, of plaintiffs' argument is that the SSDs are not separate and autonomous but are instead agents of the state whose boundaries are constantly disregarded and can therefore be ignored

in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Guided once again by Milliken, plaintiffs' position is rejected:

> Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. (citations omitted).

418 U.S. at 741-42. Applying the local control measure to Detroit, the Supreme Court concluded there were no constitutional violations by those districts that would justify "consolidation of 54 inde-

pendent school districts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super school district." 418 U.S. at 743. A review of school district existence in Missouri leads the Court to conclude the SSDs are more autonomous than those discussed in Milliken and numerous other desegregation cases.

Local Autonomy

Establishment of school district boundaries in Missouri is controlled at the local level to a greater degree than in Michigan. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 162.222, 162.441 (1978), § 162.431 (Supp. 1983) (requiring approval of the qualified voters in each school district affected) with Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 247-48 (6th Cir. 1973) (Michigan school districts are not highly locally autono-

mous because of various Michigan statutes giving the Michigan State Board of Education the power to change boundary lines and to merge school districts), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The state of Missouri does not have the power to require a merger or consolidation of school districts. Based upon a review of Missouri statutes and those cited by the Supreme Court in Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742, and those relied on by the Sixth Circuit in Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, the Court finds that Missouri school districts have more authority and autonomy than Michigan school districts. The independence of the local districts in Michigan was sufficient for the Supreme Court to conclude interdistrict relief was improper.

The Court finds that school districts

in Missouri are governed by locally elected boards of education and have the authority and autonomy to control boundaries, curriculum, finance and administrative matters. Based on these facts, and on a review of the facts relied upon in Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, 1256 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court finds that the school districts in Missouri have at least as much independence and autonomy as school districts in Alabama where interdistrict relief was denied.

Public education in Missouri is structured differently than public education in Indiana. In Indiana, the state has far more authority and control over school district boundaries. For instance, in United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101, 1124-25 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) the court found that legislation affecting the boundary lines of the Indianapolis Public Schools had been enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. There is no such evidence here.

Public education in Missouri is also structured differently than public education in Delaware. There, the state has substantially more authority and control over local school district internal matters and school district boundaries. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.Supp. 428, 438 (D. Del.), aff'd mem. 423 U.S. 963 (1975). In Evans, the court determined that the enactment of the Education Advancement Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Likewise, public education in Missouri is structured differently than public edu-

cation in Kentucky. There, the court referred to school district lines as being "artificially drawn." Newburg Area Council v. Board of Education, 510 F.2d 1358, 1360 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). A Kentucky statute authorized reconsolidation of school districts within a single county even without consent of the county school board. Also, the court found evidence that the school district boundaries had been ignored in the past for the purpose of aiding and implementing continued segregation.

There was no credible evidence that any of the boundaries of any defendant school district were established or maintained with any racially discriminatory intent. The only evidence regarding boundaries concerned the KCMSD and

Independence, over the Van Horn attendance area, and is discussed infra. The boundaries have been properly established and maintained by each SSD, and each district manages its own school affairs within its own boundaries. Establishment of school district boundaries is a local matter in Missouri, and the Court finds that each of the boundaries of the school districts involved in this case were established through local initiatives, with no taint of any racial animus. This fact alone distinguishes the instant case from many upon which plaintiffs rely including Newburg, Evans, Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 55 (1982) and Morrilton School District No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).

Reviewing plaintiffs' evidence, the Court is not persuaded by the testimony of Raphael Nystrand to the effect that Missouri school districts do not have local control of education. Mr. Nystrand based his opinion on standards set by the federal government and private accrediting agencies, entities over which the state of Missouri has no control. (Tr. 6177-78). Actions by these entities have no effect on the autonomy of Missouri school districts. Moreover, Mr. Nystrand agreed that no single tradition in public education was more deeply rooted than local control. (Tr. 6178). Indeed, he agreed that the principles of local control are a significant theme in school politics across the nation. (Tr. 6195-96).

The Court finds that local school districts in Missouri have the following characteristics, powers and authority:

1. School districts are governed by local boards of education that are elected by the voters residing in the district. (Tr.6179).
2. School districts, not the state, hire superintendents and teachers. (Tr. 6179-80).
3. School districts, by a vote of the residents, establish their own tax levy. (Tr. 6180; P. Ex. 1737).
4. Reorganization is a decision made by the local school district; a reorganization plan could be submitted to the voters of a school district even though the Missouri State Board of Education did not approve the plan and the voters could adopt or reject the reorganization. (Tr. 6184.)
5. The Constitution of Missouri, Art. 3, § 20, prohibits the General Assembly from enacting "any special law changing the boundaries . . . of any school districts." (Tr. 6181).
6. Local school districts have the plenary power to establish school attendance zones. (e.g. P. Ex. 2267).
7. Local school districts determine whether to provide transportation for their students. (Lowell Depo. at 6).

The Court also finds that the Office for Civil Rights, the federal agency in charge of monitoring civil rights compliance of local school districts, has

always recognized the local autonomy of Missouri school districts and treated the school districts accordingly. (High Depo. Vol. I at 65, 70, 110-111; Ward Depo. Vol. I at 30).

Another strong indication supporting the Court's conclusion that the local school boards are autonomous entities is the fact that the school boards are not afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity as an agent of the state but must be sued instead in their own names. Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 215 (1982).

The autonomy of the local districts is evidenced in the pre-1954 period by each local school district deciding whether to educate their black students, if any, at

schools within the district or to transfer them to schools in another district. (Tr. 372, 378, 622, 624, 696-97, 871-72, 1084-86, 1124, 1126, 1136-1138, 1154, 1199, 5837 and P. Ex. 1814). Local school districts also made the decision whether to educate white students at schools within their district, to operate a high school in the district, or to transfer their high school students to high schools in another district. (Tr. 335-36). A school district, in its discretion, could refuse to accept transfer students, both black and white and usually considered tuition costs and space in making such decisions. (P. Ex. 1768, P. Ex. 1769). Each school district receiving transfer students established their own rules or regulations to apply to those students' education. (P. Ex.

1774).

Having reviewed hundreds of minutes from various boards of education in this case, the Court is fully convinced, and hereby finds, that each of the school districts is a locally autonomous and independent entity. Because each defendant district is independent and autonomous from the state of Missouri, and from all other school districts, none has an affirmative duty to merge with other districts. None can be held vicariously liable for the acts of the state, federal government or other entities. And, absent a finding of an interdistrict constitutional violation, none can be made a part of an interdistrict remedy.

In regard to the first theory, plaintiffs point to interdistrict student transfers made by some of the SSDs pur-

suant to state mandate before Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). The fact that such transfers were made before the Supreme Court declared separate schools unconstitutional does not entitle plaintiffs to relief. Instead, plaintiffs had to prove first that the segregated schools existing before 1954 were the direct and substantial cause of blacks leaving each defendant district; second, assuming that occurred, that it had a significant segregative effect in the KCMSD. See, 418 U.S. at 744-45; Lee, 639 F.2d at 1256 ("there must be clear proof of cause and effect and a careful delineation of the extent of the effect"). Plaintiffs' proof was weak, speculative and in any event de minimus.

The "vestiges" theory also fails. First, the affirmative duty to eliminate

vestiges is premised upon the notion that each defendant district produced the segregation sought to be eliminated and therefore has a duty to undo its damage. Second, the affirmative duty plaintiffs would impose (assuming one exists) is far more expansive than that required by the Constitution. The Court in Milliken articulated the parameters of a school district's obligation when it declared, "the constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district." 418 U.S. at 746. (emphasis added). Thus, the KCMSD and each SSD has an obligation to provide a unitary school system in their respective districts. Failure to dissolve, merge, legislate, cooperate or entice blacks into their districts does not, as plaintiffs suggest,

evidence a constitutional violation for which this Court can mandate an inter-district remedy. Such actions may be urged by social scientists but that does not create a constitutional duty. While minds, like parachutes, work best when open, the Court cannot judicially create openmindedness nor impose an obligation absent a constitutional violation.

In regard to the "effect" theory, plaintiffs suggest in their amended complaint that, "as agents and sub-divisions of the state, the defendant school district . . . must be included in an interdistrict remedy, even absent any finding that they have committed specific violations on their own initiative." Such a "no-fault" position was argued by Justice Marshall dissenting in Milliken:

> Nor should it be of any significance that the suburban school districts

> were not shown to have themselves taken any direct action to promote segregation of the races. Given the state's broad powers over local school districts, it was well within the State's powers to require those districts surrounding the Detroit school district to participate in a metropolitan remedy.

418 U.S. at 807. The majority considered and rejected this position demanding instead there be a violation, or cause, by each defendant district as well as an interdistrict effect:

> Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent

> district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.

418 U.S. at 744-45 (emphasis added).

While it may be within the province of another Court to review and rewrite the standard, it is this Court's obligation and duty to apply the law, as presently composed, to the facts of this case. That application compels the Court to reject plaintiffs' theories and grant the suburban school district defendants' motions for judgment pursuant to Rule 41(b).

I. Pre-1954 Evidence

The defendants admitted, and the Court judicially noticed, that Missouri mandated segregated schools for black and white

children before 1954. See, MO.CONST. Art. IX, § 1(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976) and §§ 163.130, 165.117 R.S.MO (repealed 1957). These provisions were not immediately and formally abrogated after the Brown decision was announced; however, the State's Attorney General issued an Opinion in 1954 declaring them unenforceable. (P. Ex. 2232). The statutes were repealed in 1957 and the constitutional provision was finally rescinded in 1976. This historical background is recounted in more detail by the courts in Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); and United States v. Missouri, 363 F.Supp. 739, 746-47 (E.D. Mo. 1973) aff'd 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).

Plaintiffs argued that in response to

this mandate, Missouri through its agents, the SSDs, maintained a regional black interdistrict school system causing blacks to leave the SSDs and migrate to Kansas City in search of an education. Plaintiffs' argument is not supported by the law or the evidence. While the law required separate schools to be provided, it did not require separate school districts. Compare, Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972) aff'd 412 U.S. 92 (1973). The manner in which blacks in any defendant district were educated was solely a matter of local control and within the discretion of the local school district. (Tr. 5837; P. Ex. 1814). As discussed supra, each defendant district was, and is, an autonomous entity not, as plaintiffs suggest, an agent of the state.

The major support for plaintiffs' case came from various lay witnesses and the opinions of an expert historian, Dr. Anderson. According to Dr. Anderson, segregated schools were legally mandated for most or all of the years from 1889 to 1954. (Tr. 4223-24). This fact, so plaintiffs' theory goes, would compel blacks in the three-county area surrounding Kansas City to migrate to schools in Kansas City in significant numbers. From 1910 to 1920, a time when Dr. Anderson testified the depopulation had begun in earnest, the number of blacks enumerated in the three-county area decreased by 287 people yet the number of blacks enumerated in the KCMSD increased by 6,676 people. From 1930 to 1960, the black population in the three-county area (excluding the KCMSD) decreased by

approximately 550 people. During that same time period, the black population in the KCMSD increased by approximately 45,000 people. (Tr. 4573-74). Even assuming the entire decrease in the three-county area can be accounted for only by people leaving and going to Kansas City because of the dual school system, the Court finds the impact of that movement on the KCMSD enumeration insignificant. (P. Ex. 53E[sub]).

The Court is not persuaded by Dr. Anderson's opinion that the greatest number of the blacks coming into Kansas City from 1865 to 1954 did not come from the deep south but came instead from inside Missouri. (Tr. 4458-59).

The Court finds that contrary to Dr. Anderson's opinion, blacks in the three-county area outside of Kansas City and the

towns of Liberty, Independence and Excelsior Springs were mostly rural, farm-dependent families. (Tr. 331, 454, 526, 796, 901-906, 935, 952, 1008, 1052, 1089, 1100-1103, 1105, 3139, and 3165-66).

A school district's enumeration counts the number of people between the ages of six and twenty residing in the district. (Campbell Depo. at 165). In 1881 blacks comprised 13.6% of the KCMSD enumeration while in 1954 blacks comprised 14.0% of the KCMSD enumeration, (P. Ex. 53E[sub]), an increase over the entire period of only .4%. (Tr. 4215).

Plaintiffs' evidence of transfers from suburban school districts to the KCMSD from 1900 to 1954 resulted in a total of only 251 students. (Tr. 4557-59). The Court finds that as of 1954, less than .5% of the total number of black students

enrolled in the KCMSD black schools were from other districts and included students from non-party defendant districts. (Tr. 2043). The number of black students that attended Lincoln High School prior to 1954 from school districts other than the KCMSD was insignificant when compared to the total number of black students that attended Lincoln. (Tr. 1773). In 1954-55, the black enrollment in the entire KCMSD was only 18.8%. (Def. Ex. K2). And for every year prior to 1970, the enrollment in the KCMSD remained majority white. (Tr. 3352, D. Ex. K2).

Plaintiffs attempted to bolster their depopulation theory by introducing a list of 44 names compiled by Marvin Robinson purporting to show individuals that were transferred to Lincoln High School before 1954 and subsequent to their transfer

lived in Kansas City. The Court finds the list does not show a connection between black schools in Kansas City and the movement of blacks into Kansas City. As made apparent on cross-examination, a number of the people on the list now live in Independence or other places throughout the United States; some people on the list lived in Kansas City for only a short period of time; some did not even move to Kansas City until after 1954. Nor was there credible evidence as to why these 44 people moved to Kansas City. (Tr. 2163-64, 2168, 2170-81). The total is insignificant in any event.

The most significant pre-1954 increases in the KCMSD black enumeration took place during the World War I (from 1910 to 1920 an increase of 6,676) and World War II periods (from 1940 to 1950 an

increase of 3,223). Dr. Anderson admitted that the world wars were factors that brought blacks into the KCMSD, and the Court finds that the substantial increases in the KCMSD black population are in large part due to the unusual economic and employment ramifications of the world wars and intervening depression. (Tr. 5932-34, 9988-90).

The most rapid and substantial increases in black students in the KCMSD occurred after 1954 and through the 1960's. (Tr. 1797-98, P. Ex. 2638). Dr. Anderson, who admitted that he could not accurately quantify the effect the prior segregated schools had on black people moving (Tr. 4332-34), testified that jobs and economics were certainly factors causing blacks to move to Kansas City. (Tr. 4486, 4605). Plaintiffs' black lay

witnesses also confirmed the importance of job location and economic opportunity in their decisions to move. (Tr. 595, 600, 676-78, 713, 796, 911, 1052, 1089, 1103, 1111, 1163, 1307, 1312, 1318, 1552, 1579-80, 1680-81, 1728, 2781, 3214, and 3267). The Court finds that jobs and economic opportunity were primary motivators for blacks leaving the three-county area and moving to Kansas City and elsewhere, and that any motivation resulting from segregated schools was de minimis and insignificant when compared to those primary motivating factors. The Court further finds that transferring blacks to the KCMSD under the prior segregated school system is not a cause of the present racial distribution of the population in the three-county area. Many of plaintiffs' lay witnesses demonstrated that

they did not move to where they were transferred to school. (Tr. 372, 565, 632-36, 676-80, 714, 719, 841, 1216-17, 1334-35, 1358-60, 1385-86, 1664-65, 2587-88, 2699-2704, 3170-73).

The Court also observes that the absence of black schools in any of the defendant districts did not discourage black families from outside (or from within) Missouri from moving to and living in those districts. (Tr. 1153-54, 1213-14, and 1252-54).

Furthermore, plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court that any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remain in any of the SSDs. Similarly, the Court is not convinced that any one of the school district defendants was involved in any interdistrict violation that had a substantial segrega-

tive effect in the KCMSD as required by Milliken. On the contrary, the Court finds that each of the defendant suburban school districts disestablished its pre-1954 school system with deliberate speed and that all vestiges of that system have long since ceased to exist. Unlike Bradley, 338 F.Supp. at 167-176, there was not massive resistance to the Brown decision. Still, in that case, interdistrict relief was denied. 462 F.2d 1058, aff'd 412 U.S. 92. Specific findings regarding each district's desegregation efforts and unitary status are contained in individual sections infra.

II Duty To Eliminate "Vestiges"

School District Association

It is plaintiffs' argument that the SSDs had a constitutional obligation to

racially balance the metropolitan area--had an interdistrict vehicle, the Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City available--and failed to seize the opportunity. Plaintiffs also implied there was some racial motivation in the Association's actions. There is absolutely no evidence to justify plaintiffs' allegations.

The Association was formed in 1971 (Tr. 4819) with its primary purposes being to impact on state funding legislation and to save money through cooperative purchasing.(Tr. 4823). There is no evidence, however, that any school district member relinquished local control, joined with racial animus or promoted any program having a racial effect. The KCMSD was eligible to join.(Tr. 4824).

Cooperative efforts among school

districts does not negate their autonomy. Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 648 F.2d 959, 965 (5th Cir. 1981); and Lee, 639 F.2d at 1256-57. And, as discussed supra, there is no duty on the part of any SSD to cooperate in the racial balancing of the metropolitan area.

The Sales Tax

Plaintiffs have pointed to the cooperation by the school districts with the City of Kansas City in regard to sales tax proceeds as evidence of interdistrict cooperation on subjects other than desegregation. How this sharing of revenues adds to plaintiffs' case is beyond the Court. There is no affirmative duty to refrain from racially neutral cooperative efforts--particularly one that inures to the benefit of the KCMSD's students.

Plaintiffs intimated, but did not prove, that some of the SSDs were racially motivated in their concerns regarding the "strings" attached to the revenue. The Court finds otherwise.

The voters of Kansas City approved a 1/2% sales tax on August 16, 1974 with the revenues generated to be distributed proportionately to all school districts partially or wholly within the City of Kansas City. (P. Ex. 1763, 1767). That included the KCMSD and all SSDs with the exception of Blue Springs and Fort Osage. (P. Ex. 1767 and 1999). It also included three districts that are not party defendants. (P. Ex. 1767). The sales tax was used to generate money because the KCMSD had not been able to pass a bond issue or tax levy since 1965. (P. Ex. 1763).

Each recipient school district entered

into a Cooperative Agreement with the City of Kansas City. (See, e.g., P. Ex. 1746). The City Council Resolution not to interfere with the administration of any school district in the distribution of funds (P. Ex. 1763, 1767), was not the result of racially motivated concerns by the primarily white SSDs; instead, the resolution was in response to a constitutional challenge of the sales tax. (The Missouri Constitution, Article III § 40(24) prohibits passage of special laws regulating the management of public schools. The Missouri Supreme Court has held this provision to apply to municipal legislation, Mathison v. Public Water Supply District No. 2, 401 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1966), thereby requiring the "no strings attached" disclaimer.)

In each of the years the revenues were

distributed, the KCMSD received at least 59% of the total. That amounted to $12,612,339.00 while Hickman Mills, recipient of the second largest share, received only $2,645,521.00. (P. Ex. 1746, 1767, 1999).

The Court finds there was no discriminatory intent nor result by any defendant district. The sharing of sales tax revenues by school districts is simply not a constitutional violation. Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 648 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981).

Juvenile Homes

Plaintiffs' evidence adduced the fact that there are juvenile court homes located in several of the SSDs which homes were once operated by the KCMSD. Plaintiffs also allege the children remained segregated by race until the

early 1960's.

Even if the Court accepts plaintiffs' position as true, there is still no inter-district violation rising to the level required by Milliken to impose the remedy sought. It is the Jackson County Court, not the SSDs, that selected the sites for the schools. It is the Juvenile Court that commits children to the schools, not the KCMSD or any other district; and there is absolutely no showing that the schools have had a racial impact on the KCMSD or any SSD.

While the Court may agree that the county courts are state entities, that fact does not tend to establish a constitutional violation by any SSD.

Special Education

As further evidence of the fact that the SSDs are not autonomous, plaintiffs

point to the interdistrict arrangements made for special education. Again, plaintiffs' position is that the school districts can and do cooperate in the provision of educational services but refuse to cooperate to desegregate the metropolitan area. Once again the Court concludes that interdistrict operation of specialized programs does not compromise the SSDs' autonomy nor evidence racial discrimination. While the districts had the legal capacity to allow or participate in interdistrict transfers, they had no legal obligation to do so.

As discussed in the sections regarding individual district infra, the school districts contract among themselves to provide for the education of the handicapped and especially needy children living in their respective districts.

Those contractual arrangements are done pursuant to state law which imposes a specific duty on the districts to provide a gratuitous education to all handicapped and severely handicapped children residing in their district. See, § 162.670 et seq., R.S. Mo. The federal government promotes "free appropriate public education" for handicapped children by providing states with financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq. Because of the proportionately small number of handicapped children residing in each district, they must cooperate in the exchange of students and services to meet their statutory obligation in an administratively efficient manner. The arrangements made, however, are not racially discriminatory nor do they abrogate the districts' autonomy.

The fact that interdistrict cooperation of this nature is possible may have relevance at a remedy stage, but it does not assist plaintiffs in proving interdistrict constitutional violations.

Vocational Education

Plaintiffs also alleged the establishment and operation of area vocational technical schools in the Kansas City area was purposefully designed to perpetuate racial segregation. Plaintiffs also point to the interdistrict cooperative nature of the vocational schools. A review of the evidence, however, leads the Court to conclude that the vocational educational system in the Kansas City area is not an interdistrict constitutional violation.

Beginning in 1965, the state of Missouri began distributing federal funds to local school districts desiring to pro-

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vide vocational technical training for their students through the federal Area Vocational Technical School (AVTS) program. (P. Ex. 1552). Each district, in its discretion, determined whether or not to participate in the program and in what manner their participation would occur. (Drake Depo. at 130-131). Those individual decisions did not dilute the districts' autonomy.

In 1965, the KCMSD was the first district in the area to request it be designated as a "host" district to operate an AVTS facility. (Tr. 6359, Drake Depo. at 20). The KCMSD did not invite nor seek to associate with any other district in its AVTS; instead, it sought explicitly to serve only those students attending school in its district. At that time, it was a majority white school

district with a student population of 50,000 including ten high schools which would operate as "sending" schools to the proposed AVTS. (Tr. 6221, 6360-62; D. Ex. K2). The fact that other districts do not participate in KCMSD's AVTS is not a vestige of any prior dual school system.

The Fort Osage AVTS opened in 1968. Fort Osage, Blue Springs, Grain Valley and Oak Grove participate in the Fort Osage AVTS; the latter two districts are not parties to this litigation. (P. Ex. 1709, 1733, Gragg Depo. Vol. I at 90-91, Drake Depo. at 93). The KCMSD did not request that Fort Osage participate in its AVTS or even suggest such a possibility was available. (Bartow Depo. at 100, Gragg Depo. Vol. II at 93-94, 96). Fort Osage did not investigate participation with the KCMSD due to the long distance

between the KCMSD and Fort Osage. (Bartow Depo. at 98, 108). The Court finds the establishment of the Fort Osage AVTS was not motivated by a desire to discriminate against minorities but was based instead on sound educational and organizational reasons. It is far removed from the KCMSD and would have been impractical for Fort Osage and Blue Springs to participate in the KCMSD AVTS.

In 1971, Raytown was approved for designation as an AVTS. (P. Ex. 1537). Six school districts, Center, Grandview, Hickman Mills, Independence, Lee's Summit and Raytown, with a total of eight high schools enrolled students at the Raytown AVTS. (P. Ex. 453). There is no evidence that KCMSD participated in the discussions about Raytown's AVTS formulation (probably because KCMSD had already sought and

obtained designation as an area to maintain an AVTS). The Court finds the fact that KCMSD did not participate in these discussions was not related to race or an intent to discriminate. (Tr. 2057).

KCMSD's former acting superintendent, Dr. Fields, testified that he was involved in vocational education and he knew of no AVTS designation that was deliberately sought, designated or maintained to perpetuate segregation. (Tr. 2057). In fact, he testified that the various AVTS's were established to foster administrative convenience and to prevent overlap. (Tr. 2057).

North Kansas City School District does not participate in any vocational educational technical program with another district or in an AVTS. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 47-48, Waier Depo. at 127-29). Park

Hill participates in the Platte City AVTS and Platte City School District is not a party to this litigation. (P. Ex. 34). Liberty participates in the Excelsior Springs AVTS which is another school district not a party to this case. (P. Ex. 34).

Dr. Nystrand gave testimony that there were no sound administrative reasons for the current configuration of the AVTS's in the metropolitan area. He admitted, however, that some great distances existed between the KCMSD's AVTS and major towns in other districts that participate in outlying AVTS centers. (Tr. 6215). And, there are school districts geographically further removed from KCMSD currently not parties to the suit who participate with some defendants in an AVTS facility. (P. Ex. 1709, Gragg Depo. Vol. II at 43).

The only testimony which contended that the AVTS's were operated in a discriminatory manner came from Dr. Charles Benson. Dr. Benson, who the plaintiffs tendered as an expert in the financing of vocational education, did not claim to know of any racial discrimination but he alleged financial discrimination. Although Dr. Benson found fault with the way the state of Missouri vocational education funding formula impacted on the KCMSD, he admitted it had been approved by the federal government. (Tr. 6359). The Court notes in fact that Dr. Benson found fault with all 50 states' funding formulas for vocational education. (Tr. 6384). There is no evidence demonstrating that any defendant district was trying to contain any racial group within KCMSD by virtue of the use of funds obtained through

the formula. Furthermore, the $115.38 per student that the KCMSD received from the federal government in fiscal year 1982 was far more than any suburban defendant AVTS received. (Tr. 6373).

The Court finds that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a constitutional infirmity in the state's formula for distributing vocational educational monies under the standards of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). There has been no evidence that vocational educational monies have been distributed with a purposefully discriminatory motive or effect.

Vocational education in the Kansas City metropolitan area is unitary and is not a vestige of any prior dual school system. The area schools were established without discriminatory intent and there

was no credible evidence that their operation had the effect of segregating students on the basis of race. Unlike St. Louis, there is no separate "Special District" for vocational education drawn along racially segregative lines. See Liddell v. Board of Education, 491 F.Supp. 351, 353 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 643, 651 (8th Cir.) (Liddell III), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 1091 (1981). The Court finds that the operation of vocational education in the Kansas City metropolitan area is not an interdistrict constitutional violation. Nor do the districts' cooperative abilities in this regard support a finding of liability.

Merging Opportunities

Even if there were a duty on the SSDs to promote racial balance in the metropolitan area, plaintiffs' evidence fails

to demonstrate an intent on the part of the SSDs to racially discriminate in their various positions nor is there evidence, in many instances, that the measures raised had or would have had an integrative effect.

House Bill 171

House Bill 171 (P. Ex. 977) is an example of such a measure. It was passed by the Missouri General Assembly and signed by the Governor in 1957. 1957 Mo. Laws 454. Prior to the enactment of H.B. 171, § 165.563 provided in part:

> Every city in this state now having or which may hereafter have 500,000 inhabitants or over, together with the territory now within its limits, or which may in the future be included by any change thereof, shall be and constitute a single school district. .

. .

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 165.563 (1949) (emphasis added). H.B. 171 amended this section so that it would apply to Missouri cities having 700,000 or more inhabitants.

The legislative history demonstrates that H.B. 171 did not amend the population level prescribed by § 165.563 for the first time; the section's predecessor was enacted in 1897. Act of March 23, 1897, § 2, 1897 Mo.Laws 221 (1897). It provided that a city exceeding 300,000 persons shall constitute a single school district. That statute was then amended in 1909 to change the population level from 300,000 to 500,000 persons. Act of May 28, 1909, § 1, 1909 Mo.Laws 846 (1909). There is no evidence nor did plaintiffs argue that the Missouri General Assembly chose to establish the population level at 300,000

in 1897 for racial reasons or to amend it to 500,000 in 1909 for racial reasons.

There are additional reasons supporting the Court's finding that House Bill 171 was not discriminatorily enacted: First, Representative J. McKinley Neal, a black representative from a legislative district within the KCMSD (Tr. 4653), voted for H.B. 171. Representative Neal had long been active in promoting civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League (Tr. 4653), and he introduced the legislation which led to the creation of the Missouri Commission for Human Rights in 1957. (Tr. 3130). Second, not one state representative or senator, black or white, cast a vote against H.B. 171. (SSD Ex. 4). Third, the Court finds that the state of Missouri enacted H.B. 171 for the same reasons that

it had prescribed a population level in 1897 and amended that figure in 1909. Its purpose was to avoid administrative confusion and problems resulting from annexations or population changes. Fourth, the KCMSD designed the amendments prescribed by H.B. 171 and supported the passage of the bill. (Tr. 4648, 6222). The Court finds that the KCMSD supported H.B. 171 because of bonding and operational problems that would result if the KCMSD automatically expanded and became coterminous with the City of Kansas City. (Travis Depo. at 93-100). Furthermore, the black enrollment in the KCMSD was stable during this period; in 1956, the student population was 22.3% black and in 1957 it was 22.8% black. (Tr. 2048). Finally, Representative Frank Mazzucca, whose district included part of the KCMSD

(Tr. 4651-52), introduced H.B. 171 in the Missouri General Assembly. (SSD Ex. 4). His actions were not motivated by racial concerns.

The population of the City of Kansas City did not exceed 500,000 in the 1960 census. (Tr. 13,315-16). Therefore, H.B. 171, changing the population trigger to 700,000, did not affect the boundaries or racial composition of any defendant school district including the KCMSD. Furthermore, the Court notes that significant annexations in eastern and southern Jackson County and Clay County to the City of Kansas City occurred after H.B. 171 was enacted. (P. Ex. 425). There has been no showing by plaintiffs that the KCMSD's present racial composition would have been different had H.B. 171 not been passed.

The KCMSD annexed several all-white

school districts following 1954, including Sugar Creek in 1955, Rock Creek in 1957, Pitcher-Fairview in 1958, and Pleasant Valley in 1973. (Tr. 1974, 6120; P. Ex. 407). The Court finds that based on this evidence that even after the Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decision, and after the enactment of H.B. 171, the KCMSD was annexing school districts and gaining white students through those annexations. The Court must therefore conclude that H.B. 171 was not enacted with the intent to concentrate black students within the KCMSD nor did it constitute an intentional interdistrict violation.

Spainhower and Related Proposals

Plaintiffs also point to the Spainhower Commission's report and other metropolitan proposals as evidence of

racial animus and a derogation of the SSDs' duty to eliminate the vestiges (by promotion) of a dual school system.

The Spainhower School District Reorganization Commission report of 1979 contained multifaceted recommendations involving, for example, finance, boundaries, and various levels of local control. The Court finds that the General Assembly did not enact the recommendations of the Spainhower Commission because it desired to maintain Missouri's strong tradition of local control over public education. (Tr. 6095, 6967; Spainhower Depo. at 35-36, P. Ex. 497, 1728, 2172 and 2192). The state-wide nature of the Commission's recommendations would have substantially reduced local control.

There was no credible evidence on which the plaintiffs may rely to attempt

to support their allegation that racial concerns led to the defeat of the Spainhower recommendations. Dr. Nystrand testified that the defeat of the Spainhower recommendations resulted from a desire to maintain local control and from racial concerns. (Tr. 6095). While there has been considerable evidence to support the Doctor's conclusion regarding local control, the plaintiffs did not present facts to support the conclusion that racial opposition caused the recommendation's defeat. Allegations that some legislators may have made private comments about race, (Spainhower Depo. at 30), even if accepted as true, were not a significant factor contributing to the recommendation's demise. (Spainhower Depo. at 30-37). Nor is plaintiffs' position bolstered by evidence that private indivi-

duals opposed the Spainhower recommendations. The vast majority of opposition by private individuals was motivated by concerns that the patrons' sense of participation would be negated and that local control would be diminished. These concerns were altogether unrelated to race. (Tr. 6967, P. Ex. 497). Moreover, private racially-motivated opposition is factually irrelevant. No defendant or governmental entity adopted these purported racial motivations or was prompted to act or to refrain from acting because of them. Nor does private opposition constitute "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore such opposition is also legally irrelevant. See, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3357 (1983).

The plaintiffs have offered evidence that various school district defendants expressed opposition to the Spainhower recommendations. The evidence shows that the defendant districts which opposed the recommendations opposed them because they desired to maintain the control and authority over educational matters exerted by the local boards of education. (P. Ex. 1728). Also, the districts had great pride and a sense of community in the school districts which they had built. The recommendations proposed to destroy or to alter those districts in a fundamental fashion. (Spainhower Depo. at 35). There were simply myriad reasons for opposition to these recommendations that had no discriminatory basis.

Additionally, the variety of proposals to restructure school districts in the

metropolitan area drew both support and opposition. Some of those proposals, such as Dr. Hazlett's article in "Conceptions for Changing Times," suggested a metropolitan school district which did not include all of these defendant districts.

The "Milwaukee Plan" which essentially pays incentives for black students to attend school in other districts also failed in the state legislature. The Missouri Department of Education concluded that the bill as introduced was too expensive for the state.

There is no evidence that any of the SSDs rejected or declined to consider these proposals for reasons at all related to race. Plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence of racial intent by any of these suburban school district defendants. Cf. Bradley v. School Board, 338 F.Supp. at

158 (opposition to merger suggestions) rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058, (4th Cir. 1972) aff'd mem., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). And absent a duty to merge, arguing failure to do so is legally irrelevant.

Employment Practices

In an intradistrict setting, courts often consider faculty composition as one indicator of a segregated school system. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Plaintiffs argue in this interdistrict context, however, that faculty imbalance between the SSDs and the KCMSD is a vestige of the prior dual school system and that the lack of black teachers in the suburbs discourages blacks from moving to these areas and thereby affects the racial composition of the student body. The Court rejects plaintiffs' arguments for two reasons:

first, the evidence does not support plaintiffs' conclusions that there has been discriminatory hiring by the SSDs; and second, there is no credible evidence that a link exists between faculty composition and student body composition.

Because this is not a Title VII employment discrimination suit of an intradistrict nature, plaintiffs had to draw a link between employment practices by the SSDs and the racial composition of its student body thereby implying an interdistrict effect. Plaintiffs' evidence, however, fails to provide that link.

Plaintiffs rely primarily on the testimony of their statistician, Dr. Robert Carlson. Essentially, Dr. Carlson's analysis shows that between 1973 and 1980, ten percent of the teachers

available for hire in the metropolitan area were black yet few of the SSDs hired that percentage of minority teachers. The conclusion drawn is that employment decisions (and ensuing racial composition of the faculty) was not a chance occurrence. (Tr. 6448, 6529). While the analysis may eliminate chance as a reason for the number of black hires, it does not provide a basis for plaintiffs' further conclusion that racial animus motivated the districts' employment decisions and that in turn led to an imbalanced student body.

For the following reasons, the Court finds Dr. Carlson's methodology unsound and his conclusions therefrom unpersuasive: first, the analysis assumes each district received 10% minority applications; there was no evidence of the actual

number of applications submitted to each defendant district from which faculty was hired. (Tr. 6506). Second, the analysis did not consider if black applicants turned down job offers (Tr. 6515) or whether there was a personal preference by black teachers to teach children of a particular race. (Tr. 6483). Instead, Dr. Carlson assumed all black applicants would be willing to work in the SSDs. (Tr. 6502). Third, Dr. Carlson did not consider if the KCMSD, or another district, such as Kansas City, Kansas was hiring an inordinately large number of black teachers from the available labor pool, and if so why. (Tr. 6503-04, P. Ex. 721F, Table C). Nor did Dr. Carlson consider disparities in starting salaries among the defendant districts and the KCMSD. (Tr. 6475). Fourth, in determining the number

of expected black hires, Dr. Carlson considered both full-time and part-time teachers. In calculating the number of blacks actually hired, Dr. Carlson only used full-time teachers and disregarded part-timers. (Tr. 6473-74). Fifth, Dr. Carlson did not consider the labor pool members' qualifications to teach particular subjects nor match those qualifications to the needs of each defendant district. Dr. Carlson did not compare the needs of each district, did not compare the curriculum of each district, and did not consider whether the labor pool members were certified to teach in Missouri or Kansas. (Tr. 6469-6476). In fact, Dr. Carlson's opinion was based upon the unproven assumption that black and white teacher applicants had equal training, qualifications, and experience. (Tr.

6485).

Plaintiffs' conclusion that black faculty would attract more blacks to the suburbs was supported primarily by the opinion of Dr. Orfield. His opinion, however, was not based on any reliable study or analysis actually done. (Tr. 15,304, 15,415). In fact, the study upon which Dr. Orfield purportedly relied merely referred to "some" black teachers or staff being present in the district. (Tr. 15,299). And, gauged by that standard, every suburban district qualifies. Moreover, the Court notes that plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Fields, contradicted Dr. Orfield's opinion by concluding that more black teachers in the SSDs would make little if any difference in the number of black students in the districts. (Tr. 2115).

Raytown and Grandview each have more black students than North Kansas City School District, although North Kansas City School District has appreciably more black teachers than either of those districts. (P. Ex. 2967). The evidence in this case, therefore, refutes plaintiffs' conclusions.

The Court finds it would be speculative to conclude there would be more black students residing in the defendant districts if those districts had more black teachers and staff. In any event, plaintiffs have no constitutional right to attend school in a school district with a teaching staff of any particular racial composition. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 706 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1983). As the Sixth Circuit declared, "[A]ll that the students are entitled to

is the 'sustained good faith effort to recruit minority faculty members so as to remedy the effects of any past discriminatory practice.' (citations omitted)." Id. at 762 (footnote omitted). The Court notes that the school district in Oliver had already been found guilty of discriminatory hiring practices. Certainly, a student's rights in districts not found guilty of constitutional violations (like here) would not be greater.

III. Effects

A portion of plaintiffs' "effect" theory suggests that the SSDs may be included in an interdistrict remedy even absent any finding that they have committed specific constitutional violations. Plaintiffs had to resort to arguing "effect" because they presented no evidence that any of the SSDs acted to cause

segregation.

One aspect of this theory, white flight, does not implicate any SSD and must be rejected. There is no evidence that any school official of the SSDs acted to lure white families or to discourage black families from moving into their districts. In fact, the Court finds that none of the factual evidence concerning housing implicated any of the school district defendants. Several of plaintiffs' witnesses, Edward Fields, Lucille Bluford and Cleo Muller, testified to having had substantial contact with the SSDs yet none of these witnesses knew of any action by the SSDs which lured white families into those districts. (Tr. 2116, 3127 and 6964).

In fact, as indicated at the outset, none of plaintiffs' witnesses, expert or

otherwise, could attribute any change in the housing market to an action by any SSD. A review of some of that testimony confirms this fact.

Plaintiffs called Dr. Gary Orfield as an expert in both school and housing areas. The Court finds that Dr. Orfield's testimony concerning racial transition within the KCMSD has only intradistrict implications. There was nothing in Dr. Orfield's testimony that would constitute credible evidence that any SSD caused or contributed to cause white flight from the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 1778A-G demonstrates no significant white flight effects in any of the suburban districts). Moreover, Dr. Orfield noted that no ethnic group is racially balanced residentially and no one in this field of study apparently advocates a random dispersal of ethnic groups.

(Tr. 15,410).

The Court also finds that many of the moves of blacks into the suburbs are accounted for by the desire to live in middle class situations and not necessarily a desire to live in an integrated situation. (Tr. 15,408-10).

Plaintiffs also called Dr. John Kain in connection with their housing case. The import of the Kain analysis was an attempt to portray what the population distribution would be in the Kansas City metropolitan area if all residential location decisions had been made solely on the basis of three factors, family income, family structure, and the presence of children. Dr. Kain attempted to discount the significance of other factors which influence a family's decision on where to live. (Tr. 7473-76). Dr. Kain's decision

to use only three variables in his analysis was assertedly based on his knowledge of research in the field of the factors influencing residential choice. (Tr. 7489). Dr. Kain readily admitted, however, throughout his testimony that many other factors bear on a family's decision of where to reside.

Even accepting Dr. Kain's conclusion that the present racial segregation is due to discrimination, Dr. Kain offered no evidence or opinions tending to show that any actions or inactions of any SSD contributed in any significant way to causing the racial residential separation he described. The Court finds that none of the SSDs did or failed to do anything which had any significant effect on residential patterns in the Kansas City SMSA. His testimony, therefore, does not support

plaintiffs' claims for relief against the SSDs.

Another of plaintiffs' expert witnesses was Yale Rabin, a professor of architecture and urban planning at the University of Virginia. (P. Ex. 2871). Although the thrust of Mr. Rabin's testimony was that blacks have been confined within the KCMSD, absolutely no credible evidence pointed to actions by any of the SSDs causing this condition to exist. The Court finds that blacks are not constrained within the KCMSD by any action of the SSDs. Indeed, as discussed infra, P. Ex. 53G and other evidence shows that the black enrollments in each of the defendant school districts have increased fairly steadily since 1968. In 1980, 23,434 blacks resided outside of what Mr. Rabin called the "principal contiguous

area" on P. Ex. 12A. (Tr. 11,071-72). This was an increase from 1970 of 14,645 blacks. (Tr. 11,074). Mr. Rabin made no attempt to develop the data at the school district level (Tr. 11,080-81), although he could have done so through Dr. Kain's method (P. Ex. 1265H), or roughly by use of township level data. (Tr. 11,083). In any event, the Court finds that this fact refutes Mr. Rabin's barrier theory to black movement. The Court finds that nothing in Mr. Rabin's testimony tended to establish any facts for which there would be any liability on the part of any SSD.

In regard to Mr. Rabin's testimony concerning relocation matters, the Court finds that the relocations had no significant effect on the racial composition of the enrollment in any SSD. The Court also finds that any racial discrimination

resulting from the placement of highways and urban renewal projects are matters with which no school district had any influence, input or control.

Another of plaintiffs' housing experts was Professor Gary Tobin. The Court has considered carefully Dr. Tobin's presentation, and finds that none of the SSDs were shown by Dr. Tobin to have had any significant involvement in housing matters, or any control whatsoever over the private decisions people make as to where to live. The Court also finds that none of Dr. Tobin's opinions demonstrated any significant effect on the racial makeup of any of the SSDs. Dr. Tobin described the growth of the white population in suburban areas between 1950 and 1970, although he, like Professor Rabin, made no attempt to study the growth in any individual school

district. He stated that the white population grew by over 224,000 while the population in the City of Kansas City (which includes many areas covered by the SSDs) declined by 72,000. (Tr. 12,982-83, 13,313-15 and P. Ex. 16G). He made no analysis as to the cause of that demographic shift, and there is no evidence that any of the SSDs took any action to lure whites out of the city. The SSDs had no involvement in or influence on the manner in which blacks or whites made residential decisions. Actions of the KCMSD in assigning children to particular schools may have had an intradistrict effect but those actions were not influenced by any SSD. Nor did those actions have any significant effect on the enrollment of any other SSD.

Part of plaintiffs' evidence of white

flight to the suburbs consists of charts displaying the transfer of student records from various KCMSD high schools to surrounding districts over a 15-year period from 1958 to 1973. (P. Ex. 1775B, C, D, E). The following totals reflect the number of records transferred to each SSD and the percentage of total student enrollment that number represents.

SCHOOL DISTRICT	Total No. Trans-Ferred	% of KCMSD Enroll-ment	% of SSD Enroll-ment
Blue Springs	24	.04	.5
Center	225	.3	4.1
Ft. Osage	9	.01	.2
Grandview	82	.1	1.2
Hickman Mills	350	.5	2.5
Independence	121	.2	.8
Lee's Summit	66	.1	1.1
Liberty	9	.01	.2
No. Kansas City	120	.2	.5
Park Hill	25	.04	.4
Raytown	346	.5	2.3

(P. Ex. 1775B, C, D, E, 53G).

Even assuming all students were white (the records contained no race designa-

tions) and further assuming they all moved to the SSDs because of racial transition in the KCMSD schools, plaintiffs' argument still fails. First, there is no evidence that the SSDs enticed these families to move to their districts. And second, regardless of the impetus behind the moves, the numbers involved are too insignificant to have had a segregative impact on the KCMSD or the SSD. White flight is simply not a constitutional violation by any SSD.

In describing the Southeast Corridor, (the direction of extension of the black population from its core), Dr. Tobin stated that by 1980 it had extended into the Raytown, Hickman Mills, Center and Grandview School Districts. (Tr. 12,978-79). Thus, the Court finds that school district boundaries have not

constrained black movement in any way. (Tr. 13,367).

Dr. Tobin also testified extensively regarding racially restrictive covenants that were utilized and enforced until 1948. (Tr. 13,005, 13,012-14). There was no evidence such covenants were enforced by the state courts following Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Nor was there any evidence that any SSD was involved in the placement or enforcement of any racially restrictive covenant. (Tr. 13,359). Additionally, tremendous housing growth in many suburban areas occurred after 1948 when such covenants were a nullity. The fact that blacks presently live in locations previously covered by restrictive covenants further undermines their significance.

Dr. Tobin also testified regarding FHA

practices and their effect on the housing industry. (Tr. 13,081). These practices, however, are totally beyond the control of any particular school district. No connection was made between actions by FHA or other government officials and any SSD official.

Dr. Tobin's other area of analysis concerned the location of public and subsidized housing. He made no analysis, however, of the number of public and subsidized units compared to the total number of units in each suburban district, (Tr. 13,348), or compared to the total population in each district. (Tr. 13,349). Thus, there is no precise way to determine whether the KCMSD has a disproportionate share.

Plaintiffs' Ex. 27 purports to list all public and subsidized housing, and it

shows that such housing is available in significant amounts- in every defendant school district. The HUD § 8 program is also available in all parts of the metropolitan area. Although Dr. Tobin at first disputed the observations of former HUD director Southerland that there were thousands of lower income units in suburban areas (Tr. 13,350), he later agreed with that fact. (Tr. 13,429-30). Essentially, Dr. Tobin argued that there would be even more blacks living in low cost housing in suburban areas if there were more affirmative marketing and counseling. (Tr. 13,239-40). Nevertheless, these matters are totally beyond the control of any school district. Furthermore, such an opinion overlooks Parvin Estates, a § 236 subsidized project in the NKC district, where Mrs. Ruth

Schecter, one of the project's organizers, engaged in extensive marketing efforts with little success. (Tr. 12,542-43, 12,581-82, 12,584). Despite the affirmative marketing efforts advocated by Dr. Tobin, Parvin Estates has only been able to attract a 7 to 12% minority. Dr. Tobin had not considered those matters in giving his opinions. (Tr. 13,273-74).

Mrs. Schecter stated her expert opinion that a dual housing market existed and that to some extent it continues. (Tr. 12,339). The programs and practices she described, however, involved private real estate brokers (Tr. 12,339-40), and speculators (Tr. 12,377). She also blamed various HUD programs such as FHA (Tr. 12,369, 12,376), § 235 (Tr. 12,371) and subsidized housing (Tr. 12,382, 12,386), as well as highways and urban renewal;

none of her opinions were based on actions by any particular SSD.

Another expert witness on the housing matter was journalist Charles Hammer. Most of Mr. Hammer's testimony concerned actions within the KCMSD; he did not identify any SSD as having any connection whatsoever with racial turnover in southeast Kansas City neighborhoods. He attributed fault to real estate brokers (Tr. 12,008), urban renewal, highways, and FHA. (Tr. 12,025, 12,040 and 12,044-45).

To the extent, if any, that the racial composition of the KCMSD is the result of steering and blockbusting practices by private real estate agents, both black and white, (Tr. 1930-33, 3103-04), the Court finds that these actions of private individual real estate agents are not actions

of the KCMSD or of any SSD, and are beyond the control of any school district. (Tr. 1927-28). The Court finds that the SSDs played no role in initiating, sanctioning, or perpetuating blockbusting, steering or red lining activities. (Tr. 1927-31, 1935). Ms. Lucille Bluford, the editor of the black newspaper, Kansas City Call, noted that the transition of neighborhoods from white to black and accompanying white flight had existed in Kansas City since the 1940's (Tr. 3001, 3004) yet there was no testimony that linked the SSDs with this process. The Court finds that people moved for a variety of reasons, including a desire to be with people of like religious and racial characteristics. (Tr. 2034-35). There was no testimony that the SSDs contributed to those private preferences and decisions. (Tr. 3125).

A substantial number of black families have moved into the SSDs during and after the 1960's. (Tr. 439, 667, 1559-60, 1702-03, 1724, 2062, 2103, 2351, 3125-26, 4869-71, 6810, 7095 and 7097). Many of these black families moved into those districts from locations inside the KCMSD. (Tr. 439, 6810, 6968).

With the exception of Liberty, the percentage of black students in each of the SSDs has increased since 1968 and, as the following chart displays, the increase has sometimes been dramatic:

SCHOOL DISTRICT	% of Black Students		% of Student Enrollment	
	1968	1982	1968	1982
Blue Springs	0	162	0	1.9
Center	3	327	.1	10.6
Ft. Osage	2	25	0	.4
Grandview	32	494	.6	9.8
Hickman Mills	29	1,497	.2	16.7
Independence	141	140	.9	1.2
Lee's Summit	1	N/A	0	N/A
Liberty	124	101	3.4	2.7
No. Kansas City	0	153	0	1.0

Park Hill	23	N/A	.4	N/A
Raytown	0	673	0	7.6

(P. Ex. 53G).

Although the percentage of black students in Liberty declined slightly from 1968 to 1982, that decline cannot be attributed to massive white flight to Liberty. In fact the raw numbers show that Liberty only had 28 more white students in 1982 than it did in 1968, an increase of only .79% over fourteen years. (P. Ex. 53G).

Based on the evidence presented, the Court is compelled to find that no SSD in any significant way influenced the housing patterns in the Kansas City metropolitan area. And, as discussed supra, the Court rejects plaintiffs' "effects" theory that liability may be placed upon the SSDs for being the recipients of people moving for whatever reason. Absent a nexus between

conduct of the defendant SSDs and the housing actors, the Court will not find the SSDs liable for racial imbalance that may be attributed to policies or practices of independent housing actors. Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982).

FINDINGS APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS
Blue Springs

No evidence of racial motivation was presented regarding the formation of the district which, by popular vote of eleven rural districts in 1949, became the Blue Springs Reorganized School District No. 4. (P. Ex.255, 525).

Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that the boundaries of the defendant district were discriminatorily drawn. The Board of Education did pass a resolution dated July 25, 1975 that opposed any

measure that would change, divide or enlarge its existing boundaries. (P. Ex. 2125). Although KCMSD is mentioned in the resolution, the Court finds this was only a vote for local control; there is no evidence of discriminatory purpose or impact. In any event, the resolution had no effect; the people could have ignored it and petitioned and voted for a change in boundaries.

There were some black families living in the small rural districts which were later reorganized to form the defendant district. All were farmers (Tr. 883, 914, 935, 951-52, 964, 5308), and the closest school for blacks was the Young School in Independence. The enumeration data shows only five black children located in the small rural districts between 1911 and 1943. Even assuming these children were

transferred to Independence or Kansas City for school, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence that the transfers had other than a de minimis impact on any other school district. All the black families were gone by 1943.

In 1971, the Blue Springs District joined the Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City to increase buying power, influence legislation, and share new education ideas (P. Ex. 1700, Bartow Depo. Vol. II at 46). The Court concludes that Blue Springs' participation in this organization did not discriminate against the KCMSD or its students.

Blue Springs participates in the Ft. Osage AVTS as do the Grain Valley and Oak Grove Districts (not defendants herein). (P. Ex. 34 and 1709). The Court finds no

racially discriminatory intent accompanied the founding of the Ft. Osage AVTS nor Blue Springs' participation therein. (See also individual section regarding Ft. Osage, infra).

The only other interdistrict student involvement relating to Blue Springs is the operation of a Blind-Deaf Center that educates children from both Blue Springs and other districts. (P. Ex. 1720). Non-resident transfers to the Center are accepted on a space-available basis. (P. Ex. 1720). There is no evidence of any discriminatory intent nor effect on any of the defendant districts by the operation or participation in the Blind-Deaf Center.

Such matters as the 1/2% sales tax and House Bill 171 are irrelevant to Blue Springs because the district is not within

the city limits of Kansas City. (Tr. 6204, P. Ex. 1767 and 1999). Nor is it contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37).

While there are few black faculty or staff employed in the defendant district, there is no evidence that the teachers are hired on other than their qualifications. (P. Ex. 982 and 2967). As more fully set forth in the general findings supra, interdistrict employment discrimination, even if found to exist, has little if any bearing on the racial composition of defendant districts and therefore has little relevance to this litigation.

There is no evidence that the Blue Springs School District acted to prevent blacks from obtaining housing in the district with an intent to discriminate. Even if Dr. Tobin's map depicting restictive covenants in Blue Springs is

found to be accurate, (P. Ex. 22), they had no effect because most of the residential development in the area occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory act or omission by these defendants which has had a substantial segregative impact in any other school district, the Court will sustain the Rule 41(b) motion filed by Blue Springs and its superintendent.

Center

The present Center School District consists of territory formerly occupied by the Center, Dallas and Boone districts. Dallas and Boone were grade school districts and sent their high school students to Center when space was available. (Lehman Depo. at 16). The present bound-

aries and the annexations that occurred were not racially motivated. (See, e.g., P. Ex. 405). The district is situated south and is contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37). Center did support passage of Senate Bill 29 in 1963 which changed the law so that annexation elections would be more difficult to call but their position was prompted by the fact that eight elections had been called from the late 1940's until the early 1960's to annex Center to the KCMSD. Each election, held at the district's expense, had failed by a large margin. (Bondurant Depo. at 13, 74, 49). The Court finds the position taken by Center was not racially motivated and had no segregative effect.

There is no evidence that Center had any black residents at any time prior to 1954. (Lehman Depo. at 83). The records

do show the following number of high school students residing in areas now encompassed by Center attended the KCMSD for the years indicated: 1949-50, 37; 1950-51, 38; 1951-52, 39; 1952-53, 42; 1953-54, 77; 1954-55, 116. (P. Ex. 1770). Even if the Court were to assume all these children were black, they are of insufficient number for the Court to conclude they had a substantial segregative effect on either district. The Court therefore determines that for space reasons or other reasons not apparent from the evidence, some Center students attended the KCMSD; none of the transfers, however, were racially motivated. (Lehman Depo. at 29). There is no evidence that Center at any time failed to permit black children residing in the district to attend its schools, treated black children attending

Center schools differently because of race, assigned students on other than a racially neutral basis, denied admission to any black student on the basis of race, or in any other way conducted itself in a racially discriminatory manner. Center never operated a dual school system and, therefore, no vestiges remain to dismantle.

Over the past decade, Center's minority population has grown significantly. Presently, over 12% of the student population is black. (P. Exs. 53G, 983, and 2967). This growth substantiates the Court's findings there are no unconstitutional barriers to black residents or students in the Center District.

As explained in the general findings, the Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City, of

which Center is a member, was not formed and does not operate with a racially discriminatory purpose. (Tr. at 4832). The organization has had no racially segregative effect in any district.

Because the district is presently located within the Kansas City city limits, (P. Ex. 425), it chose to support and share in the 1/2% city tax. (P. Ex. 2177). As discussed regarding all districts supra, Center's cooperation with the City in this manner was in no way racially motivated.

Because of a lack of facilities in the district, Center sends its handicapped and other special education students outside the district, often to the KCMSD. (Lehman Depo. at 61). These transfers are made for sound educational reasons, are racially neutral, and are insignificant in

number.

Center participates in the Herndon AVTS located in the Raytown School District. There is no evidence that Center refused to participate in the KCMSD's vocational technical school or that the KCMSD ever offered the opportunity to participate.

Support of H.B. 171 and opposition to the Spainhower plan were for reasons of local autonomy. (Lehman Depo. at 77-79). There is no evidence whatsoever that Center's position on either issue was racially motivated.

Center employed its first black teachers in 1978. (P. Ex. 984). There is no evidence that Center has ever discriminated against any applicant for employment on the basis of race. Nor is there any evidence that any black appli-

cant for employment in Center has ever been refused employment. The only evidence regarding Center's employment practices are the statistics from plaintiffs' statistician, Dr. Roger Carlson. And, as discussed at length supra, his statistics and opinions are based on the availability of teachers in the entire SMSA rather than on the number of applicants to each defendant district. The Court therefore finds his opinions unpersuasive. Further, as more fully explained in the general order, there is insufficient evidence that the racial makeup of Center's staff has in any way influenced housing choices of either race. The Court finds that Center's hiring practices have had no effect whatsoever on the racial composition of the student body of Center or that of the KCMSD.

In regard to housing, the Court finds there is no credible evidence that Center School District took any action or position which prevented any black family from moving to the district. Nor is there any credible evidence that Center took any action or position which enticed or lured any white family from the KCMSD to Center. The map prepared by Dr. Tobin, plaintiffs' expert, (P. Ex. 22), shows that there were racially restrictive covenants in the Center School District, but there is no evidence which tends to prove that Center had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants nor is there any evidence that any black family failed to move to Center because of those covenants. The continued increase in the number of blacks enrolled in Center (see, e.g., p. Ex. 53G, and 983), is convincing

evidence that there is no barrier to blacks moving to the Center District nor is there any present effect of any past practices which may have had a discouraging effect on black moves.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory act or omission by these defendants which has had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by Center and its superintendent.

Fort Osage

The Ft. Osage Reorganized School District R-1 was created in 1949 by a popular vote of the people residing in the area. (P. Ex. 538). The proposed reorganized district included the former Buckner and Levasy High School Districts and sixteen other rural districts. In 1951,

three more rural school districts annexed to Ft. Osage, (Gragg Depo. Ex. F032), and in 1972, the Courtney School District voted to annex to Ft. Osage. (Gragg Depo. at 61-62). The Court finds the reorganization and annexations were not racially motivated. Ft. Osage is not contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37).

There was some evidence that a small number of black families lived around Sibley, now part of the Ft. Osage district, well before 1954. There is no evidence that Ft. Osage or any of its predecessor districts educated its black students in separate schools. Instead, the predecessor distrists transferred those two or three black students to the KCMSD. (Tr. 5.60). These few transfers did not have any segregative effect on any district. If any blacks left Ft. Osage or

its predecessor districts, or failed to move to such areas from 1910 to 1954 because no black school was maintained, plaintiffs have failed to prove their numbers were other than de minimis. (Tr. 5960).

By 1954 there were no blacks living in the Ft. Osage School District. In 1968, two blacks had enrolled in the school district; by 1982, there were 25 blacks regardless of race, attended the one high school located in the district. (P. Ex. 2967). There is no evidence of discrimination against any blacks attending the Ft Osage schools. (Gragg Depo. 220-222).

At one time, Ft. Osage's orthopedically handicapped students attended the Delano School in the KCMSD because Ft. Osage had too few students with such handicaps to provide adequate teaching faci-

lities within the district. (Gragg Depo. at 134-35). Presently, these children attend school at the Independence Comprehensive Special Education Program, (Gragg Depo. at 136), which is much closer than the Delano School. Ft. Osage's blind students attend the Blind-Deaf Center in Blue Springs school rather than the Troost School in the KCMSD, again because it is considerably closer to the students' homes. (Gragg Depo. at 137). The Court finds that these educational transfers did not have any effect on the racial composition of Ft. Osage or any other school district. Nor are they racially motivated or administered.

The Ft. Osage AVTS opened in 1968 accepting students from the Ft. Osage, Blue Springs, Grain Valley and Oak Grove School Districts. (Bartow Depo. at 94).

The Grain Valley and Oak Grove districts are not parties to this case and none of the participants is contiguous to KCMSD. (P. Ex. 1709, Gragg Depo. Vol. 2 at 43). Ft. Osage decided to build the AVTS within its district because it had unused bonding capacity. (Bartow Depo. at 101). As discussed in the general findings, Ft. Osage did not join with the KCMSD AVTS because it was too far away. (Tr. 6215). No school district other than those currently participating in the Ft. Osage AVTS, including the KCMSD, ever asked to participate in the Ft. Osage AVTS. (Bartow Depo. at 100, Gragg Depo. at 93-94 and Vol. II 2 at 96). The Court finds that the formation and operation of the Ft. Osage AVTS does not constitute a violation much less a significant interdistrict violation. Nor does state funding of the

Ft. Osage AVTS unfairly impact on the funding of the KCMSD AVTS. (Tr.6407-08).

Notwithstanding its affirmative action policy statement, the district has yet to employ a black teacher or staff person. (P. Ex. 2967). In recent years, Ft. Osage has entered into written contracts with black teaching candidates but, on each occasion, the candidates have decided to pursue other alternatives. (P. Ex. 2967 and Gragg Depo. at 225). Plaintiffs' evidence of employment practices, based entirely upon Dr. Carlson's analyses, did not consider this fact. (Tr. 6514). Moreover, as set forth more fully in the general findings, there is simply no credible evidence that the presence of more black teachers or administrators in Ft. Osage would have had any significant impact upon the racial composition of the students enrolled there.

Plaintiffs did not present proof that the Ft. Osage School District acted to prevent blacks from obtaining housing in the district nor in any way encouraged whites to do so. The map of restrictive covenants prepared by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Tobin, located no such covenants in the Ft. Osage School District. (P. Ex. 22). There is no evidence that Ft. Osage ever opposed subsidized or other low cost housing of any kind in its district, and the Court finds such public and subsidized housing presently exists. (P. Ex. 27). The district's only involvement in zoning plans was its opposition to a planned liquor store near the Ft. Osage High School, (Gragg Depo. at 54-56, 58), and was not racially motivated.

The Court finds that Ft. Osage did not take a position on the Spainhower report.

(Bartow Depo. at 152). Additionally, because none of the Ft. Osage School District lies within the limits of the city of Kansas City, House Bill 171 and the 1/2% sales tax have no relevance to this defendant.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Ft. Osage School District and its Superintendent.

Grandview

Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. James Anderson, established that no black persons resided in Grandview prior to 1954. (Tr. 5959, P. Ex. 37A). Therefore, Grandview never transferred any black stu-

dents to the KCMSD. The Court finds that Grandview has never operated a dual school system and accordingly there are no vestiges to dismantle. The district is situated to the south but not contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37).

Currently the school district has a black enrollment of 10.1%. (P. Ex. 2967). Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Kain, predicted virtually the same proportion of black students would be expected in the school district in the absence of alleged discrimination (Tr. 8066). These figures confirm that, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, there are no barriers preventing blacks and other minorities from moving to Grandview. All students, regardless of their race, meeting the established and racially-neutral residency requirements of the Grandview School

District, have always attended school in that district.

Over the years, handicapped children or other students with special educational needs have attended special schools in other districts, mainly the KCMSD, (Strode Depo. at 23, Staires Depo. at 27-28 and Harrison Depo. at 91), because Grandview did not have adequate facilities to provide for them (Strode Depo. at 35). These transfers were for the sole purpose of accommodating the needs of its handicapped students (Staires Depo. at 27 and Strode Depo. at 23); there is no evidence of racial discrimination.

Grandview participates in the Herndon AVTS located in the Raytown School District. Grandview's participation in Herndon was administratively reasonable and proper and was not racially motivated:

Herndon is located much closer to Grandview High School than is the KCMSD vocational education facility. Grandview is adjacent to the Raytown School District, but does not border on the KCMSD. Further, there was no evidence to show that the KCMSD invited or suggested to Grandview that it participate in the KCMSD's existing vocational program.

Grandview's opposition to the Spainhower recommendations was not related to race or any alleged potential for consolidation with the KCMSD (Strode Depo. at 75, Staires Depo. at 46 and Harrison Depo. at 115). Grandview opposed some of the Spainhower recommendations because it believed them to threaten local board autonomy. (Staires Depo. at 46, Strode Depo. at 75 and P. Ex. 3240)

The only evidence offered by the

plaintiffs to support their allegation that Grandview discriminated in hiring came from the plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Roger Carlson. In addition to the other flaws in his analysis, Dr. Carlson's data was inaccurate as applied to Grandview. For example, Dr. Carlson reported that Grandview hired three black teachers between 1973 and 1980 (P. Ex. 721F, Table G), yet plaintiffs' other evidence shows that Grandview hired five black teachers during that period. (P Ex. 988 and 2967, Harrison Depo. at 76). Notwithstanding the variation, the racial composition of the faculty and staff of Grandview has not affected the racial composition of the students attending Grandview. (See general findings supra).

Plaintiffs did not present proof that the Grandview School District acted to

prevent blacks from obtaining housing in the district with an intent to discriminate. The map of restrictive covenants prepared by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Tobin, located very few such covenants in Grandview. (P. Ex. 22). Moreover, the Court notes most of the residential development in Grandview occurred after the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948 , eliminated the effect of such covenants.

There is no evidence that Grandview did anything to lure white students or to discourage black students from moving to Grandview. The school district studied residential development to assist in enrollment projections and as interested in housing and zoning matters because of their effect on the tax base. The district opposed the development of

trailer parks because they are assessed as personalty for tax purposes. There is no evidence that any such action was intended to or had the effect of discouraging blacks from residing in the district.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Grandview district and its Superintendent.

Hickman Mills

The Hickman Mills School District was created as a result of a consolidation law passed in 1902.(Nesbit Depo. at 49). In the 1960's, there were two boundary disputes involving Hickman Mills: one with Center School District and one with the

Grandview School District. In each case an election was held and the voters of Hickman Mills voted not to give up the land; the land involved in the Center dispute was granted to Center School District by a board of arbitration and the land involved in the Grandview dispute remained with Hickman Mills. (Nesbit Depo. at 57). Neither of the boundary disputes were racially motivated or had any racially discriminatory effect.

In 1964, an annexation election was held for the purpose of determining whether or not Hickman Mills should be annexed to the KCMSD and the proposal was defeated. (Tr. 4764-65, Wall Depo. Vol. I at 23). The Board of Education of Hickman Mills and its administrators adopted a neutral position on the issue. (Tr. 4765). Although race may have been an issue in

the minds of some individual voters, (Tr. 4761-62), the primary reasons in favor of annexation to the KCMSD were financial ones, (Nesbit Depo. at 144-145), and the primary reasons against annexation concerned retention of local control of the schools. (Nesbit Depo. at 145). To the extent that race was an issue with some voters in the annexation election, the racial issue was not in any way caused by any action of the school district. The Court notes that at the time of the annexation election, the KCMSD was 65.2% white, (Def. Ex. K2), and the Hickman Mills district is not contiguous to the KCMSD.(P. Ex. 37).

Hickman Mills had no blacks living within its boundaries at any time prior to 1954 or at any time between 1954 and the mid-1960's. (Tr. 4620, P. Ex. 1785, Wall

Depo., Vol. I at 35, Nesbit Depo. at 19). Without black residents, there could not have been transfers of black school children to any other district nor the operation of dual schools for black and white children. Plaintiffs have failed to show the absence of a school for black children within Hickman Mills precluded any blacks from settling there. The Court finds Hickman Mills has always and continues to operate a unitary school system.

The black enrollment percentage of Hickman Mills School District has grown from less than 1% in 1968 to 18.02% in 1983.(P. Ex. 53G, 2967). The 18.02% black enrollment figure exceeds the 14.53% black population of the Missouri portion of the SMSA, and one of plaintiffs' experts, John Kain, stated that the Hickman Mills School

District had reached the percentage black enrollment he predicted would have occurred if there had been no race discrimination. (Tr. 8060, P. Ex. 53G, 1265P). Black occupancy has increased in every census tract within Hickman Mills in the past decade. (P. Ex. 1, 9, and 36). Every elementary school within Hickman Mills has steadily gained in the number of blacks enrolled over the period 1968 to 1982; in 1968, 13 blacks were enrolled in the elementary schools and by 1982 that number had increased to 757. (P. Ex. 1865A).

There were several post-1954 complaints regarding alleged disparate discipline of black and white students and a need for improved race relations. (Tr. 5126-27, 9629-30). The complaints occurred between 1967 and 1983, a time

period within which the black enrollment of the district jumped from 29 to 1,571 students. (P. Ex. 53G, 2967). There was no evidence that these intradistrict complaints had any segregative effect within Hickman Mills or in any other defendant school district.

On October 27, 1979, the Office for Civil Rights, following a compliance review of the pupil assignment practices of Hickman Mills, notified the district it was not in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Eleven classes were found to have minority students in excess of OCR's acceptable range and required the reassignment of 1,268 black students in 1979-80. (P. Ex. 2444, 2967). One day later, Hickman Mills responded by letter that the pupils had been assigned randomly by computer and the district

immediately agreed to make necessary adjustments to correct the imbalance. The OCR was justifiably satisfied and this intradistrict incident had no discriminatory effect on any other school district defendant. (P. Ex. 53G, 2967).

The Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City, of which Hickman Mills is a member, (Wall Depo. Vol. 1 at 41-42), does not operate with a racially discriminatory purpose. Its main functions are bulk buying power, a forum for discussing education issues, (Tr. 4832), and trying to influence legislation. As discussed in the general findings, there has been no evidence that any action taken by the organization has had an interdistrict segregative effect on any school district defendant.

Because a large portion of the

district is within the Kansas City city limits, it chose to support and share in the 1/2%, city tax. (P. Ex. 2177). As discussed in the general findings supra, cooperation with the city in this regard was not racially motivated.

Hickman Mills has cooperated with other defendant school districts, including the KCMSD, to provide for the education of its handicapped and special education students. (P. Ex. 1949, Wall Depo. Vol. II at 12-15). Records indicate the nonresident transfer of students in 1976 (race unknown) to special education/ handicapped schools in the KCMSD, or to the Herndon AVTS. (P. Ex. 1949). The number of such transfers is de minimis and again has had no segregative effect on Hickman Mills, the KCMSD or any other school district defendant.

Hickman Mills established a program for partially sighted and hard of hearing students and receives children from Grandview, Raytown, Lee's Summit, Center and Belton (nondefendant). There is no hint these children are received on other than a racially neutral basis. (Nesbit Depo. at 204-05).

Hickman Mills participates in the Herndon AVTS in the Raytown School District.(Nesbit Depo. at 169). The KCMSD did not invite nor suggest to Hickman Mills that it could participate in KCMSD's area vocational school.(Nesbit Depo. at 169). Hickman Mills' involvement in the Herndon AVTS has had no interdistrict segregative effect on any defendant school district in this case.

Hickman Mills opposed the Spainhower report because it, like other districts,

feared the plan would result in a loss of local control of schools. (Nesbit Depo. at 173 and 178). There is absolutely no evidence that Hickman Mills' opposition to the plan had any effect on the racial composition of any school district defendant.

In regard to faculty, there is no evidence that Hickmsn Mills failed to hire any qualified black teacher who applied for a job with the district. Outside of the testimony of Ms. Betty Sapp, discussed infra, plaintiffs relied on the statistical calculations and conclusions of Dr. Roger Carlson. There is a variance between the number of black teachers hired by the school district as reported and analyzed by Dr. Carlson (P. Ex. 721F, reporting 8) and plaintiffs' other evidence: the EEO-5 forms for 1977 and 1978 (P. Ex. 990, reporting 9), and defendant's answers to

interrogatories for the years 1977 through 1979 (P. Ex. 2967, reporting 11). Regardless of the number selected, the Court finds no correlation in Hickman Mills between the number of black teachers and the number of black students enrolled in the district. As more fully set forth in the general findings, employment practices and composition have no bearing on the racial composition of the student body and therefore no relevance to this litigation.

Ms. Betty Sapp, a former black teacher with Hickman Mills School District, alleged there were unfair disciplinary and class assignment practices regarding blacks at one junior high school. Ms. Sapp had also filed an employment discrimination charge against the district which was settled without litigation. Ms. Sapp's testimony that three black teachers

besides herself were not rehired in 1979 (Tr. 8792) is contrary to the weight of the evidence. (P. Ex. 990, 2967). Even without questioning the witness' veracity, her allegations of discrimination are of an intradistrict nature, having no relevance to the issue of interdistrict liability.

There is no evidence that the Hickman Mills School District caused or contributed to cause housing discrimination within its boundaries. The map prepared by Dr. Tobin (P. Ex. 22), shows there were restrictive covenants in the Hickman Mills School District, but there is no evidence which tends to prove that the school district had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants. Nor is there any evidence that any black family failed to move to Hickman Mills

because of those covenants. The continued and substantial increases in the number of blacks enrolled in Hickman Mills (see, e.g., P. Ex. 53G, Ex. 990), is convincing evidence that there is no barrier to blacks moving to the Hickman Mills School District nor is there any present effect of any past practices which may have had a discouraging effect on black moves. (Tr. 13,368-69).

Opposition by the Hickman Mills School Board to the rezoning of certain properties for trailer courts or apartment projects was premised on their belief that the tax revenues from such developments were insufficient to adequately support the per pupil expenditures for children from those developments. (Nesbit Depo. at 107, Wall Depo. Vol. II at 50-51). There is no evidence that any opposition

was race related.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by Hickman Mills and its superintendent.

Independence

All of the Independence School District is situated in Jackson County, Missouri and includes the majority of the City of Independence, and a very small portion of the cities of Kansas City and Sugar Creek. (P. Ex. 37, 150). It lies directly east of the KCMSD and borders the Van Horn attendance area. (P. Ex. 36B). The Van Horn attendance area includes the former Rock Creek Elementary School District, the Sugar Creek Elementary

School District and the Pitcher-Fairview Elementary School District. (Tr. 6120). Currently, the Van Horn attendance area is, with small exception, completely within the limits of the City of Independence. (P. Ex. 36). The Sugar Creek District annexed to the KCMSD in 1955. The Rock Creek School District joined the KCMSD in 1957 and the Pitcher-Fairview District joined the KCMSD in 1958. (Tr. 6120, P. Ex. 407). All students in the Rock Creek, Pitcher-Fairview and Sugar Creek school districts were white. (Tr. 1976). Each of these districts has continuously remained a part of the KCMSD since annexing to it.

In 1971, a group of KCMSD patrons living in the Van Horn attendance area initiated a proposal to de-annex the Van Horn High School attendance area from the

KCMSD and to annex it to Independence. (Tr. 1975-76, 6155-60). These KCMSD patrons obtained a sufficient number of signatures to call for an election in both districts. A number of reasons unrelated to race contributed to this proposal to change the boundaries. (Tr. 6156, Goodrich Depo. at 30). The voters in KCMSD defeated this proposition while the voters in Independence approved it. (Goodrich Depo. at 32). Because of the variance, the proposal was presented to a board of arbitration who decided not to approve it, thereby keeping the Van Horn attendance area in the KCMSD. (Goodrich Depo. at 32). The Court finds this boundary proposal was handled according to the requirements of the applicable and racially-neutral Missouri statutes. Whatever the intent of the patrons pro-

posing the change may have been, there is no credible or persuasive evidence that the KCMSD, the Independence School District, the state or any other governmental official or entity acted with any racial animus. The Van Horn attendance area has continuously remained in the KCMSD. Even if this proposed change was racially motivated, there has been no effect on the boundaries or racial composition of the KCMSD, Independence, or any other school district. (Tr. 2054-55).

There have been no attempts or proposals to change Independence's boundaries since 1974. Considering all the evidence, the Court finds the Independence boundaries were formed and maintained for racially neutral reasons; the district has never annexed or failed to annex any

territory for any reason related to race. The current boundaries are racially neutral and unitary in all respects.

There is a well-established stable black community in the Independence School District, primarily centered in the City of Independence. (Tr. 4570-71). Because of state-mandated segregated schools, black children, from 1866 until integration, attended the Douglass School (later renamed Young). (P. Ex. 39). The black school offered only elementary classes until it added ninth grade in 1920, tenth grade in 1934, and eleventh and twelfth grades in 1935. (P. Ex. 39). In 1945, the high school portion was closed and those students were transported to the KCMSD. Young continued to operate elementary classes for black children until 1957. (P. Ex. 39).

The following chart indicates the number of blacks of school age enumerated and enrolled in Independence for the school years shown:

School Year	Enumerated	Enrolled Elementary	Enrolled High School	Enrolled Total
1930-31	235			153
1931-32	246	182	19	201
1932-33	238	174	12	186
1933-34	242	168	18	186
1938-39	225	144	52	196
1939-40	219	127	56	183
1940-41	207	123	49	172
1941-42	258	104	51	155
1942-43	251	103	53	156
1943-44	248	85	42	127
1944-45	236	78	42	120
1945-46	226	75	*	75
1947-48	151	97		97
1948-49	161	108		108
1949-50	160	106		106
1950-51	157	104		104
1951-52	142	108		108
1952-53	151	110		110
1953-54	147	124		124

*In 1945, the Young High School closed and students were transported to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 39).

See P. Ex. 1787. Independence paid the tuition and transportation for the black

high school students transported to the KCMSD. (Tr. 1719, Plucker Depo. at 50 and Ex. 5 thereto). From 1945 to 1954, approximately 100 such transfers occurred. (Tr. 4560). Even if all such transferred students moved from Independence to the KCMSD, the Court finds they are of insufficient number to have had a substantial effect on the racial composition of Independence or the KCMSD. The few transfers between Independence and the KCMSD for this nine year period was not a direct and substantial cause of the racial composition of the KCMSD, Independence or any other school district. The Court also finds that the number of blacks, if any, that left Independence over the 1945 to 1954 time period because the black high school was not maintained is de minimis. Assuming all blacks who lived in

Independence and attended high school in the KCMSD left Independence, went to the KCMSD, and did so because there was no black high school in Independence, the Court finds that any such migration has had no significant effect on the racial composition of the KCMSD, Independence or any other school district defendant.

All transfers between Independence and the KCMSD stopped immediately after Brown. On July 8, 1954, the Independence Board of Education adopted a resolution to accept all its black students of high school age, that is grades 9 through 12, in its junior high and high school in the fall of 1954. (P. Ex. 2254 and Plucker Depo. at 79, 82). Between 1954 and the 1957-58 school year, the remaining grades were integrated. (P. Ex. 2254, 3317 and Plucker Depo. at 85-86). The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Orfield,

testified that gradual integration of black students over a few years after Brown, had no significant effect. (Tr. 14,926). The Court agrees and finds that the operation of the Young school for elementary students for a short period after 1954 had no significant effect on either Independence or the KCMSD. Independence fully and adequately discharged its affirmative duty under Brown by 1957-58, and there are no vestiges of the prior dual school system remaining.

The Independence School District experienced a steady growth in total enrollment from 1950-51 to 1970-71, when it peaked at 16,801; enrollment has steadily declined since. (P. Ex. 15A, 991B, 2967). Black enrollment, in that peak year, was 145 students or .9% of the total. (P. Ex. 53G, 991 and 991B). While

the total black enrollment in 1982 was actually five less than in 1970, because of the declining white enrollment black students comprised 1.2% of the total student enrollment. (P. Ex. 53G, 991).

There is no evidence that students are assigned to schools within Independence on a racially discriminatory basis. Nor is there evidence that Independence discriminates in providing facilities, extracurricular activities, transportation, or any other student service.

Independence is a member of the Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City, an organization providing legislative information and group price discounts. (Goodrich Depo. at 32-34). As reiterated in the general findings, there is no evidence that this organization was formed to act or has, in

fact, acted in a racially discriminatory manner. Nor is there evidence that this group was formed to harm, or has harmed, blacks or the KCMSD.

Because a portion of the Independence School District is within the municipal boundaries of the City of Kansas City, Independence supported and shared in the proceeds from the city's 1/2% sales tax. (P. Ex. 1999). As with other school district defendants, there is no indication that Independence's agreement to share in this tax was in any way racially motivated. (See, general findings at 20-21).

In regard to special education, Independence has cooperated with a number of school districts to provide a broader range of educational programs to meet the needs of particular students.

Independence sent its handicapped and special education students to various schools in the KCMSD, including the Delano School, when Independence did not have proper facilities to educate them. (Goodrich Depo. at 146). Subsequently, Independence stopped sending its handicapped students to the KCMSD because of the hardship on the students. (Goodrich Depo. at 146-48). Today, Independence provides special education for the physically and mentally handicapped in its own district. Visually handicapped children participate in the Blind-Deaf Center operated by the Blue Springs School District. (Goodrich Depo. at 146-48). There is no evidence that any of these cooperative endeavors for students with special educational needs were or are motivated by racial animus or had a racially segregative effect.

Prior to 1971, Independence provided vocational education at schools within its district. (Plucker Depo. at 118-19). Then, in 1971, the Raytown School District invited Independence to participate in its AVTS (P. Ex. 1537), and Independence agreed. (Peters Depo. at 111). The Court finds that the KCMSD did not invite or suggest to Independence that it could participate in the KCMSD's AVTS. (Goodrich Depo. at 150). The Court further finds that the KCMSD wanted to operate its own AVTS and had substantially completed the steps necessary to do so before Independence or any other school district contemplated participation in the Raytown AVTS. (Tr. 6221-22, 6360-62). (See also, vocational education, general findings, supra). There is no credible evidence that Independence's decision to par-

ticipate in the Raytown AVTS and not to participate in any other AVTS was motivated by any racial animus.

The Spainhower plan was discussed and opposed by the Independence Board of Education because of its proposed elimination of local control of schools. (Peters Depo. at 71).

Due to the small portion of the Independence School District that is contained within the city of Kansas City, it would have been virtually unaffected by House Bill 171. (P. Ex. 36).

In regard to employment practices, Independence has hired teachers of all races on the basis of ability, the number of openings, and the number of applications. Independence has employed black teachers throughout its history.(P. Ex. 2967, Plucker Depo. at 119). All black

teachers employed by the Independence district before the Brown decision were integrated into the district's faculty in the secondary schools. (P. Ex. 2255). No black teacher was fired, demoted or treated unfairly in any fashion.(Plucker Depo. at 120). And while Independence has made a good faith effort to hire every black teacher that applied, (P. Ex. 2967), some qualified black candidates have not applied because the KCMSD's salary schedule was better than that offered by Independence. (Tr. 1768, 6393 and Peters Depo. at 92). Independence has also encouraged black teachers to become administrators and is the only suburban district with a black principal. (P. Ex. 2967). The Court also finds that the proportion of black teachers in Independence is within the "acceptable range" of the

"expected number" predicted by plaintiffs' statistician, Dr. Roger Carlson, even though Dr. Carlson did not consider that Independence hired five black teachers between 1973 and 1980. (Tr. 6446 and P. Ex. 2967). Even so, as fully discussed supra, there is no substantial or credible evidence that any relationship exists between the racial composition of the Independence faculty and the racial composition of the student body of Independence, the KCMSD or any other school district.

In regard to housing, there has been no evidence that Independence acted to lure or to encourage white families or to discourage black families from moving into Independence. Nor has Independence involved itself in decisions of other entities relating to zoning or the type or

placement of housing to be constructed within its district. (Goodrich Depo. at 63-64, Peters Depo. at 51, Plucker Depo. at 130-31). Independence has never allowed any non-resident white student to transfer to Independence from the KCMSD.

Fred Cioffi, an investigator for HEW, testified that Independence fully cooperated in his investigation of a rumor that there were transfers of white students from the KCMSD to Independence. His investigation found no such transfers. (Tr. 10,156-57).

The Court finds that Dr. Tobin's map of restrictive covenants showed few such covenants in Independence. (P. Ex. 22A). Moreover, there is no evidence that the district had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants nor is there any evidence that any black

family failed to move to Independence because of those covenants. In fact, blacks now live in the neighborhoods which were covered by those restrictive covenants. (Tr. 1734).

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact on any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Independence School District and its superintendent.

Lee's Summit

Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R-7 (Lee's Summit) was created in 1949 by a popular vote of the people residing in 18 rural districts that were to comprise the proposed district. (Campbell Depo. at 97). Only two of the

18 rural districts operated both an elementary school and a high school; none operated a black school. (P. Ex. 150; Campbell Depo. at 72, 87). Neither the Lee's Summit R-7 nor any of its predecessor districts have ever been contiguous with the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37). The Court finds that the boundaries of the Lee's Summit district and the boundaries of the 18 predecessor districts were not established with a racially discriminatory intent.

With the exception of four minor boundary changes in the 1960's and 1970's, none involving the KCMSD, the Lee's Summit District remains the same today as it was in 1949. The Court finds that those boundary changes were not racially motivated and had no discriminatory impact on the Lee's Summit or any other school district.

(P. Ex. 150, 258, 3330, Campbell Depo. at 116-123, Copeland Depo. at 48-50).

There was, prior to 1954, a black community in the City of Lee's Summit in the old Lee's Summit No. 79 District (now a part of the present Lee's Summit School District). (P. Ex. 37A). Many of those families had no children, (Tr. 1208-12, 1216, 1736-37), so there were never more than a few black children in Lee's Summit in the early 1900's. (Tr. 1258-60, 1267). The 1949-50 school enumeration shows only four black families in the district with children. (P. Ex. 1802).

The Court finds that except for one or two black students in only three or four isolated years between 1900 and 1954, no predecessor districts other than old Lee's Summit No. 79 had any black students. (P. Ex. 49). The Court finds that the

following is the black enumeration for the old Lee's Summit No. 79 and the Lee's Summit R-7 school district for the years 1915-16 through 1954-55:

School Year	Black Enumeration
1915-1916	1
1920-1921	7
1922-1923	4
1923-1924	4
1924-1925	4
1925-1926	4
1926-1927	4
1927-1928	2
1928-1929	2
1929-1930	4
1930-1931	7
1931-1932	3
1932-1933	5
1933-1934	6
1934-1935	5
1935-1936	6
1936-1937	7
1937-1938	8
1938-1939	6
1939-1940	7
1940-1941	7
1941-1942	7
1942-1943	6
1943-1944	8
1944-1945	8
1945-1946	10
1946-1947	13
1947-1948	12
1948-1949	10
1949-1950	10
1950-1951	8

1951-1952	6
1952-1953	7
1953-1954	6
1954-1955	5

(P. Ex. 1799, 1801, 1802). The number of blacks enumerated gradually increased from 1915 until 1947. After remaining fairly constant for four years, the number gradually declined. Based on this pattern, the Court finds there was no significant depopulation in the Lee's Summit R-7 or the old Lee's Summit No. 79. If all these blacks had left Lee's Summit and moved to the KCMSD and did so because there were no black schools in the district after 1910, the numbers are still too insignificant to have any substantial segregative effect on either the KCMSD or Lee's Summit.

Because of the state-mandated separate schools, the old Lee's Summit School District operated a black school until approximately 1910, at which time it was

closed because there were so few black children. (Tr. 1199-1200, 1221). Despite the fact that there were no black schools after 1910 in Lee's Summit, black families moved to the district before 1954. (Tr. 1153-54, 1212-13, 1252-53, 1285-86, 1318, 1735, 2124). The old Lee's Summit No. 79 District transported its black students, from 1930-31 to 1940-41, to the Pleasant Hill School District. From 1941-42 until 1944-45, blacks were transported to the Young School in the Independence School District. From 1944-45 until 1950-51, old Lee's Summit (and, after 1949, Lee's Summit R-7), transported black elementary students to Young and its black high school students to the KCMSD. From 1951-52 until 1953-54, all black students from the district were transported to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 1800, 1801, 1802, 1863).

The Court finds that old Lee's Summit and Lee's Summit R-7 transported black students to the KCMSD for only ten years. The total number of individual black students transferred was approximately 15, (Tr. 1256-58, 1742, and 5961, P. Ex. 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, 1810, 1811, 1863, 3350), and the Lee's Summit District provided the transportation and tuition. (Tr. 1257, 1742, 1747, P. Ex. 3350, Campbell Depo. at 159-61, 166-67, and 172).

The Court finds the fact that the Lee's Summit School District and its predecessors did not maintain a black school from 1910 to 1954 and the fact that the Lee's Summit District transferred a de minimis number of black students to the KCMSD from 1945-46 to 1953-54, have not had and do not have any significant effect

on the present racial composition of either the KCMSD or Lee's Summit School District.

In the 1954-55 school year, immediately after the Brown decision, the Lee's Summit District integrated its schools and all involuntary transfers of black students were stopped. One black student, at her request, was permitted to attend her final year of high school in the KCMSD during the 1954-55 school year. (Tr. 1267-68, 1274-76, Campbell Depo. at 174-75). After the 1954-55 school year, all students, regardless of race, meeting the racially neutral residency requiements of the school district, were permitted to attend school in the Lee's Summit R-7. The district discharged its affirmative duty and constitutional obligations under Brown by, among other actions, ceasing all black

transfers and admitting all students to its schools on a racially neutral basis. The Court finds there are no vestiges of the prior legally mandated segregated school system in the district.

Total student enrollment in the district steadily increased to its peak of 7,001 students in 1979 and has gradually declined since. (P. Ex. 53G, 993, 2967). The number of black students enrolled in the district has increased regularly from 1 in 1968, to 87 blacks enrolled in 1980. (P. Ex. 53G). Presently, black students are enrolled in every school in the Lee's Summit District. There is only a single high school in the district and all students attend it. (P. Ex. 2967).

Plaintiffs presented no evidence showing that the Lee's Summit District provides facilities, extracurricular acti-

vities, transportation, or any other student service on a racially discriminatory basis. Nor has there been any evidence of school site selection or closings with a discriminatory intent. Only students whose families reside in Lee's Summit R-7 or who own property in the district are permitted to attend school in the district. Those students whose parents only own property must pay tuition set off by the amount of tax paid on the property. (P. Ex. 3337, Campbell I Depo. at 84-85, 107, 125-126). There is no evidence that this policy was racially motivated or applied in a discriminatory manner but is the result of sound administrative, educational, and financial concerns. There is no evidence that Lee's Summit has acted with an intent to discriminate or to affect the racial composition of the KCMSD

or any other school district at any time since the Brown decision. Lee's Summit is presently operating a unitary school district.

Lee's Summit joined the Cooperating School Districts Association of Suburban Kansas City for purchasing power, and were not motivated by any racial animus. (Copeland Depo. at 81-84, Campbell Depo. at 64-65).

In regard to the 1/2% city tax, such a small part of the City of Kansas City is in Lee's Summit, that the district's sales tax proceeds were a "very very small portion" of the district's receipts. (Campbell Depo. at 59, Copeland Depo. at 100). The Court finds no discriminatory intent by Lee's Summit in regard to these tax receipts and the Court finds that the sales tax has had no significant segrega-

tive effect in any school district.

There have been over the years, isolated instances where special education or handicapped students were transferred to another district. Frequently, those children were sent to private schools. (P. Ex. 3495; Campbell Depo. at 38 40, 46-48, Ex. 114 thereto; Copeland Depo. at 42, 64-65). School district records for 1975 indicate 55 students attended school in another district with tuition being paid by Lee's Summit. They were all learning disability or special education and handicapped programs. (P. Ex. 1722). The Court finds that these transfers were not done with any discriminatory intent and have had no significant effect on the present racial composition of the Lee's Summit or any other defendant school district. Nor do these cooperative

arrangements abrogate the district's autonomy.

The Lee's Summit R-7 district participates in the Herndon AVTS located in the Raytown School District. The Court finds no discriminatory intent or racial motivation in Lee's Summit's participation in the Herndon AVTS, which is substantially closer than the KCMSD AVTS. (P. Ex. 34). Plaintiffs presented no evidence that the KCMSD ever approached the Lee's Summit district about participating in an AVTS or ever invited Lee's Summit to participate in the KCMSD AVTS once it was established. The fact that Lee's Summit never participated in the KCMSD AVTS is not because of any racially discriminatory intent by the Lee's Summit District.

There is no evidence demonstrating any involvement by Lee's Summit School

District in House Bill 171.

The Lee's Summit School Board took no position on the Spainhower recommendations. (Campbell Depo. at 140, Copeland Depo. at 99). Nor was race ever discussed by the Lee's Summit District in connection with the recommendations. (Copeland Depo. at 110-111).

Although there are no black faculty or staff presently employed full-time by the district, (P. Ex. 994, 2967), plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance this was due to racial discrimination rather than other factors such as wages or the district's location. The Court finds that affirmative steps have been taken by the Lee's Summit District yet blacks have failed to pursue, seek, or accept the employment opportunities made available to them. There have been good faith efforts

by the Lee's Summit district to employ blacks. (P. Ex. 2967). In any event, as reiterated in the general order, this is not an employment discrimination case and there is no credible evidence that the hiring practices of the Lee's Summit district are the cause of the present racial composition of the KCMSD or Lee's Summit School Districts.

In regard to housing, the Court finds that the school district was not involved in any way and was in no way responsible for the development of housing or housing policies by various municipalities either entirely or partially within the Lee's Summit School District. (Campbell Depo. at 21). The only concern Lee's Summit had with housing was its impact on the number of students that would be attending its schools. (Campbell Depo. at 67). With

the exception of a legitimate racially-neutral concern about trailer parks, (because they are taxed as personalty, not realty), the Lee's Summit School District did not involve itself in zoning questions or concerns. (Campbell Depo. at 137-39, Copeland Depo. at 87-89, 92).

In regard to racially restrictive covenants, the Court notes there were very few such covenants in Lee's Summit. (P. Ex. 22). There is no evidence that the Lee's Summit School District had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants or that any person was prevented from moving to Lee's Summit because of such covenants. There is simply no evidence that the Lee's Summit School District did anything to either lure white families or to discourage blacks from moving into the district or

engaged in any conduct with the intent or which had the effect of affecting the racial composition of the student enrollment in the Lee's Summit School District.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Lee's Summit School District and its Superintendent.

Liberty

The Liberty School District serves an area in Clay County, Missouri, centered in the community of Liberty, Missouri. The school district is not now nor has it ever been contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 1, 1A, 9). There is no evidence that the

formation of Liberty's boundaries or any annexation thereafter was accomplished with the purpose or effect of racial segregation. There is no evidence that any annexation took place for other than sound educational and practical reasons.

Based on the testimony of various witnesses and exhibits admitted, the Court makes the following findings regarding the education of blacks in the Liberty School District before 1954. Pursuant to the State mandated separate schools, the Liberty School District operated, from at least 1907, the Garrison School for blacks. Garrison had grades one through eight until 1926 when it added ninth grade. (Tr. 479). In 1930, tenth grade was added, in 1983, eleventh and in 1953 all twelve grades were available. (Tr. 2504, 5358). Then, from 1953 to 1957-58,

Garrison offered only elementary grades.

Blacks from Liberty and surrounding areas such as Excelsior Springs, Plattsburg, White Oak, Mecca and Shady Grove attended Garrison. (Tr. 3523-24). There was insufficient proof that either the quality of education offered or lack of certain grades at Garrison caused an out-migration of blacks from Liberty to the KCMSD.

In the years when high school was not available at Garrison, Liberty paid the transportation and tuition to send its black students to the KCMSD. That included 7 to 8 blacks who attended Lincoln for part of the 1945 or 1946 school year before Garrison hired another teacher. (Tr. 3522). Then, during the 1953-54 school year about 20 blacks were transported to the KCMSD. (Tr. 1831).

The records from the KCMSD indicate a total of 13 blacks had been transferred from Liberty to its district before 1954. (P. Ex. 1775). The totals, even when liberally calculated, show less than 30 blacks were transferred from Liberty to the KCMSD in the years prior to the Brown decision. The Court finds this total too insignificant to have had a substantial segregative impact on either the KCMSD or Liberty.

The Liberty High School integrated in 1954. (Tr. 1858, 2799, P. Ex. 2259), while Garrison continued to operate as a segregated elementary school through the 1957-58 school year. (P. Ex. 2263). Thereafter, and continuing to the present, the Liberty School District has been completely integrated and unitary. (P. Ex. 2264). While the Board's failure to

act immediately regarding Garrison is not commendable, the Court finds that its gradual desegregation plan, which integrated all its schools within four years of the Brown decision, fully complied with the constitutional requirements of Brown II. See, 349 U.S. at 299-301. Moreover, plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Gary Orfield, opined that the operation of Garrison as an elementary school for blacks until 1958 had a small effect, if any, on the residential patterns of blacks in the metropolitan area. (Tr. 14,926).

The total student enrollment in Liberty gradually increased from 3,644 in 1968 to its peak of 4,014 students in 1974 and has been declining since. (P. Ex. 53G, 995). Black enrollment during the same period has declined slightly, from 124 to 101 students, for a current total

of 2.7% of the student enrollment. (P. Ex. 53G, 995). There is no evidence that students are assigned to schools on a racially discriminatory basis or that facilities, extracurricular activities, transportation, or other student services are provided in a discriminatory fashion.

Because a tiny portion of the City of Kansas City extends to the Liberty School District, it chose to participate in the 1/2% sales tax with the City. It received less money than any other defendant district. (P. Ex. 1999). Regardless of the amount, there is no evidence that this cooperation with the City of Kansas City had any racially segregative effect on the KCMSD or Liberty School District. (See general findings supra).

In regard to special education, Liberty, like other SSDs, may transfer

some specially needy students to other districts for educational opportunities. Again, there is no evidence that Liberty's cooperation in this regard affected the racial composition of any district or compromised Liberty's status as an autonomous entity.

Liberty participates in the AVTS located and run by the Excelsior Springs School District, which is not a party to this action. There is no evidence that the Liberty School District participates with the Excelsior Springs AVTS for the purpose or the result of segregating students on the basis of race. Excelsior Springs, like Liberty, is located north of the Missouri River and is not contiguous at any point with the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 37).

There is no evidence that the Liberty

School District took any position with regard to any legislation or propositions of reorganization, specifically, H.B. 171 and the Spainhower recommendations. The Court finds that the failure of the Liberty School District to take a position on any of the reorganization matters had no effect on the racial composition of any school district. Nor has there been a showing that Liberty's participation or nonparticipation in any cooperative venture with any other school district was undertaken with the purpose or effect of segregating students in either its district or in the KCMSD.

In regard to faculty employment, the Court once again notes this is not an employment discrimination suit but a school desegregation suit. And while Liberty has employed only up to 2 black

faculty members in any given school year, (P. Ex. 996), plaintiffs have failed to show a correlation between minority faculty and the number of blacks enrolled in the district. (See general findings supra). There is no credible evidence that the Liberty School District has engaged in any discriminatory employment practices nor have any complaints to that effect been filed against the district. The Court finds that of those black teachers who taught in the prior dual school system at least one stayed to teach in the integrated system, Professor Gantt, and the others left for reasons which the plaintiffs have failed to show. (Tr. 1837-38, 2381-82, P. Ex. 2254, 2265).

There has been no evidence that the Liberty School District has involved itself in decisions relating to zoning or

the type and placement of housing within its district. The school district opposed trailer courts, like other school districts, not on racial grounds but because they were assessed as personalty rather than realty. (Riggs Depo. at 39-40, Stockwell Depo. at 50). The district tried to keep abreast of housing developments, (Stockwell Depo. at 49-50), simply to provide for projected student population. (Riggs. Depo. at 13, Lidikay Depo. at 132).

There were a few racially restrictive covenants identified within the Liberty School District (P. Ex. 22), but there has been no evidence that the Liberty School District either placed or enforced any of those covenants. Nor has it been shown that a single black family refrained from moving to Liberty because of a racially

restrictive covenant. There is no evidence that the Liberty School District acted in any manner to attract whites or to discourage blacks from moving to the district.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will sustain Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Liberty School District and its superintendent.

North Kansas City

The North Kansas City School District (NKC) has been in existence since approximately 1913. (Tr. 5960-61). At various times, pursuant to a vote of the people, other elementary school districts have annexed to NKC, (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 22-23), because many of them did not have

a high school within their district and had been sending students on a tuition basis to NKC. All of these districts were contiguous to NKC. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 20-21). There is no evidence that the annexation of these districts to NKC or any other annexation to NKC was related to race or had a discriminatory effect. In 1962, NKC passed a resolution advising surrounding districts without high schools that were sending their high school students to NKC on a tuition basis that NKC could not continue to accept such students due to overcrowding and financial considerations. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 44). Race played no part in this policy. There is no evidence that NKC established, decreased, enlarged or maintained its boundaries for any reason related to race.

In regard to the education of black students prior to 1954, the Court makes the following findings based, unless otherwise specified, on the testimcny of Ms. Pratt Davis, Ms. Feeler and Mr. Waller. (See Tr., Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, 1983). From 1900 to 1954, there were some black families residing within the present boundaries of the NKC school district. The largest community of blacks was in the White Oak area, from 1915 to the 1940's. Because Missouri mandated separate schools, the black children attended the White Oak Elementary School, supported by the rural black community. Between 15 to 17 students were enrolled in that school. (P. Ex. 2397). The White Oak school operated intermittently until 1944. (P. Ex. 39). Those students wishing to go to high school traveled either to Garrison in

Liberty or to R. T. Coles and Lincoln in the KCMSD with NKC paying their tuition and transportation. According to plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Anderson, about 10 to 15 students transferred to the KCMSD from the NKC area between 1900 and 1954. (Tr. 5960-61).

The total number of transfers from NKC to the KCMSD prior to 1954 did not have a substantial current effect on the racial composition of either district. Even if the Court concludes, which it does not, that the blacks living in NKC before 1954 moved to the KCMSD for schools, the numbers are too insignificant to have other than a de minimis effect on any defendant school district.

The Court finds that immediately after the Brown decision, the 1954-55 school year, the remaining black children in the

district, the Pratts, were given the option of attending NKC schools or attending one more year in the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 2942, Schooling Depo. at 26-27). Because of various school activities in which the children were engaged, Mrs. Pratt elected to have her children continue in the KCMSD. One of her children, Ms. Shirlene Pratt Davis, testified at trial that no such option was provided. (Tr. 162-63). The Court does not find her testimony credible because she was only sixteen years old at the time and may have been at work during Dr. Schooling's visit with her mother. (Tr. 101, 204).

Even if the Court accepted Ms. Pratt Davis' version as true, the interdistrict transfer of the Pratt children is too insignificant to have had any effect, much less a substantial current effect, upon

any school district.

The Court finds that NKC discharged its affirmative duty and constitutional obligations under Brown by, among other things, ceasing all black transfers and admitting all students to its schools without regard to race by 1955. There are no remaining vestiges of the prior dual school system in the district.

Presently, students are assigned to schools within NKC on a racially neutral basis. Attendance zones within NKC have been drawn without regard to race and without any intent to discriminate. (P. Ex. 997A, Waier Depo. at 74 and 241). There is no evidence of race discrimination on the basis of providing facilities, extracurricular activities, transportation or any other student service.

The school district's total enrollment

steadily increased from 1953 to its peak in 1970 and has gradually declined since. (P. Ex. 2967). Black student enrollment has grown from zero in 1968 to 174 in 1984. (P. Ex. 53G, 997, 997A, and 2967).

While there was testimony of race discrimination against one black child in the Briarcliff Elementary School in 1974, it was a matter of intradistrict concern and has had no interdistrict effect. (Tr. 227).

A few witnesses testified that the North Kansas City area once had a reputation of being inhospitable to blacks. The Court finds that there is no evidence that NKC school officials or <u>any</u> school district caused or contributed to cause this alleged reputation. Nor does the Court find it relevant or significant as a possible interdistrict effect.

Because a portion of Kansas City extends into NKC, it agreed to share in the 1/2% sales tax. (P. Ex. 1999). Again, no evidence exists tending to show this cooperation with the City of Kansas City had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.

Over the years, a few handicapped children or other special educationally needy student; have been transferred to specialized schools in other districts. There is no evidence that NKC discriminated in this area or that these determinations were made in a manner that was not racially neutral.

NKC has never participated in a cooperative vocational education project with another school district. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 47). The decision to provide vocational education in the NKC

schools and not to participate in any cooperative vocational education program is not related to race. Further, there is no evidence that the KCMSD ever contacted NKC to propose any sort of cooperative vocational educational program involving those two districts. (Waier Depo. at 130).

NKC supported passage of House Bill 171, not for racially discriminatory reasons but for tax and local control reasons. (P. Ex. 430, Doolin Depo. Vol. II at 118-120).

In regard to faculty employment, there is no evidence that faculty or other school staff are assigned within NKC on a discriminatory basis. NKC has followed the practice of hiring the best person available for an open position. (Waier Depo. at 140-43, Atkin Depo. at 34 and P.

Ex. 2967). The number of black teachers in NKC has increased from one in 1972-73 to fifteen in 1980. (P. Ex. 998 and 2967).

Plaintiffs' employment discrimination evidence against NKC is premised primarily upon the analyses and opinions of their statistician, Dr. Carlson. The Court finds Dr. Carlson's opinions in regard to NKC unpersuasive. Dr. Carlson calculated that NKC had only hired three black teachers between 1973 and 1980 when the correct number was 14 to 15 black teachers hired. (P. Ex. 998 and 2967). The correct number is within two standard deviation points of Dr. Carlson's predicted number of hirees. (P. Ex. 721F, Table G). Furthermore, as described more fully in the general findings supra, there is no credible evidence of any correlation

between the racial composition of a school district's faculty and staff to the racial composition of its student body. Plaintiffs' own evidence refutes their theory: the black enrollment in the Hickman School District has grown rapidly from 29 (.20%) in 1968 to 1,497 (16.70%) in 1982. (P. Ex. 53G). This increase took place while Hickman Mills, according to Dr. Carlson's data, hired eight black teachers from 1970 to 1983. (P. Ex. 721F, Table G). That number is less than that hired by NKC. The numbers simply do not reflect a correlation between the racial composition of the staff and the student body.

In regard to housing, there has been no evidence that NKC acted to lure or encourage white families to move into NKC or to discourage black families from

moving there. In fact, it has been NKC's policy not to attempt to influence the type of housing that was built or not built in the district. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 119, Ewing Depo. at 27, 106, and Waier Depo. at 77, 79-80). The Court finds there is no credible evidence of housing discrimination in NKC that has had a substantial interdistrict segregative effect. Dr. Tobin's map showing restrictive covenants cited very few such covenants in NKC. (P. Ex. 22). In fact, much of the NKC development occurred after the Supreme Court mooted the effect of these covenants in 1948. See, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In any event, there is no evidence that the NKC School District participated in the placement, encouraged the enforcement of these covenants or that any blacks failed to

move to the district because of the covenants.

The NKC district is interested in housing only to the extent of planning construction of schools and accommodating the students generated by the new housing. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 30, 33, 124, and Ewing Depo. at 23). These actions by NKC were in no way related to race but were simply to plan to meet the educational needs of the district's students. In a few instances, NKC contacted zoning officials about zoning matters when it was necessary to arrange for rezoning or the like to accommodate the purchase or sale of property which the school district owned or wished to acquire. (Doolin Depo. Vol. I at 33). These contacts were not race related and did not impact upon the race of students attending KCMSD schools.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by NKC and its Superintendent.

Park Hill

Park Hill Reorganized School District No. 5 (Park Hill) is located wholly within Platte County, Missouri, (Harmon Depo. at 31), and is not contiguous to the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 22A). The school districts in Platte County were consolidated and reorganized between 1949 and 1951 with the Park Hill District coming into existence as a result of a consolidation of five school districts with the old Parkhill School District in 1950, followed by a reorganization of six additional districts with

the Consolidated District in 1951. All took place pursuant to a popular vote of the residents of the affected areas. (Aikmus Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 3 and 4 thereto). The area encompassed by the Parkhill School District was rural and agricultural prior to 1947. (Tr. 1499, 2718, 3169, 3182, 3138, 13,022-23, P. Ex. 22 and 22A). The Court finds that the establishment of the Park Hill boundaries in 1951 were not racially motivated and have not had any segregative effect in either the Park Hill district or any other school district and there have been no significant boundary changes since that time.(Jones Depo. at 56-57, 74-75, Harmon Depo. at 32-34 and Shipley Depo. at 27, 68-70).

Historically, there was a black community in the area that became the Park

Hill District, centered in the town of Parkville. (See, e.g., P. Ex. 2, 8B, 37, 37A; 51A and 51B). In 1900, there were approximately 250 blacks in the two townships, Pettis and Waldron, that subsequently became what is the Park Hill School District. (May Township as constituted in 1900 was also part of what became the Park Hill District, but had few blacks. See P. Ex. 51A). By 1910 the black population of Pettis and Waldron Townships had decreased by 66 persons, and the white population had decreased by over 400. (P. Ex. 51A). Since Waldron was the more agricultural area (Tr. 2718-19, 3138 and 3182), it is reasonable to infer that the decline in population between 1900 and 1910 was associated with the decline in the availability of agricultural employment and supports the conclusion that the

decline in black population in this area was the result of economic changes in agriculture rather than the availability of schools. Between 1910 and 1960, the black population in the area covered by Pettis and Waldron Townships decreased by fewer than 50. (P. Ex. 51A). The black population of Pettis Township mostly concentrated in Parkville, where jobs were available. (Tr. 329-330, 1466, 2720, 3169 and 3221). The Court finds from the weight of the credible evidence that economic conditions and employment opportunities, rather than schools, were the significant factors affecting choice of residence by those blacks leaving and those blacks remaining in the Park Hill area between 1910 and 1960.

Even if schools were a significant factor in the out-migration of blacks from

the Park Hill area subsequent to 1910, the Court finds that the numbers of persons out-migrating from the Park Hill area to be so minimal that it could not have had any effect on the racial composition of Park Hill schools or schools in any other district including the KCMSD.

As of the 1940's, there were 15 to 20 black families residing in Parkville and several more families to the west of town. (Whipple Depo. at 21-22, Jones Depo. at 10-11 and Tr. 3165-69, 3242). Only one black family did not reside in the immediate Parkville area, the Pearl family, (Jones Depo. at 35), but resided on a farm located in what became part of the Platte City district. (Tr. 3143 and 3158).

Since at least 1903, the old Parkville district (and Park Hill after 1951) continuously operated a black elementary

school, Banneker, in Parkville. (Tr. 2828, P. Ex. 77A, and Jones Depo. at 48). From at least 1924 on there were between 25 and 30 students in that school. (Tr. 2828, 3181 and Jones Depo. at 48). According to various witnessed (Curtis Hoskins Jackson and Douglass), Banneker accepted blacks from surrounding black communities, used old books and supplies from Grayden Elementary (white school) and those purchased by the teachers from personal funds. Banneker operated as a segregated black elementary school until it was closed in 1959. (P. Ex. 39, 2278). There was insufficient proof that either the quality of education offered or lack of certain grades at Banneker caused an out-migration of blacks from Park Hill to the KCMSD. The Court finds that the operation of Banneker school could not and did not

have a significant segregative effect upon the Park Hill District, the KCMSD or any other district.

Although there was no high school for blacks in what now constitutes the Park Hill School District, there is no evidence that black high school students from the area attended the KCMSD schools prior to 1940. (P. Ex. 1775). The evidence is that some black Parkville students attended Sumner High School in Kansas City, Kansas and others attended Kansas Vocational School (KVS) and still others attended church-related schools in both Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas. (Tr. 3170, 3187, 3189, 3226-27).

Between 1940 and 1956, black high school students from Parkville (up to 1951) and the Park Hill (after reorganization in 1951) districts attended the KCMSD

schools. Tuition and transportation were paid by the Parkville and, subsequently, the Park Hill School District. (Tr. 1477-78, 3228-29, Jones Depo. at 27-28). No more than 7 students were transported in any year, and somewhere between 11 and 16, total, were actually transferred to the KCMSD schools from Parkville. (Tr. 2839, P. Ex. 1775, 1831, 2271A). The transfer of so few students to the KCMSD did not have any significant effect upon the racial composition of the Park Hill District, the KCMSD or any other district nor was it a cause of depopulation within the Parkville and Park Hill District or impaction of blacks within the KCMSD.

On August 9, 1954, the Park Hill Board of Education decided to postpone desegregation of the high school for one year until the final decision of the Supreme

Court in Brown. (P. Ex. 2270, Fickle Depo. at 33-34). In August, 1955, the Board again took up desegregation of the high school (at that time there were 42 blacks enumerated, 13 of high school age, (P. Ex. 2269), and voted to furnish tuition and transportation to the KCMSD for the 7 who enrolled for the 1955-56 school year. (P. Ex. 2271A). While the Board's failure to act immediately on the Brown decision is not commendable, the minutes reflect some genuine concerns about the students and their preferences and do not reflect any overt refusal to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court or any racial animus. (P. Ex. 2271). Park Hill High School was integrated in the 1956-57 school year, the junior high was integrated in the 1957-58 school year and the elementary schools were integrated

in the 1959-60 school year. (Tr. 2740, 2831, 2848, 2857 and Jones Depo. at 35-36, 103). Even though the Park Hill district did not completely integrate until five years after Brown I, the Court finds its gradual desegregation was within a constitutionally acceptable time span under Brown II. 349 U.S. at 299-301. In any event, there was no segregative impact upon any other defendant district. Since 1959 the Park Hill District has operated a unitary, fully integrated school district. (Tr. 1507). Black students attend each of Park Hill's schools (P. Ex. 999), and all students, regardless of race, attend neighborhood schools. (Tr. 1507, 1509).

There is no evidence that any person moved into or out of the Park Hill School District to the KCMSD or elsewhere because of the continued operation of segregated

schools between 1954 and 1959. Additionally, Dr. Orfield, plaintiffs' expert, testified that the continued operation of segregated schools in Park Hill and other districts beyond 1954 had at most, a small effect on residential patterns. (Tr. 14,926). In view of the foregoing, the Court must conclude that the continued operation of segregated schools until 1959 had no significant segregative effect on either the Park Hill School District or any other school district including the KCMSD and was not a cause of depopulation or impaction. The Court further concludes that the vestiges of the prior dual school system have been fully eliminated.

The number of black students in Park Hill schools has increased since 1976 a total of 110 students, while at the same time, the overall student population has

fallen by 600 students. (P. Ex. 20A, 2967). The continued increase in black enrollment in the Park Hill District suggests that there are no remaining effects of the prior dual school system in that district.

Because a portion of the Park Hill School District is within the municipal boundaries of the City of Kansas City, Park Hill supported and shared in the proceeds of the city's 1/2% sales tax. (P. Ex. 1748). As with other school district defendants, there is no indication that Park Hill's agreement to share in this tax was in any way racially motivated or had any racial impact.

The Park Hill District participates in the Platte City AVTS, a district not a party to this litigation. Both Park Hill and Platte City are contiguous districts

north of the Missouri River, neither of which border the KCMSD. (P. Ex. 34). There is no showing that Park Hill's participation in this AVTS and not in KCMSD's AVTS is for other than obvious reasons of closeness and administrative convenience.

There is no evidence that Park Hill took any position with respect to House Bill 171 or with respect to the annexation of parts of the Park Hill School District by the City of Kansas City.

The Park Hill School District adopted a resolution on February 10, 1969 (P. Ex. 1728) indicating that it was opposed to the Spainhower recommendations because of the Board's concerns with finances, local control and representative government. (Harmon Depo. at 133-137). Such opposition was not motivated by racial animus and has not been shown to have had any

significant effect on the passage or failure of any legislation.

While the records indicate Park Hill has hired few black faculty or staff, (P. Ex. 1000, 2967), plaintiffs have not established the number of blacks who applied for employment with the district. Nor is there any evidence that any black applicant for employment has ever been turned down by the Park Hill School District. There is no evidence that any person was not hired or was terminated by the Park Hill School District by reason of race. The evidence is that the school district's hiring practices are racially neutral and designed to affirm equal employment opportunity. (P. Ex. 2967, Jones Depo. at 93, Howard Depo. at 67-69, 113 and Shipley Depo. at 55-57). Again, absent a nexus between faculty racial com-

position and student body racial composition, this evidence has no bearing on liability in an interdistrict case. (See general findings supra).

The Park Hill School District generally avoided all involvement in housing matters within its borders. (Jones Depo. at 45-46, Harmon Depo. at 49-52 and Shipley Depo. at 32-33). The district never opposed or took a position against apartments, trailer courts or subsidized housing and all are present within the district. Harmon Depo. at 49-52, 120-121 and Shipley Depo. at 32-33, 80). The district never took an active role in zoning matters, other than one incident involving a commercial development adjacent to one of its schools where service of alcohol was involved in addition to a boundary dispute. (Jones Depo. at 45-46,

Harmon Depo. at 4952, 120-121, Shipley Depo. at 32-33 and Howard Depo. at 31-35). Traditionally, the district's only involvement in development within its boundaries was an attempt to purchase school sites in areas where development was likely to occur. (Jones Depo. at 45-46, Harmon Depo. at 41-44, 115-116, 162 and Howard Depo. at 23). The Court finds no evidence that the Park Hill District was involved in making or carrying out housing policies. Further, the actions of the school district had no effect on the racial residential patterns within the Park Hill District and no interdistrict effect on racial residential patterns.

The Court finds there were 33 restrictive covenants identified in Platte County, most of them put in place between 1940 and 1950. (P. Ex. 22, 1239A).

Before the Shelley v. Kraemer decision, 334 U.S. 1, the entire population in the county only increased by approximately 1,000 people. (P. Ex. 16A). Obviously, these covenants did not create a "white haven" in the county. The Court finds that the existence of the restrictive covenants had no effect on racial residential patterns within the Park Hill School District. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the school district had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants.

The Court finds that the Park Hill School District has neither lured white families or discouraged black families from moving to the district. Plaintiffs' witnesses could only place three families from the KCMSD in the Park Hill School District.

Having failed to establish any intentional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact in any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by Park Hill and its Superintendent.

Raytown

Consolidated School District No. 2 (Raytown) resulted, by popular vote of the people, from the consolidation of several rural school districts in 1903. (Herndon Depo. at 32-33). There have been no annexations or boundary changes since its formation, (Herndon Depo. at 34), and no evidence of a racially discriminatory intent or effect therefrom. Raytown is contiguous to the KCMSD on the east, southeast. (P. Ex. 37).

The Raytown Board of Education passed

a resolution on July 7, 1975, that opposed any measure that would change, divide or enlarge its existing boundaries. (P. Ex. 2194). Although the KCMSD is mentioned in the resolution, the Court finds this was a vote affirming local control; there is no evidence of discriminatory purpose or impact. Moreover, the resolution was a nullity because the people in the district, by petition and vote, could change their boundaries notwithstanding the Board's position.

Prior to 1954, there were no black enclaves or communities within the boundaries of the Raytown School District (P. Ex. 37A, Lowell Depo. at 8-9, 14). No black students, therefore, were transported out of the Raytown District to the KCMSD or any other district, (Lowell Depo. at 9), nor was there a need for separate

schools as mandated by the state. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the absence of a separate school for blacks within the Raytown School District prior to 1954 precluded any blacks from settling there.

The Raytown School District experienced a steady growth in total enrollment from 1953-54 to 1969-70, when it peaked at 16,058; enrollment has gradually declined since. (P. Ex. 2967, Herndon Depo. at 44). No black students resided within or were enrolled in the Raytown School District during the 1953-54 or the 1954-55 school years. (Lowell Depo. at 13-14). Because the district did not maintain records of the race of the students during the 1960's, (P. Ex. 2967), the Court cannot ascertain when blacks were first enrolled. The number of

blacks has increased in the past decade from 13 enrolled in 1970 to 673 enrolled, 7.6% of the student body, in 1982. (P. Ex. 53G, Ex. 1001).

Because a portion of the Raytown School District is within the municipal boundaries of the City of Kansas City, (Lowell Depo. 8-9), Raytown supported and shared in the proceeds from the City's 1/2% sales tax (P. Ex. 1999). As with other school district defendants, there is no indication that Raytown's agreement to share in this tax was in any way racially motivated.

There are some students residing within the Raytown School District that have attended school in other districts because of handicap or for special education. (Atkin Depo. at 93-95, 97-98). Plaintiffs have not shown that such atten-

dance for special education was influenced by or based on racial considerations. These transfers had no effect, in any event, upon the racial composition of Raytown or any other defendant district. Nor did the cooperative arrangements diminish the district's autonomy.

The district provides its students with vocational education at its Joe Herndon Area Vocational-Technical School which was built after state approval in the early 1970's and opened in the 1973-74 school year. (P. Ex. 1537, Sheets Depo. at 16, 17-19). The decision to build an AVTS in the Raytown School District followed the expression of interest in participating in such a school by the Center, Grandview, Hickman Mills, Independence, and Lee's Summit School Districts. (P. Ex. 3271, Herndon Depo. at

124-128). There is no evidence that the creation of the Herndon AVTS nor the districts that sought to join therein were motivated in any way by a discriminatory purpose. The Herndon AVTS has operated at 80% to 90% of capacity throughout most years of its operation. (Sheets Depo. at 39). It has never received any requests from a student or from any district for exchange of students between the Herndon AVTS and any other AVTS. (Sheets Depo. at 54).

In 1980, the Office for Civil Rights conducted an onsight review and investigation of the Herndon AVTS and concluded the vocational-technical programs were being provided in compliance with the non-discrimination requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (P. Ex. 453). There is no showing that the racial

composition of the student enrollment at the Herndon AVTS has had any effect upon the racial composition of any defendant school district.

In regard to H.B. 171, the Raytown Board of Education voted in 1956 to request an opinion from the Attorney General whether any part of its district would be absorbed into the KCMSD if the City's population exceeded 500,000. (P. Ex. 2191). No evidence exists, however, relating this request to other than racially neutral concerns over local control and administration.

The Raytown School District opposed the Spainhower recommendations not because of any racial animus, but because it was not administratively feasible. (Herndon Depo. at 71-72).

While the records indicate Raytown has

hired few black faculty, (P. Ex. 1002), plaintiffs have not established the number of blacks who actually applied for employment with the district. Instead, they rely upon the statistical analysis of Dr. Carlson who computed faculty availability for the entire SMSA. (P. Ex. 721). (See general findings supra). Plaintiffs have not established with credible evidence that there was any racial discrimination in the district's employment decisions. (P. Ex. 2967).

In regard to housing, the Court finds there is no credible evidence that the Raytown School District took any action or position which prevented any black family from moving to that district. (Herndon Depo. at 22, 41, Atkin Depo. at 141). Nor is there any credible evidence that Raytown took any action or position which

enticed or lured any white family from the KCMSD to Raytown. The map prepared by Dr. Tobin, (P. Ex. 22), shows that there were racially restrictive covenants in the Raytown School District, but there is no evidence which tends to prove that the district had any complicity in the placement or enforcement of those covenants nor is there any evidence that any black family failed to move to Raytown because of those covenants. The continued increase in the number of blacks enrolled in Raytown (P. Ex. 53G, and Ex. 1001), is convincing evidence that there is no barrier to blacks moving to the Raytown School District nor is there any present effect of any past practices which may have had a discouraging effect on black moves.

While there was some evidence that the

Raytown area has a reputation of being inhospitable to blacks, (see, e.g., Cleaver's testimony), plaintiffs adduced absolutely no evidence that the school district or its officials caused or contributed to cause that reputation.

The only position which the Raytown district took with respect to any housing or zoning matters was its opposition to trailer courts because of their taxation as personalty rather than realty. (Herndon Depo. at 40-41). There is simply no evidence that the Raytown School District engaged in any conduct relating to housing matters which had the intent or effect of affecting the racial composition of the student enrollment in the Raytown District or in any other defendant school district.

Having failed to establish any inten-

tional racially discriminatory acts or omissions by these defendants which have had a substantial segregative impact on any other district, the Court will grant the Rule 41(b) motion filed by the Raytown School District and its Superintendent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For ease of discussion and understanding, various legal standards have been included in the pertinent fact-finding sections of this order supra. They are hereby incorporated as conclusions of law. In some instances, only brief remention of certain cases may be made.

As indicated earlier, the touchstone of an interdistrict school desegregation case is Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken teaches that before district boundaries may be ignored or

school districts consolidated for remedial purposes, there must be evidence of a constitutional violation in one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. The racially discriminatory acts must be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. 418 U.S. at 744-45. The absence of an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect requires interdistrict relief to be denied. Id.

The theories offered here have been considered--and rejected--by the Supreme Court in Milliken. For example, upon finding violations within the predominantly black city district but not in the surrounding predominantly white suburban districts, the Court declared, "Where the schools of only one district have been affected, there is no constitutional power

in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial composition of that district's schools with those of the surrounding districts." 418 U.S. at 749. After assessing the evidence, the Supreme Court held, "Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to that system." Id. at 746. To award the relief plaintiffs seek here would be contrary to the express mandate from the High Court because it "would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court." Id.

The cause and effect nexus cannot be overemphasized. As the Fifth Circuit

recognized, "[t]he court's deliberate choice [in Milliken] of phrases such as 'substantial' or 'direct cause' and 'significant segregative effect' expresses an insistence that in cases where an interdistrict remedy is requested, there must be clear proof of cause and effect and a careful delineation of the extent of the effect." Lee v. Lee County, supra, 639 F.2d at 1256. Not only is plaintiffs' evidence here blurred as to cause and effect, there is no "careful delineation of the extent of the effect."

Another recent Fifth Circuit decision elaborated on the Supreme Court's requirement of an "interdistrict violation": "The requisite segregative intent must be not simply to discriminate within the offending system but further a clear intent to cause segregative effects within

the neighboring district." Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 648 F.2d 959, 969 (5th Cir. 1981). As clearly evident by the findings of fact made herein, plaintiffs have failed to prove that conduct by any SSD met this standard.

Furthermore, the Court has rejected plaintiffs' "effects" argument which would have held the SSDs liable and incorporated them in an interdistrict remedy on the basis of alleged wrongs committed by other actors, e.g., the state. The Taylor court also rejected the "effects" argument reasoning if:

> [i]nterdistrict effect alone transform otherwise intradistrict unconstitutional actions into an interdistrict violation, then the Milliken insistence that 'without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy' contains a redundancy: the only interdistrict thing about the violation would be its effect.

648 F.2d at 969.

As articulated in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, to make out a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim, plaintiff must show a discriminatory purpose, not just disparate impact and foreseeable consequences. 443 U.S. 449 (1979). Plaintiffs' evidence simply does not make the intentional cause and effect connection.

This Court is compelled to follow the frequent admonition from the Supreme Court to tailor the remedy to fit the scope of the violation. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II), Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The Court in Dayton specifically criticized the lower court for aggregating a series of violations to add

up to a significant "cumulative" violation--a procedure plaintiffs would have us adopt here. The Court notes Dayton was not an interdistrict case; however, the message gleaned is to correct only the violations found, and nothing more expansive is justified or permissible. Therefore, the constitutional violation must be substantial. Neither cumulative nor de minimus violations will justify interdistrict relief. 433 U.S. 406, 413 (Dayton I). At most, plaintiffs' evidence is only de minimus and is therefore legally insufficient to justify the relief sought against the suburban school district defendants.

A review of the legal standards applicable to various issues raised by plaintiffs confirms the Court's conclusion.

Pre-1954

The parties stipulated to the existence of the state mandated dual school system and the Court took judicial notice of the fact that private discrimination and segregation were prevalent in years past. Nonetheless, plaintiffs presented months of testimony regarding discriminatory conditions existing from the turn of the century to the Brown decision in 1954. For the Court today to find a constitutional violation based on that evidence, however, plaintiffs needed to prove by a preponderance that the SSDs were the original segregative actors and that vestiges of those past acts remain. It is in this latter respect that plaintiffs' proof floundered. Regarding physical segregation in schools during the early decades of this century, the Supreme Court stated "[b]oth by reason of the

substantial time that [had] elapsed and because these practices have ceased, . . . the foregoing will not necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segregative policy." Dayton I, supra, 433 U.S. at 411. The Court has found no continuing segregative policy by these defendants.

Another factor negating the importance of plaintiffs' voluminous pre-1954 evidence is simply its age. Our society is dynamic; myriad factors produce a multitude of simultaneous decisions and consequent effects. If it were a stagnant entity, the pernicious effects of de jure segregation would be obvious. Due to its fluid nature, however, acts now 30 years past have negligible present effects. Such is the fate of the discriminatory practices plaintiffs took months to deve-

lop. Too many events have intervened, reshaping earlier actions. Lee v. Lee County, supra, 639 F.2d at 1259.

The Brown Duty

Plaintiffs' evidence also supports the Court's conclusion that all SSDs have met their constitutional obligation to operate a unitary school system. That obligation was initially articulated in Brown II 349 U.S. at 300: "At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." Defendants are required to "make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. Id. (emphasis added). the findings in the

individual district sections show, each suburban district, within a maximum of four years of Brown, was sending its students to school without regard to race. Most districts were doing so within one year of the Brown decision. (See individual findings supra). Prior to Brown and pursuant to state statute, the local school districts had been operating a dual school system. Certainly such prompt action dismantling the dual system following Brown was accomplished "with all deliberate speed." 349 U.S. at 301. The duty of each SSD was to dismantle its dual school system; not the dual system in some other district.

And once a racially neutral school system had been established, racial imbalance resulting from other than purposely segregative acts is beyond the

authority of the Court to correct. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Ross v. Houston Independent School District, 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[s]chool officials who have taken effective action have no affirmative 14th amendment duty to respond to the private actions of those who vote with their feet.") The constitution does not compel school officials to correct conditions over which they have no control, like residential choices. Berry v. School District, 442 F.Supp. 1280, 1326 (W.D. Mich. 1977) aff'd 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 235 (1983). The Court well remembers the observation of the Supreme Court that there is just so much baggage that a school case can carry. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 22-23.

Moreover, evidence of housing discrimination was presented in the Milliken case and discussed in the concurring and-dissenting opinions (418 U.S. at 753, 757, 762 & 781) yet the majority opinion was based on findings regarding conduct by school officials, not housing actors.

Housing

Plaintiffs, however, relying on certain language in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Milliken, seek to encompass the SSDs in an interdistrict remedy because of an alleged nexus between housing discrimination and school segregation. Justice Stewart indicated an interdistrict remedy might be imposed "[w]ere it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races . . . by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state

housing or zoning laws. . . ." 418 U.S. at 755. He also stated, however, that the existence of a predominantly black school population in the city "core" cannot be changed by federal courts "unless and until it is shown that the State or its political subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist." 418 U.S. at 756 n.2. Therefore, even applying the standards suggested by Justice Stewart, plaintiffs either had to prove intentional segregative acts by each school board sought to be included or that the SSDs were mere agents of the state causing alleged constitutional violations by the state to vicariously inure to the SSDs.

Plaintiffs proved (if such proof was necessary) that there is a nexus between housing patterns and school composition. The two are inextricably intertwined:

> People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of the people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner city neighborhoods.

Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21. However, proof of the connection alone is insufficient to find liability. And plaintiffs' evidence of segregative acts by the SSDs was anemic.

As already discussed, within a few years of Brown, each SSD was operating a unitary school system. The post-Brown actions purportedly evidencing "vestiges" of segregative intent, (for example support or opposition to legislative proposals, zoning changes, trailer parks, apartments and annexations) hardly support an inference of a constitutional violation by the SSDs much less an explicit finding

of a substantial constitutional violation.

As discussed earlier, to find the SSDs vicariously liable for acts of the state, the Court must make the threshold determination that the SSDs are mere agents or arms of the state and not independent, locally autonomous entities. After applying the test for autonomy as directed by Milliken, the Court already concluded the SSDs are independent and their boundaries must be respected.

Whether plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of liability against other actors in the housing market is irrelevant to the instant motions to dismiss filed by each SSD defendant. The nexus necessary must be between the conduct of the defendant school districts and actions of those responsible for shaping residential patterns. The absence of such

a connection forbids a finding of liability against the SSDs to remedy any racial imbalance that may be attributed to those housing market actors. Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982).

Faculty

The Court has already found that the faculty and staff composition of the SSDs does not affect the racial composition of the student bodies therein. The Court noted that any intradistrict or purported employment violations have no relevance unless shown to have an interdistrict effect. Furthermore, the evidence did not even support a finding of intradistrict discriminatory hiring or promotion policies by the SSDs. The duty, which each SSD has fulfilled, is to make a sustained good faith effort to recruit minority faculty members. Oliver, supra, 706 F.2d

at 762.

The Court refuses to apply an intra-district factor, faculty imbalance, (see e.g. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 18-20), and conclude therefrom that an interdistrict violation exists. There is simply no law to support plaintiffs' proposition.

Furthermore, as evidenced by the SSDs' answers to interrogatories, the districts have been hiring on a racially neutral basis for many years thus weakening any effect the past dual school system may have had. Dayton I, supra, U.S. at 411.

Findings by Other Courts

The findings made herein are wholly consistent with the law as applied in this Circuit. Probably the most distinguishing feature between this and the Liddell litigation is the fact that no trial, resulting in a finding of liability

against the suburban districts, was ever held. A plan was devised to remedy school segregation existing within the city schools in which the state was to fund a portion. Regarding the suburban districts, however, the plan could only provide incentives for their voluntary cooperation:

> [T]he district court can require existing defendants--the state and city school board--to take the actions which will help eradicate the remaining vestiges of the government-imposed school segregation in the city schools, including actions which may involve the voluntary participation of the suburban schools. For example, the district court could
>
> * * * *
>
> (4) require the state to provide addi-

tional incentives for voluntary inter-district transfer.

Liddell v. Board of Education, 677 F.2d 626, 641-42 (8th Cir.) (Liddell V) cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 172 (1982) (emphasis added). As the Eighth Circuit commented,

> Many of these ideas and techniques require cooperation by the suburban schools, others do not. To the extent that suburban schools are willing to cooperate, the plans requiring their participation can now go forward. To the extent they are unwilling to do so, the 12(c) plans must be tailored to be effective without their mandated participation. We emphasize that suburban schools that voluntarily participate will not by such participation admit liability or waive any right that they may presently have to be excluded from a plan of mandatory interdistrict desegregation.

Id. at 642 (emphasis added). The ruling is abundantly clear that absent a finding of liability on the part of each SSD, they cannot be compelled to participate in an

interdistrict plan; only by their voluntary cooperation could interdistrict transfers be considered. The Liddell court did conclude that because the state was the primary constitutional violator, mandating that it fund voluntary interdistrict transfers was settled as the "law of the case." Liddell v. Board of Education, No. 83-1957 slip op. at 28 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984) (Liddell VII). Such is not the issue nor posture of the case here.

Comparison of this increasingly familiar record with other cases in which an interdistrict remedy was found appropriate confirms the Court's decision that the requested relief must be denied. The Court in Berry v. School District, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.) cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 235 (1983), Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.Supp.

428 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975), and Newburg Area Council v. Board of Education, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) all found the local districts were not autonomous (unlike in Missouri). Here, the SSDs do not ignore their district lines although they do cooperate with other locally autonomous districts to provide educational opportunities for their students. (See, e.g., "Special Education" and "Vocational Education" sections supra).

As discussed earlier, plaintiffs' reliance on the older Eighth Circuit cases of Morrilton, Kinloch, and Haney is misplaced because those cases involve racial gerrymandering of school district lines, an issue absent here. Likewise, plaintiffs' reliance on the Indianapolis

and Pennyslvania cases is inappropriate because there, state legislation having obvious multidistrict racial effect was found as the basis for interdistrict relief. See, United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 449 U.S. 838 (1980) and Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 55 (1982).

Recent cases applying the interdistrict standards of Milliken have summarily rejected all-encompassing allegations unsupported by evidence of significant interdistrict violations. See, e.g., Bronson v. Board of Education, 578 F.Supp. 1091 (S.D. Ohio 1984), Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, No. 81-43-CV-8 (E.D. N.C. June 10, 1983), and Armour v. Nix, No. 16708 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1979)

aff'd mem., 446 U.S. 930 (1980). The similarity between plaintiffs' theories and evidence in those cases and the case at bar confirms the Court's conclusions herein. Even if the Court were to view plaintiffs' evidence liberally, which under Rule 41(b) it is not required to do, the violations proved are at most, de minimus and far removed in time. Therefore, interdistrict relief must be denied and the Rule 41(b) motions of the SSDs granted.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Rule 41(b) motions filed by the following school districts and their superintendents are granted: Blue Springs Reorganized School District R-IV, Center School District No. 58, Fort Osage Reorganized School District R-1, Grandview Consolidated School District No.

4, Hickman Mills School District, Independence School District, Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R-VII, Liberty School District, North Kansas City School District, Park Hill Reorganized School District No. 5, and the Raytown Consolidated School District No. 2.

/s/
RUSSELL G. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Dated: June 5, 1984

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

CRAIG JENKINS, et al., Plaintiffs,	)	
vs.	)	No. 77-0420-CV-W-4
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.	)	Filed 9/17/84

ORDER

Originally, plaintiffs and the KCMSD filed this action jointly alleging various federal and state agencies and surrounding school district officials caused or contributed to cause the racial segregation existing in the metropolitan schools. In 1978 when the KCMSD was realigned as a defendant, plaintiffs made similar allegations against it, although there has been,

during the course of this litigation, a "friendly adversary" relationship between them. (See, e.g., stipulations of fact, filed February 21, 1984).

The KCMSD cross-claimed only against the state for its failure to eliminate the vestiges of its prior dual school system. For additional background, see this Court's orders of June 5 and July 16, 1984.

Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4), 136, 2201 and 2202. Plaintiffs also allege claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000d and under the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought against all defendants.

After hearing the presentation of plaintiffs' evidence and before any defense, the Court dismissed the suburban

school districts. Plaintiffs simply failed to show that those defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that substantially caused racial segregation in another district. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). See order filed June 5, 1984.

HEW was also dismissed for plaintiffs' failure to prove the agency acted with racial animus or abused its discretion in the enforcement of Title VI. See order filed July 16, 1984. The KCMSD presented its cross-claim, Missouri and HUD defended, plaintiffs and the KCMSD rebutted, Missouri presented surrebuttal and, on the 92nd day of trial, the Court refused to hear sur-surrebuttal. Thus, on June 13, 1984, the evidence ended.

The claims addressed by this order are plaintiffs' claims against the KCMSD, the

State of Missouri and HUD and the crossclaim of KCMSD against the State of Missouri. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds in favor of plaintiffs against the KCMSD and the State of Missouri; in favor of KCMSD against the State of Missouri; and against plaintiffs and in favor of HUD.

THEORIES AND DEFENSES

Plaintiffs allege, and Missouri has admitted, it mandated racially segregated schools before 1954. It is plaintiffs' position that after 1954 Missouri failed to take affirmative steps to eliminate the vestiges of its prior dual school system. In fact, plaintiffs argue, Missouri acted to perpetuate racial segregation by enforcing restrictive covenants and other unfair housing practices, by discrimina-

torily relocating blacks who were displaced by highway development and urban renewal, and by supporting racially-identifiable interdistrict arrangements (e.g. vocational and special education area schools).

Against the KCMSD, plaintiffs claim district officials adopted ineffective policies to change the segregative patterns that were developed or developing. In an exculpatory allegation plaintiffs allege the KCMSD could not balance the racial population of students in its district due to impaction of minorities, white flight, housing policies of other agencies and "other factors beyond the capacity of that district to manage." (Amended complaint, May 18, 1979 ¶20).

Regarding HUD, plaintiffs allege the agency abrogated its affirmative duty to

prevent and reduce racial segregation and instead intentionally increased segregation by failing to consider racial isolation in its site location for low income projects and locating most of the projects within the KCMSD; establishing express guidelines before 1949 requiring racial segregation and permitting such practices after that date; funding local housing agencies which did not prevent segregation in their policies or practices; and providing funds and insurance to suburban areas where access to blacks was restricted. These policies and practices, plaintiffs claim, racially impacted the KCMSD schools.

In its cross-claim against Missouri[1] the District alleges the State has not

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[1] The collective designation of "Missouri" or "State" is intended to include the governor, the Missouri State Board of Education and its officers, and Arthur L. Mallory, the state Commissioner

fulfilled its constitutional obligation to take action to dismantle its prior dual school system and is primarily liable for the existing segregation in the KCMSD. Not only has Missouri failed to take necessary remedial measures to eliminate past segregation but the District charges the state has acted to perpetuate segregation. To the extent the Court might find the KCMSD to be internally segregated, the District alleges the State is largely responsible for such a condition and should be required to contribute financially to any remedial plan the Court might order as relief against the KCMSD. Further, the District charges the State has caused a high concentration of economically and socially disadvantaged

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of Education.

minority students within its boundaries, a condition which increased student expenses and decreased the District's tax base. Concomitantly, the KCMSD alleges the State's actions or omissions caused the surrounding districts to be predominantly white.

For relief, therefore, the KCMSD seeks a court order requiring the State to propose and assist (financially and otherwise) in the implementation of a plan which will eradicate any vestiges of the State's past dual school system which includes the racially identifiable character of the KCMSD and the surrounding suburban districts.

Plaintiffs claim the only effective way to "protect and preserve" the constitutional rights of plaintiffs is to judicially mandate the "reassignment of

students among all districts in the metropolitan area and/or to realign or reconstitute the defendant school districts," with compensatory payments made by the State to fund the reconstituted districts. (Plaintiffs' amended complaint, May 18, 1979 ¶25). Plaintiffs request defendants submit a plan to eliminate the racial identifiability of the KCMSD and other school districts in the metropolitan area. To facilitate adoption of such a plan, plaintiffs seek to enjoin federal agencies from funding state and local entities until the plan is submitted. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the federal defendants and statements from all defendants on their future plans to reduce and eradicate segregative conditions.

Missouri has argued in defense that it has met its affirmative duty to the extent

of its statutory power and that local entities have the sole authority to effect the changes plaintiffs seek, e.g. redrawing district lines. Moreover, Missouri charges the racial isolation that exists is not vestiges but is the product of resegregation from natural demographic trends. Finally, Missouri argues the Kansas City area is typical of cities nationwide that had no dual school system; therefore the racial patterns cannot be attributed to the State's past conduct.

Procedurally, Missouri argues that plaintiffs and the KCMSD pleaded only interdistrict claims and seek only interdistrict relief, which claims were denied by this Court's order dismissing the suburban school districts. The Court disagrees. In its order of June 1, 1981, the Court addressed both the inter and

intra-district claims raised by the KCMSD's cross-claim. Neither plaintiffs nor the KCMSD's pleadings are defective in this regard. In any event, and contrary to Missouri's allegations, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to conform to their contention interrogatories (filed October 17, 1983 Doc. No. 351). The Court deferred ruling the motion preferring to address the contentions individually as they arose during the trial. (Tr. 35). Insofar as plaintiffs' evidence (adopted by the KCMSD Tr. 17,275) stated intra-district claims, the motion is hereby granted.

On February 21, 1984, plaintiffs and the KCMSD entered into a stipulation of fact which the Court holds is only binding between them; however, the stipulations will be controlling, unless otherwise

stated by the Court, regarding the racial composition and enrollment in the District past and present, its 1955 through 1977 "desegregation" plans, its transfer policy, the Havighurst and Hazlett reports and faculty composition. The District stipulated, inter alia, that before 1977 it was not a unitary district or in compliance with federal regulations. (See, also, Tr. 24). Nor does the District contest the HEW findings of non-compliance. It does state, however, contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, that it did not operate with discriminatory intent after 1954.

HUD argues in defense that it does not select the sites for low income projects and that said projects are dispersed throughout the metropolitan area in any event. HUD also maintains it does not

relocate people, but merely monitors the relocation activities of other agencies and has made adjustments where necessary. Regarding FHA, the government insists there are no vestiges of its past practices and moreover that FHA's involvement in the context of all housing transactions is de minimis. HUD concludes it has not abused its discretion and that plaintiff's evidence fails to show a causal link between schools and HUD's activities.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The State admitted, and the Court judicially noticed that Missouri mandated segregated schools for black and white children before 1954. See Mo. Const. Art. IX, Section 1(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976) and §§ 163.130, 165.117 R.S. Mo. (repealed 1957). These provisions were not imme-

diately and formally abrogated after the Brown decision was announced; however, the State's Attorney General issued an Opinion in 1954 declaring them unenforceable. (P. Ex. 2232). The statutes were repealed in 1957 and the constitutional provision was finally rescinded in 1976. This historical background is recounted in more detail by the courts in Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); and United States v. Missouri, 363 F.Supp. 739, 746-47 (E.D. Mo. 1973) aff'd 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).

Each school district in Missouri participated in this dual school system before it was declared unconstitutional in Brown I. Districts with an insufficient number of blacks to maintain the state-

required separate school made inter-district arrangements to educate those children. Undeniably, some blacks moved to districts, including the KCMSD, that provided black schools. (Tr. 2043, 4557-59). As the Court previously noted, however, this movement was insignificant when compared to the total black enrollment in the KCMSD. (Tr. 1773, D. Ex. K2). Accordingly, no interdistrict constitutional violation by any suburban school district was shown. (See order filed June 5, 1984).

Dr. James Anderson, plaintiffs' expert historian, opined the black migration into Kansas City was from a depopulation of blacks in the surrounding three-county area moving to the city primarily for schools. In its opinion of June 5, the Court rejected Dr. Anderson's opinions as

contrary to the weight of the evidence and as being without sufficient foundation. The Court finds the greatest influx of blacks came from southern and border states and that they migrated because of a host of factors.

This in-migration coupled with a high birth rate (Tr. 16,509-510) resulted in the Kansas City black population doubling from 41,574 in 1940 to 83,740 in 1960. (Id.)

Before 1954, access to schools was one of many reasons some blacks chose to move into the KCMSD. (Tr. 16,688, 14,793-94, 16,691-93, 16,835). Economics and job opportunities were also major factors in black migration. (Tr. 595, 600, 676-78, 713, 796, 911, 914, 1052, 1089, 1103, 1111, 1163, 1307, 1312, 1318, 1552, 1579-80, 1680-81, 1728, 2781, 3214, 3267,

18,527, 18,550, 16,842). Often jobs would pull migrants to the city and then availability of schools would influence, more specifically, what housing choice would be made within the city. (Tr. 16,688).

Dr. John Kain, plaintiffs' expert on the determinants of residential location, predicted dispersed racial residential patterns would exist in Kansas City if race were not a factor in housing choices. (Tr. 7515-7529). Dr. Kain used three indicators to predict housing choice: income, type of family, and whether there were school-aged children. (Tr. 7489, P. Ex. 1265 series). His conclusion was that absent housing discrimination blacks would be dispersed throughout the metropolitan area. (Tr. 7719, P. Ex. 1265G). Dr. Kain discounted or rejected other factors such as job location, ethnic clustering and

personal preference. (Tr. 7473-76, 7846). The Court disagrees to the extent Dr. Kain rejected the possible influence of other factors in his analysis.

The intensity of segregation is demonstrated by the fact that the average black family lives in a census tract that is 85% black while the average white family lives in a census tract that is 99% white. (Tr. 14,739, 14,745). Regardless of their motivation for coming, once here, blacks settled in the inner city or, the "principal black contiguous area." (Tr. 10,837-38, 10,847-49). Plaintiffs' witnesses blame this black concentration (and ensuing white flight from it) on the dual school system, the enforcement of restrictive covenants, site and tenant selection policies for low income housing and other government practices and policies as well

as on private discrimination. (Tr. 12,974, 12,976, 13,024, 13,032-13,035, 13,040-41, 13,043, 13,046-47, 13,058-62, and 13,123-24).

Not surprisingly, Missouri defended with experts whose opinions declared economics, accessibility to jobs, spacial barriers, personal preference and private discrimination were the factors affecting black movement. (Tr. 19,102, 19,104-05). They all discounted or totally rejected schools and the dual school system as having any effect. (Tr, 18,620-24, 18,627-28). To the extent those experts deny the influence of schools in housing patterns, particularly in the context of Missouri's legacy, their opinions are rejected.

The Court finds the dual housing market (Tr. 12,974-76), which still exists

to a large degree today (Tr. 12,008-09, 12,339), impacted blacks in the KCMSD and consequently caused the public schools to swell in black enrollment. The Court finds there is an inextricable connection between schools and housing. "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of the people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner city neighborhoods," Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).

There were many witnesses called and literally weeks of testimony concerning the cause of blacks settling in the inner city of Kansas City and within the KCMSD. This testimony was relevant as to the

suburban school districts and HUD. It was not relevant on the claims of plaintiffs against the KCMSD and the State of Missouri because those defendants had an obligation to the black students regardless of why they settled in the school district. As will hereafter be pointed out, the Kansas City District school system had never been totally integrated. In Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983), the school board tried to justify its one-race schools on the basis that they resulted from demographic patterns for which the school officials had no responsibility. The Court held that the Board's argument failed, stating:

> The Board's reliance on housing patterns as justification for the continued existence of one-race schools is not only factually but legally unsound....
>
> Until it has achieved the greatest degree of desegregation

> possible under the circumstances, the Board bears the continuing duty to do all in its power to eradicate the vestiges of the dual system. That duty includes the responsibility to adjust for demographic patterns and changes that predate the advent of a unitary system. [citations omitted]. The racial isolation of some schools, whether existing before or developing during the desegregation effort, may render disestablishment of certain one-race schools difficult or even impossible. Until all reasonable steps have been taken to eliminate remaining one-race schools, however, ethnic housing patterns are but an important factor to be considered in determining what further desegregation can reasonably be achieved; they do not work to relieve the Board of its constitutional responsibilities.

Davis, 721 F.2d at 1435. The Court, therefore, will focus on the anatomy of the KCMSD.

Plaintiffs allege the KCMSD could have done more than it did to stably integrate its schools. (Tr. 14,892-93). Plaintiffs

are quick to point out, however, that the District was faced with a pervasive system of segregation and would more than likely end up "resegregated" like all major cities. Id.

The Court notes that several witnesses used the term "resegregated" when describing racial change in the schools and housing patterns, usually changing from predominantly white to predominantly black. That may be correct terminology in the context of their testimony but the Court finds it has no legal significance. A segregated District cannot become resegregated until it is first integrated. The KCMSD has not yet become integrated on a system-wide basis.

As a consequence of their failure to do more, plaintiffs allege there are lingering effects of the dual school

system. The District also blames the prior dual system for its present status, maintaining the State did nothing to relieve the conditions it created. Several witnesses confirmed the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Brown I that forced segregation ruins attitudes and is inherently unequal: "[Segregation] may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494. (Tr. 16,414, 16,416 16,422). The general attitude of inferiority among blacks (Tr. 1,920-21) produces low achievement (Tr. 16,573) which ultimately limits employment opportunities and causes poverty. (Tr. 2,453-56, 16,414, 16,457-58). While it may be true that poverty results in low achievement regardless of race, (Tr. 16,508), it is undeniable that most poverty-level fami-

lies are black. (Tr. 16,422). The District stipulated that as of 1977 they had not eliminated all the vestiges of the prior dual system. (Stipulation introduction filed 2/21/84). The Court finds the inferior education indigenous of the state-compelled dual shool system has lingering effects in the Kansas City, Missouri School District.

Racial Composition of the School District: In the 1954-55 school year, 18.9% of the District's 63,487 students were black (stipulation 2, Def. Ex. K-2). Because the State compelled separate schools for blacks, the District established and maintained segregated facilities with segregated staffs. In 1954, the KCMSD operated 90 schools of which 14 elementary, 1 junior-high vocational school and 1 high school-junior

college were for black students. (Stipulation 5, Def. Ex. K-2). Those schools were located in the black-concentrated areas (Stipulation 6) and as that community expanded in a southeast direction so did the black schools. (P. Ex. 20, 740, 741, 742 map series, 1653; Tr. 3,577-78, 12,990-92).

The white students in the District during this period attended one of the 62 elementary schools, 3 junior high schools, eight high schools (1 with a vocational school) or the junior college. (Stipulation 10, Def. Ex. K2).

The KCMSD was majority white in enrollment until 1970 (Def. Ex. K-2, Tr. 17,009), and could have achieved a mathematical racial balance in its schools until that year. (Tr. 17,010-12). Instead, the District chose to operate

some completely segregated schools and some integrated ones. (Def. Ex. K-2). Regardless of some school officials' feelings that a more mathematically oriented plan would be less stable (Tr. 17,205-207, the District's chosen path was ineffective in integrating its school system.

As of 1977, 25 one-race schools under the pre-1954 system remained 90% or more of the same race. (Def. Ex. K54, Stipulation 85, 86; Tr. 16,980). In addition, there were four black schools from the dual system that were still predominantly black when they closed in 1968. (Tr. 16,999-17,001). In summary, as of 1974, 20 years after Brown I, 39 schools were more than 90% black; another 38 had 10 to 90% black enrollment. Eighty percent of all blacks in the District

attended schools that were 90% black; only 19% of the blacks attended a school that was 10 to 90% black. (Stipulation 84).

With the adoption of Plan 6C (discussed infra) in 1977, the District eliminated the 16 entirely white schools and reduced the number of 90+% black schools to 28. (Tr. 16,567). During the 1983-84 year, no school had less than 30% black enrollment; 24 schools however are racially isolated with 90+% black enrollment. (Tr. 16,568, Def. Ex. K-2). The Court finds the District did not and has not entirely dismantled the dual school system. Vestiges of that dual system still remain.

Liberal Transfers. During the pre-1954 days, the District utilized a liberal transfer policy within each system, (Stipulation 11), allowing students to

transfer to any open (uncrowded) school. (Stipulation 23, 24, 56; Tr. 16,940). Blacks did not use the liberal transfer policy as frequently as whites. (Tr. 2,010, 3,544; Stipulation 61). The Court finds the liberal transfer policy was not adopted or maintained to foster segregation even though it allowed whites living in racially transitional neighborhoods to transfer within the District to whiter schools. (Stipulation 57, Tr. 16,941-42).

Critics of the transfer policy blame its liberality for the racial turnover in schools by not compelling whites in that attendance area to attend that school. (Tr. 6,604-05; Stipulation 50, 56; P. Ex. 2780). Others, however, attribute the policy with fostering stabilization in transitional neighborhoods, slowing white flight and thus aiding integration. (Stipulation 56; Tr. 3,025-26, 13,663-64).

In the years following Brown, the District attempted to accommodate varying views regarding the effect of the transfer policy. (Stipulation 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62) and made adjustments in both the liberality and review of the proposed transfers. (Tr. 16,556-57). When the District proposed abandoning the liberal transfer policy in order to satisfy federal OCR officials and retain federal funds, an integrated neighborhood organization sought to enjoin the abandonment fearing it would produce more white flight. (Tr. 13,662-64). The District did however revoke the policy pursuant to OCR directives (Tr. 13,667). In 1973, race was considered in transfer requests, giving preference to transfers that would promote integration. (Tr. 13,738). The Court finds the evolution of the transfer

policy was not motivated by racial animus.

Neighborhood Schools: In response to the Brown II decision in 1955, the District adopted an assignment system known as the neighborhood school plan. (Stipulation 12, 13). Pursuant to this plan, the separate racial zones were eliminated and attendance areas were drawn around each school based on the buildings' capacity, distances involved, and other factors like safety, transportation and terrain. Id. By calculating the number of students in each attendance area, the District projected enrollment and expected racial composition for its various schools. Contrary to its predictions, many of the previously black schools opened with more than 92.5% black enrollment; 921 whites were predicted at these

schools yet only 117 were present during the official census taken that fall. (Stipulation 22). White enrollment in the District decreased by approximately 1,200 between 1954-55 and 1955-56. Id. (P. Ex. 582, 584, 584B, 585, 586, 740, 743, 744). Because most of the schools were in racially segregated neighborhoods before 1954, the Court finds adoption of the neighborhood school concept did not substantially change the segregated school system.

Attendance Zones: Following Brown the District made frequent shifts in the attendance areas of elementary and secondary schools as the population shifted, depending upon the capacity of various buildings. (Tr. 3,028; Stipulation 16 through 20, 29 through 31, 34, 37, 41, 43, and 48). In June, 1963, the District's

proposed attendance zone changes were challenged by a group of residents who charged the changes would resegregate the schools and neighborhoods. (Stipulation 49). The Board in response, modified its plans and adopted a policy statement recognizing that integration was an important factor to be considered in the District's decisions. (Stipulation 50 through 52). Nevertheless, the attendance zone changes did not achieve system-wide integration.

In addition to the regular attendance zones, various "optional" zones were utilized to allow students in those areas to choose among several schools. (Stipulation 31, 34, 51). Many of those optional zones existed before 1954, (see P. Ex. 739, 740; maps) and continued thereafter. (Stipulation 34). Regardless

of the intent, e.g. to relieve overcrowding, (Tr. 2,011-13, 16,937-38), the Court finds the use of these optional zones, coupled with the liberal transfer policy, did not aid to integrate the District; to the contrary, it allowed attendance patterns to continue on a segregated basis.

Intact Busing: From the mid-1950's through the 1970's the District was faced with overcrowded conditions. (Tr. 16,948-49; 6,583, 6,548-49, 7,305-06). Besides adjustments to attendance zones, in the mid-1960's, the District also adopted a busing program. The Board declared that the busing program was not for integration but was required to relieve overcrowded conditions at some schools. (Stipulation 53). While the Board added it would aid integration when possible, it chose to bus entire

classrooms of black students to predominantly white schools but to keep them as an insular group, not allowing them to be mixed with the receiving population. (Tr. 7146-47, 8,612). In the face of civil rights protests, in 1965, the bused students were integrated into the regular enrollment. The Court finds the District's use of intact busing had a segregative intent and effect. Because the practice was stopped in the 1960's, however, no continuing violation exists. Certainly black children subjected to that experience well remember the feelings of isolation and inferiority obviously produced by the practice.

Middle School: In 1965, a bond issue was passed to build three new schools in order to relieve the overcrowding in the Central area. (Stipulation 63). Because

local civil rights groups protested the proposed site locations as being segregative and ineffective to relieve overcrowding, the District hired a consultant, Dr. Havighurst, to make a report and recommendation for the new sites. (Stipulation 64). His final report proposed, inter alia, a middle school at the Paseo and Brush Creek to stabilize a transitional neighborhood and retain its integrated character. (Stipulation 64, 67). After 1 1/2 years of debate, the Board rejected this portion of Dr. Havighurst's recommendations stating there was a lack of funds and it did not appear that integration could be maintained. (Stipulation 67). Some blacks viewed the District's failure to adopt the middle school as a step toward continuing the segregated school conditions. (Tr.

3017-20). The Court finds that reasonable minds could differ as to the effect and ability of the middle school to help integrate. (Tr. 16,478-79).

Concepts for Changing Times: At the instance of several community and civil rights groups, Superintendent Hazlett, in 1968, presented a document "Concepts for Changing Times," in which various proposals for district-wide integration and stabilization were suggested. (P. Ex. 414, 414A, 2603; Stipulation 69). The Board appointed a bi-racial committee (committee of 30) to study the "Concepts" and make recommendations. The Committee generally endorsed the ideas (P. Ex. 414E through K, 2780U and V) however, the Board never voted on the proposals and none were otherwise acted upon. (Stipulation 69). In fact there was no district-wide

desegregation plan adopted by the KCMSD until Plan 6C was implemented in 1977-78). Id.

As indicated supra, as the black population expanded from the central city in a southeast direction, neighborhoods and schools experienced a racial transition. As blacks moved, or were bused to the schools, in the area, whites moved out. (Tr. 8715-16, 8721-30, 9228-32, 9235). Several community groups attempted unsuccessfully, to maintain an integrated neighborhood and stabilize the often rapid transition. (Tr. 9,347-48, 9,395-96, 13,631-32).

In 1965, the Kansas City Commision on Human Relations issued proposals to stabilize the southeast area. (Stipulation 70). Many of which were adopted by the KCMSD. Racial turnover continued una-

bated, however, with the efforts proving to be little more than a thumb in the dike. (Stipulation 71).

It is interesting to note that in the 1958-59 school year there were 52,491 white students in KCMSD. It had 14,952 black students which comprised 22.5% of the total enrollment. The highest enrollment in the past 30 years occurred in 1967-68 when there was a total enrollment of 74,997 students. The largest enrollment of blacks occurred in the 1971-72 school year when there was a total of 35,620 black students enrolled. In the 1983-84 school year the total enrollment in the KCMSD was 36,650 students, 10,022 whites and 24,803 blacks with a percentage of 67.7% black. The total enrollment from 1967-68 to 1983-84 has been reduced more than 50%. Enrollment

of whites between 1958-59 and 1983-84 has been reduced by 80%. The black enrollment from 1971-72 to 1983-84 has been reduced by approximately 30%.

Plaintiffs contend that the State established a system of area vocational schools that effectively segregated students on the basis of their race and that the methods of funding these schools were racially discriminatory. The Court addressed this issue in its June 5 order dismissing the suburban defendants.

The Kansas City Technical Center is an AVTS for all high schools in KCMSD. It was the first AVTS formed in the Kansas City area. It served all students in the KCMSD regardless of race. There is no proof that the formation of this school has prolonged or contributed to the segregation in the schools in the KCMSD. DESE

administers vocational educational funds without regard to race and all districts are treated alike. (Tr. 17,939).

The State has been of some aid to school districts in the State which have segregation problems. When a Missouri school district received an OCR complaint, the DESE sent a letter to the district offering the department's assistance. (Tr. 17,464). A Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) was established, funded by federal funds, which provides assistance to school districts involved in voluntary or court ordered desegregation upon a district's request. (Tr. 17,667). It also notifies the eligible districts of other services which can be provided under the conditions of the federal grants. The TAU proposal for funding to the federal government explicitly names St. Louis and Kansas City

school districts as priority areas for technical assistance. (Tr. 17,684). KCMSD has requested and been provided TAU assistance. (Tr. 17,682, 17,785; St. Def. Ex. M-2).

The DESE also provides valuable assistance to urban school districts through its Urban Education Section. (Tr. 17,592-604).

Claims Against HUD

Plaintiffs have made numerous claims that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) violated its responsibilities under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., and the applicable housing laws and regulations.

Title VI, § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d provides "no person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (known as the Fair Housing Act) declares that "it is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." The Act contains a number of detailed provisions banning discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the sale or rental of housing, the financing of housing and the provision of brokerage services. See, 42 U.S.C. §§

3604, 3605, 3606. The Act further makes it unlawful to interfere with any person's exercise of enjoyment of these rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

Before analyzing some of the myriad claims made by plaintiffs it may be helpful to briefly summarize the basic goals of the federal housing programs. The United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437J, was originally enacted to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of housing for families of low income. It authorized HUD to make loans and annual contributions to local public housing agencies (PHAs) to develop, operate and maintain low rent public housing projects for families with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1437B-C. Congress sought to achieve this goal by vesting the

responsibilities of the administration of these housing programs in local housing agencies.

Under the 1934 Act, FHA guaranteed or insured payment of residential mortgage loans for those of low income who qualified, making it possible for low income people to purchase homes with very low down payments and interest rates below the national average. In 1954 the Act was amended under 12 U.S.C. § 1751(d)(3) and (4) to provide mortgage insurance to developers, including public bodies, of multi-family rental or cooperating housing for moderate income or displaced families. The Housing Act was again amended in 1959, 12 U.S.C. § 1751(v) to make mortgage insurance available to facilitate the financing of rental housing for the elderly or handicapped.

The Act was amended in 1974 by the Housing and Community Act of 1974 which had as part of its objectives the elimination of slums and the renewal of older urban areas. 42 U.S.C. § 5301. It specifically recognized that the concentration of persons of low income in the central cities was creating social, economic and environmental problems. In 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1439 was amended to place greater emphasis on local housing assistance plans. The primary goal of the federal housing program is to provide decent housing for the poor; however, its secondary concern is to develop and maintain stable, desirable urban communities.

The § 235 program [12 U.S.C. § 1715(z) 1968] combined mortgage insurance with HUD mortgage subsidy payments to the lender in amounts determined by the buyer's income.

The § 236 program was authorized in 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(z)(1). In addition to mortgage insurance HUD provided interest subsidies to nonprofit, limited dividend or cooperative programs to reduce interest rates to an extremely low level.

Section 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f), (Housing and Community Development Act of 1974) provided for rental subsidies to lower income persons by payments directly from HUD to landlords including public bodies. Under § 8 the rental subsidy is tied to the tenant not to the property. In other words the § 8 certificates are HUD's guarantee of the rental subsidy. The tenants are responsible for finding their own housing although the administering housing authority may be able to direct the certificate holder to landlords who have indicated a desire to have § 8

tenants. If the prospective landlord does not agree to participate in the program, the tenant must take the certificate somewhere else or forego the subsidy. Also if the certificate holder moves from one qualified apartment to another, the lessee takes the certificate along.

Scope of Judicial Review

Plaintiffs have not alleged nor have they met the statutory prerequisites for filing a private action under Title VI, § 2000d et seq., nor under Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610 or 3612, requiring such complaint to be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Plaintiffs have properly proceeded on the basis that HUD has violated their rights to "the equal protection of the laws" as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment

of the United States Constitution. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The standard of review for HUD's actions are the same as those for HEW which were set forth in this Court's order of July 16, 1984 (pp. 21 and 22). Briefly, there must be a showing that in administering the federal housing programs in the Kansas City area its actions were arbitrary and capricious, without a rational basis, it did so with discriminatory intent or purpose, and there is a causal connection between the violation and the injury, the segregated schools in the KCMSD. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (1981); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Aschuker v. Dept. of

Housing and Urban Development, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982); Clients Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1983). Discriminatory purpose "implies that the decisionmaker...selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979).

Plaintiffs claim that FHA's appraisal practices prior to 1949, and even thereafter, contributed to segregated housing in the Kansas City area. Clearly, FHA's appraisal manuals for 1936 (P. Ex. 1303) and 1938 indicated racial restrictive covenants would tend to insure a stable community thus enhancing the value of the property. In 1947 and thereafter

emphasis was placed on such considerations as to whether there was a probability of a change in occupancy, that in a change from one user group to another the successor group exhibits a lower income level. The manual also pointed out that a neighborhood would probably remain more stable where there was compatibility among the neighborhood occupants. (P. Ex. 1305). By 1947 reference to racial restrictive covenants was deleted from its manual and it has refused to insure the mortgage on any property which contained such restrictions. Insurance of mortgages by FHA incurs a risk of loss of federal funds. Racial restrictive covenants were intended to cause housing segregation. While such covenants were brought about by private action they were enforced by the courts of Missouri until after the case of Shelley

v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 was decided in 1948. Even though such covenants were discriminatory without a doubt they did have an effect on the market value of residential property. FHA did not enforce the covenants; however, it accepted the fact that Missouri courts did enforce them. FHA was faced with this reality and could not ignore it in making a determination as to the maximum risk which should be incurred with funds of a federal agency. In view of this FHA did not act arbitrarily nor capriciously in giving these covenants consideration in arriving at an appraisal. As demonstrated by Ex. P. 22, the areas most affected by these covenants soon were occupied by blacks after the covenants were no longer enforceable. There was no evidence showing the number of FHA insured mortgages in the restricted areas.

Prior to 1950 FHA insured approximately 15,000 homes in the KCMSD. (Ex. FD37A). Between 1950 and 1980 there were in excess of 2,000,000 housing turnovers in this area. If FHA's appraisal practices prior to 1950 had any effect on present racial housing patterns, it would, at most, be de minimus.

Plaintiffs claim that HUD violated its Title VI and VIII obligations when it continued to fund the Kansas City Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) after it knew that the LCRA was following racially discriminatory practices. In 1953 the LCRA was established by Kansas City, Missouri to administer urban renewal programs under the Housing Act of 1949. HUD provided federal funds to assist in urban renewal and neighborhood development activities. (Ex. FD204C).

After receiving the complaint that LCRA was practicing racial discrimination in its relocation activities, HUD made a Title VI complaint investigation. In that investigation HUD found that blacks were being located primarily in the southeast part of Kansas City while whites were relocated throughout the Kansas City area. (P. Ex. 2913A). As a result of the Title VI investigation, LCRA was required immediately to cease such discriminating practices and to file reports with HUD so that HUD could monitor their referrals. The reports were to be filed with HUD every 90 days (Ex. P2913A). LCRA failed to file its reports in a timely fashion. (Tr. 11,601). The reports that were filed showed no significant improvements in LCRA's referral practices. As a result in June, 1973, HUD refused to fund the 1974

Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) unless the city assumed the responsibility for all relocation services. (Ex. FD204C). In June, 1973, HUD, LCRA and the City of Kansas City entered into a cooperation agreement by which the City assumed the responsibility for relocation under the urban renewal and neighborhood development plan. As part of this agreement each relocatee was to receive at least one referral outside of the "inner city." (Ex. FD239). The cooperation agreement required the City to file reports at least twice a month with reports to include the race of each displaced person, the number of dependents and the address of housing referrals. (Ex. FD239). Following this agreement, approximately 1/3 of the housing referrals provided to black relocatees were outside of the inner city

area. (Ex. P322A, Tr. 10,991). The relocation reports show that between 1971 and 1976 only 174 black households were relocated during the six year period. (Ex. P622B). The Court finds that in working out the cooperation agreement between the LCRA and the City of Kansas City, Missouri, HUD acted in a reasonable and responsive manner. To have cut off funds would have penalized those most in need of housing, that is the people of low income, and could not have been done absent a lengthy Title VI investigation. The Court finds that by entering into the cooperation agreement between HUD, LCRA and the City of Kansas City, their actions were not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights.

Title VIII. Plaintiffs contend that within the KCMSD, § 8 certificate holders

are segregated by race. The Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC) administers the § 8 assistance program in Kansas City, Missouri in which HUD provides housing assistance payments to HAKC for § 8 participating tenants. (Tr. 12,197, 12,364). HAKC's § 8 program presently has 1,458 certificates in use with 16% white and 84% nonwhite. (Ex. P1481B). There are public housing authorities administering the § 8 assistance housing programs in Independence, Liberty and Lee's Summit, Missouri. These PHA's presently have 619 certificates in use with the racial composition 98% white and 2% nonwhite. (Ex. P1481A). By the nature of the § 8 program, participants may request a certificate from any issuing jurisdiction and then locate housing of their own choosing within the jurisdiction issuing

the certificate. (Tr. 20,455). There was no evidence that HUD or the PHAs attempted to direct § 8 certificate holders as to the location of the housing which they chose.

Under the Public Housing Act of 1949, P.J. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, Congress recognized that the problem of providing decent housing for low income families was "clearly related and practically inseparable from the problem of clearing urban slums." In other words, the 1949 Act created a slum clearance program. Congress provided loans and capital grants to clear the land and then make it available for redevelopment in accordance with locally devised plans for the area. This was reaffirmed by Congress in the 1954 Housing Act, P.J. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590. The urban renewal projects were required to be

located in areas for which the community had a plan for both slum clearance and redevelopment. HAKC has nine projects for family occupancy under management containing a total of 2,270 units. (Ex. P1609). HAKC constructed seven family projects between 1952 and 1963 all either within the model cities or urban renewal areas. (Ex. P2917). The Housing Authority had two other family projects containing 50 units each consisting of single family homes located throughout Kansas City, Missouri. (Ex. P1609).

At the outset HAKC followed the "freedom of choice plan." In 1968 HAKC adopted a new assignment Plan in accordance with HUD regulations which required applicants to select a suitable vacant unit from among the three development locations with the highest vacancy

rate or be removed to the bottom of the waiting list. (Ex. P1596FFF). In 1976 HUD made a Title VI investigation of HAKC's assignment practices. It found that HAKC was allowing applicants to choose a suitable vacant unit in any development rather than giving a choice only of a unit among the three developments with the highest vacancy rate. (Ex. P1596FFF). Following the investigation, HAKC and HUD entered into a compliance agreement in which HAKC adopted a new tenant assigmment policy. This policy required that applicants be assigned to suitable units at one of the three developments with the highest vacancy rate. In addition it provided for a minority preference housing option. This feature of the plan allowed for the immediate placement of any applicant or transfer of any resident to a development

in which the applicants or tenants racial group comprised 33 1/3% or less of the development's population. (Tr. 12,225, Ex. P1596GGG). The Court finds that the location of the public housing was in accordance with the congressional acts and that HUD's monitoring of the program was neither arbitrary nor capricious and that the compliance agreement entered into between HAKC and HUD was reasonable.

Plaintiffs also contend that HUD assisted multi-family housing caused the overwhelming majority of these units to be located within the KCMSD. The Court finds that HUD followed a balanced housing policy and attempted to insure that assisted housing located in the inner city area was balanced by assisted housing projects in the suburban areas. (Tr. 20,657). HUD reviewed all proposals for multi-

family housing projects to include racial characteristics of the project area. (Tr. 20,408-09). HUD had disapproved some proposed projects because they were located in areas of minority concentration. (Tr. 20,563-68). The evidence indicates that there has not been a lack of balance between federally assisted housing within the KCMSD and the suburban areas. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27B reflects that there were 6,832 HUD insured or subsidized multi-family units within KCMSD and 9,872 such units in the 11 suburban school districts (which have been dismissed in this action). This indicates that HUD did follow a balanced housing policy. HUD published site selection regulations known as "Project Selection Criteria", 24 C.F.R. § 200.700 et seq. Without setting forth the criteria, they were sufficient to enable HUD

to make a reasonable determination that a particular project was in compliance with Titles VI and VIII. There was no evidence in the case that the practices of HUD in site selection and approval for federally subsidized multi-family housing had a substantial effect upon the racial makeup of schools within the KCMSD. A good example is the East Hills Village located in the Knotts Elementary School attendance zone. The East Hills Village project was approved by HUD in 1971. (Ex. P27B). In 1971 when the project was approved by HUD, Knotts School was 84% black and in 1973 when the East Hills Village project was opened, Knotts School was 91.9% black. (Ex. K-2). When East Hills Village opened there were 30 elementary school age children, 27 black and 3 white. (Ex. P1199). Ten percent of the children were

white, ninety percent were black. The black percentage was higher in Knotts School than that reflected in the East Hills Village project.

Although the evidence showed that HUD assisted housing was not concentrated within KCMSD, plaintiffs nevertheless asserted that most blacks who resided in assisted housing lived within the KCMSD. Even assuming that this is true, it does not show a Title VIII violation on the part of HUD. HUD established affirmative marketing regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.600, 841.202 and 880.206, and the evidence reflects that the Kansas City HUD office monitored these affirmative fair housing and marketing plans very closely. A detailed description of HUD's review and monitoring of the affirmative fair housing marketing plans was provided by Elaine

Owens. (Tr. 20,413-431; 20,516-521). Each project sponsor was required to establish an "anticipated occupancy goal" for tenants which was both realistic for the project area and which would provide greater integration than the current racial mix of the area. (Tr. 20,419, 20,516-17). The review also assured that advertising and contact with the community groups were adequate to reach persons who would not otherwise be expected to apply for such housing. (Tr. 20,415-19). Its review involved a pre-occupancy conference with the sponsor to discuss the provisions of each marketing plan and how the plan was to be implemented as well as an appraisal of the sponsor's past affirmative marketing experience. (Tr. 20,420-23). With respect to HUD's monitoring of the plans, sponsors were

required to submit monthly occupancy reports until the project was 95% occupied. Thereafter, occupancy reports were to be submitted annually. (Tr. 20,423-24). HUD also monitored the Equal Housing Opportunity Plans under § 8 housing programs. (Tr. 20,431-33). Generally its efforts were designed to insure that participating § 8 certficate holders were made aware what affordable housing was available to them throughout the entire community and that the public housing authorities informed them of their rights under the fair housing laws. HUD made annual monitoring visits to all PHAs in the Kansas City area that administered § 8 programs. (Tr. 20,453-54). Undoubtedly the affirmative fair housing marketing plans did not result in the integration which HUD desired; however,

this was not the result of the lack of affirmative marketing efforts. A good example was the evidence concerning Parvin Estates which was located in predominantly white north Kansas City. (Tr. 12,542-43). Mrs. Ruth Sechter testified at length concerning the marketing plans imposed in the development of Parvin Estates. She stated that the plan had been successful in making blacks aware of the openings at Parvin Estates but they were unsuccessful in attracting the expected number of black families to the project. She attributed this to reasons that were beyond the sponsor's control and not the fault of the plan. (Tr. 12,582). This project contained 300 units; however in spite of the affirmative marketing efforts, they were never able to attract more than 12% minorities. The occupancy rate for blacks

was actually lower. (Tr. 12,562). Certainly there was nothing about the marketing regulations or the manner in which they were implemented and monitored which was arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiffs also asserted that blacks were routinely denied FHA mortgage insurance well past 1954. There was no evidence whatsoever to support plaintiffs' contentions in this regard. Mr. Newsome, with 23 years experience as a real estate agent, was not aware of a single instance in which FHA had refused to insure a mortgage loan because of race. (Tr. 9,439, 9,517). The only evidence on the issue was to the effect that race was not a factor in HUD's decision to insure a home mortgage loan. (Tr. 19,925-26, Treu Depo. at 60; James Depo. at 15). Since 1962 FHA has required a certification of

compliance with its nondiscrimination policy by all lenders, buyers and sellers. (Ex. FD45A & B, 46A & B, and 350 [see 24 C.F.R. § 200.300 et seq.]).

Plaintiffs also claimed that there was racial discrimination in the sale of homes in which the FHA insured mortgage had been foreclosed. Plaintiffs maintain that many management brokers maintained separate lists of these homes, one for whites and one for blacks, and presold homes in white areas to whites to avoid the possible purchase by blacks. The evidence reflected only one instance in which this occurred. Ms. Dorothy Davis testified that in 1966 Mr. Homer Ritch, a management broker agreed to sell property to her several days before it was advertised to the general public. (Tr. 11,730). HUD investigated Mr. Ritch's conduct which

resulted in an official reprimand by HUD and a nonrenewal of his contract to manage HUD properties. (Tr. 11,746). HUD immediately altered the manner in which such homes were sold to prevent any future occurrences of preselling. (Tr. 11,732-33). Under the new procedure, all proposals for the sale of HUD owned properties had to be submitted directly to HUD not to management brokers and no proposals were received until the Monday following the Thursday advertisement of the property. (Tr. 11,732-33). The most detailed evidence concerning HUD's property disposition was in the deposition testimony of Jaspar Levine, the Director of HUD's property disposition branch between 1965 and 1979. Summarily, he testified that HUD maintained the property in good condition so that they would not

blight the neighborhoods. (Levine Depo. at 26). When title to the property was acquired by HUD, a repair list was prepared, contracts were let for the repair, and the repair work was performed. (Levine Depo. at 27,31). If property remained unsold for a period of 30 to 60 days, it was normally taken off the market, further repaired and re-advertised for sale. (Levine Depo. at 28). Homes that needed only minor repairs were offered for sale in an "as is" condition. (Levine Depo. at 26). The evidence showed that HUD held properties were available for sale to all members of the general public regardless of race. (Tr. 11,726, Levine Depo. at 79). Properties held for sale were advertised in the Kansas City Call, a black newspaper, and the Kansas City Star and Times. (Tr. 11,726-27). A list of HUD

held homes that were ready for sale was regularly mailed to all interested persons. (Tr. 11,727). The evidence does not support plaintiffs' contention that HUD's practices in the sale of homes on which its insured mortgages had been foreclosed was racially discriminatory.

There was evidence that some HUD held homes in the Southeast Corridor were allowed to deteriorate and fall in disrepair. Assuming the accuracy of this testimony there was an absence of any evidence to support a finding that such neglect of the property by HUD was because of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.

Various State Agencies

Plaintiffs contend that the following state agencies had an opportunity to

reduce the impaction of blacks and minorities in the inner city of Kansas City: the Missouri Housing Development Commission, the Division of Finance, Division of Savings and Loan Supervision, the Division of Insurance, the Missouri Real Estate Commission, and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. In view of this Court's finding that the State had an obligation under the fourteenth amendment to assure that blacks within the KCMSD were not denied the equal protection of the laws regardless of why they settled within the KCMSD, the evidence concerning the aforementioned state agencies will be addressed only very briefly.

Plaintiffs contend that the State and particularly the Missouri Department of Highway and Transportation (MDHT) have managed its relocation program for persons

displaced by highway projects in a manner that had a racially segregative effect. Their main complaint was the location of the I-70 route which was first chosen in 1956 when the interstate system took effect (Tr. 18,243) and at a time when the KCMSD was overwhelmingly white. (Def. Ex. K-2). I-70 was financed by both federal and state funds (Tr. 18,243). I-70 generally followed the route of what was previously U.S. Route 40 (Tr. 18,248) and was chosen to serve the existing traffic patterns as they then existed and were anticipated to continue. The I-70 project had to be approved by the Federal Highway Administration. (Tr. 18,246). Planning for this project was generally approved by various agencies of the city government. (Tr. 18,246-47). It goes without saying that the location of a highway and par-

ticularly an interstate highway through a residential area will displace a certain number of residents in that area. There is no proof whatever that the State's action as it related to the construction of the I-70 project amounted to any constitutional violation.

Plaintiffs contend that in its relocation program for the South Midtown Freeway (SMF), MDHT managed its program in a manner which resulted with blacks who were displaced being located in areas which were predominantly black and the whites being located in suburban areas which were predominantly white. The Court finds that the location for the SMF generally followed existing patterns of traffic and was probably the most feasible and reasonable location for the freeway and insofar as the freeway location was concerned,

there was no constitutional violation on the part of the State. (Tr. 18,258). Again, the plans for the freeway had to be approved by the federal government. (Tr. 18,298). It was necessary for a relocation plan to be prepared and submitted to the U.S. Department of Transportation for approval for funding. (Tr. 18,032-33). Relocatees who requested assistance from MDHT were assisted in finding replacement housing. (Tr. 18,028). Relocation payments were authorized by the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970. (Tr. 18,019). On the initial contact, the relocatees completed a questionnaire which included the relocatee's preference for relocation. (Tr. 18,019-20). The relocatees did receive financial assistance dependent upon their circumstances. (Tr. 18,021-27). Relocatees were told to contact MDHT if at any

time they felt they were the victims of discrimination but no such complaints were ever received by MDHT. (Tr. 18,031, 18,043). Generally, MDHT advised relocatees of the availability of houses and did not refer them to realtors for this purpose. (Tr. 18,032, 18,041, 18,042).

The State contended that plaintiffs' claims that the State's location of highways and its management of its relocation programs were racially discriminatory should have been dismissed and no evidence on these issued admitted because the United States Department of Transportation was dismissed and the Highway Department for the State of Missouri was not a party. Without deciding the issue as to whether these claims should have been dismissed, the Court finds that there was nothing in the location of the highways nor in the

operation of the MDHT's relocation program which amounted to a constitutional violation and for which the State of Missouri would be liable.

Plaintiffs claim that the State through the Missouri Housing Development Commission (MHDC) engaged in the implementation of federal housing programs which contributed to the creation and perpetuation of a dual housing market in the metropolitan Kansas City area. MHDC was created by the Missouri legislature in 1969 to provide loans to middle and low income persons. (Tr. 18,306-07). MHDC does not build or manage any developments but simply provides financing. (Tr. 18,307).

Its first financial commitment was on December 15, 1971 which was for three developments including Parvin Estates located in the North Kansas City Missouri

School District. (Tr. 18,309). MHDC funds come from a sale of tax exempt bonds which provide the necessary proceeds for making loans to developers or in the case of single family programs to individuals to purchase mortgages under the single family home loan program. (Tr. 18,310-11). MHDC received no federal funding but has been requested to administer certain section 8 housing assistance contracts and as a result receives funding directly from HUD in which MHDC acts as a conduit to distribute these funds to eligible mortgagors who in turn make principal and interest payments to MHDC. (Tr. 18,310-13). Nearly all projects in which MHDC participated are federally insured, either FHA or VA, and in some instances private mortgage insurance guarantees. (Tr. 18,315). There

was considerable evidence concerning the type of federally insured projects in which MHDC was involved; however, the Court sees no particular advantage in reviewing those projects in detail. State Exh. C-12 reflects the projects in which MHDC was involved and the location of those projects. It clearly appears that the majority of the units in which it was involved were located outside the KCMSD.

Plaintiffs and the KCMSD offered evidence of the alleged past racially discriminatory practices of private individuals in the fields of real estate, residential and commercial, financing, insurance and public accommodations. They seek to hold the state responsible for these activities because real estate brokers, banks, savings and loan institutions, insurance companies and other entities claimed to

have been engaged in this practice receive licenses from and are subject to regulation by the State of Missouri. There is no doubt that private entities did engage in discriminatory practices such as red lining, steering and blockbusting. As stated the discriminatory acts were committed by private individuals or entities. The only complaint involving illegal activities of realtors which was filed with the Missouri Real Estate Commission led to the permanent revocation of the real estate license of the agent involved. (Tr. 12,257-58). Other complaints were filed with the Kansas City Human Relations Committee which did receive an affirmative response from that committee. (Tr. 4721 and 4711-12). The mere fact that activities of these private individuals or entities were either licensed by or subject to

regulation by a state agency does not convert the private action into state action for which the State of Missouri would be liable. However, private action may, in law, become state action when the state has exercised coercive power or has provided significant encouragement for the private discriminatory activity. This is clearly the teaching of the following cases without any further discussion concerning the holding in those cases: Moosehead Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.E.2d 627 (1972); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 LE2d 534 (1982) and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 LE2d 418 (1982). There was no evidence whatsoever that the state agencies exercised coercive power or significantly encouraged the private individuals or

entities in their discriminatory practices so as to make their actions the actions of the State. While these agencies, acting within the authority granted them by the General Assembly, committed no constitutional violation, the State could have given those agencies obligations and authority which could have aided in the disestablishment of the dual school system which it created. This Court cannot say what precise course the State should have taken at any particular stage in meeting its affirmative duty to disestabish the dual system; however, by acting through these agencies, it could have at least partially met that duty. A finding that none of the aforementioned agencies committed any constitutional violation entitling plaintiffs to relief does not dispose of the question concerning the State's liability.

In the past the State has taken positive actions which were discriminatory against blacks. As previously stated, it mandated separate schools for blacks and whites; it established separate institutions for teaching black school teachers, § 10632 R.S. Mo. (1939); it established and maintained a separate institution for higher education for blacks at Lincoln University, § 175.050 R.S. Mo. (1949); it provided that school boards in any town, city or consolidated school district could establish separate libraries, public parks and playgrounds for blacks and whites, § 165.327, R.S. Mo. (1959); it made it a crime for a person of 1/8 Negro blood to marry a white person, § 563.240 R.S. Mo. (1959); and its courts enforced racially restrictive covenants. These actions had the effect of placing the State's imprima-

tur on racial discrimination. It created an atmosphere in which the private white individuals could justify their bias and prejudice against blacks. A large percentage of whites do not want blacks to reside in their neighborhood and a large percentage of blacks do not want to reside within a neighborhood in which they are not wanted. This has and continues to have a significant effect on the dual housing market in the Kansas City area. Thus, the Court finds that the State has encouraged racial discrimination by private individuals in the real estate, banking and insurance industries. Liability on the part of the State might be a very close question if it hinged solely on its encouragement of private discrimination. There is a much more salient reason for finding liability on the part of the State.

The KCMSD did not mandate separate schools for blacks and whites. The people of the State of Missouri through constitutional provision and the General Assembly through legislative enactments mandated that all schools for blacks and whites in this State were to be separate. There is no room for doubt but what the State of Missouri intentionally created the dual school system. Under Brown I, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, (1954), this constituted a violation of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution and no further proof of segregative intent is required. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Green v. School Board of New Kent Co., 391 U.S.

430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968); Liddell v. State of Missouri, 731 F.2d. 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) and other cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various circuit courts clearly demonstrate that having created a dual system, the State and the KCMSD had and continue to have an obligation to disestablish that system. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), the Court stated:

> [W]e have held that where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute at the time of our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.' Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).

Keyes 413 U.S. at 200. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979), the Court stated:

> But the measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system.

Dayton, 443 U.S. at 538. Having found that there are still vestiges of the State's dual school system still lingering in the KCMSD, the obligations of the KCMSD and the State have not been met.

The State argues that under the Constitution of the State of Missouri and the statutes of the State, it was unable to take any affirmative action to dismantle the KCMSD's dual school system.

In the general memorandum and order filed June 5, 1984, in discussing the local autonomy of public schools within the State of Missouri, it was stated at page 8: "The State of Missouri does not have the power to require a merger or consolidation of school districts." This statement by the Court was intended to reflect that the state statutes had vested that power in the school districts and had not retained it for the State. It is the conclusion of this Court that none of the provisions of the Constitution nor statutes of the State of Missouri would have prevented the State of Missouri from fulfilling its affirmative duty of disestablishing a dual school system subsequent to 1954. Article 9, § 1(a) of the Missouri Constitution requires the General Assembly to establish and maintain free

public schools; Article 9, § 1(b) provides that schools for any contiguous territory may be established by law. Article 3, § 40(20) provides that the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law "creating new townships or changing the boundaries of townships or school districts." There is nothing in the State Constitution which would prevent the General Assembly from enacting legislation which would give the State sole authority to establish school districts as it sees fit. If such legislation is the only means by which the State can fulfill its 14th amendment obligations, then such legislation is mandatory. It is clear that school districts in the State exist pursuant to the State Constitution and it is also clear that the General Assembly for the State of Missouri may abolish or

create districts subject only to the requirement that the territory within the district must be contiguous and subject only to the provision that such may not be done except by general legislation as opposed to special legislation. The General Assembly established the school districts and if it deems necessary, can change them even though to do so might require amendments of some of the present statutes. In this regard the General Assembly has authority which this Court does not have. The teachings of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, as analyzed in Hills v. Geautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) were to the effect that a federal court had no power to restructure the operation of local and state government entities absent a constitutional violation by those entities. Article 1, § 3 of the Missouri

Constitution provides that the people of the State have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to alter or reform government whenever they deem it necessary. Article 1, § 4 of the Constitution acknowledges that it is a free and independent state subject only to the Constitution of the United States. Thus it recognizes that its laws must conform to the United States Constitution. As stated in Milliken I, "no state law is above the Constitution."

In Cooper v. Arron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958), it was stated:

> It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedi-

> cated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

In Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971), the Court stated:

> [I]f a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees.

Even if the hands of state administrators such as the Commissioner of Education, the State Board of Education, or other agencies were "tied" by state

statutes, the State as a collective entity cannot defend its failure to affirmatively act to eliminate the structure and effects of its past dual system on the basis of restrictive state law. The State executive and its agencies as well as the State's General Assembly had and continue to have the constitutional obligation to affirmatively dismantle any system of de jure segregation, root and branch. This obligation is parallel with the obligation of the KCMSD. This case is before this Court simply because the KCMSD and the State have defaulted in their obligation to uphold the Constitution.

Having found that there are still vestiges of the dual school system in the KCMSD, the Court finds the issues in favor of plaintiffs against the KCMSD and the State of Missouri and it further finds the

issues in favor of the KCMSD against the State of Missouri. Since these defendants have failed to comply with their constitutional obligations, this Court not only has the power but the duty to enter a decree which will correct the continuing effects of past discrimination as well as bar discrimination against blacks in the future. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 85 S.Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965).

The issues of liability and remedy have previously been bifurcated by this Court. Therefore at this time the Court makes no determination as to what remedy should be decreed nor a determination at this point whether or not the case should be opened for additional discovery and later a trial on the remedy issue. The Court is of the opinion that the initial

step which should be taken in regard to remedy would be the preparation and submission of a plan which might obtain the approval of the parties involved as well as the approval of this Court.

Since the State under its Constitution has the duty to establish and maintain free public schools, it has the primary responsibility for insuring that the public education systems in the State comport with the United States Constitution. The State Board of Education and the KCMSD Board of Education have much more expertise than this Court in the operation and management of public schools within this State. The KCMSD Board more clearly understands the facilities which are available within its system, the extent to which some school facilities are overcrowded while others are not or may

even be vacant. It understands the problems of the transportation of students to and from the various school facilities and it more fully understands the administrative problems with which it is faced than this Court does; therefore, the State Board of Education and the KCMSD Board of Education are hereby directed to prepare a plan which would establish a unitary school system within the KCMSD. In doing so, they should concentrate on the schools in which the student enrollment is more than 90% black. They should also, to the extent possible, see that students are permitted to attend a school nearest the student's home so long as by so doing it does not deter from properly integrating the students in the KCMSD. They should also bear in mind cost factors as well as the purpose of the public schools in this

state, that is to furnish quality education to its students. While the Court does not intend to limit matters which should be considered to those enumerated above, it does suggest that the above are some considerations which should be kept in mind. It is also the Court's opinion that much of the cost for preparing and implementing a plan to dismantle the vestiges of a dual school system in the KCMSD should be borne by the State. The Court would invite the two Boards to follow the teachings of the United States Supreme Court in regard to appropriate remedies as set forth in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., supra; Green v. School Board of New Kent Co., supra; and Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Education, supra. The Court further directs that such a plan be submitted to the Court within

ninety (90) days from the date of this order. Plaintiffs will be given thirty days after the plan is filed in which to file any written objections to it. Upon the submission of such a plan, it may be determined at that time whether or not an additional hearing should be held and evidence received in regard to a remedy.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment on the issue of liability in favor of HUD and against plaintiffs; in favor of plaintiffs and against the State defendants and the KCMSD; and in favor of the KCMSD and against the State defendants on its cross-claim; and it is further

ORDERED that within ninety (90) days from the date of this order, the State Board of Education and the KCMSD Board of Education are directed to submit a pro-

posed plan which will have the effect of removing the vestiges of the dual school system as it presently exists in the KCMSD; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days after the proposed plan is filed in which to file objections to it.

/s/
RUSSELL G. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Dated: September 17, 1984

Nos. 86-1717 and 86-1718

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 24 1987
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, et al., *Petitioners,*

VS.

STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., *Respondents.*

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JOINT AND CONSOLIDATED BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR NORTH KANSAS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, GRANDVIEW CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT C-4, LEE'S SUMMIT REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT R-7, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, FORT OSAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1, BLUE SPRINGS REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF LIBERTY, HICKMAN MILLS CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT C-1, CENTER SCHOOL DISTRICT, RAYTOWN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT C-2 and PARK HILL REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. V OF PLATTE COUNTY

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REPLY TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions posed to the Court by the two petitions are not actually presented by the unappealed factual findings and holdings below. Indeed, the questions are premised upon factual assumptions that are contrary to the district court's actual and unappealed findings which specifically established that there were no violations of an interdistrict nature and no violations which had any current significant interdistrict effect. Because of the long-settled and established law in interdistrict school desegregation cases, the factual nature of the decisions below, and the lack of any conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals, there is no question worthy of certiorari.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The plaintiff Jenkins class was a plaintiff/appellant below and is a petitioner here. Petitioner Kansas City, Missouri School District ("KCMSD") was a defendant, cross-claimant/appellant below.

Petitioner KCMSD filed no cross-claims against any of the respondent school districts described below. Thus, KCMSD, having never made a claim against such respondents, has no standing or legal basis on which to present the question it states in its petition, assuming the opinions below actually present the question. KCMSD was found to be a constitutional violator and a nonunitary district.

Respondents North Kansas City School District, Grandview Consolidated School District C-4, Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R-7, School District of the City of Independence, Fort Osage School District R-1, Blue

Springs Reorganized School District, School District of the City of Liberty, Hickman Mills Consolidated School District C-1, Center School District, Raytown Consolidated School District C-2 and Park Hill Reorganized School District No. V of Platte County were all defendants/appellees below. Each of these districts was found to be a unitary district. They are hereinafter referred to as the "respondent districts," and in the decisions below they were often referred to as the "SSDs."*

Respondent United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") was a defendant/appellee below.

Respondent State of Missouri (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "State") was a defendant/appellee-cross-appellant below.

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*As the district court found, "each of the school districts is a locally autonomous and independent entity [and] . . . each defendant district is independent and autonomous from the State of Missouri, and from all other school districts." 300a; *See also* 285a-300. Despite the individual interests of each respondent district, to lessen the Court's burden of reviewing the rather long petitions, these respondents are filing this joint and consolidated opposition brief. In the event of any briefs on the merits, separate briefs may well be filed because of the presence of many individual fact findings and differences among the districts.

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Nos. 86-1717 and 86-1718

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, et al., *Petitioners,*

vs.

STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., *Respondents.*

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JOINT AND CONSOLIDATED BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT DISTRICTS

The respondent districts respectfully pray that this Court deny the two petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

ADDITIONAL OPINIONS BELOW

The petitioners omitted from their description of opinions that may be relevant the unpublished July 16, 1984; January 25, 1985; and May 11, 1987 district court orders.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners' statements and factual arguments attempt to rewrite, on a piecemeal and selective basis, some but not all of the district court's orders and unappealed findings.[1]

Petitioners alleged claims of both interdistrict and intradistrict school desegregation violations. These respondent districts were dismissed at the close of petitioners' case on April 2, 1984, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). On April 18, 1984, the district court also dismissed the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"). The district court denied Rule 41(b) motions filed by HUD and the State. Thus, the trial continued on claims of housing-related violations against HUD and intradistrict violations against KCMSD and the State. On June 5, 1984, the district court issued 105 pages of detailed and comprehensive findings in support of the April 2, 1984 dismissal of the respondent districts. On July 16, 1984, the district court issued a comprehensive order in support of HEW's dismissal.

The district court, after completion of the intradistrict trial, issued its September 17, 1984 intradistrict order. It found no housing-related violations by HUD or the State but it did find intradistrict liability against both KCMSD and the State on other grounds, namely the failure to remove all vestiges of a dual system in KCMSD.

Petitioners then presented a remedial plan to force consolidation of the previously dismissed respondent dis-

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1. Most frustrating of all, petitioners argue their evidence without acknowledging that they failed to prove their factual theories. To concoct their questions, the petitions retry their failed evidence on the interdistrict issues as reflected in the June 5, 1984 findings and, at the same time, use that rejected evidence to rewrite some of the findings in the subsequent September 17, 1984 intradistrict order.

tricts. Petitioners theorized that the State had supposedly been found in the September 17, 1984 intradistrict order to have committed interdistrict violations having current significant segregative effects in the respondent districts. On January 25, 1985, the district court rejected petitioners' construction of the September 17, 1984 intradistrict order and required petitioners to submit a remedial plan to remove the dual school vestiges found to exist only in KCMSD. Thereafter, a comprehensive and substantial intradistrict remedial plan for KCMSD was approved.[2]

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2. The petitions suggest that the decisions below resulted in a limited remedy of "compensatory programs" that left rights in "legal limbo." Plaintiffs' Pet. at 9. In seeking attorney fees from the district court, plaintiffs' counsel argued to the contrary. In response to an argument that fees should be reduced because the interdistrict issues were lost, plaintiffs' counsel rejoined:

> [The remedy] included the vindication of the constitutional rights of all blacks in this community and the enhanced opportunities of all present and future children within KCMSD to experience significant educational enhancements.
>
> * * *
>
> [T]he relief plaintiffs obtained is exceptional by any measure, qualitative or monetary, meriting not only a fully compensatory award but an enhanced award as well. Failure to obtain an interdistrict consolidation order in no way detracts from the extraordinary relief obtained.
>
> * * *
>
> In cold monetary terms . . . the present "limited" remedy will result in *annual* expenditures of at least $30 million *per year* for educational programs. An additional $49 million to $200 million will be spent over several years to provide improved facilities and additional tens of millions of dollars will be spent each year to provide for magnet schools and voluntary transfers among cooperating school districts. For a program that surely will last for at least a generation, between one-half and one billion dollars will be invested in the education of the children of this community as a result of this litigation. Limited, indeed!

See Suggestions in Support of Motion for Partial Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses at 20 filed February 5, 1986, and Plaintiffs' Reply to State Defendants' Response at 6-7 and 10, filed September 19, 1986.

After the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rendered its December 5, 1986 opinion, the same district court issued its May 11, 1987 order awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs but denying any fee award to KCMSD because it was not a prevailing party against the State.

Plaintiffs spent months of trial trying to prove interdistrict violations by the respondent districts. The thrust of plaintiffs' case was that pre-1954 dual schools caused KCMSD's current student-body racial composition. Plaintiffs concentrated on alleged historical facts to try to show that a so-called "regionalized interdistrict dual system" existed which forced blacks to live only in KCMSD. Plaintiffs also tried to show that school district boundary lines were drawn for impermissible racial reasons; that the respondent districts were not locally autonomous; and that blacks were constrained in residential choices by intentionally impermissible government conduct such as pre-1948 enforcement of restrictive covenants, highway location, urban renewal and the location of public housing. Plaintiffs thus presented a standard interdistrict case that attempted to prove interdistrict violations by the various respondent districts and other government authorities. They also tried to establish that current significant interdistrict effects existed in KCMSD or the respondent districts from the alleged violations. The district court's findings establish that the plaintiffs failed to prove any of those interdistrict violations or current significant effect allegations.

The district court carefully applied the criteria of *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), to determine whether intentional interdistrict violations or current significant interdistrict effects existed. In applying *Milliken*, the district court assumed petitioners' argument that in-

nocent parties could be coerced into mandatory interdistrict remedies if current significant interdistrict effects existed from the violation of some other party. The district court's June 5, 1984 findings described accurately the petitioners' trial theories, which are the same theories adopted in the petitions' questions:

> [F]irst, that the SSDs, as agents of the state, were guilty of operating a regional system of segregated schools that centered on and impacted Kansas City with blacks and made the suburbs whiter before 1954; second, that the SSDs failed in their affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of the dual school system; and third, *that the SSDs are liable for the effects of actions by the KCMSD and other defendants and can therefore be included in an interdistrict remedy*. . . .

284a (emphasis supplied). "[W]hen *considered in light of the evidence,*" 284a-85 (emphasis supplied), the district court rejected the factual predicates necessary to support those theories. Indeed, the district court found that plaintiffs' evidence was not only blurred as to cause and effect, but there also was no "careful delineation of the extent of the effect." 496a. In sum, plaintiffs did not prove a constitutional violation in one district that produced a current significant segregative effect in another district.

The following review of the district court's 105 pages of factual findings establishes, as noted above, that the district court found no intentional interdistrict violation by these respondent districts or by any other entity. Moreover, that court found no current significant interdistrict effects in KCMSD or any respondent district resulting from actions by KCMSD or other defendants.

In regard to the absence of the required showing of an intentional interdistrict violation, the district court

found that "[w]itness after witness, including witnesses who had been actively involved in the promotion of civil rights, testified they knew of *no* acts by [the respondent districts] that were done with a discriminatory intent." 278a-79. Those witnesses included the editor of the leading black newspaper, long-time black KCMSD administrators, a former KCMSD board president and a former black KCMSD superintendent. *Id.*

In regard to whether the respondent districts were the product of a violation, the district court found that there was "no credible evidence that any boundaries . . . were established or maintained with any racially discriminatory intent." 294a. These districts were autonomous and not mere agents of the State. 300a. The district court also found that there was a higher degree of local autonomy for school districts in Missouri than any other state having prior interdistrict school cases. 290a-95.

In regard to plaintiffs' historical evidence, the district court found that no "regional black interdistrict system" caused blacks to leave the respondent districts. 306a-07. It also found that "[t]he manner in which blacks in any defendant district were educated [prior to 1954] was solely a matter of local control and within the discretion of the local school district." 307a. The district court found that no "vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remain in any of the SSDs." 315a. Indeed, the district court found that "transferring blacks to the KCMSD under the prior segregated school system is not a cause of the present racial distribution of the population in the three-county area." 314a. Plaintiff's proof on the issue of transfers was "weak, speculative and de minimis." 301a. The increase in black population in KCMSD was due to "unusual economic and employment ramifications of the World Wars and the Depression."

313a. The district court added that "jobs and economic opportunity were primary motivators for blacks . . . moving to Kansas City and elsewhere. . . ." 314a.

In reviewing the plaintiffs' evidence of effects of supposed violations, the district court found that the theories of plaintiffs' experts either had "intradistrict implications," were related to effects only "within the KCMSD," or did not otherwise implicate any respondent district. 353a, 354a, 367a.

In reference to arguments concerning the extent of black residential dispersion, the district court found that no "ethnic group is racially balanced residentially and no one in this field of study apparently advocates a random dispersal of ethnic groups." 354a. The district court added that "blacks are not constrained within the KCMSD," and "black enrollments in each of the defendant districts have increased fairly steadily since 1968." 357a. An "increase from 1970 of 14,645 blacks" in the area around KCMSD refuted the "barrier theory to black movement." 358a. Further, urban renewal or highway displacement type relocations "had no significant effect on the racial compositions of the enrollment in any SSD." *Id.*

The district court also made findings that no interdistrict effect resulted from racial transition within KCMSD or from KCMSD's own actions. For example, the district court found:

> Actions of the KCMSD in assigning children to particular schools may have had an intradistrict effect . . . [but] those actions [did not] have any significant effect in the enrollment of any . . . SSD.

360a.

The district court reviewed the number of former KCMSD students attending schools in the respondent dis-

tricts, which was the plaintiffs' only attempt to quantify supposed interdistrict effects, and found that even "assuming they all moved to the SSDs because of racial transition within the KCMSD schools, plaintiffs' argument still fails [because] regardless of the impetus behind the moves, the numbers involved are too insignificant to have had a segregative impact on the KCMSD or the SSD." 362a.

The district court found that there was "no evidence [that restrictive covenants] were enforced by the state courts following *Shelley v. Kraemer*" and that "tremendous housing growth in many suburban areas occurred after 1948 when such covenants were a nullity." 363a. There were few covenants in the respondent districts and there were none in some. 363a, 371a-493. Restrictive covenants did not have any significant effect on the racial makeup of any SSD. 363a.

In regard to other housing-related issues, the district court found that "people moved for a variety of reasons, including a desire to be with people of like religious and racial characteristics" and the personal choice of living near middle class persons. 368a. It also found that many housing related issues involved "private" real estate concerns. 368a-69. These respondent districts were not involved in any type of housing violations. Further, in regard to public housing, the district court found that "such housing is available in significant amounts in every defendant district." 365a. These findings are the opposite of and inconsistent with the emotional argument that blacks are "locked in" to KCMSD. KCMSD Pet. at 23.

The district court's July 16, 1984 order dismissing HEW made similar findings of no interdistrict effect.[3]

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3. It was claimed that HEW should have mandated a metropolitan plan in its previous civil rights investigations of KCMSD. HEW concluded that a metropolitan plan was neither required nor necessary for a viable KCMSD intradistrict plan.

The district court found that the "total testimony plaintiffs elicited concerning the current effect" had no credibility because the witnesses conceded that "the process of resegregation [would have continued] and [a KCMSD unitary system] would not have solved the problem in any kind of a permanent or stable way." *See* Order, July 16, 1984 at 13 (petitioners omitted this order from their Appendix). The district court also found that "planned integration in the 1960's would not have significantly affected white flight." *Id.*

In the later September 17, 1984 intradistrict order, no housing-related violation was found against any party. Thus, HUD was dismissed. Because of other, more "salient" reasons, 602a, KCMSD and the State were found liable for intradistrict violations. The district court, however, found no State violations in urban renewal and relocation policies, highway location or public housing location. This intradistrict order reiterated the earlier interdistrict finding that "there has not been a lack of balance between federally assisted housing within KCMSD and the suburban areas," 579a, and, with respect to State-sponsored projects, it "clearly appears that the majority of the units in which [the State] was involved were located outside the KCMSD." 597a.

Having found no interdistrict liability, on the intradistrict issue of how to deal with the "anatomy of KCMSD," 539a, the district court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to retry "the cause of blacks settling . . . within KCMSD." 537a. The court focused on the intradistrict responsibility of KCMSD and the State "regardless of why [blacks] settled in the school district." - 538a. It is, therefore, clear that the district court's prior findings of no interdistrict effect or violations were reiterated and confirmed in the September 17, 1984 intradistrict order.

In the intradistrict remedial phase, the district court's January 25, 1985 order (which petitioners omitted from their Appendix although it was in the Appendix in the Court of Appeals) rejected petitioners' plan to consolidate the respondent districts based upon the September 17, 1984 intradistrict order. The district court rejected an interdistrict order because it:

> goes far beyond the nature and extent of the constitutional violation this Court found existed. . . . Clearly a plan which would require the consolidation of suburban school districts, ones in which no constitutional violation *or* significant segregative effect has been found, results in a restructuring and coercion of local government which is prohibited under *Milliken.* I.

Id. at 2 (emphasis supplied). Thus, all that was necessary was a plan to remove "the vestiges of the dual school system as it presently exists *in the KCMSD.*" *Id.* at 3 (emphasis supplied).

Petitioners' factual arguments that significant interdistrict effects existed from the State's supposed, but never specified, interdistrict violation is wrong. The same district court's May 11, 1987 order rejected an award of attorney fees to petitioner KCMSD and held:

> Finally, the KCMSD alleges in its crossclaim, as did the plaintiffs in their complaint, that the State is liable for interdistrict violations. *It is undisputed that the KCMSD and the plaintiffs failed in their attempt to prove an interdistrict liability against the State of Missouri.*

Id. at 13 (emphasis supplied).

In reviewing the district court's findings,[4] the Court of Appeals' majority opinion noted that the district court found that all respondent districts were unitary, 47a; there was no barrier to movement of blacks into the respondent districts, 48a; that any pre-*Brown* acts had negligible present effects, 48a; there were no interdistrict violations from intradistrict factors, 49a; the dissents' factual argument "flies in the face" of the district court's findings that were "not clearly erroneous;" and the "dissent does not establish what the Jenkins class and KCMSD did not argue, that these findings of fact are clearly erroneous," 49a, 51a. Petitioners' arguments were "contrary to" or undermined by the district court findings petitioners did not attack as clearly erroneous. 52a-55.

The majority did not agree with petitioners' appellate argument that the district court had not applied petitioners' legal theory, "[C]ontrary to the argument of the class that the court looked only to the culpability of the SSD's, the scope of the order is far broader." 65a. *See also,* 59a; 72a. The opinion also noted that the district court compared plaintiffs' theories to *Milliken* and that the district court made specific findings that "negate current significant interdistrict effects." 65a-66a. Moreover, the majority correctly observed that there was no finding of a current significant effect from any violation. Thus, after reviewing many findings that no boundaries were

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4. The Court of Appeals' majority preferred the district court's findings over the unproven and unpreserved factual arguments petitioners presented on appeal. The majority observed:

> The broad scope of these arguments is considerably narrowed when viewed in light of significant factual findings of the district court. *These findings are not challenged as clearly erroneous.*

47a (emphasis supplied).

racially motivated, that the districts were autonomous, and that no housing violations were found, the court stated that "these findings pose an insuperable burden to granting interdistrict relief." 74a.

The majority also analyzed the district court's findings that boundaries had not constrained black movement in any way, 74a; pre-*Brown* schools did not prevent blacks from living in the respondent districts, 75a; black enrollment in these districts had steadily increased, 75a; KCMSD's increases in black population were due to the unusual economic and employment ramifications of the World Wars and intervening depression, 75a; personal choice in housing decisions played an important role in residential patterns, 76a; no current effect of restrictive covenants existed, especially in light of the fact that suburban growth occurred after 1948, 77a; there was "no lack of balance" in location of public housing, 81-82a; and facts in other interdistrict cases relied upon by petitioners were "directly contrary to those found here." 83a. Similarly, the court added that the findings made in reference to HUD "belie the possibility of interdistrict effect," 87a, and that the district court's later opinions "certainly make no finding of any interdistrict effect," 90a.[5] Thus, the court concluded:

> [T]he factual findings of the district court effectively foreclose findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs

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5. In considering the dissenting arguments, Judge Gibson observed, "The dissent embarks upon fact findings of its own . . . This is contrary to the finding of the district court . . . and the dissent makes no effort to consider these statements in a proper Rule 52(a) analysis." 88a. Judge Gibson added that "there simply is no evidence in the record in this case that official housing discrimination caused school segregation and the findings of the district court as we have outlined above so demonstrate." 92a.

> flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD.
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> * * *
>
> To consider isolated bits of evidence, de minimis in nature, and to mix this with speculation is insufficient . . . The findings made were adequate to dispel the conclusion required by *Milliken* that there be significant segregative effects in the SSDs caused by actions of a constitutional violator in KCMSD.

91a, 93a.

Judge Arnold disagreed with the majority only on housing-related issues because he was unsure whether there were "private" housing violations encouraged by the State and, if so, whether any such violation had current significant interdistrict effects. He suggested a remand to reconsider the findings based on the record at the time of the Rule 41(b) motions. If the district court could not then dismiss the districts, Judge Arnold suggested that the districts produce evidence to show no current significant interdistrict effects of any housing related violations. He, of course, did not have the benefit of the May 11, 1987 order which reiterated the finding that no interdistrict liability against the State had been found.

REASONS THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

The two petitions present questions that, whatever significance they may have in the abstract or in an appropriate case, are not presented here. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the facts necessary to establish petitioners' legal theories were not

proved. This Court, of course, sits to decide cases, not abstract or hypothetical questions.[6] The facts of this case —found by a trial judge who saw hundreds of witnesses in many months of trial and affirmed by the Court of Appeals—preclude reaching the abstract questions presented.[7] Petitioners also ignore recent decisions by this Court which compel support of the factual determinations made below. Moreover, there is no conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals in the well-settled area of interdistrict school desegregation law. The petitions should, therefore, be denied.

I. THIS CASE, DECIDED ON UNAPPEALED FACTUAL FINDINGS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THESE RESPONDENT DISTRICTS, HAS NO NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE QUESTIONS STATED ARE NOT PRESENTED BY THE FACTUAL FINDINGS.

Petitioners assert that the district court and the Court of Appeals' majority have "misread" *Milliken* in regard to

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6. For example, in *The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.*, 359 U.S. 180 (1959), the Court was compelled to dismiss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted when the question in the petition turned out not to be presented on the record. As Justice Brennan noted:

> While this Court decides questions of public importance, it decides them in the context of meaningful litigation. Its function in resolving conflicts among the Courts of Appeals is judicial, not simply administrative or managerial. Resolution here of [the conflict] can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly.

Id. at 184.

7. The petitions are obviously designed to create the illusion that the district court found an interdistrict liability, albeit an unspecified one, against the State in its September 17, 1984 intradistrict order. That illusion is contrary to findings in the prior June 5, 1984 findings, the July 16, 1984 HEW Order and the subsequent orders of January 25, 1985 and May 11, 1987.

whether proof of interdistrict effects of constitutional violations by the State or KCMSD would be sufficient to warrant inclusion of the respondent districts in a mandatory interdistrict remedy even if they were themselves innocent of any wrongdoing. Petitioners further assert that because of this misreading of *Milliken*, the lower courts did not undertake an analysis of whether the violations found by the district court had substantial segregative effects in the respondent districts. Petitioners' assertions are wrong. What the petitioners are really complaining about is that the findings showed there were no interdistrict effects.

The liability of the State and KCMSD in the intradistrict proceeding was based on their failure to remove the vestiges of the pre-1954 school system *in KCMSD*. 603-605a. The intradistrict liability was derived from this failure, not from supposed housing violations or an impermissibly vague notion of encouragement of private discrimination. 602a. The district court specifically found that "plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court that any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remain in any of the SSDs." 315a. Thus, there was no effect in the respondent districts of the source of the State's intradistrict liability—the pre-1954 dual school system that was not totally eradicated in KCMSD. This and the other unappealed fact findings discussed above undermine petitioners' arguments that a supposed misreading of *Milliken* affected the outcome of this case. The respondent districts prevail under any reading of *Milliken* because the district court found, and the Court of Appeals concurred, that no significant interdistrict effect resulted from any violation by any entity.

Cutting through the petitions' chaff, this is a fact bound case which the plaintiffs lost at trial and on appeal.

Neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals retreated from longstanding precedent or extended previously settled legal principles. The result merely turned on fact findings that are germane and relevant only to this particular case.

The district court conducted a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the circumstantial and direct evidence adduced on the issue of discriminatory intent. *See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). No illegal intent was found. Moreover, unlike every other reported interdistrict case, each respondent district took prompt action to comply with *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

The district court found that no boundary lines were ever drawn for racial reasons. The respondent districts have essentially the same boundaries now as they had before 1930. Further, at least as far back as 1910, KCMSD's boundary, as is common in the North, has not been coterminous with any city's boundaries. Indeed, one of KCMSD's largest areas of white enrollment is located outside the City of Kansas City.

In regard to boundary issues, both petitions strive to make this case analogous to cases involving gerrymandering or racially motivated state legislation by mischaracterizing a 1957 legislative amendment. *See*, for example, Plaintiffs' Pet. at 52-53. That amendment dealt with population levels which affected the permissible size of city school districts. The district court found that the bill, which was known as House Bill No. 171 ("H.B. 171"), had no "racial reasons" when it was first passed in 1897 or later amended upon several occasions. 335a-36. The district court's unappealed fact finding was that the legislation was intended to "avoid administrative con-

fusion and problems" and that the actions of state legislators "were not motivated by racial concerns." 337a-338. As the district court also found, "H.B. 171 was not enacted with the intent to concentrate black students within the KCMSD" and there were no current significant effects from its enactment. 339a. Moreover, as the district court found, KCMSD was never prevented from making any annexation outside of Kansas City as evidenced by its subsequent annexations of white areas. 338a-39.[8] Given these findings, it is undisputed that these respondent districts are not the product of any violation.

The district court found that there was no regionalized interdistrict dual school system and that the *de minimis* number of pre-1954 transfers of black students to KCMSD were not a significant cause of KCMSD's present racial composition. The district court also rejected plaintiffs' expert witness who tried to develop a "depopulation" theory which hypothesized that blacks were gradually forced out of all areas except KCMSD. 305a-316. In its September 17, 1984 intradistrict order, the court reiterated that it rejected that expert opinion "as contrary to the weight of the evidence and as being without sufficient foundation." 532a-33.

The respondent districts did not lure any white students from KCMSD. This simply is not a case involving illegal transfers of white students. *See*, for example, 426a. Moreover, the district court found that these districts did not involve themselves in any housing discrimination. Unlike most other interdistrict cases, a substantial amount of subsidized and public housing exists in these districts.

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8. The district court also found that no illegal racial intent existed in regard to a commission report known as the Spainhower Commission which was never enacted into law. The district court found "no credible evidence . . . to support their allegation that racial concerns led to the defeat of the Spainhower recommendations." 340a.

KCMSD was not racially indentifiable in 1954. Only 18% of its students were black. Because of hundreds of thousands of moves and demographic changes over the past 30 years, KCMSD's black percentage increased. The district court observed that our society was quite dynamic. 501a. The Court of Appeals also observed that one of plaintiffs' experts conceded that the forces at work in central cities after 1954 would have caused KCMSD to become majority black and that many nongovernment-caused factors affected residential choices. 76a.

Plaintiffs' only attempt to quantify any interdistrict effects (regardless of cause) was rejected by the district court because the numbers, whether aggregated or disaggregated, showed at most only a *de minimis* impact on enrollments. 361a-62. Moreover, KCMSD's black enrollment actually decreased by more than 10,000 from 1970 to 1984. At the same time, no "whitening" effects were shown in the respondent districts because, as the district court found, substantial numbers of black families moved there during the late 1960's, the 1970's and even more so in the last few years, some from neighborhoods within KCMSD. 369a. As of 1980, over 23,000 blacks resided outside of what one of plaintiffs' experts called the "principal contiguous area," an increase of 14,645 since 1970. 357a-58. The district court found that this fact refuted any notion of barriers to black moves. 358a. While KCMSD's black enrollment decreased by more than 10,000, black enrollment in these districts increased by more than 3,000 students.[9]

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9. Plaintiffs' Pet. at 28-29, resorts to a non-record argument. That argument violates Fed. R. Evid. 408 with respect to use of a supposed offer of compromise and is highly improper. It also presents an incomplete picture. Unfortu-

(Continued on following page)

As the district court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, this is a case which deals with demographic trends unrelated to acts of wrongdoing by governmental entities. There is no showing of any current significant interdistrict effects caused by any violation. Thus, the questions presented in the petitions are not presented by the findings here. This Court recently emphasized the importance of recognizing the trial court's role in making factual determinations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,* 470 U.S. 564 (1985).

For obvious reasons, the petitions never mention *Anderson.* Instead, they attempt to obscure the factual theories petitioners lost by focusing on racial balance disparities and renewing still unproven assertions that were found not to constitute intentional violations. Petitioners imply failed to prove their own trial theories. Two courts below reviewed the evidence and reached the same conclusion; petitioners' dissatisfaction with that reading does not justify denying deference to the fact finding court. In the circumstances here, *Anderson* could not be more applicable.

II. THE LEGAL ISSUES ARE SETTLED AND THE RESULT IN ANY INTERDISTRICT CASE SIMPLY DEPENDS UPON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS MADE IN THAT CASE; THERE IS NO CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

Milliken is an established case that has, over the past 13 years, provided good and sufficient guidelines for adju-

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Footnote continued—

nately, petitioners have used any response to voluntary plan participation in ways to achieve a perceived litigation advantage. The districts thus concluded that only upon the complete termination of litigation could a proper atmosphere for meaningful consideration of such plans exist.

dicating interdistrict cases. Basically, *Milliken* held that "without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy", 418 U.S. at 744. The Court recognized, in setting forth the relevant interdistrict standards, that principles of autonomy and local control are firmly rooted in our tradition of government and play a particularly important role in encouraging "educational excellence."

> [The] notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the education process. *See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia*, 407 U.S. at 469. Thus, in *San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez*, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973), we observed that local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision making, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and healthy competition for educational excellence."

418 U.S. at 741-42. Due to the importance of such local institutions, interdistrict relief was refused, in part, because:

> [t]o approve the [interdistrict] remedy ordered by the [district] court would impose on the outlying districts, *not shown to have committed any constitutional violation*, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in *Brown I* and *II* or any holding of this Court.

418 U.S. at 745 (emphasis supplied). Here, each respondent district is an exemplary and important public institution that is crucial to the communities it serves. Moreover, there is no finding of a current significant interdistrict effect resulting from any interdistrict violation.

Despite *Milliken's* standards and holding, petitioners assert the respondent districts can be coerced into a mandatory interdistrict remedy merely for alleged wrongs of others. It may well be that petitioners' confusion stems from an erroneous belief that an interdistrict remedy must follow anytime a State is found liable for intradistrict violations. That is not correct because the ultimate remedy in *Milliken* was an intradistrict remedy funded in large part by the State of Michigan.

Milliken set forth the type of discriminatory acts which will constitute interdistrict violations for purposes of determining the availability of an interdistrict remedy.

> Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.

418 U.S. at 745. Neither circumstance exists here and no current significant interdistrict effects were found in any event. There is certainly no other circumstance presented here to compel coercive or mandatory interdistrict remedies.

Milliken's principles were reaffirmed in *Hills v. Gautreaux*, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). *Hills* considered *Milliken's* prohibition against "judicial decree[s] restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation." *Id.* at 196.

The Court upheld the concerned order in *Hills*, but only after concluding that the remedial order would not consolidate, restructure or impair the rights of the local governmental units. 425 U.S. at 305-06. In discussing *Milliken*, the Court emphasized the needless judicial interference with the operation of the suburban districts in that case:

> [T]he District court's desegregation order in *Milliken* was held to be an impermissible remedy not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of *local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation.*

425 U.S. at 297 (emphasis supplied). The Court held that the "crucial distinction between HUD and the suburban school districts in *Milliken* is that HUD has been found to have violated the Constitution," *Id.* at 297, and the remedy for its wrongs was fashioned so as not to impair the rights of local units of government. The *Hills* court declared that the proposed remedy in *Milliken* was impermissible due to:

> the limits on the federal judicial power to interfere with the operation of the state political entities that were not implicated in unconstitutional conduct. Here, unlike the desegregation remedy found erroneous in *Milliken*, a judicial order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail *coercion of uninvolved governmental units.*

425 U.S. at 298 (emphasis supplied).

Certainly, neither *Milliken* nor *Hills* holds that an interdistrict remedy can be ordered in the absence of a

current significant interdistrict effect from an interdistrict violation. Here, the findings precluded any current significant interdistrict effect or violation. In these circumstances, no court has ever required a mandatory interdistrict order. Nor has any court imposed a mandatory interdistrict remedy upon innocent school districts that were not the product of a gerrymandering-type violation. Thus, there is no basis for granting certiorari because of some alleged conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Moreover, the decisions below, as conceded by both petitions, are fully in accord and consistent with *Armour v. Nix*, No. 16708 (N.D. Ga. September 24, 1979), *aff'd*, 446 U.S. 930 (1980); *Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education*, 745 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984); *Tasby v. Estes*, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978); *Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board*, 648 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981); *Lee v. Lee County Board of Education*, 639 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1981); *Berry v. School District of Benton Harbor*, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); *Liddell v. State*, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 216 (1984); and *Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District*, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 106 S. Ct. 2926 (1986). *See also, Bronson v. Board of Education*, 578 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D. Ohio 1984), *aff'd*, 687 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982) and *Bell v. Board of Education, Akron Public Schools*, 491 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ohio 1980), *aff'd*, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982).

The Eighth Circuit's majority recognized that such cases had "great force" and that *Goldsboro*, for example, presented "many similarities to the case before us." 100a-101. Indeed, in those cases, just as here, the trial courts made findings that no boundaries had been drawn or

maintained on the basis of race; that pre-1954 transfers (which, unlike here, did not stop immediately after *Brown*) had no current effect; that the outlying districts were either unitary or being operated in accordance with a court plan; and that there was no district cooperation with other governmental bodies to maintain racially identifiable schools. Here, there also was no imbalance in public housing location.

The petitions are wrong in asserting that a conflict exists with decisions from the Third or Seventh Circuits. *See Evans v. Buchanan,* 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), *aff'd,* 423 U.S. 963 (1975) and *United States v. Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis,* 456 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indianapolis interdistrict case), *aff'd in part and vacated in part,* 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied,* 449 U.S. 838 (1980). These cases involve no more than intentional illegal gerrymandering coupled with imbalances in public housing location. They are also cases in which current significant effects of violations were found. Thus, what exists are differences in the controlling and important facts. When a boundary is created with discriminatory intent, as in the cases petitioners cite, the resulting districts are implicated in the violation and thus no deference to local government structure is required. Here, no such interdistrict violation or "interdistrict regionalized dual system" existed. Thus, no interdistrict presumption of failure to satisfy any affirmative duty to merge existed.

Neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals found any conflict with the decisions petitioners cite. Indeed, as the majority noted:

> These cases all involve governmental action fixing or ignoring boundaries with discriminatory intent. The

> findings in the case before us are to the contrary. These cases are therefore distinguishable as are the boundary cases such as *Morrilton,* considered by this court. See Part IV, *supra.* These decisions upon which the Jenkins class so heavily relies, when viewed in light of the findings made by the district court, *plainly have no applicability to the present case.* . . .

99a (emphasis supplied); *see also* 95a.

In *Evans,* a pre-*Washington v. Davis* case, school districts except for the predominantly black Wilmington district were consolidated under a 1968 state law. That law allowed, for a one-year period, district reorganizations except for the Wilmington district. In concluding that such gerrymandering legislation was a violation, a pure disparate impact rationale was applied. *Evans* was, however, limited by the intent requirement announced later in *Washington v. Davis. See, Goldsboro, supra* at 330-332. Here, no intentional violation was found. Further, unlike here, interdistrict effects were found to exist. Thus, no conflict exists; far differing facts apply.[10]

Nor is the *Indianapolis* case in conflict. Once again, far different facts existed. All area governmental operations except school districts were consolidated in a State-passed legislative Uni-Gov concept. Illegal racial intent was found to exist in the passage of that 1970's Uni-Gov legislation. The opposite is true here. Indeed, a complex multiplicity of State and local governmental entities exists here. *No* illegal intentional racial legislation was found to exist. The vital and long established unitary districts

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10. The dissent acknowledged that "proof of disparate impact on the SSDs is not enough to hold the SSDs liable and provide the basis of interdistrict relief," 262a. Significantly, the dissent also conceded that the absence of violations by these districts had significance. 178a and 266a.

here are *not* the "product of a violation" as was the case in *Indianapolis*.[11] Further, unlike here, there was a lack of balance in public housing location in the *Indianapolis* case.

Missouri school district boundaries are established by local votes and *not* by a State Board of Education. Moreover, the district court found that in Missouri there is a great amount of local autonomy in school districts. Indeed, the degree of autonomy was greater than in *Milliken, Evans v. Buchanan* or the *Indianapolis* case. The lack of local control was, of course, important to the decisions in both *Evans* and *Indianapolis*.

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11. Like *Evans* and *Indianapolis*, cases such as *Hoots v. Pennsylvania*, 672 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 877 (1982), and *Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (Louisville interdistrict case), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 931 (1975), involve gerrymandering. *Newburg* also involved illegal white transfers to the suburbs. Moreover, both Pennsylvania and Kentucky had far different educational systems with little local autonomy. Here, the finding established just the opposite. Interestingly, the subsequent *Berry*, 698 F.2d 813, and *Bell*, 683 F.2d 963, cases from the Sixth Circuit show that no conflict could possibly exist in this area. Those cases show that results just depend upon the locally relevant factual findings and the varying State approaches to local educational autonomy. The *Bell* court did not find any conflict with previous decisions. *Bell*, 683 F.2d at 968.

In the *Indianapolis* case, the Seventh Circuit also rejected evidence of realtor practices and other forms of private discrimination. 637 F.2d at 1109 n.15. Violations by the city housing authority were cited but, unlike here where no housing authority was a party except HUD which was dismissed, it was a party against whom relief was sought and, unlike here, there was an imbalance in public housing location. *Id.* at 1117. Districts not involved in significant violations were dismissed. *United States v. Board of Commissioners of Indianapolis*, 503 F.2d 68, 73-74, 78-80, 86 (7th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).

Parenthetically, it can be noted in regard to housing-related issues, Judge Arnold, recognized the factual nature of the relevant inquiry. He also observed that the opinion "does not make law for this Circuit. . . ." 180a. Thus, no possible conflict among Circuit Courts of Appeals could exist in any event.

This is not a situation where any of the Courts of Appeals have recognized or stated that a conflict exists. To the contrary, any difference among the cases is not the legal principles applied but simply the result of differing and meaningful underlying factual findings. *See,* for example, *Goldsboro, supra* at 330-332.

The absence of intentional violations, the findings of no current significant interdistrict effect, the differing structure of the educational organization in the State, the lack of any gerrymandering and many other unique local facts such as the lack of imbalance in public housing location makes this case far stronger than any other interdistrict case, including *Milliken.* Thus, there is no reason to review settled issues which have not troubled this Court for the past 13 years. Any subsequent interdistrict case that may occur elsewhere will depend upon the local facts developed at trial.

CONCLUSION

The petitions should be denied. The questions stated are not presented. Moreover, the case is so fact sensitive on local matters that no purpose would be served by certiorari. The law is well settled and no conflict among the Courts of Appeals exists. The result in any case is dependent largely upon the locally governing facts as found by the trial judge.

June 24, 1987

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Nos. 86-1717 and 86-1718

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, *et al.*,
Petitioners
v.
THE STATE OF MISSOURI, *et al.*,
Respondents

THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT, *et al.*,
Petitioners,
v.
THE STATE OF MISSOURI, *et al.*,
Respondents.

On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR STATE RESPONDENTS

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the court of appeals was required to order an interdistrict remedy despite findings that there was neither an interdistrict violation nor significant, current interdistrict effects.

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On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR STATE RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT

This lawsuit involves claims regarding the racial composition of the schools in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The suit was originally filed in 1977 by the Kan-

sas City, Missouri School District (the KCMSD) through its superintendent and its school board, and by students in the district. The named defendants included the State of Missouri, the Missouri State Board of Education and various Missouri officials, twelve Missouri School districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area, the State of Kansas, the Kansas State Board of Education and various Kansas officials, several Kansas school districts in the Kansas City metropolitan area, as well as the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). The lawsuit alleged unconstitutional interdistrict segregation caused by acts of the defendants and sought a sweeping remedy involving reassignment of students across district and state lines.

In October 1978, the district court dismissed all of the Kansas defendants. *School District of Kansas City, Missouri v. State of Missouri*, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The court also realigned the KCMSD as a defendant. Thereafter, in May 1979, students in the KCMSD and in several of the defendant Missouri school districts filed an amended complaint.[1] All of the non-Kansas defendants named as defendants in the initial complaint remained defendants in the amended complaint, and the KCMSD was added as a new defendant.

The amended complaint, at least as construed by the district court, made two distinct claims: it realleged the interdistrict violation alleged in the original complaint; and it alleged an intradistrict violation, committed by the KCMSD and by the State defendants, within the KCMSD. In July 1979, the KCMSD asserted a simi-

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[1] The named plaintiffs were replaced at various times during the litigation. In February 1985, the court certified a class of all present and future KCMSD students.

larly dual cross-claim against the State defendants[2]; it sought indemnification for its intradistrict liability, and it made the same allegation of an interdistrict violation as that made by the plaintiffs.[3]

The trial of the case began in 1983. After hearing months of evidence by the plaintiffs and KCMSD, and before hearing evidence in response, the district court dismissed all of the suburban school districts from the case. Order of April 2, 1984. The Court found, in accordance with *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), that school districts in Missouri were autonomous and that none had committed any interdistrict violation. Further, in extensive and detailed fact findings, the court found that none of the discriminatory governmental actions advanced by plaintiffs or the KCMSD to support their interdistrict claims had any significant current interdistrict segregative effect. *See generally* Pet. App. 283a-493a.

The findings of fact in the June 5 Order addressed each of the theories for finding interdistrict liability. First, the court held that there had been no manipulation of district boundaries for racial reasons, finding a "[l]ack of proof of discriminatory intent in the establishment or changing of any school district boundary lines." Pet. App. 287a. Second, the court held that the

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[2] The state defendants were the State of Missouri, the Governor of Missouri, the Missouri State Board of Education and its members, and the Commissioner of Education of the State of Missouri. In March 1985, the Treasurer of the State of Missouri was added as a defendant necessary for relief.

[3] Before trial began in 1983, the United States Department of Transportation and one of the Missouri school districts were dismissed by stipulation, leaving the KCMSD, eleven suburban school districts (SSDs), the State defendants, HUD, and HEW (later dismissed) as defendants.

pre-1954 State segregation policy had no significant current interdistrict effects, finding plaintiffs' proof on this point to be "weak, speculative, and in any event *de minim*[*i*]*s*." Pet. App. 301a. Third, the court determined that the pre-1948 State enforcement of racially restrictive covenants had no significant current interdistrict effects. Pet. App. 363a. Taking these matters together, the district court concluded that "[a]t most, plaintiffs' evidence is *de minim*[*i*]*s* and is therefore insufficient" to support relief involving the SSDs. Pet. App. 499a.

The court then heard further evidence and, on September 17, 1984, issued its final liability ruling. *Jenkins v. State of Missouri*, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Pet. App. 518a-617a. In that decision, it found liability for segregation within the KCMSD on the part of both the State defendants and the KCMSD. The court first noted the undisputed fact that, prior to 1954, the State and the KCMSD had imposed a mandatory dual school system upon the students in the KCMSD. The court stated that, "having created a dual system, the State and the KCMSD had and continue to have an obligation to disestablish the system." Pet. App. 604a. The court then found that "there are still vestiges of the State's dual school system still lingering in the KCMSD [and that] the obligations of the KCMSD and the State have not been met." Pet. App. 605a.[4]

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[4] *See also* Pet. App. 611a-12a ("Having found that there are still vestiges of the dual school system in the KCMSD, the Court finds the issues in favor of plaintiffs against the KCMSD and the State of Missouri and it further finds the issues in favor of the KCMSD against the State of Missouri.") The Court found no basis for liability in post-1954 State actions concerning vocational schools, highway location and relocation assistance, and Missouri Housing Development Commission programs. Pet. App. 557a, 589a-600a ("none of the aforementioned agencies committed any constitutional violation").

The court identified two such "vestiges" in its opinion. Of particular importance was the fact that "24 schools . . . are racially isolated with 90+% black enrollment." Pet. App. 545a. The court specifically found that, in light of this condition, "the District did not and has not entirely dismantled the dual school system." Pet. App. 545a. The court also found that "the inferior education indigenous of the State-compelled dual school system has lingering effects in the Kansas City, Missouri School District." Pet. App. 542a.[5]

The court ordered the State and the KCMSD to develop a remedial plan to "establish a unitary school system within the KCMSD." Pet. App. 614a. The KCMSD's initial plan proposed consolidation of the KCMSD with the SSDs. *See* KCMSD Plan for Remedying Vestiges of the Segregated Public School System (January 18, 1985). Because of its earlier rulings against the claims of interdistrict violation, however, the district court rejected this plan and ordered the KCMSD to prepare an amended plan "to be implemented within the existing boundaries of the [KCMSD], which would have the effect of removing the vestiges of the dual school system as it presently exists in the KCMSD." Order of January 25, 1985 at 3.

After submission of a new remedial plan by the KCMSD, and submission of alternative plans by the State defendants, the court held a two-week hearing on the scope of appropriate relief. In June, 1985, the court issued an order establishing a multifaceted district-wide remedial plan. Order of June 14, 1985. The plan contemplates a broad upgrading of conditions throughout the KCMSD, including additional teachers, all-day kindergarten programs, expanded summer school programs, be-

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[5] Although the court found that certain actions by the State, largely the passing of now-superseded statutes, had "encouraged racial discrimination by private individuals," it did not rest any determination of liability on such grounds. Pet. App. 601a-02a.

fore and after school tutoring, a voluntary transfer program with suburban districts, and renovation of school facilities. This plan is currently being implemented in the district.[6]

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of interdistrict relief.[7] With regard to "issues not related to housing," Pet. App. 8a, five judges (Gibson, Ross, Fagg, Wollman, and Arnold, JJ.) agreed that the findings and conclusions of the district court did not justify an award of interdistrict relief under *Milliken v. Bradley*, *supra*. On the housing issues, the court affirmed the denial of interdistrict relief by an equally-divided vote, with Judge Arnold voting to remand the case to the district court "to consider whether there are interdistrict housing violations which would require relief." Pet. App. 8a-9a. Three judges (Lay, C.J., Heaney, and McMillian, JJ.) dissented.

The extensive plurality opinion, which is further discussed at pages 10-16, *infra*, drew its "basic guidance" regarding the standards for interdistrict relief from *Milliken v. Bradley*, *supra*. Pet. App. 33a. It thus recognized that " 'it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.' " Pet. App. 33a, quoting *Milli-*

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[6] Subsequently, in separate orders issued in June and November, 1986, the district court ordered implementation of a magnet school plan that turns all of the senior high schools, all of the junior high schools, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools into magnet schools. Although the State proposed that some schools be made into magnet schools, it has appealed the district court orders on the ground that they are unnecessarily broad. At present, the orders are back before the district court to allow for additional findings, after which it is expected that the appeal of the orders will proceed.

[7] The court of appeals also affirmed the intradistrict relief with certain modifications. Pet. App. 116a-36a. No party has sought review of that portion of the decision.

ken v. Bradley, supra, 418 U.S. at 745. Later, the plurality, after discussing both *Milliken v. Bradley* and *Hills v. Gautreaux*, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), stated: "*Milliken* and *Hills* make clear that we may grant interdistrict relief only to remedy a constitutional violation committed by an SSD, or to remedy an interdistrict effect in the SSD caused by a constitutional violation in KCMSD." Pet. App. 63a.

The plurality then reviewed the findings of the district court, concluding that they established the existence of neither an interdistrict violation nor any significant current interdistrict effects. It noted that the district court "first carefully considered whether the SSDs had violated the Constitution. It found that they had not." Pet. App. 63a. In addition, the plurality found that the district court "dealt not only with the issue of whether the SSDs were constitutional violators but also whether there were significant interdistrict segregative effects." Pet. App. 66a. The plurality added: "When it did so, it made specific findings that negate current significant interdistrict effects, and concluded that the requirements of *Milliken* had not been met." Pet. App. 66a.[8]

The plurality emphasized "the importance of the district court's factual findings in school desegregation cases." Pet. App. 37a. Having stated its view that "[t]he arguments of the Jenkins class [petitioners in No. 86-1717] run contrary to the facts found by the district court," Pet. App. 57a, it declined to "substitute its judgment for that of the district court." Pet. App. 58a. Similarly, it disagreed with the dissenting judges' treatment of the factual findings, saying that those judges had engaged in "the rejection of the district court's carefully weighed findings of fact and substitution of those

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[8] The findings of the district court regarding the absence of interdistrict effects are discussed in more detail at pages 10-13 *infra*.

more desirable, frequently based on evidence considered and rejected by the district court." Pet. App. 40a-41a. The plurality held that such "appellate factfinding" was "directly contrary to the mandate of *Anderson* [*v. City of Bessemer City*, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985)]." Pet. App. 40a-41a.

In his separate opinion, Judge Arnold disagreed with the plurality's reading of the factual findings relating to housing, stating that "the District Court never finally determined whether or what current interdistrict segregation is attributable to these housing violations." Pet. App. 157a.[9] In the absence of such a final resolution, Judge Arnold said, "the case should be remanded to the District Court to determine precisely what current interdistrict segregative effects may be attributed to housing discrimination by the State [and other entities]." Pet. App. 176a.

The dissenting judges took still a different view, stating that "the record does not support the district court's conclusions." Pet. App. 181a. Those judges believed that "the district court's factfinding process was tainted with legal error" and, therefore, that its findings were "entitled to less than usual deference and should be reversed as clearly erroneous." Pet. App. 185a. The dissenting judges would have reversed the judgment dismissing the suburban districts and HUD, and remanded the case for further evidentiary hearings and, if then appropriate, for the imposition of an interdistrict remedy. Pet. App. 187a-88a.

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[9] In this regard, Judge Arnold noted references by the district court "to a number of instances of housing discrimination by the State and its subdivisions that could have had such segregative effects." Pet. App. 156-57a. The plurality concluded that these references "fall short of making a specific finding of a constitutional violation, and certainly make no finding of any interdistrict effect." Pet. App. 90a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners in this desegregation case are seeking review of a decision that the court of appeals did not render. According to the petitions, the court of appeals refused to order interdistrict relief, despite findings of current interdistrict effects resulting from violations by the State or other parties, on the ground that each suburban school district had not itself committed a constitutional violation, This refusal, say petitioners, is in conflict with the decision of this Court in *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (*Milliken I*), and with decisions of other federal courts of appeals. Additionally, petitioners in No. 86-1717 (the "Jenkins petitioners") argue that the failure to eradicate the interdistrict effects is contrary to the principles set out in *Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman*, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (*Dayton II*).

The actual decision of the court of appeals is very different. The plurality correctly recognized that, before an autonomous school district may be compelled to participate in an interdistrict remedy, *Milliken I* requires, at the very least, either a showing of an interdistrict violation by that district or a showing of current interdistrict effects in the district. Applying that principle here, the plurality reviewed the detailed findings made by the district court and concluded that those findings showed, first, no interdistrict violations by the suburban districts and, second, no significant, current interdistrict effects in those districts. Because of these findings, its decision to deny interdistrict relief was entirely consistent not only with the holding of *Milliken I* but with the holding of every federal decision granting interdistrict relief, all of which have conditioned such relief on a demonstration of interdistrict effects. Likewise, because it found that no interdistrict effects remain, the plurality did not depart from any requirement established in *Dayton II* of assuring that the vestiges of prior discrimination have been eliminated. Further review of these factual matters is not warranted.

1. The Decision Below Is Not in Conflict With *Milliken I* or Interdistrict Cases from Federal Courts of Appeals.

A. The first task, given the nature of the petitions for certiorari, is to identify just what the court of appeals did and did not decide. Contrary to petitioners' representations, the plurality did not decide that the findings showed continuing interdistrict effects but that interdistrict relief was barred by the absence of an interdistrict violation on the part of each defendant school district.[10] Instead, it decided that the findings showed no current interdistrict effects and, as a consequence, no basis for awarding relief under any possible reading of *Milliken I*.

The emphasis given to the lack of interdistrict effects would seem hard to miss: the plurality took great care to review each of the findings of the district court leading to that conclusion. In the very first paragraph of its opinion, summarizing the decision of the district court, the plurality noted that "there was no finding of interdistrict violation or interdistrict effect." Pet. App. 7a. Similarly, in a more detailed review of the district court decision, the plurality specifically pointed to two findings supporting the denial of interdistrict relief: "that within four years after *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (*Brown I*), and in most cases within a shorter time, all the SSDs had eradicated the vestiges of

[10] In No. 86-1718, for example, petitioners state the following "Question Presented": "Whether the court below erred in this interdistrict school desegregation case by requiring proof that each and every school district committed independent constitutional violations with a segregative effect on the Kansas City, Missouri School District, despite proof that all the defendant districts participated in and were affected by the State-created metropolitan-wide racially dual school system." KCMSD Pet. i. In No. 86-1717, petitioners describe the plurality opinion as holding that "interdistrict relief is available only if there has been a racially discriminatory act *by each defendant district*." Jenkins Pet. 38, *quoting* June 1984 Order (emphasis added by petitioners).

their dual school systems and were operating unitary systems" and that "none of the alleged discriminatory actions committed by the State or the federal defendants had caused any significant current interdistrict segregation." Pet. App. 13a-14a. The plurality then set forth separately a series of findings with regard to the issue of interdistrict relief, Pet. App. 16a-26a, pointing out that the district court had "rejected the argument that within the SSDs any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remained," Pet. App. 19a, and had found that pre-1948 enforcement of racial covenants in housing "did not have a current significant segregative effect." Pet. App. 24a-25a.

The plurality repeatedly relied on these and other findings in addressing each theory advanced by petitioners for interdistrict relief. It began with arguments based upon the existence of mandatory segregation prior to 1954—arguments that it found to be "considerably narrowed when viewed in light of significant factual findings of the district court." Pet. App. 47a. Noting that the district court had found "the pre-*Brown* acts thirty years past to have negligible present effects," Pet. App. 48a, the plurality concluded that "[t]he factual argument based on the pre-*Brown* interdistrict system of locating dual schools flies in the face of the district court's finding that the pre-*Brown* acts have negligible present effects." Pet. App. 49a. For the same reason, the plurality was unpersuaded by "the argument that the SSDs, though not at fault, would still be liable to take part in eliminating the effects on children in their districts of the State's metropolitan-wide dual school violations . . . ." Pet. App. 53a-54a. The plurality held that this theory "suffer[ed] from two fatal deficiencies [:] [i]t ignores the lack of finding of any such effects, and is contrary to the district court's findings that within at most four years after *Brown I*, any vestiges of the dual school systems that may have existed in the SSDs had been eliminated." Pet. App. 54a.

The plurality also held that the findings of fact defeated petitioners' arguments based upon claims of housing discrimination. It again emphasized that the district court had made "specific findings that negate the existence of significant interdistrict current effects in the SSDs." Pet. App. 74a. The plurality thus gave great weight to findings that the location of schools prior to 1954 "did not discourage black families from outside or within Missouri from moving to and living in [the suburban] districts" (Pet. App. 74a-75a); that "the substantial increases in the KCMSD black population were in large part due to the unusual economic and employment ramifications of the World Wars and intervening Depression" (Pet. App. 75a); that "the restrictive covenants [enforced until 1948] have no current effect in the SSDs" (Pet. App. 77a); and that the findings with regard to the claims against HUD "belie the possibility of interdistrict effect occurring in the SSDs." Pet. App. 86a. It finally concluded that "[t]he findings made were adequate to dispel the conclusion required by *Milliken* that there be significant segregative effects in the SSDs caused by actions of a constitutional violator in KCMSD." Pet. App. 93a.[11]

Although petitioners argued in the court of appeals that certain statements by the district court constituted findings of interdistrict effects, the plurality decided otherwise. Thus, while petitioners pointed to parts of the September 1984 opinion discussing a "dual housing market" and private discrimination "encouraged" by the State, the plurality said that these observations, read in the context of the full findings of fact, "fall short of making a specific finding of a constitutional violation, and certainly make no finding of any interdistrict effect."

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[11] We note that, in 41 pages of Statements purporting to set forth the facts of this case, petitioners do not refer to even a single one of the findings included in the paragraphs in the text, *supra*; they acknowledge neither that the district court made them nor that the plurality explicitly relied on them.

Pet. App. 90a. To the contrary, the plurality "conclude[d] that the factual findings of the district court effectively foreclose findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD." Pet. App. 91a.

The petitions in this case make no effort to come to grips with these statements; indeed, they are framed as though the statements had never been made.[12] This neglect, however, severely distorts the meaning of the plurality opinion. The plurality "recognize[d] at the outset the importance of the district court's factual findings in school desegregation cases." Pet. App. 37a. And it observed that the role of an appellate court with regard to factual findings was a limited one, all the more so in this case because petitioners had elected not to challenge the findings as clearly erroneous. Pet. App. 42a, 47a; see *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City*, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985). Petitioners thus are not free to separate the court of appeals' holding from the findings on which it expressly depends.

B. The decision below, read properly, fits well within the requirements of *Milliken I*. The plurality, relying upon the findings set forth above, applied *Milliken I* carefully, ultimately resolving that even the most minimal predicates for granting interdistrict relief had not been met.

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[12] Petitioners in No. 86-1718 assert that "the district court and the Eighth Circuit plurality never actually engaged in an analysis of whether State violations had substantial segregative effects in the surrounding districts." KCMSD Pet. 17. This statement is hard to credit when the plurality expressly noted findings, among others, showing that "the pre-*Brown* acts have negligible present effects" (Pet. App. 49a) and "effectively foreclos[ing] findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD" (Pet. App. 91a). The difficulty faced by petitioners does not arise from a lack of analysis of interdistrict effects but from the fact that, on the interdistrict issues, "[p]laintiffs' proof was weak, speculative and in any event *de minim*[*i*]*s*." Pet. App. 301a.

The plurality began its discussion of the merits by setting out the standards governing interdistrict relief under *Milliken I*: "Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." Pet. App. 33a, quoting *Milliken I*, 418 U.S. at 744-45. The plurality further noted that "the interdistrict segregative effects [must be] current." Pet. App. 35a-36a.

The plurality discussed the standards of *Milliken I* again in addressing petitioners' contention that the district court had mistakenly required a showing of violations by each and every school district. After examining both *Milliken I* and the explanation of that case in *Hills v. Gautreaux*, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), the plurality stated: "*Milliken* and *Hills* make clear that we may grant interdistrict relief only to remedy a constitutional violation committed by the SSD, *or* to remedy an interdistrict effect in the SSD caused by a constitutional violation in KCMSD." Pet. App. 63a (emphasis added). To apply this standard, it evaluated the findings of the district court to see whether they established *either* an interdistrict violation by the SSDs *or* current interdistrict effects in the SSDs. Pet. App. 63a-95a.

The plurality thus did not say that interdistrict relief requires a violation by each school district to be included in the remedy, nor did it endorse any such holding by the district court. To the contrary, the plurality took pains to show that the district court did not stop with the issue of liability of the suburban districts but assessed the effects in those districts of other actions al-

leged by petitioners. Pet. App. 65a-66a. The plurality noted: "The district court thus dealt not only with the issue of whether the SSDs were constitutional violators but also whether there were significant interdistrict segregative effects. [Citation omitted] When it did so, it made specific findings that negate current significant interdistrict effects, and concluded that the requirements of *Milliken* had not been met." Pet. App. 66a.[13]

The plurality also went over the findings of fact in detail, satisfying itself that no basis for interdistrict relief had been shown. As we have previously noted, that review included a discussion of the statements regarding a "dual housing market" and the encouraging of private discrimination relied upon heavily by petitioners here. Having considered all the findings, the plurality concluded that, even if the district court had misread *Milliken I* by relying too much on the element of liability, its findings "effectively foreclose findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD." Pet. App. 91a.[14] Without either an interdis-

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[13] Although petitioners insisted before the court of appeals that the district court misread *Milliken I*, and that reversal was thus required, the plurality was unconvinced for several reasons. Although it agreed that "[t]he court's order admittedly emphasizes the absence of culpability of the suburban districts," Pet. App. 65a, it observed that "the court explicitly recognized that under *Milliken* 'there must be evidence of a constitutional violation in one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.' " Pet. App. 65a, *quoting* Order of June 5, 1984. The plurality then noted that the district court specifically considered the issue "whether there were significant interdistrict segregative effects." Pet. App. 66a. Given the extensive findings regarding the lack of such effects, the plurality decided that petitioners had shown no basis for interdistrict relief even if their arguments regarding the district court's reading of *Milliken I* were accepted. Pet. App. 90a-91a.

[14] Judge Arnold in his separate opinion disagreed with this view of the district court findings, and suggested that both the plurality and the district court gave too much attention to the lack of culpa-

trict violation or interdistrict effects, the plurality perceived no basis for interdistrict relief.

This holding, far from being incompatible with *Milliken I*, follows unavoidably from it. In that case, the Court concluded that a violation occurring within a single district and with effects confined to that district was an inadequate basis for requiring other, autonomous districts to participate in an interdistrict remedy. While the Court at times seemed to imply that the lack of culpability of the other districts was itself a factor weighing against interdistrict relief, *see, e.g.*, 418 U.S. at 745 (rejecting imposition of remedy on districts "not shown to have committed any constitutional violation"), it is clear that at least a showing of significant interdistrict effects was necessary to justify imposing the remedy on those districts. The plurality below made just that inquiry; it simply decided that no such effects had been shown here.

C. The decision below is also consistent with the decisions of other courts of appeals. None of the cases cited by petitioners, or any other case so far as we are aware, has imposed an interdistrict remedy in the absence of a showing of current, significant interdistrict effects.

The decision of the three-judge court in *Evans v. Buchanan*, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), *aff'd*, 423 U.S. 963 (1975), provides a ready example. There, after discussing the standards of *Milliken I*, the court observed that "to the extent that segregation imposed by state law has had interdistrict effects, federal courts can fashion appropriate interdistrict remedies." *Id.* at 432. It

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bility of the SSDs. Pet. App. 145a-146a n.1. He pointed out, however, that even if the plurality believed in a requirement of culpability (as, in his view, they "seem[ed] to"), that belief would not be controlling in the Eighth Circuit itself. Rather, the question of the scope of a proper remedy in a case involving interdistrict effects but no individual violations "is . . . open for determination in future cases in this Circuit." Pet. App. 180a.

then made findings regarding a number of government practices, related to both schools and housing, stating in conclusion that "[t]his conduct constitutes segregative action with inter-district effects." *Id.* at 438. Similarly, it found that a state statute precluding consolidation of the Wilmington school district with other districts "played a significant part in maintaining the racial identifiability of Wilmington and suburban New Castle County school districts." *Id.* at 445.

The same sorts of concerns were present in *United States v. Board of School Commissioners*, 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). In that case, the court of appeals expressly stated, relying on *Milliken I*, that "[b]efore a court may impose an interdistrict remedy, a constitutional violation, *i.e.*, intentional state action, must exist which has significant segregative interdistrict effects." 573 F.2d at 405. The court subsequently found that certain state action regarding school boundaries had such effects. *Id.* at 407-08. It also indicated that various housing practices could support an interdistrict remedy, even if they had ceased, provided that "it is shown that prior discriminatory practices have a continuing segregative effect on housing patterns (and, in turn, on school attendance patterns) within the Indianapolis metropolitan area." *Id.* at 409.

The plurality below distinguished these and other cases, not because they required only a showing of interdistrict effects, but because no interdistrict effects were shown here. Indeed, with regard to *Evans* and *Board of School Commissioners*, the plurality said flatly that "[t]he facts relied on to support the housing violations . . . are directly contrary to those found in this case." Pet. App. 83a; *see also* Pet. App. 95a-99a.[15]

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[15] In *Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Kentucky*, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 1074 (1975), the court of appeals stated: "A crucial difference between the present cases and *Milliken* is that school

Petitioners in No. 86-1718 (the "KCMSD petitioners") also accuse the plurality of "effectively erect[ing] a new rule—that interdistrict effects of a constitutional violation give rise to an interdistrict remedy only where those effects are caused by the gerrymandering of boundaries . . . ." KCMSD Pet. 18. The rule is wholly imaginary. The plurality did not say that manipulation of boundaries was the only justification for interdistrict relief; it merely noted, quite correctly, that cases involving interdistrict relief commonly involve such manipulation and that nothing of the sort was established in this case. Pet. App. 95a. Furthermore, of course, the plurality took dozens of pages to review, and ultimately reject on the basis of the factual findings, each of petitioners' contentions regarding interdistrict relief—including those grounded in allegations about school assignments or housing practices—without any suggestion that the contentions were foreclosed *ipso facto* by a failure to mention boundaries.

In short, the decision below does not rest upon a failure of the plurality to follow *Milliken I*, or to apply the same principles invoked by other courts of appeals; it rests upon the failure of petitioners in this case to show that racial disparities between the city and suburban districts are the result of deliberate governmental discrimination. Although petitioners sought to establish that cause-and-effect relationship over months of trial, the district court found to the contrary, and those findings, never challenged as clearly erroneous, controlled the

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district lines in Kentucky have been ignored in the past for the purpose of aiding and implementing continued segregation. Such disregarding of school district lines *continues to have an effect on racial imbalance in the county's schools . . . .*" *Id.* at 1380 (emphasis added). In *Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 672 F.2d 1107 (1982), the court noted findings, among others, that "district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race" (*id.* at 1116) (internal quotes omitted) and that various districts had been intentionally created "as identifiably black and white districts" (*id.* at 1120). These conditions existed at the time of suit. *Id.* at 1110-13.

disposition on appeal. Petitioners' efforts to get around those findings, and to recast the decision below as something it is not, should be rejected.

2. The Decision Below Is Not a Departure from the Principles of *Dayton II*.

The Jenkins petitioners make a further argument that the decision below is inconsistent with the principles of *Dayton II*. Once again, the argument runs aground on the factual findings in this case.

This Court held in *Dayton II* that a school district, having once engaged in intentional segregation, has a continuing duty to see that the effects of that segregation are eradicated. That duty, as the Court went on to observe, includes "the obligation not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects." 443 U.S. at 538. Asserting that respondents failed to fulfill that duty here, the Jenkins petitioners argue that various conduct, in particular the failure to expand the boundaries of the school district, has left in place interdistrict effects requiring an interdistrict remedy.

The obvious problem with this argument, as with petitioners' other contentions, is that it ignores the findings regarding the lack of interdistrict effects. The district court found, and the plurality below accepted, that no effects of any prior *inter*district segregation presently existed; all that remained to be undone were the effects of *intra*district segregation, for which the court imposed a substantial intradistrict remedy. Thus, insofar as petitioners' interdistrict claims are concerned, the duty to see that effects of prior actions are not continuing, and the corresponding obligation not to impede execution of that duty, has been met. That is all that *Dayton II* requires.[16]

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[16] As the plurality below recognized, the findings of the district court were anything but conclusory ones. Noting the existence of racial disparities between the KCMSD and suburban districts, the

Given the findings below, petitioners' argument seems less an effort to apply the teachings of *Dayton II* than one to avoid the teachings of *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In the latter case, this Court held that the essential predicate of a constitutional remedy is "current conditions of segregation resulting from intentional state action." *Id.* at 240. Here, petitioners are seeking to base a remedy on the supposed effects of one action (the failure to expand district boundaries), which the district court specifically found not to have been taken with any discriminatory intent, Pet. App. 334a-39a, and to do so by saying that it was necessary to correct for the effects of some other action. Whatever merit this argument might have in a proper case, it is clearly out of place where the effects of the other action no longer are continuing. In that context, it is nothing more than an attempt to treat nondiscriminatory conduct as though it were a constitutional violation.

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district court examined decades of actions to determine whether the disparities were the result of intentional governmental discrimination. In so doing, it found that the actions cited by petitioners had *de minimis* interdistrict effect at the time and had no significant *current* effect. Instead, the court found, other factors, such as the availability of jobs and economic opportunities, were far more important. *See generally* Pet. App. 283a-493a.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for writs of certiorari should be denied.

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Nos. 86-1717 and 86-1718

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

KALIMA JENKINS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

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No. 86-1717

KALIMA JENKINS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.

No. 86-1718

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v.

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals misinterpreted *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* 418 U.S. 717 (1974), when it affirmed the district court's denial of interdistrict relief in this school desegregation case. As the questions presented in the petitions are directed primarily at parties other than the federal respondents, this memorandum will explain first why there is no issue involving the federal respondents that warrants this Court's review and, second, why the questions on which petitioners seek certiorari are not properly presented on the record in this case.

1. a. In its early stages, this case involved a broad-based challenge to alleged racial segregation in the public

schools in the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD), and, more generally, in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Claims of interdistrict and intradistrict violations were asserted against the KCMSD, suburban school districts (SSDs), the State of Missouri, and a host of local, state and federal agencies and officials.[1] Following a lengthy presentation of evidence by the plaintiff (64 trial days, more than 140 witnesses, 2,100 exhibits, and 10,000 designated pages of depositions (see Pet. App. 12a)), the district court found no discrimination on the part of the SSDs and no lingering effects in those districts of prior discriminatory actions, and it therefore rejected petitioners' claims for interdistrict relief.[2] Following the presentation of further evidence, the court found that

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[1] The complaints named as defendants the United States Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and Transportation (DOT), and the Secretary of HUD. DOT was dismissed by stipulation before trial. HEW was dismissed by the district court during the trial. Neither DOT nor HEW participated in proceedings in the court of appeals. Of the federal parties originally involved in this case, only HUD and the Secretary of HUD participated in the full trial and in the proceedings in the court of appeals. The claims against HUD and the Secretary were dismissed following trial, that dismissal was affirmed by the court of appeals, and HUD and the Secretary (hereinafter referred to collectively as HUD) are thus the only federal respondents in this Court.

[2] The district court stated that there had been no racially-motivated manipulation of district boundaries ("[l]ack of proof of discriminatory intent in the establishment or changing of any school district boundary lines" (Pet. App. 287a, 294a)); that it was unpersuaded "that any vestiges or significant effects of the pre-1954 dual school system remain in any of the SSDs" (*id.* at 315a); "that each of the defendant suburban school districts disestablished its pre-1954 school system with deliberate speed and that all vestiges of that system have long since ceased to exist" (*id.* at 316a); that neither the State's pre-1948 enforcement of racially restrictive covenants nor any other housing-related action had a significant current interdistrict effect (*id.* at 354a-369a).

racial segregation continued to exist within the district (KCMSD) in which the individual petitioners attend school and accordingly ordered substantial intradistrict relief against that district and the State of Missouri.[3] The district court dismissed all claims against HUD.

The court made several findings that specifically negate any liability on the part of HUD for segregation in the public schools within the KCMSD district. The court found: (1) "[i]f [the Federal Housing Authority's] appraisal practices prior to 1950 [which, it was claimed, considered the impact of racially restrictive covenants on market prices] had any effect on present racial housing patterns, it would, at most, be *de minim[i]s*" (Pet. App. 570a); (2) HUD "acted in a reasonable and responsive manner" in working out cooperation agreements with the Kansas City Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority and the City of Kansas City, Missouri, to stop discrimination, permit HUD to monitor housing referrals, and increase referrals of minorities to housing locations outside the inner city (*id.* at 573a); (3) "the location of the public housing was in accordance with the congressional acts and * * * HUD's monitoring of the program was neither arbitrary nor capricious and * * * the compliance agreement entered into between [the Housing Authority of Kansas City] and HUD was reasonable" (*id.* at 578a); (4) "HUD followed a balanced housing policy and attempted to insure that assisted housing located in the inner city area was balanced by assisted housing projects in the suburban areas (*ibid.*); and (5) "[t]here was no evidence in the case that the practices of HUD in site selection and approval

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[3] The court's conclusion that intradistrict segregation exists within the KCMSD was based on its findings that the State and the KCMSD had maintained a dual system within that school district prior to 1954, that "vestiges of the State's dual school system still linger[] in the KCMSD" (Pet. App. 605a), and that the State and the KCMSD had not fulfilled their "obligation to disestablish that system" (*id.* at 604a).

for federally subsidized multi-family housing had a substantial effect upon the racial makeup of schools within the KCMSD" (*id.* at 580a). The district court therefore held that HUD had no liability (*id.* at 616a).

b. An evenly divided court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the portion of the district court's judgment that dismissed all claims against HUD, noting that the petitioners did not "assert that the district court's underlying factual findings are clearly erroneous" (Pet. App. 111a).[4]

The court of appeals found that petitioners had presented no basis for concluding that the district court had erred as a matter of law in its judgment in favor of HUD (Pet. App. 114a), and accordingly, held that HUD had no liability. The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's denial of interdistrict relief as to all defendants and affirmed, as modified, the award of intradistrict relief against the KCMSD and the State of Missouri.

2. Neither petition raises a question challenging the findings and holdings of both lower courts that HUD has no liability in this case. Although the petition in No. 86-1717 makes several references to HUD,[5] it does not

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[4] In a separate opinion, Judge Arnold dissented only "from those portions of the lead opinion concerning suburban school district (SSD) participation in a remedy" (Pet. App. 141a); "[i]n all other respects," Judge Arnold "concur[red] in the judgment" (*ibid.*). That statement of his position would have made Judge Arnold an additional vote to affirm HUD's dismissal, resulting in a 5-3 vote in favor of affirmance of the dismissal of the claims against HUD. However, because Judge Arnold's opinion also expressed "concerns" over the trial court's analysis of the claims against HUD (*id.* at 163a n.10), the plurality opinion deemed the court to be evenly divided on the disposition of the claims against HUD (see *id.* at 8a-9a).

[5] Only the petitioners in No. 86-1717 raised in the court of appeals the district court's dismissal of HUD; petitioners in No. 85-1718 did not challenge below the dismissal of HUD and they do not do so in this Court.

With respect to the petition in No. 86-1717, it is clear that the first question presented—whether interdistrict relief was properly denied

challenge the factual findings, in which both courts below concurred, that support the dismissal of all claims against HUD. Nor, for that matter, does the petition in No. 86-1717 contend that HUD caused any illegal segregation that may presently exist in the local public schools.[6]

"on the ground that the State and not the surrounding school districts caused * * * segregation" (Pet. ii)—does not relate to HUD. The second question presented—whether interdistrict relief is warranted against "Missouri and the other defendants" that "intentionally segregated black and white children into separate school districts prior to 1954 and took no steps thereafter to remedy that interdistrict segregation" where there are alleged to be "continuing areawide effects of the defendants' post-1954 segregative conduct" (*id.* at ii-iii)—does not on its face appear to include HUD, which had no part in the pre-1954 intentional segregation in Missouri schools.

If petitioners did intend to embrace HUD within the scope of the phrase "other defendants," the second question still would not present an issue involving HUD that warrants this Court's review. As we discuss in the text, petitioners did not challenge in the court of appeals, and they do not challenge in this Court, the findings of fact that exonerate HUD; nor do petitioners challenge the judgments of both lower courts that hold HUD not to be liable.

[6] Petitioners' inability to establish in the district court that HUD's actions contributed to segregation in the schools in the Kansas City metropolitan area is fatal to any claim against HUD. Even petitioners' expert testified (Tr. 14,891-14,893) that by 1954 the KCMSD schools were bound on a course to become heavily black no matter what desegregation actions were taken. Moreover, HUD played no role in policies that were identified by the witnesses as contributing significantly to segregation of the Kansas City schools: KCMSD zone boundary changes that had the effect of perpetuating the prior system of de jure segregated schools (Tr. 6798-6799, 6869-6870); KCMSD's liberal transfer policy that permitted students to attend schools of their choice outside the attendance zone in which they lived (Tr. 3024-3028, 6604, 6973; 24 C.A. App. 7368); KCMSD's policy of opening newly constructed or annexed schools in the late 1950's and 1960's as either all-black or all-white schools (7 C.A. App. 1992-2020); curriculum changes at Paseo High School (Tr. 6654, 15,155); the urban

In addition, petitioners do not challenge the district court's finding, affirmed by the court of appeals, that "[t]here was no evidence in the case that the practices of HUD in site selection and approval for federallly subsidized multi-family housing had a substantial effect upon the racial makeup of schools within the KCMSD" (Pet. App. 580a). See *Goodman* v. *Lukens Steel Co.*, No 85-1626 (June 19, 1987), slip op. 8; *Graver Mfg. Co.* v. *Linde Co.*, 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949). At all events, the key factual findings in this case, on which both lower courts agreed, are well supported by the record. The HUD-assisted housing program at issue here did not even begin until 1969 and the overwhelming majority of HUD-assisted multifamily housing units within KCMSD were developed subsequent to 1970—after the KCMSD had already become a majority black school district (7 C.A. App. 2229). The small number of families using the mortgage assistance offered as part of that program belies the notion that HUD had a significant impact on the racial composition of the schools (Tr. 12,371, 12,062-12,063).[7]

3. As the dismissal of HUD from this case is a wholly factbound matter that petitioners do not challenge, HUD has no continuing role in this case. Indeed, HUD did not take a position in the lower courts on the questions that petitioners raise here, which focus on the court of appeals' reliance on *Milliken* v. *Bradley* in affirming the denial of interdistrict relief.[8] Although HUD's participa-

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riots of April 1968 (Tr. 6851, 6942); and increases in neighborhood crime (Tr. 6804, 6851, 6949, 12,119).

[7] Similarly, the total number of urban renewal relocations by the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority represented less than .2% of the overall turnovers in the Kansas City area between 1950 and 1980 (Tr. 20,368-20,369).

[8] The district court dismissed the claim against HUD in an order (Pet. App. 518a-617a) that was entirely separate from the opinion in which the court dealt with questions of interdistrict remedies against

tion in the case is unrelated to the issues raised in the petitions, those issues are of interest to the United States and we will therefore comment briefly on whether further review is warranted with respect to the lower courts' denial of interdistrict relief against other respondents in this case.

a. In our view, the record in this case presents no occasion for this Court to consider whether the court of appeals misconstrued *Milliken* v. *Bradley*. As a threshold matter, petitioners' effort to press their claim for interdistrict relief against the other respondents suffers from problems similar to those that beset petitioners' claims against HUD. In a case in which the lower courts' unchallenged findings show no interdistrict violation and no present significant interdistrict effects flowing from any intradistrict violation (see Pet. App. 65a-66a), the prospect of an interdistrict remedy simply does not arise.

Petitioners argue that *Milliken* v. *Bradley* does not require as a predicate to the imposition of an interdistrict desegregation remedy against a given school district that that school district be found to have committed an independent constitutional violation. Building on this premise, petitioners contend that they are entitled to interdistrict relief against the suburban school districts based on constitutional violations by the State. But even if all of petitioners' legal contentions were accepted, it would not change the judgment in this case. The court of appeals concluded, based on the district court's unchallenged factual findings, that the SSDs had not themselves committed constitutional violations (Pet. App. 63a); that "all SSDs met their obligation to operate a unitary school system within a maximum of four years after *Brown* [v. *Board of Education,* 347 U.S. 483 (1954)], most of them doing so within one year" (Pet. App. 47a-48a); and that the intra-

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the SSDs (*id.* at 274a-517a); it is the latter opinion that is targeted by the petitions for a writ of certiorari.

district violation by the State had no present effect in the SSDs, a conclusion based on "the district court's findings that within at most four years after *Brown I*, any vestiges of the dual school systems that may have existed in the SSDs [prior to 1954] had been eliminated" (*id.* at 54a; see *id.* at 66a).[9]

The court of appeals identified the feature of petitioners' theory that remains its fatal weakness in this Court, *viz.*, that "[t]he arguments of [petitioners in No. 86-1717] run contrary to the facts found by the district court" (Pet. App. 57a (footnote omitted)). Having concluded that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, the plurality of the court of appeals, relying on *Anderson* v. *City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 573-575 (1985), properly refused to "substitute its judgment for that of the district court" (Pet. App. 58a). See *City of Pleasant Grove* v. *United States*, No. 85-1244 (Jan. 21, 1987), slip op. 9-10; *Maine* v. *Taylor*, No. 85-62 (June 23, 1986), slip op. 13-15. Given the factual record on which the case comes before this Court, it is plain that the interdistrict remedial questions posed by petitioners would not be reached in disposing of this case. It is similarly clear that *Milliken* v. *Bradley* is controlling.

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[9] This latter point was reiterated in the district court's order of May 11, 1987, ruling on motions for awards of attorney's fees. In that order (at 13), the district court stated that "[i]t is undisputed that the [petitioners] failed in their attempt to prove an interdistrict liability against the State of Missouri."

Even though petitioners "presented no evidence that any of the SSDs acted to cause segregation" (Pet. App. 352a-353a), the district court considered and rejected (*id.* at 303a, 352a-371a) each of petitioners' theories for including the SSDs in an interdistrict remedy based on the "effects" of the State's intradistrict violation. The district court also rejected petitioners' contention that the SSDs could be included in an interdistrict remedy as "agents" of the State (*id.* at 284a); the court concluded (*id.* at 290a) in light of the history and practice of local control over schools in Missouri that "the SSDs are more autonomous than those discussed in *Milliken* and numerous other desegregation cases."

b. Petitioners' principal quarrel (see 86-1717 Pet. 11, 27-28) appears to be with the district court's statement (Pet. App. 285a) that "[t]he linchpin of an interdistrict case, as declared by the Supreme Court, is whether there has been a racially discriminatory act by each district that substantially caused segregation in another district." Petitioners seek to contrast that statement with this Court's statement in *Milliken* v. *Bradley*, 418 U.S. at 744-745, that, as a necessary predicate for setting aside the boundaries of "separate and autonomous school districts * * * it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation" (see 86-1717 Pet. 34-35).

Petitoners' emphasis on the particular formulation of the issue by the district court is of little consequence at this stage in the litigation. As the case comes to this Court, the immediate subject of scrutiny is not the opinion of the district court, but the judgment of the court of appeals. And the plurality opinion of the court of appeals employed a legal standard that was faithfully drawn from *Milliken* v. *Bradley*. In describing the standard for interdistrict relief, the court of appeals perceived that " 'it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation' " (Pet. App. 33a (quoting *Milliken* v. *Bradley*, 418 U.S. at 745)). Having articulated that unexceptionable legal standard, the court of appeals proceeded to apply that standard to the unchallenged facts found by the district court. At the completion of that process, the court of appeals concluded that there was ample basis to hold that this case fits comfortably within the facts of *Milliken* v. *Bradley* and does not vary from the facts of *Milliken* v. *Bradley* in the ways that petitioners suggest. See Pet. App. 65a-66a, 74a, 91a-93a.

The court of appeals' decision denying interdistrict relief was based on the district court's finding "that none of the alleged discriminatory actions committed by the State or the federal defendants had caused any significant current interdistrict segregation" (Pet. App. 13a-14a) and on "specific findings that negate the existence of significant interdistrict current effects in the SSDs" (*id.* at 74a (footnote omitted); see *id.* at 371a-493a (district court's individualized findings concerning each SSD)). The court of appeals concluded that the district court's findings "pose an insuperable barrier to granting interdistrict relief" (*id.* at 74a) and that "even accepting the * * * arguments [of petitioners in No. 86-1717] that the district court misread *Milliken* by improperly limiting its inquiry solely to whether the SSDs were guilty of committing constitutional violations, * * * the factual findings of the district court effectively foreclose findings of interdistrict effect in the SSDs flowing from constitutional violations with respect to housing that may have occurred in KCMSD" (*id.* at 90a-91a (footnote omitted)). It is these findings, rather than any legal conclusion reached below, that "foreclose[] efforts to require the SSDs to be subject to the claim for interdistrict relief" (*id.* at 91a-92a).

By focusing on a statement excerpted from the district court's extensive discussion without also challenging the findings of fact, petitioners are at bottom raising a debating point that can have no effect on the disposition of this case. In short, petitioners' effort runs counter to the well-established proposition that "[t]his Court 'reviews judgments, not statements in opinions' " (*California* v. *Rooney,* No. 85-1835 (June 23, 1987) (per curiam), slip op. 3 (quoting *Black* v. *Cutter Laboratories,* 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956)). Where, as in this case, the language petitioners target is not even in the opinion of the court of appeals, but in the opinion of the district court, the call for an exercise of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction is all the more attenuated.

4. This Court has instructed that federal courts are "required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.' " *Hills* v. *Gautreaux,* 425 U.S. 284, 293-294 (1976) (quoting *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* 418 U.S. at 744). Accord, *e.g., Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Mindful of the " 'fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts,' " this Court has stated that "[t]hose powers could be exercised only on the basis of a violation of the law and could extend no farther than required by the nature and extent of that violation" (*General Building Contractors Ass'n* v. *Pennsylvania,* 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982) (quoting *Hills* v. *Gautreaux,* 425 U.S. at 293)). See also *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977); *Village of Arlington Heights* v. *Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,* 429 U.S. 252, 264-271 (1977).

In contrast to these tenets, petitioners would ask this Court to address novel and complex issues of interdistrict remedies without due regard to the record. Under principles announced in 1974 in *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* the absence of any significant present segregative effects outside of the KCMSD precludes an interdistrict remedy in this case for the State's intradistrict constitutional violations. 418 U.S. at 744-745, 748; see *Hills* v. *Gautreaux,* 425 U.S. at 293-294. Further clarification of that point of law is unnecessary, as is any review of the court of appeals' application of the law to the unchallenged facts of this case. Since this case ultimately does not present a sound basis for considering questions of interdistrict remedies—the only questions petitioners would place before this Court—the infirmities in the petitions are best recognized at the present stage in the proceedings.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

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No. 86-1717

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

KALIMA JENKINS, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, *et al.*,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

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KALIMA JENKINS, et al.,

Petitioners,

-v-

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et. al.,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

All parties agree that cognizable constitutional violations producing a significant segregative effect in more than one district warrant interdistrict relief. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974). All parties agree as well that, while the facts determine whether "significant effects" exist, the law first must declare what and whose violations count in totaling those effects.

Respondents do not dispute that the courts of appeals are divided on that legal question. In the Third and Seventh Circuit, all consititutional violations count -- those by the State as well as the affected school districts; those by housing as well as school officials; and those that steer blacks and whites to opposite sides of preexisting lines as well as those that draw lines between them.[1] In the Fourth and Sixth Circuit, only violations by the surrounding school

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[1] Hoots v. Commonwealth, 672 F.2d 1107, 1121 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109-11, 1115 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 573 F.2d 400, 410 (7th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 339-40 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). See, e.g., SSD Brief, 24 (acknowledging that the Third and Seventh Circuits impose inter-district relief encompassing innocent school districts based on violations -- including "public housing" violations -- by the State).

districts count; violations by the State do not.[2]

Respondents acknowledge, moreover, that the four-judge plurality and the four dissenting judges below give conflicting answers to the question -- Which violations count? Judge Arnold and Chief Judge Lay for himself and Judges Heaney and McMillian conclude that the case should be decided under the Third and Seventh Circuits' rule "that a school district can be made to participate in an interdistrict remedy even if it is not 'personally' guilty of violating the Constitution, that such relief is appropriate where a State's constitutional violations have contributed to interdistrict segregation, . . . and

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[2]Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education, 745 F.2d 324, 328, 332 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984); Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982); Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972) (en banc), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).

that there is nothing unique or peculiar about housing agencies that would take them out of this rule."[3]

On the other hand, as the SSDs themselves point out, Judge Gibson's plurality opinion concludes that the Third and Seventh Circuit precedents "'have no applicability to the present case.'" SSDs Brief, 25 (quoting 99a, Opinion of Gibson, J.) (emphasis supplied by the SSDs). Instead, Judge Gibson derives his rule of decision from the Fourth Circuit view that "'[a]n independent school district which has not caused segregation in a neighboring independent district has no duty to rectify a racial imbalance in other districts,'" and the Sixth Circuit view "'declin[ing] to accept'" the "'argument

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[3] 149a-51a (Opinion of Arnold, J., dissenting) (citing Hoots, supra and Board of School Commissioners, supra). Accord, 190a-207a (Opinion of Lay, C.J.).

that a school board otherwise innocent of segregative intent is liable for the discriminatory housing practices of other governmental agencies.'"[4]

Without disputing that this legal question divides the Circuits, respondents argue that the petitions should be denied anyway because, they say, that legal question -- notwithstanding all the ink spilled on it below -- is not presented by this case. Instead, respondents argue, the case is controlled by a handful of one- or few- word quotations in the June 5, 1984 Opinion stating that some un-specified violations considered by the

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[4]62a-64a, 67a-68a (Opinion of Gibson, J., quoting Goldsboro, supra, 745 F.2d at 328; Bell, supra, 683 F.2d at 968). Even respondents cannot agree: The SSDs suggest that the only State violation that counts is "intentional illegal gerrymandering." SSD Brief, 24-25. The State calls the gerrymandering distinction "wholly imaginary." State's Brief, 18.

district court in that opinion had "de minimis" effects.

Respondents are wrong. They arrive at their conclusion only by assiduously obscuring how the district court, in making the June 5 "insignificant effects" findings, answered the question -- Effects of what? What violations count?

Because the district court answered that only the SSDs' vioations count and refused to consider the State's violations, the affirmance below inescapably rejects the Third and Seventh Circuit rule and adopts a conflicting view. For under the Third and Seventh Circuit rule that all the violations count, "insufficient effect" findings reached by summing less than all the violations cannot possibly resolve the case and instead require

reversal and a remand for consideration under a properly inclusive standard.[5]

There is no need to speculate about how the district court answered this critical question of law.

At trial, the district court stated:

> As I read Milliken and its progeny, the constitutional violation must have occurred in one of the suburban districts that had a segregative effect upon the Kansas City, Missouri School District. Now that's Milliken as I read it. And 80 percent of

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[5] E.g., United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (reversing and remanding because the district court's "insufficient evidence of intent" finding may have been influenced by the trial court's improperly parsimonious view of what counts as proof of intent); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547 (1961) ("[h]istorical facts 'found' in the perspective framed by an erroneous legal standard cannot plausibly be expected to furnish the basis for correct conclusions if and merely because a correct standard is later applied to them"); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394, 396-97, 402 (1948) (Rule 41(b) dismissal premised on district court's finding of "insufficient evidence" of conspiracy reversed because the district court's unduly narrow standard for measuring the "quantum of proof" of conspiracy excluded evidence that should have been considered). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 2782-83 (1986) (collecting cases).

> [plaintiffs'] proof in this case so far would not comport with Milliken. Now, if I'm reading Milliken wrong, then I'm reading it wrong.[6] (T.7342.)

Then, in its June 5 Opinion, rejecting "plaintiffs' 'effect' theory . . . that the SSDs may be included in an interdistrict remedy even absent any finding that they have committed specific constitutional violations," the court said again:

> These theories, when considered in light of the evidence and the prevailing legal standards, must be rejected.
>
> Because this is an interdistrict case, all the evidence comprising this voluminous record must be weighed by that standard. In-

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[6] And: "All I have to say, my interpretation of the Milliken case is if you're not claiming violations of constitutional rights by the suburban districts, its irrelevant." T.10,057. And: "You're misreading Milliken. The violation must be incurred by the district you're seeking to join in the remedy." T. 6767. And: "Absent conduct of these independent districts which was the violation of students' civil rights, absent that, there's absolutely no obligation on the part of these independent districts." T.4689.

> tradistrict cases are inapplicable. The linchpin of an interdistrict case, as declared by the Supreme Court, is whether there has been a racially discriminatory act by each defendant that substantially caused segregation in another district. (352a, 284a-85a.[7])

And again:

> The [Milliken] majority considered and rejected [plaintiffs'] position demanding instead that there be a violation, or cause, by each defendant district as well as an interdistrict effect.
>
> While it may be within the province of another Court to review and rewrite the standard, it is this Court's obligation and duty to apply the law, as presently composed, to the facts of this case. That application compels the Court to reject plaintiffs' theories and grant the suburban school district defendants' motions for judgement pursuant to Rule 41(b). (304a-05a.)

And again:

> One aspect of [plaintiffs'] theory, white flight, does not implicate any SSD and must be rejected. There is no evidence that any school official of the SSDs acted to lure white families or to discourage black families

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[7]Emphases in this and the following passages are supplied; citations and quotations are omitted.

> from moving into their districts . . . .
>
> The Court finds that Dr. Orfield's testimony concerning racial transition within the KCMSD has only intradistrict implications. There was nothing in Dr. Orfield's testimony that would constitute credible evidence that <u>any SSD</u> caused or contributed to cause white flight from the KCMSD.[8] (353a-54a.)

And again:

> Even accepting Dr. Kain's conclusion that the present segregation is due to discrimination, Dr. Kain offered no evidence or opinions tending to show that any actions or inactions <u>of</u>

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[8]Quoting only the words "intradistrict implications" from the last paragraph, the SSDs claim that the district court found no interdistrict effects from the "white flight" violation. SSDs Brief, 7. The SSDs omit the district court's very next sentence, however, which explains precisely <u>why</u> the court believed that violation had only "intradistrict implications." Because: "There was nothing in Dr. Orfield's testimony that would constitute credible evidence that <u>any SSD</u> caused or contributed to cause white flight from the KCMSD." When, however, the district court in its later opinions undertook to analyze the violations of <u>the State</u> and the effects of <u>those</u> violations, its opinions tell an entirely different story: "The Court has found that segregated schools, a constitutional violation, has led to white flight from the KCMSD to suburban districts . . . ." August 25, 1986, Opinion of the District Court, at 1-2.

> any SSD contributed in any significant way to causing the racial residential separation he described. The Court finds that none of the SSDs did or failed to do anything which had any significant effect on residential patterns in the Kansas City metropolitan area. His testimony, therefore, does not support plaintiffs' claims for relief against the SSDs. (356a.)

And again:

> Although the thrust of Mr. Rabin's testimony was that blacks have been confined within the KCMSD, absolutely no credible evidence pointed to actions by any of the SSDs causing this condition to exist. The Court finds that blacks are not constrained within the KCMSD by any actions of the SSDs.[9] (357a.)

And again, concluding the discussion of housing evidence:

> Based on the evidence presented, the Court is compelled to find that no SSD in any significant way influenced the housing pattern's in the Kansas City metropolitan area. And, as discussed supra, the Court rejects the plaintiffs' 'effects' theory that

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[9]The SSDs portray this passage as follows: "The district court added that 'blacks are not constrained within the KCMSD.'" SSDs Brief, 7. What the district court actually said is: "blacks are not constrained within the KCMSD by any action of the SSDs." 357a.

> liability may be placed upon the SSDs for being the recipients of people moving for whatever reason. Absent a nexus between conduct of the defendant SSDs and the housing actors, the Court will not find the SSDs liable for racial imbalance that may be attributed to policies or practices of the independent housing actors. Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982). (370a-71a.)

And yet again, explaining why the court was dismissing the SSDs without first adjudicating the liability of the State:

> Whether plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of liability against other actors in the housing market is irrelevant to the instant motions to dismiss filed by each SSD defendant. The nexus necessary must be between the conduct of the defendant school districts and actions of those responsible for shaping residential patterns. The absence of such a connection forbids a finding of liability against the SSDs to remedy any racial imbalance that may be attributed to to those housing market actors. Bell v. Board of Education, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982).[10] (508a-09a.)

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[10]Notwithstanding HUD's confusion, the second question presented in 86-1717 includes that agency among the actors whose segregative conduct the district court erroneously ruled "irrelevant" in the June Opinion. 508a-09a. See Petition in 86-

Accordingly, although the district court surely concluded in its June 5 opinion that "plaintiffs' evidence is only de minim[i]s and is therefore legally insufficient to justify the relief sought against the suburban school district defendants," that conclusion unrelentingly begs the question -- Evidence of what? What is de minimis? What effects are, as the district court was careful to say, "legally insufficient"?[11] And just as persistently, the district court answered that question:

> After hearing the presentation of plaintiff's evidence and before any defense, the Court dismissed the

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1717, at i-iii. The opinions of Judge Arnold and Chief Judge Lay elaborate how the district court's and plurality's controversial interpretation of Milliken, misinterpretation of Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), and related legal errors caused HUD's dismissal. 160a-65a & nn.9-10, 185a-90a, 214a-19a.

[11]The State misquotes this passage, leaving out, without elipses, the critical word "legally." State's Brief, 4.

> suburban school districts. Plaintiffs simply failed to show that those defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that substantially caused racial segregation in another district. See order filed June 5, 1984. (September 17, 1984 Decision, 520a-21a.)

Nor must this Court speculate about whether the State's admitted violations had interdistrict effects. For, in its September 1984 Opinion, after dismissing the SSDs and continuing the trial against the State,[12] the district court made extensive "interdistrict effect" findings against the State -- albeit solely in support of its allocation to the State rather than the Kansas City District of a

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[12]The State's case at trial following the SSDs' dismissal consisted principally of the testimony of three expert witnesses, each of whom devoted all his testimony to refuting the interdistrict claims against the State. T.18,505-19,834, 20,625-807, 21,982-22,110. The district court "rejected" all three experts' conclusions. 536a.

majority of the costs of the intradistrict remedy.[13]

Juxtaposed, then, to the "insignificant effect" findings in the June Opinion, in which only the SSDs' conduct was at issue, is an "equal and opposite" series of "substantial effect" findings in the September Decision in regard to the State's interdistrict violations. For example, discussing the city-

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[13] See July 6, 1987 Order, at 13 (adopting 207a-15a, Opinion of Lay, C.J.). Indicative of the interdistrict focus of the September Decision are: 522a-25a (reviewing claims that: "Missouri acted to perpetuate racial segregation by . . . supporting racially-identifiable interdistrict arrangements;" "the State's acts or omissions caused the surrounding districts to be predominantly white;" the State and HUD "provid[ed] funds and insurance to suburban areas where access to blacks was restricted"); 571a ("blacks were being located [by the State] primarily in the southeast part of Kansas City while whites were located throughout the Kansas City area"); 574a, 578a, 579a, 584a (State and federal housing activity in "Independence, Liberty and Lee's Summit," "the suburban areas," "the 11 suburban school districts," "predominantly white North Kansas City," and "outside the KCMSD"); and 595a (the State "perpetuat[ed] a dual housing market in the metropolitan Kansas City area").

wide effects of the State's pre-1954 interdistrict system of segregating schools, the district court found:

> Each school district in Missouri participated in this dual school system before it was declared unconstitutional in Brown I. Districts with an insufficient number of blacks to maintain the state-required separate school made interdistrict arrangements to educate those children. Undeniably, some blacks moved to districts, including the KCMSD, that provided black schools. (531a-32a.)

And:

> The Court finds the greatest influx of blacks came from southern and border states. . . . This in-migration coupled with a high birth rate resulted in the Kansas City black population doubling from 41,574 in 1940 to 83,740 in 1960.
>
> Before 1954, access to schools was one of many reasons some blacks chose to move to the KCMSD. Economics and job opportunities were also major factors in black migration. Often jobs would pull migrants to the city, and then availability of schools would influence, more specifically, what housing choice would be made within the city. (533a-34a.)

With regard to the State's housing violations, the district court found:

> In the past the State has taken positive actions which were discriminatory against blacks. [List of discriminatory actions omitted.] These actions had the effect of placing the State's imprimatur on racial discrimination. It created an atmosphere in which the private white individuals could justify their bias and prejudice against blacks. . . . This had and continues to have a significant effect on the dual housing market in the Kansas City area. (601a-02a.)

Consider, finally, the district court's combined assessment of the State's school and housing violations:

> The Court finds the dual housing market which still exists to a large degree today impacted blacks in the KCMSD and consequently caused the public schools to swell in black enrollment. The Court finds there is an inextricable connection between schools and housing. "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner city neighborhoods." (536a-37a, quoting Swann v. Char-

lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971)).

It is not true, then, as respondents imply, that the district court in its June Opinion answered an all-encompassing--"Were the effects enough?" -- with a comprehensive -- "No." Rather, rejecting plaintiffs' legal theory and the Third and Seventh Circuit precedents on which plaintiffs relied, the district court in June held as a matter of law that it would not consider the State's violations and would consider only the SSDs'. See 508a (effect of the State's violations "is irrelevant to the instant motions to dismiss filed by each SSD defendant").

Only, therefore, in September, with the SSDs out of the case, did the district court finally consider the effects of the State's violations -- concluding that they were "important," "significant," "city"-wide, "area"-wide, "large," "often," and

"continu[ing]." 531-34a, 536a-37a, 601a-02a. Persisting even in September, however, in the conclusion that "a federal court has no power to restructure the operation of local and state government entities absent a constitutional violation by those entities," the district court again denied interdistrict relief. 608a.

Had a district court in the Third or the Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion, the result undeniably would have been a reversal and remand. See authority cited supra notes 1, 5. Instead, the district court reached this conclusion in the Eighth Circuit; and instead of remanding, the Eighth Circuit affirmed--the four-person plurality holding "irrelevant" the Third and Seventh Circuit decisions and relying instead on the contrary Fourth and Sixth Circuit view.

The courts of appeals cannot agree on the meaning of this Court's decision in Milliken. As a result, federal courts in Delaware and Illinois are reorganizing and desegregating metropolitan-area school districts, while those in Missouri and North Carolina are not. These petitions present that conflict. The Court should grant certiorari to resolve it.[14]

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

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[14]Respondents do not dispute that the State's enactment of H.B. 171 in 1957 continues today to have the substantial interdistrict effect of keeping the 74 percent minority Kansas City District from automatically expanding to the 73 percent white boundaries of the City of Kansas City. All that respondents argue in regard to this "failure to dismantle" violation is that the courts below properly refused to consider it because it was not intentional. See State's Brief, 3; SSDs' Brief, 16-17. Having been rejected by the Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538-42 (1979), this conclusion of the courts below supplies a separate grounds for certiorari.

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